by Mark Zuehlke
On the right flank, 3rd Division’s 4th Canadian Mounted Rifles made good progress once it was able to get moving and came up alongside 1st Division adjacent to Foilies by late afternoon. But to the right of this battalion, the 5th Canadian Mounted Rifles met intense head-on machine-gun fire from Bouchoir and flanking fire from Arvillers, a village that the adjacent French troops had failed to gain. This situation was only resolved when a combined Canadian-British force of infantry and tanks struck out from 3rd Division’s line of advance and cleared Arvillers in tough fighting that centred on a large beet-sugar factory.29
With the Canadian Corps advance progressing rapidly, and in accordance with Currie’s revised battle plan, the reserve brigades were never called forward. So the Canadian Scottish did little but walk along some distance behind the forward troops, tasting “the heady wine of victory. In the hot, August day, with everybody in high spirits, the whole countryside was alive with movement. Generals and their staffs were galloping to and fro. Command pennants, which had been laid aside since 1914, fluttered in the breeze over the escorts; divisional headquarters, a hive of bustle, with attendant motor cars, signal wagons and wireless aerials were grouped near the cover of copse and hedge; supporting troops in formed bodies were streaming forward; reserve troops lay on the ground waiting the summons to advance.”
Only as dusk began to settle did 16th Battalion return to the grim realities of war as it marched along the Amiens-Roye road toward Beaufort in what was the third major move of the day. Just as it turned dark the men heard the drone of aircraft overhead and recognized them as German. They “flew low, backward and forward, over the lines of the tall elms that bordered the highway” jammed with “troops, guns, and transport.” After a few passes the planes roared down and “bombed and machine-gunned the roads, the horse lines, and villages where troops were quartered. The airmen shot out parachute flares which lit up every feature of the ground, and flung down egg bombs which, bursting on contact into a shower of ragged fragments, caused widespread injuries. Then, the terror of death, and maiming stalked the night.” Confusion reigned all along the roadway as hundreds of horses “terrified by the roar of the planes’ engines, stampeded, and many men were hit.” Serendipitously, the Canadian Scottish were unscathed while units either side of them were struck hard. When the planes flew off, the battalion continued past “the dead and wounded lying by the roadside [that] told their own story of the losses incurred by other units.” 30
How many of the 2,574 total Canadian casualties for August 9 resulted from the air raid went unrecorded, but all the units caught in it were badly shaken. The frequency and deadly result of air raids had increased dramatically with each passing month in 1918. The raid on the night of August 9 was yet another example of how technological advances stacked the odds against a soldier’s chances of survival.
The Canadian Scottish halted at Beaufort, Lt.-Col. Peck establishing his headquarters in the battered village while the troops distributed by companies in nearby fields where stooks of newly cut grain stood in orderly rows amid the black shell craters. Few could sleep, for the German shelling intensified hourly. “A shell here, a shell there, sometimes inflicting casualties and always so close as to disturb the resting troops.”
By 0420 hours, when Peck ordered the battalion to advance into battle positions near Rouvroy, a thick fog draped the land. Unable to take any bearings, the troops counted on the guides to know their way. As they set up in a series of old trenches, the guides assured them that once the fog lifted the Germans beyond would have them in their sights. Company commanders needlessly instructed the wary soldiers to stay under cover and avoid moving in the open. All across the front, the sounds of men working with entrenching tools carried on the air—telling them that the Germans were close and frantically preparing their defences.31
Intelligence staff at Fourth Army headquarters reported German reserves being rushed to the Amiens battlefront by train, bus, and truck. The numerical advantage Fourth Army had enjoyed was so reduced by the morning of August 10 that its thirteen forward divisions faced precisely the same number of German divisions. Given the loss of impetus and the growing resistance little more ground could be won, but Haig still hoped to at least establish the line set out in the orders he had issued on the evening of August 8. This meant the Canadians must win another five miles of ground.
But they would have a fresh division, for the British 32nd Division was now committed to advance alongside 4th Division—the two passing through the front lines won the day before. This assault began at 0930 with the 32 nd moving through the 1st and 3rd Division lines and 4th Division past the 2nd Division.32 The sudden appearance of the British troops caught the Canadian Scottish by surprise when “out of the vanishing fog, large bodies of cavalry, guns and infantry in close order suddenly burst into their view. As these units came forward they gradually opened out into battle formation in spectacular fashion, as if they were on the manoeuvre field. Their men were in high spirits, the staffs were all business, everybody concerned was confident of success.
“The attacking battalions passed out of sight into the haze, and later in the morning, after the mist had cleared, further bodies of cavalry and horse artillery went through. In the distance, to the east, the smoke of burning towns or dump could be seen rising in the sky, but whether it had reference to the advance of the earlier hours 16th Battalion did not know. No news of the operation was received until the late afternoon, when rumour began to whisper dark tales of its failure, which found some confirmation in the gloomy looks and depressed men of the personnel of the brigade headquarters established in the field near at hand,” the battalion’s historian noted.
By midday, the advance had been checked. The 32nd Division gained virtually no ground this day and the 4th did only somewhat better. That night, the Canadian Scottish advanced a mile into a series of old French trenches east of Rouvroy. They moved past “derelict tanks, demolished by direct hits—‘the inside of them like charnel houses’—the dead men and dead horses scattered everywhere around, told very surely of its location and fate. The 32nd British Division had met with disaster in the old system of trench defences, in use from the beginning of trench warfare until the Germans broke through in March-April 1918.”33
Despite Fourth Army’s and that of the French on its flank the day before, plans were hatched for a renewed offensive on August 11. But the Amiens offensive was spent and there were few gains. The 4th Canadian Division moved not at all, instead forced to parry three separate German counterattacks. Because of this, Currie decided “that it was inadvisable to try to progress mainly by Infantry fighting, and recommended that the operations should be slackened to give time to organize a set piece attack on a broad front.”34 Only limited objectives were set for an attack scheduled to begin either on August 15 or 16 wherein Canadian Corps would cover the French army’s left flank during a drive on Goyencourt, which lay two miles short of Roye.
After several cancellations, this attack materialized on August 16. As part of Fourth Army’s limited participation Currie instructed 1st Division to secure Fresnoy-les-Roye and La Chavette with 2nd Division advancing immediately to the left.35 Having learned only early that morning that the offensive was proceeding, Currie’s orders did not reach 1st Division headquarters until mid-morning. Maj.-Gen. Archie Macdonnell quickly assigned seizing Fresnoy-les-Roye to 1st Brigade and La Chavette to 3rd Brigade. At 1130 hours Brig. George Tuxford urgently phoned the commanders of the 13th and 16th Battalions with orders that the former was to attack La Chavette with the latter covering its left flank.
None of the battalion commanders had expected a battle; Lt.-Col. Peck had instructed his company commanders they were to merely maintain a holding pattern. It was a clear, hot morning that promised a scorching afternoon. Everyone was looking forward to happily sitting the day out in relative peace. The battalion was currently disposed with Nos. 2 and 3 Companies holding the line respectively from right to left. No. 4 Company was
in close support and No. 1 was farther back in reserve. As seizing La Chavette was assigned to 13th Battalion, Peck considered the Canadian Scottish role relatively limited.
Peck summoned the officers from No. 4 Company to his headquarters and said only that unit would go forward. Brigade intelligence indicated the German strength across the Amiens front was weakening, which was why the offensive was being undertaken. Because the ground was dead level with little natural cover, the platoons would advance by means of a series of old communication trenches running from the battalion’s current front lines in fairly straight lines to beyond La Chavette. These trenches passed on either flank of the only tactically important ground. This was Schwetz Wood, a small copse of scrubby trees and dense gorse about 700 yards east of the Canadian Scottish front. Peck wanted the company to surround the wood and pin any Germans there in place so they were unable to interfere with the Royal Highlanders of Canada’s capture of La Chavette. To this purpose No. 13 and No. 14 Platoons would pass through No. 2 Company’s lines and outflank the wood to the south via two parallelling trenches while No. 15 and No. 16 Platoons shoved out from No. 3 Company’s lines and followed two parallelling trenches that passed to the north of the wood.
Less than an hour after the briefing, the four platoons moved warily up the communication trenches. No. 13 Platoon, under Sgt. Alexander Reid, was in the most southerly trench while Lt. William Douglas Macpherson’s platoon followed one, codenamed Regulus Alley, which lay 250 yards south of the wood. Reid’s men surprised a small German position, captured one soldier, and sent the others scampering just a few minutes after they entered the trench. Not long afterward, the platoon came to an intersection and Reid realized their intelligence had been wrong and the trench had trended north rather than running in a straight line past the wood. The platoon was now in Regulus Alley. Reid saw the back of No. 14 Platoon out ahead and sent a runner to find out what Macpherson wanted him to do. Macpherson replied that Reid’s platoon should follow his in line.
The two platoons snaked along the trench until they were well past Schwetz Wood and Macpherson could see Fresnoy-les-Roye to his right. West of the village, a series of trenches were crowded with German infantry who looked to be forming up for an advance right toward his position. Realizing his force was badly outnumbered, but would likely be detected if they tried to withdraw, Macpherson ordered Reid to deploy his men in the trench while he slipped No. 14 Platoon out to the left into a string of shell holes. This established the men in an L-shaped formation that enabled them to cover their flanks and also be positioned to try blocking the Germans if they advanced toward Schwetz Wood. Macpherson had no intention of provoking the Germans into action. He ordered the men to stay hidden.
North of the wood, No. 15 and No. 16 platoons, respectively under Lt. William Houston and Lt. Edward Payson Thompson, had snuck along parallel trenches to where they intersected the southern terminus of Chavette Trench and the westward terminus of Sottises Alley. Chavette Trench was the main defensive work running in front of the village of La Chavette, while Sottises Alley provided a protected route for the Germans to bring supplies and reinforcements up to the front from their rear areas well to the east of Schwetz Wood. According to the brigade plan, the Royal Highlanders should have, by this time, launched their attack on La Chavette. So the two Can Scot lieutenants expected Chavette Trench to have been cleared of Germans. But as they led their men past the junction and into the entrance to Sottises Alley, a large German force burst out of Chavette Tunnel and attacked their rear. At the same time more Germans charged toward them from Sottises Alley. A desperate close-quarters fight ensued as the forty-five Canadian Scottish tried to open an escape route back through the Germans behind them. Both Thompson and Houston were killed in the fight’s opening seconds.
Back on the battalion’s front lines, No. 3 Company commander Captain Ernest Otto Rietchel heard the sharp gunfight, gathered a rescue party, and headed toward the action. The thirty-two-year-old Rietchel had come to the battalion in April 1915, been wounded a month later, and returned the following October with a lieutenant’s rank. In March 1918 he had been awarded the Military Cross for bravery. Deeply religious, Rietchel made it plain that he loathed war. But his sense of duty and “abhorrence of what was wrong … overruled his private dislike of going to war to kill.” Rietchel acted with his normal decisiveness, running out into No Man’s Land at the head of the rescue party. Moments later a machine-gun burst killed the officer. His men faltered, pulling back to the safety of their trenches. After a while the remains of the two No. 4 Company platoons escaped into the lines. They numbered just twenty-five of the original forty-five and reported having to abandon their wounded.
Back at headquarters, Peck realized that the Germans were determined to make a stand at Schwetz Wood and ordered a two-company attack to clear them out. No. 2 Company was directed at the wood while No. 3 Company advanced to the trench junction north of it where the two platoons had been ambushed. When Peck phoned No. 2 Company commander Major James Scroggie, he simply said: “Get Schwetz Wood.” “Yes, sir” was all Scroggie replied. “Good man,” Peck added and hung up.
Scroggie was gathering his men when a runner from Lieutenant Macpherson reported that the No. 4 Company officer had surreptitiously withdrawn his two platoons back down Regulus Trench from where they had been originally hiding in sight of the Germans in the trenches near Fresnoy and established another L-shaped position that extended toward the wood’s southwestern corner. Scroggie was heartened by this news, as it meant Macpherson would be covering No. 2 Company’s right flank as it attacked the wood. With no time to tee up covering artillery or mortar fire, Scroggie simply formed two platoons into a line and led a 700-yard charge straight across open ground. Not a shot opposed them and the men crashed into Schwetz Wood to find it undefended. After struggling through the tangled undergrowth, Scroggie and several men stepped out of the other side of the wood and immediately came under heavy machine-gun fire. Ducking back into cover, Scroggie sent word that he would need artillery support before any advance beyond the wood could be made. When the shells started falling, 2nd and 3rd Companies went forward together about 300 yards beyond the wood and took control of the Chavette Trench-Sottises Alley junction. North of this position, the Canadian Scottish could hear the Royal Highlanders heavily engaged in front of La Chavette. The 13th Battalion made three attempts to gain a toehold inside the village, but was repulsed each time. Not until the following day would the Royal Highlanders take La Chavette.
At the trench junction the Canadian Scottish discovered some of the wounded No. 4 Company had been forced to abandon. The Germans had bandaged the men’s wounds and, when they withdrew, left them to be recovered. This reduced the 16th Battalion losses, which still totalled sixty with three officers and fifteen other ranks killed, thirty-three other ranks wounded, and nine of the men from the two overrun No. 4 Company platoons lost as prisoners.36
This action marked the end of 16th Battalion’s role in the Amiens offensive, which sputtered to conclusion on August 22. By then, Canadian Corps was once again on the move, this time to join British First Army in the Arras sector. The Canadians left the Amiens area proudly, knowing that although the offensive had cost a total of 11,822 casualties they had given better than they received. Currie wrote that his corps had “fought against 15 German Divisions: of these 10 were directly engaged and thoroughly defeated, prisoners being captured from almost every one of their battalions; the five other Divisions, fighting astride our flanks, were only partially engaged by us.
“In the same period the Canadian Corps captured 9,131 prisoners, 190 guns of all calibres, and more than 1,000 machine guns and trench mortars.
“The greatest depth penetrated approximated to 14 miles and an area of over 67 square miles containing 27 towns had been liberated.… Considering the number of German Divisions engaged, and the results achieved, the [Canadian] casualties were very light.”37
Unlike so often in the past the
Germans were to be allowed no opportunity to regroup or regain the ground lost. “If we allow the enemy a period of quiet,” Haig warned the General Staff in London, “he will recover, and the ‘wearing out’ process must be recommenced.” The Germans were on the ropes and his gut “feeling [was] that this is the beginning of the end.” Amiens had proved that boldly executed offensives could bring victory. Haig cautioned his subordinates that they would never again “advance step by step in regular lines as in the 1916-17 battles. All Units must go straight for their objectives, while Reserves should be pushed in where we are gaining ground.”38
chapter eleven
The Finest Performance
- AUGUST 20-SEPTEMBER 3, 1918 -
During the last days of August, the Allies struck hard across an ever-enlarging front. On August 20, with the Amiens offensive still smouldering, the French Tenth Army had thrown twelve divisions northward from Aisne and gained five miles between Noyon and Chauny in two days. The Third French and British Third armies weighed in on August 23 and General Sir Julian Byng’s divisions advanced two miles toward Bapaume, sweeping up 5,000 prisoners. Field Marshal Douglas Haig next committed Fourth Army on the Somme River and then directed First Army to be ready for an operation on August 26 with the Canadian Corps leading.
Having only completed relocating from Fourth Army, the Canadians had anticipated a short respite for rest and refitting. But, as the official Canadian historian later put it, such a period after “extensive operations … was denied the Canadians for in these last hundred days of the war each major offensive so rapidly succeeded its predecessor that unprecedented demands had to be made on the stamina of the forces employed.”1
By the end of August, almost all the losses of the spring and early summer had been reversed, but the Allied plan was less about winning ground than destroying the German army before it could take refuge inside the heavily fortified Hindenburg Line. Constructed in the winter of 1916-1917, this line stretched from the North Sea to Verdun and consisted of a network of deep trenches tying together hundreds of steel-reinforced concrete pillboxes protected by a 60-foot-wide wall of barbed wire. To ensure that any Allied attack became disorganized well short of this main defensive line, the Germans had constructed an outpost zone about two miles to its front that was 1,100 yards deep. The mile-and-a-half stretch of ground between the outpost line and Hindenburg proper was designated a “Battle Zone” meticulously pre-sighted and range-marked to be swept by masses of machine guns and artillery. Any Allied attackers would first have to fight through the outpost line, then cross the gauntlet of the “Battle Zone,” before facing the deadly wall of the Hindenburg fortifications.2
