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The Last Great Senate

Page 55

by Ira Shapiro

251 Danforth could no longer abide the amount of abuse: Ibid.

  251 On September 25, Senate Finance voted 13–0: Art Pine, “Senate Panel Strips All New Oil Finds from Windfall Bill,” Washington Post, September 26, 1979.

  251 The next day, the Finance Committee had made more cuts: Art Pine, “Panel Votes away More Money Than Oil Tax Would Raise,” Washington Post, September 27, 1979.

  252 “They just chug-a-lugged it all”: Ibid.

  252 The chairman told the committee: “Issue of Fuel Aid for Poor Splits Senate Finance Panel,” Associated Press, September 29, 1979.

  252 Hart’s subcommittee issued its report: “Synthetic Fuels Not Likely to Become Alternative to Foreign Oil, Congressional Report Holds,” Associated Press, September 29, 1979.

  252 October 3, Long put forth a compromise: Art Pine, “Long Proposes a Compromise on Oil Windfall Profits Tax,” Washington Post, October 4, 1979.

  253 The Finance Committee bill would capture: Art Pine, “Oil Windfall Tax Whittle to 29% in Senate Version,” Washington Post, October 9, 1979.

  253 On October 2, legislation to create: Mary Russell, “Lines Are Drawn in Senate on Bill for Energy Board,” Washington Post, October 3, 1979.

  253 Muskie, with his customary passion: Ibid.

  253 the Senate rejected the Muskie-Ribicoff substitute: Mary Russell, “Senate Gives White House Energy Package Victory,” Washington Post, October 4, 1979.

  254 the EMB legislation passed the Senate on October 4: Mary Russell, “Senate Votes ‘Fast Track’ Energy Unit,” Washington Post, October 5, 1979.

  254 Senate Appropriations Committee approved $20 billion: Mary Russell, “Senate Unit, in Shift, Backs Synfuel Fund,” Washington Post, October 11, 1979.

  254 the Committee decided to scale back the tax credit package: Art Pine, “Senate Panel Shifts on Insulation Tax Credits,” Washington Post, October 18, 1979.

  254 CBS televised an interview of Kennedy done by Roger Mudd: Clymer, Edward M. Kennedy, pp. 285–287.

  254 O’Neill had warned Kennedy in September: Ibid., p. 285.

  255 Some of his closest friends wondered: Ibid., p. 287.

  255 “What are you guys going to advise me to do”: Mark Bowden, Guests of the Ayatollah (New York: Grove, 2006), p. 19.

  255 students stormed the lightly-guarded U.S. embassy: Glad, Outsider in the White House, p. 176.

  255 The original idea, according to the leader of the students: David Harris, The Crisis: The President, the Prophet and the Shah—1979 and the Coming of Militant Islam (New York: Little, Brown, 2004), p. 200.

  255 Speaking to a conference of northeastern state officials: “Business: Crude Assaults,” Time, November 12, 1979.

  256 Kennedy was attacking him: Martin Schram, “Kennedy Attacks President’s Policy on Oil Price Controls,” Washington Post, November 4, 1979.

  256 Jackson and the Energy Committee pushed: Mary Russell, “Senate Begins Fight on Rival Energy Bills,” Washington Post, November 6, 1979.

  256 The Senate rejected the Proxmires version, 57–37: Mary Russell, “Senate Begins Fight on Rival Energy Bills,” Washington Post, November 9, 1979.

  256 On November 7, a Washington Post article: Mary Russell, “Senate Wages Energy War with Popgun Legislation,” Washington Post, November 7, 1979.

  257 finally began floor debate on the windfall profits tax: Helen Dewar, “Oil-State Senators Lose Surprise Attempt to Cut Tax on Windfall Profits,” Washington Post, November 17, 1979.

  257 Bumpers introduced an amendment: Helen Dewar,“Senate Votes to Repeal Controversial Rule Raising Tax on Inherited Property,” Washington Post, November 20, 1979.

  257 the Senate voted, 53–41, to exempt most independent producers: Helen Dewar, “Windfall-Tax Break for Independent Oil Approved by Senate,” Washington Post, November 28, 1979.

  258 Byrd said he favored raising the windfall profits tax: Spencer Rich, “Byrd Sees a Compromise Hiking Tax on Oil Profits,” Washington Post, December 2, 1979.

  258 the Senate voted 58–35 for a Bradley-Chafee amendment: Helen Dewar, “Senate Votes to Increase Oil ‘Windfall Profits’ Tax,” Washington Post, December 5, 1979.

  258 On December 5, the Republicans offered a plan: Helen Dewar, “Senate GOP Narrowly Beaten in Effort to Force Tax Cuts,” Washington Post, December 6, 1979.

  258 a compromise that would allow the windfall profits tax to pass: Helen Dewar, “Sen. Long: ‘If Missouri Succeeds in Taxing Louisiana, I’ll Get Back at Missouri,’” Washington Post, December 9, 1979.

  259 as Danforth would write almost thirty years later: Danforth, Faith and Politics , pp. 24–26.

  259 On December 12, the Senate plunged into a filibuster: Helen Dewar, “Filibuster Stalls Senate Attempts to Toughen Tax on Oil Profits,” Washington Post, December 13, 1979.

  259 “In about 15 years, I think you’ll be a great senator”: Danforth, Faith and Politics, p. 25; interview with Senator Danforth, March 30, 2010.

  259 On December 14, the Senate ended a three day filibuster: Helen Dewar,“Senate Ends Filibuster on Oil Tax with $178 Billion Compromise,” Washington Post, December 15, 1979.

  260 Years later, the humiliating defeat stayed with him: Interview with Senator Danforth, March 30, 2010.

  260 On December 17, the Senate gave final approval: Helen Dewar, “Senate Votes $178 Billion Oil Tax Bill,” Washington Post, December 18, 1979.

  260 Three days later, the House and Senate split the difference: Helen Dewar, “Tax on Oil Profits Set at $227.3 Billion,” Washington Post, December 21, 1979.

  260 Jimmy Carter would later write: Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 123.

  261 The resulting legislation succeeded in reducing oil imports: Carter, White House Diary, p. 490.

  261 Assessing Carter’s quest for a national energy policy: John C. Barrow, “An Age of Limits: Jimmy Carter and the Quest for a National Energy Policy,” in Fink and Graham, eds., Carter Presidency, p. 172.

  262 “The bipartisanship that I enjoyed”: Carter, White House Diary, p. 530.

  CHAPTER 15: FIGHTING THE ECONOMIC TIDE

  263 On a trip to Europe, Ribicoff found “geo-politics”: Ribicoff, America Can Make It!, p. 225.

  264 He called on the U.S. government to concentrate its efforts: Ibid., p. 226.

  264 the creation of a new permanent board: Ibid., p. 216.

  265 Jimmy Carter had come to office an avowed free trader: Judith Stein, “The Locomotive Loses Power: The Trade and Industrial Policies of Jimmy Carter,” in Fink and Graham, eds., Carter Presidency, pp. 74–75.

  265 the American steel industry was facing an acute crisis: Ibid., pp. 76–82.

  265 completion of the multilateral Tokyo Round: Carter, White House Diary, pp. 313–314.

  266 The Senate passed the Trade Amendments Act: Ibid., p. 347.

  266 they discovered that 28,000 patents: Interview with Senator Birch Bayh, March 18, 2010.

  266 Gaylord Nelson meanwhile used his chairmanship: Interview with William Cherkasky, December 3, 2010.

  267 Chrysler Corporation announced it was closing: Robert B. Reich and John D. Donahue, New Deals: The Chrysler Revival and the American System (New York: Penguin Books, 1985), p. 94.

  268 He was customarily a whirling dervish of activity: many of the observations about Eagleton come from having worked closely with him for nearly seven years.

  268 He was known for his sense of humor and comic timing: Interview with Ed Quick, May 21, 2010.

  269 advocates of reasserting Congress’s power to declare war: Thomas F. Eagleton, War and Presidential Power: A Chronicle of Congressional Surrender (New York: Liveright, 1974).

  269 He had helped Muskie and Howard Baker: Interview with Leon Billings, February 19, 2010.

  270 Chrysler, the smallest of the companies: Ibid., pp. 27–29.

  270 The company seemed snake bit: Charles K. Hyde, Riding the Roller Coaster: A History of the Chrysler Corporation (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2003), p. 224; Reich and Donohue, New Deals, pp. 27
–46.

  270 Riccardo asked Eizenstat for temporary relief: Reich and Donohue, New Deals, p. 88.

  270 By the end of June, Riccardo returned to the White House: “Business: Chrysler Drives for a Tax Break,” Time, July 16, 1979.

  271 Miller advised President Carter that Chrysler: Helen Dewar and Art Pine, “White House, Hill React Cautiously to Chrysler SOS,” Washington Post, August 2, 1979.

  271 The president agreed: “you’re absolutely right”: Reich and Donohue, New Deals, p. 105.

  271 “Miller just blew us out of the water”: Ibid.

  272 Russell Long, however, said that it was too early: Dewar and Pine, “White House, Hill React Cautiously.”

  272 It was not difficult to envision the UAW: Reich and Donohue, New Deals, pp. 124, 130–131.

  272 “I just don’t like you” were Ford’s last words: “Business: Upheaval in the House of Ford,” Time, July 24, 1978.

  272 Iaccoca met with Treasury Secretary Miller on September 7: Douglas Williams, “Chrysler Wants $1.2 Billion in Aid,” Washington Post, September 13, 1979.

  272 Chrysler reported a staggering $460 million loss: William H. Jones, “Chrysler’s Loss Business History’s Biggest,” Washington Post, October 31, 1979.

  273 Carter administration had decided to provide $1.5 billion: Helen Dewar, “Chrysler Rescue Plan of $3 Billion Proposed,” Washington Post, November 2, 1979.

  273 the union announced that it would make concessions: Helen Dewar, “UAW Pledges Concessions If Chrysler Gets U.S. Aid,” Washington Post, October 20, 1979.

  274 Proxmire gaveled the Banking Committee hearing to order: “Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 1979,” Hearings Before the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, Part I. November 14 and 15, 1979.

  274 “We let 7,000 companies fail last year; we didn’t bail them out”: Statement of Chairman Proxmire, Banking Committee Hearings, p. 2.

  274 Garn, the ranking member, further proved Proxmire’s point: Statement of Senator Jake Garn, Banking Committee Hearings, pp. 3–4.

  274 Heinz, bearer of one of the most famous corporate names: Statement of Senator John Heinz, Banking Committee Hearings, pp. 66–68.

  274 Weicker had earned a reputation: Statement of Senator Lowell Weicker, Banking Committee Hearings, pp. 77–79.

  275 The task of making the case for helping Chrysler: Statement of Senator Don Riegle, Banking Committee Hearings, pp. 69–74.

  275 “The United States has not thought to develop”: Ibid., p. 69.

  276 Eagleton honed in on the critics’ concern about the precedent: Statement of Senator Tom Eagleton, Banking Committee Hearings, p. 81.

  276 Chrysler’s employees should receive a substantial part: Statement of Senator Robert Byrd, Banking Committee Hearings, p. 89.

  277 the more liberal House Banking Committee approved: William H. Jones, “Panel Approves Chrysler Aid,” Washington Post, November 16, 1979.

  277 broke with the UAW’s long tradition of “pattern bargaining”: William H. Jones, “Chrysler Workers Ratify UAW Pact,” Washington Post, November 17, 1979.

  277 testifying himself on November 19, Doug Fraser told the press: W. Dale Nelson, “Fraser’s Optimism Decreases,” Washington Post, November 20, 1979.

  277 On November 20, Nader testified in vehement opposition: Statement of Ralph Nader, Banking Committee Hearings, pp. 1198–1277.

  278 The exchange became unexpectedly infused with emotion: William J. Mitchell, “Nader, Garn Clash Bitterly,” Knight-Ridder, November 21, 1979.

  278 Citicorp Chairman Walter Wriston testified against the bailout: William H. Jones, “Wriston Opposes Chrysler Aid,” Washington Post, November 22, 1979.

  279 He predicted that despite his opposition: Ibid.

  279 He proposed a “pure” $4 billion bailout: William H. Jones, “Compromise Chrysler Aid Plan Pushed,” Washington Post, November 28, 1979.

  280 the Senate Banking Committee, by an emphatic 10–5 vote: William H. Jones, “Panel Votes Chrysler Aid with Wage Roll-Back Plan,” Washington Post, November 30, 1979.

  280 “Shared sacrifice” had become the watchword of the day: William H. Jones, “Misery for Many in Senate’s Chrysler Bailout Bill,” Washington Post, December 1, 1979.

  280 Howard Paster, who had worked for Birch Bayh: Ibid.

  280 Doug Fraser termed the three-year pay freeze “unacceptable”: William H. Jones, “3-Year Chrysler Pay Freeze Unacceptable, UAW Chief Says,” Washington Post, December 5, 1979.

  281 On December 14, Mondale, speaking for Carter: Art Pine, “Aid Needed for Chrysler in January,” Washington Post, November 15, 1979.

  281 Lugar said that he might bend on the wage freeze: Merrill Brown, “New Bailout for Chrysler Opposed,” Washington Post, December 12, 1979.

  281 “the brain drain argument is specious”: Congressional Record—Senate, December 19, 1979, p. 36999.

  281 the Eagleton-Roth-Biden amendment passed the Senate: Reich and Donohue, New Deals, p. 155.

  281 Weicker punctured the celebratory atmosphere: Congressional Record—Senate , December 19, 1979, pp. 37048–37050; Reich and Donohue, New Deals, p. 155.

  282 Byrd summoned the key senators into his office again: “Nation: Santa Calls on Chrysler,” Time, December 31, 1979.

  282 Levin and Riegle went to Gerald Greenwald: Reich and Donohue, New Deals, p. 157.

  282 Byrd went the extra mile: Interview with Mary Jane Checchi, May 13, 2010.

  282 “probably the biggest mistake Congress has made in its history”: Reich and Donohue, New Deals, p. 156.

  283 In conference, the Senate and House split the difference: Art Pine, “Union Has to Forgo $462 Million of Raise,” Washington Post, December 21, 1979.

  283 Tsongas declared that “he did not want to do to Detroit”: “Nation: Santa Calls on Chrysler.”

  284 the UAW would be supporting Ted Kennedy: Interview with Jim Blanchard, June 9, 2010.

  CHAPTER 16: SALT II: DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS

  285 the relationship between the superpowers was deteriorating: Glad, Outsider in the White House, pp. 69–79.

  286 Brezhnev was very emotional about the deterioration: Ibid., p. 56.

  286 authorized Cyrus Vance to explore a summit meeting: Ibid., p. 59.

  286 decision to recognize the People’s Republic of China: Ibid., p. 61.

  286 they met more than twenty-five times: Ibid., p. 64.

  287 Carter and Brezhnev signed the SALT II treaty: Don Oberdorfer, “U.S., Soviets Reach SALT Agreement,” Washington Post, May 10, 1979.

  287 was a far cry from the ambitious arms reduction agreement: Glad, Outsider in the White House, pp. 67–68.

  288 Carter had been shocked in January in a meeting with senators: Carter, White House Diary, pp. 281–282.

  288 Treaty opponents, led by Scoop Jackson: “Special Report: To Educate Their Senators,” Time, May 21, 1979.

  288 His speech received a lukewarm response: Glad, Outsider in the White House, p. 107.

  289 Cranston said the treaty had the support of fifty-eight senators: Ibid.

  289 Jackson unleashed an extraordinary blast: Robert G. Kaiser, “Jackson Rips ‘Appeasement’ of Moscow,” Washington Post, June 13, 1979.

  290 By mid-June, Baker and Frank Church: Annis, Howard Baker, pp. 152, 156; Ashby and Gramer, Fighting the Odds, pp. 592–593; Glad, Outsider in the White House, p. 111.

  290 Cranston observed that “if Jackson were for the treaty”: “Nation: Twin Salvos for SALT,” Time, April 16, 1979.

  290 recalled with amazement visiting Byrd’s office: Interview with Senator John Culver, April 15, 2010.

  290 Byrd had visited the Soviet Union: Byrd, Senate Addresses, vol. 2, p. 586.

  291 thought Baker might be willing to play a constructive role: “Nation: Signed and Sealed,” Time, July 2, 1979.

  291 Baker had received a considerable amount of his SALT briefing materials: Kaufman, Henry M. Jackson, p. 384.

  291
Nunn seemed willing to consider voting for the treaty: Robert G. Kaiser, “White House Moves to Shore Up Support of SALT,” Washington Post, September 14, 1979.

  291 “It was nauseating to confront the gross waste of money”: Carter, White House Diary, p. 323.

  291 McGovern, a steadfast leader on such issues: “Nation: Signed and Sealed.”

  292 He was particularly angry at Jackson’s staff members: Interview with Senator John Culver, April 15, 2010.

  292 a natural supporter of the SALT II treaty: Ashby and Gramer, Fighting the Odds, pp. 591–592.

  293 seized the opportunity to take a tough stand: George C. Wilson, “SALT Stumbles over Presence of Soviet Troops,” Washington Post, September 7, 1979.

  293 Carter first pronounced the brigade “unacceptable”: “Nation: Carter Defuses a Crisis,” Time, October 15, 1979.

  293 Vance implored Dobrynin to give him some help: Glad, Outsider in the White House, p. 191.

  294 Byrd urged that the White House and congressional leaders: Ibid., p. 192.

  294 Carter convened a group of fifteen “wise men”: Ibid., p. 193.

  294 Carter would never forgive Church: Carter, White House Diary, pp. 422, 424.

  294 reported the treaty favorably by an unimpressive 9–6 vote: Kaufman, Henry M. Jackson, p. 389.

  294 the Armed Services Committee voted 10–0: Ibid.

  295 Howard Baker announced his candidacy: David S. Broder, “Baker, Tying His Fate to SALT, Formally Announces 1980 Bid,” Washington Post, November 2, 1979.

  295 the “failure to ratify the SALT II treaty: Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 265.

  296 Carter had intuited the situation at the end of 1977: Carter, White House Diary, p. 152.

  296 Carter was handling the crisis with “great competence”: “Iran: The Test of Wills,” Time, November 26, 1979.

  296 Carter was helped by Khomeini’s “irrationality”: Robert G. Kaiser, “Congress Is Giving President Freer Hand at Crisis Helm,” Washington Post, December 7, 1979.

  297 The year ended on an ironic note: Spencer Rich, “Panama Treaty Supporter Delighted at Offer to Shah, but Foes Unmoved,” Washington Post, December 16, 1979.

 

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