by Mark Zuehlke
A single bomber could be heard droning back and forth over the German front lines and occasionally it dropped a bomb that exploded with a thump. But, as the mist thickened and gained in altitude, the plane flew off. A few minutes later the troops heard the tanks coming up. “The noise crept nearer. It grew louder and louder to a rumble, clatter and clank. It seemed as if it must surely reach the enemy and give him warning.” But the Germans fired no flares and sounded no alarms.
Suddenly, at 0420, the barrage began and, as one, the Canadian Scottish surged out of the trenches toward the enemy. Peck watched with pride as his men, “who had been straining at the leash, sprang out of the trenches with the utmost eagerness. The ground mist was now greatly augmented by smoke, and the keeping of direction was very difficult.”15
Peck was surprised when the Germans failed to respond to the creeping barrage with counter artillery. Nor at first were there any gunshots from their forward outposts. Most of the men manning these either fled or surrendered. Captain Jones of No. 2 Company had Piper Maclean at his side. Telling Maclean to play “The Drunken Piper” at quick time Jones led his men in a charge to an emplacement housing several large trench mortars. “Jumping into the trench we saw in front of us the entrances to two dugouts each guarded with a machine gun mounted and well camouflaged. We shouted down to the enemy and up they came—one officer and sixty men. They were taken completely by surprise; some of them were in their stocking feet and partly clad.”
Lieutenant Mackie, meanwhile, had discovered a gap between the two leading companies and plugged it with his platoon. He and his men overwhelmed one machine-gun position only to find themselves raked by another behind them. “I placed the men in cover, took the Lewis gun corporal and two men and started back to investigate. On the rising ground on our right was a clump of trees and in them a machine gun nest. Just as we attacked it from one side, Sergeant Mowatt and men of No. 4 Company attacked it from the other and soon all was over,” Mackie recounted.16
Gaining the northern slope of the Luce gully, the Can Scots advanced down a gentle grade that seemed little more than a dip. But the mist by the river was impenetrable. Suddenly there “loomed up directly ahead … a high dark mass which at first hurried glance seemed like a strong fortification. The first part of the Battalion to see it was the centre, where, at the moment, the Commanding Officer was present. Colonel Peck gave the order to charge. The men at once rushed forward, some thirty yards or so, only to find themselves up against an almost perpendicular bank.”
At first it seemed they would not be able to climb this southern slope and continue to follow their assigned line of advance. But scouts groped along the flanks and soon reported that, to the right, it ascended more gradually. Following behind the scouts, the battalion clawed its way up to gain the Gentelles-Aubercourt road along which the supporting tanks were slowly creeping. Piper George Firth Paul, accompanying Peck’s command section, impulsively jumped on top of one bearing the name “Dominion” and skirled out the Canadian Scottish authorized march, “Blue Bonnets over the Border,” as the mighty machine rumbled alongside the advancing infantry.
Both the fog and the rugged nature of the country made it difficult for Peck to keep track of his companies, but the assignments of pipers to each one quickly proved its worth. “Our pipers played with their accustomed steadiness and stolid courage. I found the pipers of the greatest usefulness, not only to encourage and inspire the men, but the keen ear of one Piper could detect the tones of the others through the dense fog and enabled us to identify the companies in the advance.”17
As the sun broke through the mist, Peck saw scattered on the plain German antitank guns and mortars in the open with their covers still on. What few enemy soldiers were about “seemed utterly demoralized and surrendering with alacrity.”18 As the battalion’s leading wave advanced up a “long grassy slope above the Aubercourt road north of Demuin, the mist cleared without a moment’s notice.”
Peck, having told Paul to get off the tank, hurried ahead of his men with the thirty-eight-year-old piper alongside to gain the crest in order to see what resistance lurked ahead. Just as the two men came up on it, a machine gun opened fire and Paul fell dead at Peck’s side. Peck then heard several shots from a revolver, and Captain Alec MacLennan, the battalion intelligence officer, emerged with gun in hand and shouted that he had killed the gun crew. MacLennan, accompanied by scout Private Frank Durham, had been roving the battlefield independently. He was now “amazed to see Colonel Peck coming towards me only fifteen yards away” and seemingly alone.
German resistance suddenly stiffened. On the right the Germans had established a strongpoint in an old chalk-mining pit and behind this lay a heavily manned trench designated Bosnia. About 600 yards to the left the shoulder of a hill was defended by several machine guns and snipers, who caught the Canadian Scottish in a crossfire. The snipers targeted the commanders, shooting Major Render dead and wounding Major Floyd. CSM Frank Macdonald took effective control of both his No. 4 Company and No. 3, leading a charge on the chalk pit. After a fierce mêlée, the Germans were overcome. A battalion commander and his headquarters section along with a doctor and his dressing station staff were among the prisoners. The latter were put to immediate work treating the many Canadian wounded. Lt. Mackie added his platoon to the strength of the two companies under Macdonald. The advance continued toward Bosnia Trench, but machine-gun fire soon drove the men to ground.
Mackie ordered everyone to stay down while he and a corporal packing a Lewis gun crawled along a shallow ditch bordering the Demuin road to close on the trench. From the ditch, the two men located four machine-gun positions, and when one crew exposed itself to fire on the pinned-down Canadians the corporal killed all five of them with a long burst of fire. He then knocked out a second gun by killing two of its crew and wounding the others. Anytime one of the two remaining crews tried to bring their gun into action, the corporal forced them down with a well-aimed burst. Finally the officer commanding the machine-gun position stood up and waved Mackie and the corporal over. Not a chance, Mackie thought, as he signalled the German to approach him instead. Both stared long and hard at each other and then walked toward each other like gunfighters. They were 30 yards apart when the German went for his pistol, but Mackie was faster on the draw and shot him dead. Then the lieutenant and the Lewis gunner rushed the trench, taking the remaining Germans prisoner.
That ended the resistance at Bosnia Trench and enabled Mackie and his men to swing over to assist the rest of the battalion, which was engaging the Germans on the hill. Peck was here, personally directing the struggle to clear it of machine-gun positions and snipers. Finally, a Canadian Scottish sniper wriggled to an abandoned gun-pit within range of the Germans and drilled any who showed themselves in the head with a single shot. After a few of the enemy snipers were killed, the rest fled.
While the sniper was at work, Peck ordered one of the tanks to go forward with Mackie’s No. 1 Company platoon in support to finish off the machine guns. Inside the tank, serving as an observer, Canadian Scottish Lt. James Rodgers felt like he was in a Turkish bath. The heat was fierce, everyone aboard was showered in sweat. Not only the heat made riding in the tank almost unbearable, the fuel stench was overwhelming and German bullets “striking the tank made a noise like riveters working in a shipyard.… We ran into a strong machine-gun post and the Germans kept firing at us until we were right on top of them. Their fire was so accurate that it put our six-pounder on the left side of the tank out of action.
“By the time we reached the cross roads near Aubercourt, I was feeling dizzy from the gas inside the tank as were the other members of the crew, and afterwards I fainted right away.”19
The rest of the battalion bypassed the hill to clear the Germans positioned between Bosnia Trench and Aubercourt. Two No. 2 Company platoons headed straight for Aubercourt, but as they closed on the houses a machine gun hidden in one burned off a long burst that killed Lt. Archibald McConechy and Sgt. Ma
thew Barrett. Their commanders killed, the two platoons took cover. But Pte. Frederick Sumner, who had started stalking the machine gun in a flanking manoeuvre the moment it opened fire, broke the impasse by killing the crew with rifle fire.
From where he was, just west of Aubercourt, Peck had seen the platoons become stalled and ordered CSM Robert Kennedy to attack the village from the right. A member of the original contingent, Kennedy had fought in every major engagement, been twice wounded, and awarded a Military Medal in 1916. Kennedy performed as usual, leading his men into the village, knocking out the remaining machine guns and overrunning a battery of 5.9-millimetre guns abandoned by the Germans. His actions this day earned a Distinguished Conduct Medal and over the ensuing months he would add two bars for gallantry to the decoration before being fatally wounded on November 1, 1918.
Although Aubercourt had been taken, the hill where the battalion had originally been held up remained contested ground. Heavy volumes of machine-gun fire indicated that the tank and Mackie’s men were meeting stiff resistance. Putting Captain Alexander MacLennan in charge of another ad-hoc unit, Peck sent it up the hill from the German’s rear. MacLennan’s party followed the Aubercourt-Happeglene road, and as they rounded a bend came under fire from a quarry 200 yards ahead. The party was bunched and fourteen men went down, killed or wounded. The two soldiers of a No. 1 Company Lewis gun crew threw themselves down in the middle of the road to the front of the stricken men and began firing at the Germans. Lying in the open right next to the equally exposed gunners, MacLennan directed their fire. The Lewis gunners kept the weapon hot until all their ammunition drums were spent. Then they scooped up two rifles and continued shooting until the German machine gun fell silent. “I never witnessed a braver deed,” MacLennan later said of the gunners. “Their coolness, courage and marksmanship in the face of great danger was remarkable.” MacLennan always regretted that, in the confusion of the battle, he never got the men’s names. For his own courage under fire, MacLennan was awarded the Military Cross on September 16, 1918, and the bar on January 11, 1919.
With MacLennan’s relief party held up, Peck sent a second tank up the hill supported by another Canadian Scottish platoon. When it came up alongside Mackie’s men and the other tank, the Germans surrendered. The enemy at the quarry, including a regimental commander and his staff, also gave up. This ended the battalion’s fight, as it now controlled all the assigned Green Line objectives. It was about 0715 hours.
As 1st Infantry Brigade passed through 16th Battalion, some of the Canadian Scottish shouted, “Fritz, beat it! Get a move on before the war, stops.”20Move the Canadians did. By dusk the Germans had been thrown back eight miles on their front while the Australians gained seven miles. On the flanks the French had advanced five miles and III Corps two. Canadian losses were 1,036 dead, 2,803 wounded, and 29 men lost as prisoners. But German prisoners tallied 5,033 and 161 guns had been captured. Peck estimated that 16th Battalion had taken more than 900 prisoners and bagged 18 heavy guns, 17 trench mortars, and 30 machine guns for a surprisingly low casualty count of 144.21
The British Fourth Army counted its total casualties at approximately 8,800. The butcher’s bill this time had been entirely weighted against the Germans. They admitted losses of up to 700 officers and 27,000 other ranks with more than two-thirds having surrendered. “August 8,” Ludendorff wrote, “was the black day of the German army in the history of this war. Everything I had feared … had here, in one place, become a reality.”22Two days later, as Ludendorff reported to the Kaiser, the German ruler interrupted. “We have reached the limits of our capacity. The war must be terminated.” But this could only be achieved by opening peace negotiations, something the Kaiser refused to consider.23
Amiens had finally given the Allies a decisive triumph. “The surprise had been complete and overwhelming,” Currie wrote. “The prisoners stated that they had no idea that an attack was impending … The noise of our tanks going to the final position of assembly had been heard by some men and reported, but no deduction appears to have been made regarding this. An officer stated that the Canadians were believed to be on the Kemmel front.”24
Field Marshal Douglas Haig intended to keep driving the Germans. “Having secured the old Amiens defence line,” he declared, “the Fourth Army will push forward to-morrow and establish itself on the general line of Roye-Chaulnes-Bray sur Somme-Dernancourt.” To reach the new objectives the army’s right flank—where the Canadians were—would have to gain nine miles while III Corps need win only a mile. To the right of the Canadians, the French would continue advancing toward Roye while simultaneously broadening their front by another 16 miles to stretch the Germans ever thinner.25
Haig recognized Canadian Corps faced the greatest challenge meeting its objectives. There would be no surprise. The Germans would be ready and waiting. In fact, by the evening of August 8, seven German reserve divisions had bolstered the front and three of these faced the Canadians. Each passing hour gave these fresh troops more time to prepare fighting positions.
Confusion at Fourth Army headquarters ensured the Germans had sufficient time to get ready. At 1630 hours on August 8, Gen. Rawlinson arrived at Currie’s advanced headquarters in Gentelles. Currie was touring his various divisional headquarters so “Rawly the Fox” contented himself with discussing matters with Currie’s general staff officer, Brig. N. W. Webber. Rawlinson was in fine fettle, proclaiming that much credit for the day’s victory must go to the Canadian Corps. What did Currie need for the coming day? Rawlinson wondered. Webber knew exactly what the corps needed—a fresh division to relieve the badly worn 3rd Division. Rawlinson promised to release the 32nd Imperial Division from the army reserve and wired the required instructions to his headquarters. Webber and he then fleshed out a plan whereby 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions would resume the advance at 0500 hours with the 32nd Division passing through 4 th Canadian Division in the morning to come up alongside.26 The 3rd and 4th Divisions would then move into reserve.
Shortly after Rawlinson’s party drove off, a cable from Fourth Army headquarters was delivered to Webber. Rawlinson’s chief executive officer, Maj.-Gen. A. A. Montgomery, had peremptorily cancelled the 32nd Division’s movement orders and demanded that Webber proceed immediately to Drury—the closest telephone link from the Canadian front to Fourth Army—about eight miles west of Gentelles. Travelling upstream by car along roads clogged with supply transports and vehicles bearing the 32nd Division’s battalions in the opposite direction, Webber was unable to reach the phone until two hours later. The moment he came on the line, Montgomery left Webber no doubt that he was “very irate with [Rawlinson] for daring to give away 32nd Div[ision] and with myself for aiding and abetting.” The British division was immediately ordered to turn about and march back to whence it came. With 3rd Division having already moved to the rear, it was now instructed to get back to the front to resume the offensive in the morning. Montgomery was unconcerned that such a major regrouping of divisions would necessarily delay the Canadian resumption of operations.
Webber returned to corps headquarters and broke the news to Currie. Then the two officers and their staff worked through the night to issue fresh orders. Because telegraph communication with the forward divisions was unreliable these orders had to be delivered by dispatch riders. None of the divisional commanders received instructions before 0400 hours and some not until 0500 hours, so the advance was set back to 1000. Hours had been wasted.27
Even before Montgomery countermanded Rawlinson’s orders, the divisional commanders had been hard pressed to be ready by early morning. In 1st Division’s case it had to move to a new frontage, which required the brigades to sideslip 5,000 yards southward in order to face the villages of Beaufort and Warvillers. To the divison’s left would be 2nd Division (which also had to slip southward to keep aligned with 1st Division), while 3rd Division was on its right.
The southward move required longer than Currie’s staff had anticipated and was only completed
at 1100 hours. Zero Hour was shoved back to 1310. The 3rd Division was unable to move even then because the 4th Division had yet to secure its start line just beyond Le Quesnel—a final objective for August 8 that the division had failed to gain and spent the following morning winning despite stiffening German resistance. All the delays forced Currie to abandon hopes the corps would gain nine miles of ground this day. Instead, he expected at best to win only four miles.28
From the moment 2nd Division crossed the start line it faced a hard fight while 1st Division met only marginally less opposition. Maj.-Gen. Archie Macdonnell put his 1st and 2nd Brigades forward with 3rd Brigade’s battalions parcelled out and lurking in support. While 14th and 15th Battalions backed up 2nd Brigade, 16th Battalion marched to new positions behind 1st Brigade. This brigade, advancing on the division’s left flank toward Beaufort and the village of Rouvroy-en-Santerre beyond, advanced while being flayed by heavy machine-gun fire from a height of ground to its right. With 3rd Division not yet on its start line, the brigade’s 1st Battalion jogged over to clear this enemy position—an action that forced Brig.-Gen. W. A. Griesbach to advance his 2nd Battalion to fill the gap the battalion left in its wake. This meant that the brigade had three of its four battalions committed almost from the outset. But the quick adjustment of its lines to include some of 3rd Division’s front prevented the attack from stalling. Meanwhile, 2nd Brigade set a cracking pace across flat country broken by little more than a few villages and the occasional small wood or rise of ground that typified the countryside east of Amiens. Soon Warvillers was secure.
