The Last Great Senate

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The Last Great Senate Page 52

by Ira Shapiro


  97 holding the new administration to high standards: William Safire, “Carter’s Broken Lance,” New York Times, July 21, 1977.

  97 the first post-Watergate scandal: “The Administration: The Sharpening Battle over Bert Lance,” Time, August 1, 1977, summarized the revelations.

  97 “neither a witch hunt nor a whitewash”: “The Big Showdown over Banker Bert,” Time, August 22, 1977.

  97 “You have been smeared”: Wendell Rawls Jr., “Senators Back Lance and Abandon Inquiry,” New York Times, July 26, 1977.

  97 Ribicoff regretted his earlier rush to judgment: Martin Tolchin, “Ribicoff Regrets his ‘Mistake’ in Backing Lance,” New York Times, September 7, 1977; Clayton Fritchey, “The Senators, the Media, and the Lance ‘Smears,’” Washington Post, September 10, 1977; Wegman interview.

  97 Carter’s response stunned the senators: Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 132; Wegman interview.

  98 “it would be wise for Bert Lance to resign”: David Broder and Edward Walsh, “Senators Tell Carter That Lance Should Resign,” Washington Post, September 6, 1977.

  98 “This guy is going to go, no question”: Martin Tolchin, “ Ribicoff Regrets His ‘Mistake’ in Backing Lance,” New York Times, September 7, 1977.

  98 Lance offered a full-throated defense: Robert G. Kaiser, “Lance Denies Banking Practices Were Unethical or Illegal,” Washington Post, September 16, 1977.

  98 Officials from the U.S. Attorney’s office: Robert G. Kaiser, “Lance Probe Figure Allegedly Didn’t Want to Make Waves,” Washington Post, September 15, 1977; Washington Post, September 6, 1977.

  99 “like the committee eating its young”: Interview with Richard Wegman, June 3, 2010.

  99 Jody Powell leaked a false story: Robert G. Kaiser, “New Hill Testimony Contradicts Lance,” Washington Post, September 14, 1977.

  99 He sought Byrd’s advice: James T. Wooten, “Carter Aides Say Lance’s Future Is Still Uncertain After Hearings,” New York Times, September 21, 1977.

  99 “no one could replace Bert Lance”: William Claiborne, “Lance Resigns; Carter Accepts Decision with ‘Regret and Sadness,’” Washington Post, September 22, 1977.

  99 the presumption of innocence had been eroded: Adam Clymer, “Reaction on Capitol Hill Ranges from ‘Lynching’ Charge to Relief,” New York Times, September 22, 1977.

  100 “It is impossible to overestimate the damage”: Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 127.

  CHAPTER 6: THE LIBERAL FILIBUSTER

  104 artificial price ceilings had created a distorted “dual market”: Richard L. Lyons, “Senate Leaders Move to Break Impasse on Natural Gas Pricing,” Washington Post, September 24, 1977.

  104 Byrd called up the energy legislation: Ibid.

  105 liberals did not filibuster: Sarah A. Treul, “Walter F. Mondale and the Filibuster: The Evolution of Agenda Control in the U.S. Senate,” delivered at the Hubert H. Humphrey Institute, May 2, 2007.

  105 Byrd, Baker, and Jackson responded: George Larder Jr. and J. P. Smith, “Of Cots and Roll Calls,” Washington Post, September 29, 1977.

  106 Speaking at a rally in Virginia: Bill McAllister, “President Says He Would Veto a Bill to Deregulate Natural Gas,” Washington Post, September 25, 1977.

  106 after the Senate voted to invoke cloture: Richard L. Lyons, “The Case of the Senate’s Backward Filibuster,” Washington Post, September 28, 1977.

  107 humorous, painfully exhausting, and borderline surreal: Larder and Smith, “Of Cots and Roll Calls.”

  107 Dale Bumpers sharply criticized Byrd’s failure: Ibid.

  107 September 28 saw that type of movement: Richard L. Lyons, “Senate Sleeps on It,” Washington Post, September 29, 1977.

  108 That position enraged Long: George Lardner Jr. and Richard L. Lyons, “Senate Leaders Fail to Unblock Gas Bill Tieup,” Washington Post, September 30, 1977.

  108 Jimmy Carter noted in his diary: Jimmy Carter, White House Diary (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010), p. 110.

  108 On September 30, in a critical test vote: Richard L. Lyons, “Senators Refuse to Set Aside Gas Deregulation Plan,” Washington Post, October 1, 1977.

  109 Byrd decided that the filibuster had to end: Richard L. Lyons, “Mondale Helps Break Gas Pricing Filibuster,” Washington Post, October 4, 1977.

  109 an avowed enemy of the filibuster: Mondale, Good Fight, pp. 114–134.

  109 Mondale had been chosen by Carter: Ibid., pp. 161–164; Carter, Keeping Faith, pp. 36–37.

  109 Carter accepted Mondale’s vision: Mondale, Good Fight, pp. 171–172; Carter, Keeping Faith, pp. 39–40.

  110 “living in Holiday Inns”: Gillon, Democrats’ Dilemma, p. 152; Mondale, Good Fight, p. 157.

  110 grave and growing doubts about the Vietnam War: Mondale, Good Fight, pp. 77–82; Gillon, Democrats’ Dilemma, pp. 122–125.

  110 spearheaded the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1968: Mondale, Good Fight, pp. 55–68; Gillon, Democrats’ Dilemma, pp. 107–111.

  110 worked with Robert Kennedy and Cesar Chavez: Mondale, Good Fight, pp. 52, 93.

  110 powerful role on the Church Committee: Johnson, Season of Inquiry, pp. 105, 124, 153, 156, 229–230; Gillon, Democrats’ Dilemma, pp. 160–162; Mondale, Good Fight, pp. 135–153.

  111 natural liaison with the Senate: Gillon, Democrats’ Dilemma, pp. 190–192; Mondale, Good Fight, pp. 185–189.

  111 frequently raised concerns with Carter: Mondale, Good Fight, pp. 178–188, 234–237.

  111 “Nah, he wouldn’t do that”: “The Nation: Night of the Long Winds,” Time, October 10, 1977.

  111 Byrd moved in for the kill: Lyons, “Mondale Helps Break Gas Pricing Filibuster.”

  111 the Senate turned to bedlam: George Lardner Jr., “Bitterness and Resentment,” Washington Post, October 5, 1977.

  112 flushed with anger at the criticism: Richard L. Lyons, “Senate Votes to Decontrol Natural Gas Prices,” Washington Post, October 5, 1977.

  112 They lost heart and ended their effort: “The Nation: Night of the Long Winds,” Time, October 10, 1977.

  112 “The Senate is very much like a violin”: “Night of the Long Winds.”

  112 Byrd and Mondale “had used the wrong tactics”: Carter, White House Diary, p. 116.

  113 Carter put his prestige on the line: Time, October 31, 1977.

  114 New Year’s Eve found him in Tehran: Carter, White House Diary, p. 156.

  114 offered a withering indictment: David Broder, “The Senate Has No Excuse,” Washington Post, December 18, 1977.

  CHAPTER 7: A YEAR OF LIVING DANGEROUSLY

  117 While battling the disease: Solberg, Hubert Humphrey, pp. 447–456.

  117 spoke memorable words: Ibid., p. 456.

  118 The Washington Post had asked a thousand people: Ibid. p. 456.

  118 As political scientist Nelson Polsby observed: Ibid., p. 458, quoting Polsby.

  118 Humphrey might advise new senators: Ibid., p. 461.

  118 “Can you believe that Minnesota would send such a fool?”: Ibid., p. 136; Caro, Lyndon Johnson: Master of the Senate, p. 448.

  118 served as Lyndon Johnson’s bridge to the liberals: Solberg, Hubert Humphrey, pp. 161–164, 176–180; Mann, Walls of Jericho, pp. 117–120, 141–148; Caro, Lyndon Johnson: Master of the Senate, pp. 454–462.

  118 one of the most attractive personalities: Gilbert C. Fite, Richard Russell, Jr., Senator from Georgia (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), p. 420; Mann, Walls of Jericho, pp. 144–145; Caro, Lyndon Johnson: Master of the Senate, pp. 460–461.

  118 “I knew every senator”: Solberg, Hubert Humphrey, p. 461.

  118 a movie star—for Nineteenth Century Fox: Tower, Consequences, p. 128.

  119 he would have to be a loyal soldier: Solberg, Hubert Humphrey, pp. 255–256.

  119 Johnson promptly froze Humphrey out: Ibid., pp. 272–278.

  120 McClellan would meet Joe Biden: Joe Biden, Promises to Keep: On Life and Politics (New York: Random House, 2007), p. 87.
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br />   120 a prodigious worker in what he called the “legislative kitchen”: Shelby Scates, Warren G. Magnuson and the Shaping of Twentieth Century America (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), p. 203, 227–238; Eric Redman, The Dance of Legislation (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973), p. 189–197.

  120 the nation’s growing commitment to protect consumers: Scates, Warren G. Magnuson, pp. 212–216.

  120 had become a legendary combination: Ibid., pp. 217–218; Michael Pertschuk, Revolt Against Regulation, pp. 24–28.

  121 asked Church to take the lead on the treaties: Ashby and Gramer, Fighting the Odds, p. 541.

  121 His staff implored him to let this dubious honor pass: Ibid.

  121 Church had spoken for twenty years: Ibid., pp. 536–539.

  121 helped smooth passage of the 1957 Voting Rights Act: Ibid., pp. 82–95.

  122 Johnson gave Church a coveted seat: Ibid., p. 96.

  122 Church made the keynote: Ibid., pp. 129–132.

  122 came away deeply opposed to the imperialism: Ibid., pp. 19–26.

  122 in a December 1964 magazine interview: Ibid., pp. 190–191.

  122 Church’s article: Frank Church, “We Are in Too Deep in Africa and Asia,” New York Times Magazine, February 14, 1965, quoted in Ashby and Gramer, Fighting the Odds, p. 192.

  122 “plunged into these former colonial regions”: Ibid., p. 193.

  122 traveling with Johnson on Air Force One: Ibid., p. 207.

  122 deepened his critique of the war: Ibid., pp. 216–217.

  122 “the most un-revolutionary nation on earth”: Ibid., p. 216.

  122 Church went to the Senate floor: Ibid., pp. 254–256.

  123 with Republican John Sherman Cooper: Ibid., pp. 293, 299–305.

  123 The investigation was spurred by accusations: Ibid., pp. 416–433.

  123 had always distrusted big corporations: Ibid., pp. 422–423.

  123 ridiculed the argument that Allende’s election: Ibid., p. 430.

  123 tackled an even more explosive issue: Ibid., pp. 436–443.

  124 made public thousands of previously classified documents: Ibid., pp. 435–436, 441.

  124 plunged into an investigation of bribes: Ibid., pp. 455–462.

  124 “Lockheedo,” as the Japanese press referred to the scandal: Ibid., p. 464.

  124 articles by New York Times reporter Seymour M. Hersh: Ibid., pp. 470–471.

  124 The Senate created a Select Committee on Intelligence Activities: Ibid., p. 471.

  125 Mansfield had long been concerned: Johnson, Season of Inquiry, p. 10; Valeo, Mike Mansfield, Majority Leader, pp. 267–268.

  125 When Phil Hart turned down: Ashby and Gramer, Fighting the Odds, p. 472; Loch Johnson, Season of Inquiry, pp. 13–15.

  125 a fundamental divide on the committee: Loch Johnson, Season of Inquiry, pp. 57, 70, 96, 132, 145, 174, 236, 248, 271; Ashby and Gramer, Fighting the Odds, pp. 473–474.

  125 the committee held 21 public hearings: Ashby and Gramer, Fighting the Odds, p. 478.

  125 The committee issued an extensive report: Ibid., pp. 474, 478.

  125 The committee also revealed: Ibid., p. 478.

  125 a springboard to a presidential run: Ibid., pp. 485–487.

  125 vowed to Mansfield that he would finish: Ibid., p. 486.

  126 He compared himself to an evangelist: Ibid., p. 477.

  126 told Carter that Ted Kennedy was going to run for president: Carter, White House Diary, p. 167.

  127 armed with a self-deprecating sense of humor: Edward M. Kennedy, True Compass (New York: Twelve, 2009), p. 186; Clymer, Edward M. Kennedy, pp. 38–40. Of the several biographies written about Senator Kennedy, I rely principally on Clymer’s, as well as Kennedy’s memoir.

  127 he gravitated to experienced senators: Clymer, Edward M. Kennedy, pp. 43–47.

  127 the “lion cub of the Senate”: Adam Clymer, “The Lion Cub of the Senate,” New York Times, August 26, 2009.

  128 Long was a wily and gifted legislator: Clymer, Edward M. Kennedy, p. 131.

  128 see him as the Democratic frontrunner: Ibid., pp. 135–136, is one of many sources on this point.

  128 declined to take the leadership role: Ibid., pp. 161–163; Kennedy, True Compass , pp. 316–320.

  128 connecting the strands of fund-raising abuses: Clymer, Edward M. Kennedy, pp. 192–194.

  129 Richardson agreed to Kennedy’s insistence: Kennedy, True Compass, pp. 334–335; Clymer, Edward M. Kennedy, pp. 200–201.

  129 Kennedy running ahead of the new president: Kennedy, True Compass, pp. 343–344; Clymer, Edward M. Kennedy, pp. 209–210.

  129 an excellent and aggressive staff: Clymer, Edward M. Kennedy, pp. 154–166, 192–194, 240–241; Kennedy, True Compass, pp. 318–327.

  129 Breyer cited the Civil Aeronautics Board: Clymer, Edward M. Kennedy, pp. 227–228.

  129 shocking his faculty colleagues: Interview with Justice Stephen Breyer, January 13, 2009.

  130 endlessly fascinating opportunity to shape public policy: Justice Breyer interview.

  130 in “the dance of legislation”: Redman, Dance of Legislation.

  130 Like many committee staffers before him: This discussion of the power of committee staff reflects my personal experience and observations, but also several principal books including; Clymer, Edward M. Kennedy; Redman, Dance of Legislation; Pertschuk, Revolt Against Regulation; Asbell, Senate Nobody Knows; Malbin, Unelected Representatives.

  131 Senate consideration of a federal criminal code: Interview with Ken Feinberg, July 11, 2011.

  131 “I’m not sure what my views are on criminal justice”: Clymer, Edward M. Kennedy, pp. 240–241; Malbin, Unelected Representatives, p. 39.

  131 Kennedy plainly sought to bridge the chasm: Clymer, Edward M. Kennedy, p. 241.

  131 Feinberg went to work on the herculean task: Ibid., p. 241.

  131 The American Civil Liberties Union wrote to Kennedy: Ibid., pp. 241, 257.

  132 Kennedy had sharply criticized him: Ibid., p. 256.

  132 Carter’s determination to proceed piece by piece: Ibid., p. 256; Carter, Keeping Faith, pp. 85–87.

  CHAPTER 8: THE PANAMA CANAL FIGHT

  135 the ten-mile wide, American-controlled Canal Zone: William J. Jorden, Panama Odyssey (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984), pp. 21–65; Clymer, Drawing the Line, pp. 1–9.

  135 sympathized with the Panamanian position: Jorden, Panama Odyssey, pp. 30–31.

  136 Mansfield spoke for many: Ibid., pp. 74–75.

  136 Johnson committed to negotiating a new treaty: Ibid., pp. 82–87, 110–118.

  136 Nixon largely ignored Panama: Ibid., p. 147.

  137 Senate conservatives soon shot back: Ibid., pp. 241, 244, 283.

  137 reassured the country’s leader: Ibid., pp. 293–294.

  137 trailing badly until he began attacking: Clymer, Drawing the Line, pp. 27–32.

  137 “Sally Jones sitting at home”: Ibid., p. 30.

  137 his foremost Latin American expert: Clymer, Drawing the Line, pp. 43–44.

  138 Kissinger briefed Carter: Ibid., p. 43.

  138 the cornerstone of a new relationship with Latin America: Ibid., p. 44; Jorden, Panama Odyssey, pp. 341–342; Carter, Keeping Faith, pp. 152–155, 184; Glad, Outsider in the White House, pp. 88–89.

  138 constitutional responsibility is to advise and consent: Article II, section 2 of the Constitution states that the president “shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur.”

  138 reflected on bitter experience: Gould, Most Exclusive Club, p. 13.

  138 It was the Senate that ultimately shattered: Ibid., pp. 73–90.

  138 Americans trusted Kennedy’s leadership: Hulsey, Everett Dirksen and His Presidents, pp. 177–180.

  139 Byrd was ambivalent about the treaties: Byrd, Senate Addresses, Vol. 2, p. 575; Jorden, Panama Odyssey, p. 494.

  139 at least half a doz
en seminars: Ibid., p. 481.

  139 Byrd attended several sessions: Ibid., p. 481.

  139 “had an uphill road to travel”: Ibid., p. 481.

  139 Hollings approached the problem with an open mind: Hollings and Victor, Making Government Work, pp. 183–184.

  140 sent a newsletter to South Carolina: Ibid.

  140 an outrageous breach of diplomatic protocol: Jorden, Panama Odyssey, pp. 463–464.

  140 testimony from seventy-nine witnesses: Ibid., p. 468.

  140 Statements by Panama’s chief negotiator: Ibid. pp. 476–477.

  140 U.S. Ambassador to Panama William Jorden: Ibid. pp. 473–475.

  140 “intervention” in Panama: Ibid., p. 474.

  141 General Brown had been working on the treaty: Ibid., pp. 471–473.

  141 would not be able to deliver many Republican votes: Ibid., pp. 494–495; Annis, Howard Baker, p. 131.

  141 gaining the Republican presidential nomination: Annis, Howard Baker, pp. 129–131.

  141 “lends a chilling quality”: Clymer, Drawing the Line, p. 78.

  141 Baker would remember his reaction: Interview with Senator Howard Baker, October 22, 2008.

  141 “Why now, and why me?”: Clymer, Drawing the Line, p. 75.

  141 Baker was especially troubled: Ibid., pp. 78–79.

  142 He invited General Torrijos to Washington: Jorden, Panama Odyssey, pp. 355–385.

  142 Baker and Byrd both applauded the Carter-Torrijos statement: Ibid., pp. 479, 492.

  142 two of Baker’s most senior advisers: Ibid., p. 482.

  142 Byrd gave the group a thoughtful description: Ibid., p. 483.

  142 take the measure of General Torrijos: Ibid., p. 483.

  142 among Panamanians, Torrijos was a hero: Ibid., pp. 483–485.

  142 Torrijos impressed the senators: Ibid., pp. 484–486.

  143 Torrijos walked through the dusty town: Ibid., p. 484.

  143 this delegation was the toughest: Ibid., pp. 485–486.

  143 “ugly American” occurred to Ambassador Jorden: Ibid., p. 485.

  143 one senator told a CBS news reporter: Ibid., p. 486.

 

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