The King's Cardinal: The Rise and Fall of Thomas Wolsey (Pimlico)
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Another consequence of this analysis is that papal concerns were not the priority for Wolsey that has often been alleged.119 On 10 September 1515 Leo X had hurriedly created Wolsey a cardinal in an effort to buy English help against the rapidly advancing French. By late October Wolsey was planning to oppose the French in Northern Italy. There thus appears to be a possible causal connection between these two events, which historians have found all too seductive. In fact, by the time Pace had arrived in Switzerland in November 1515 Leo was already deep in negotiations with the victorious Francis, and during September at their famous meeting at Bologna the two men had come to terms. Admittedly the terms of their agreement were kept secret, but Wolsey soon discovered that no effective help was to be expected from the pope in any of his moves against France.120 It was not until November 1517 that Leo was persuaded to join, and then only secretly, an anti-French league,121 by which time Wolsey himself was negotiating hard with the French.
Nor had the pope been especially helpful over Wolsey’s more private concern, his appointment to the bishopric of Tournai. This whole episode, in its detail extremely complicated, is in essence quite simple.122 Wolsey had wanted to become bishop of Tournai. No doubt personal ambition was involved, and when the possibility had first arisen, in the autumn of 1513, he was not yet an English bishop. The point that is usually overlooked is that after the recent English occupation of the city it made political sense to appoint an English bishop, and Wolsey was the obvious candidate. Two major difficulties stood in his way. In June 1513 Leo X had appointed Louis Guillard, son of the vice-president of the Paris parlement, to the bishopric. Guillard was only twenty-one, under the canonical age. This did not prevent him from receiving the necessary papal bulls for taking possession of the see, but it did mean that technically he would remain only bishop-elect until his twenty-seventh year. This gave Wolsey a glimmer of hope; even more so did Guillard’s refusal to take the oath of loyalty to Henry after the English occupation of Tournai in September, for Wolsey now had grounds for approaching the pope, who in the early summer of 1514 appointed him administrator of the see until Guillard would take the oath.
At this point the second difficulty came into play. The town of Tournai comprised only a small proportion of the see, which meant that most of it was outside English jurisdiction. It soon became apparent that, despite the papal blessing, it was impossible for Wolsey to establish effective control of the diocese, especially as Guillard proved to be a very astute adversary who had, of course, French backing. The details of the ensuing battle are not significant, but Leo’s reluctance to help Wolsey is. Late in 1516 Leo not only confirmed Guillard’s clear title to the bishopric, but empowered him to call on the secular arm to help him obtain his rights, thereby giving Francis the ideal excuse for reconquering Tournai. This hardly suggests that a grateful pope was eager to reward his loyal servant Wolsey, and that, after exerting a great deal of pressure, Wolsey and Henry persuaded Leo to revoke the bull and to have Wolsey’s appointment reconfirmed does not seriously affect the conclusion to be drawn. In order to safeguard its temporal interests in Italy, the papacy was prepared to sell its vast reservoir of spiritual and ecclesiastical favours to the highest bidder. Sometimes this was Wolsey, but it was just as often others, and over the bishopric of Tournai it was Francis and Guillard who usually won. There was never any question of one person or state monopolizing the bidding: possessing something that no other power had, the papacy was in a very strong position to sell to whom it wanted, and at an advantageous price. In these circumstances the only sensible course was the one that Wolsey adopted – to seize opportunities as and when they occurred. This he had done in 1515 in order to become a cardinal, and would do again in 1518 in order to obtain his legatine powers. What he did not do was to allow the course of English foreign policy to be dictated to by a papal auction that he was never in a position to control. As for the bishopric, in the end Wolsey was happy enough to surrender all claim to it in return for a suitable pension.
But to return to the arrival in London of the French ambassadors towards the end of June 1517, in time to witness those elaborate ceremonials in honour of a rival embassy, from Charles and the regents, which had, it will be remembered, so impressed the Venetian ambassador. The suggestion was made earlier that they were also intended to impress the French,123 at a time when they had every reason to be increasingly apprehensive of the Burgundian court. Despite Noyon and Cambrai and despite the proposed marriage between Charles and Francis’s daughter, Louise, they must, by the summer of 1517, have realized that once Charles was established in Spain it was most unlikely that he would abide by these agreements – indeed, the likelihood was that he would wish to destroy them. No king of Spain would willingly return the recently conquered Navarre or recognize the French title to the kingdom of Naples. Even more worryingly, he might not accept any French presence in Italy. And who was it helping to bring about Charles’s establishment in Spain, but the English? Clearly it was time for the French to take the English more seriously. This, of course, is what Wolsey had been trying to get them to do for the previous three years, and thus by the autumn of 1517 the right climate for successful negotiations had been created.124
But success did not immediately follow, and the reason is simple. The negotiations failed because, in Wolsey’s view, the French were still not prepared to concede enough. In particular, they were not prepared to pay enough for Tournai, or sufficiently to compensate the English merchants who had suffered at the hands of French pirates.125 At the end of November the two French envoys sent over earlier in the month to conclude, it was hoped, an agreement left empty-handed.126 In December English commissioners were sent to Calais in an effort to settle the merchants’ complaints, but returned to England with their business unfinished only to find Wolsey in a very bad mood.127 For the time being all negotiations with France were broken off, and there was even talk of war. In February 1518 Richard Fox wrote to Wolsey to inform him that Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight were in no condition to withstand a French attack, and at about the same time the garrisons of Calais and Tournai were put on the alert.128 On 15 March Henry spent an hour and a half providing the Venetian ambassador with ‘manifest proof of the deceit of the King of France’.129 However, three days later Pace, back in England in his new post as royal secretary, reported that Henry had received two letters from the French king as well as a favourable report from the envoy sent over to France some weeks before to congratulate Francis on the birth of a son – which offered a new negotiating point, for it opened up the possibility of a marriage between the dauphin and Henry’s daughter, Mary.130 It was a possibility that the French were quick to exploit. Stephen Poncher, bishop of Paris and in charge of negotiations on the French side, wrote to Wolsey on 8 April urging him to reopen them, and to show that he meant business he sent over his secretary with a number of proposals, including a marriage alliance.131 At about the same time news reached Wolsey of the appointment of Cardinal Campeggio as legatus a latere so that in this capacity he could come to England to explain the pope’s plan for a five-year truce in Europe and a crusade against the Turk.132 It was these two initiatives, from the French and the papacy, which Wolsey seized upon and turned into his greatest triumph, the Treaty of London.
But before that treaty is examined, attention must turn to somewhat shadowy and sinister events which were taking place at Abingdon and Woodstock in the spring of 1518 – events which suggest that there was some opposition in high places to Wolsey’s conduct of foreign policy. One of the consequences of the epidemic of ‘sweating sickness’ that England had been suffering from since the previous summer was, as was noted at the beginning of this chapter, the disruption of Henry’s normal routine. Staying out of London as much as possible, and keeping his household down to a bare minimum, he decided to spend the early spring in the Thames valley. He was at Abingdon by 27 March, and there he stayed for the next three weeks – which happen to be some of the best documented weeks of Henr
y’s life. Given the physical separation of king and leading minister, and the crucial state of the negotiations with France, there was need for a constant stream of letters between the two men. Indeed, at one stage Henry insisted that a train of horses be set up so that messages could be sent every seven hours.133
Not all the communications were about foreign policy. On 3 April Pace wrote that Henry thanked Wolsey for the final clause in his letter ‘touching great personages’, and praised Wolsey’s special regard for his safety. At the same time he was anxious for Wolsey to know that he had taken effective measures on his own account, for
at such time as his Grace had perfect knowledge of the coming of the said great personages unto him, his Grace did secretly provide that they should be advertised by their own servants resident in the court, as well of the strait lodging here as the penury of horse meat, and for these respects to bring with them a very small company. And Sir Henry Marney is executor of the king’s pleasure, and doth look thereunto wisely and faithfully, as well within this town as nigh thereunto.134
Three days later Pace reassured Wolsey that Henry had not forgotten what Wolsey had written concerning some of the nobles at that time with the king.135 This is all the specific information that has survived about the episode, or at least all that can be precisely dated, but there are one or two hints of continuing concern.
First, when John Clerk, the future bishop of Bath and Wells, arrived at Woodstock on 27 April carrying letters from Wolsey he was ordered by Henry ‘that in no wise he should make mention of London matters before his Lords’. Henry also asked Clerk to put it about that Wolsey would arrive at Woodstock within five or six days, when in fact there were no plans for Wolsey to come there. Then, at the Council meeting that evening Henry went out of his way to praise Wolsey, saying that there was no man living ‘that pondereth more the surety of his person and the common wealth of this his realm’. Meanwhile, Wolsey was informed that Sir Thomas Lovell would be coming up to see him ‘for reasons be known’, arriving in London on 1 May.136
Unfortunately, those reasons are not known to us. However, there is a possibility that Lovell took with him the famous letter written in Henry’s own hand in which he warned Wolsey to ‘make good watch on the duke of Suffolk, on the duke of Buckingham, on my lord of Northumberland, on my lord of Derby, on my lord of Wiltshire, and on others which you think suspect, to see what they do with this news’.137 The letter is undated, but the reasons for connecting it with this episode are these. Henry began by stating that ‘the most of this business I have committed to our trusty councillor this bearer to be declared to you by mouth’ – and Lovell was certainly a trusty councillor, having been close to Henry’s father even before Bosworth. There was undoubtedly a marked concern about ‘great personages’, and the two who head Henry’s list, the dukes of Suffolk and Buckingham, were with him at Abingdon and Woodstock and were both present at the Council meeting on 27 April at which Henry had so deliberately praised Wolsey’s concern for his surety. Of course, the letter can be interpreted as indicating that Henry was informing Wolsey of disquiet for the first time, which if so would appear to rule out any connection between the letter and this particular episode, because Wolsey did know of the disquiet prior to any communication with him via a ‘trusty councillor’. But the reference to ‘others which you think suspect’ surely suggests that Wolsey did have prior knowledge, because without more information than was contained in Henry’s letter there would be no good reason for Wolsey suspecting anyone else. And in late April 1518 there was indeed important ‘news’ – the successful revival of negotiations with France. A close alliance with the French would have been a dramatic reversal of the apparent aims of English foreign policy during the previous three years, and that it was considered controversial is suggested by two pieces of evidence. First there was Henry’s warning to Clerk not to mention ‘London matters’ to anyone with him at Woodstock. Now ‘London matters’ could have referred to anything: perhaps to the controversial and much disliked measures to cope with the ‘sweating sickness’.138 But it could have referred to the French negotiations. Certainly these were kept secret for as long as possible, a fact confirmed by the second piece of evidence. When, towards the end of June, a French envoy arrived in London with more proposals, Henry considered the matter of such importance that he made a secret dash to Greenwich to consult with Wolsey139 – despite his intense fear of the sweating sickness.140 And it was only on his return to Woodstock on 5 July that he announced to the members of his Council the advanced state of the negotiations.141
Whether or not Henry’s famous letter should be ascribed to the end of April 1518, the fact remains that at this time the attitude of some of the nobility was cause for some concern. However, it was probably never much more than that, deriving more from general warnings from abroad than from any specific information nearer home. Of the general warnings there were a number. As early as October 1515 the bishop of Worcester was reporting from Rome that Francis I had alleged that there was about to be an insurrection in England headed by the nobles.142 In May 1516 Pace reported from Trent in Northern Italy rumours of opposition to Wolsey’s handling of affairs.143 In February 1517 Henry instructed his ambassadors in the Low Countries to deny Maximilian’s suggestion that he, Henry, was unpopular with his noblemen.144 But the most relevant warning, which almost certainly led directly to Henry’s and Wolsey’s worries in the spring of 1518, came in February of that year, via the bishop of Worcester, from the pope. And on the 27th Wolsey replied that it was quite impossible to express Henry’s gratitude for the information that there was a party in England plotting in conjunction with the French. The bishop was to reassure the pope that there was nothing to fear. No one was more loved and respected than Henry, and as for Wolsey himself, if he offered to resign he was quite sure neither the king nor the nobility would allow him to. On the other hand he could well believe that the French would stick at nothing to disturb the peace of the realm.145
It is, of course, most unlikely that Wolsey would have wished to admit to the pope that he was on the point of being overthrown, but there are other reasons for suggesting that Wolsey’s apparent lack of concern was exaggerated. If one thing has emerged from this account of his handling of foreign policy it is that it was often unsuccessful, and certainly misunderstood, even by those whose task it was to implement it. For those who were not so close to Wolsey it must have appeared especially disastrous. Large sums of money were leaving the country, some of it provided by the taxpayers, and the results both in terms of prestige and real benefits were nil. It would therefore have been very surprising if there had not been a lot of criticism, both of his policies and of Wolsey himself. It was during this period, following his appointment as cardinal in September and lord chancellor in December 1515, that the full extent of his power became apparent. It was argued earlier that there had been no ‘coup’ by Wolsey then, and that, for instance, neither Warham nor Fox had been forced out of office by him.146 But this does not mean that people would not have been suspicious of what had taken place and extremely jealous. As lord chancellor Wolsey had made it very clear that he thought royal justice should not allow for any distinction between ‘high’ and ‘low’, and to show that he meant business cases had been brought against the earl of Northumberland, the marquess of Dorset, and Lords Burgavenny and Hastings. Wolsey’s policy at home had much to recommend it, but coupled with his unsuccessful foreign policy and his rapid rise to power, it almost certainly meant that in the spring of 1518 there was some opposition to him. Its extent, however, should not be exaggerated.
One source for evidence of such opposition, discussed earlier in this chapter, is Giustinian’s reports,147 and the fact that he wrote about it should alert us to the possibility of some exaggeration. It was reassuring both to himself and his employers to believe that, but for Wolsey, the hated English policy would have been different, and the situation that Giustinian was in led him to clutch at straws. The other evidence for
opposition should be treated with equal caution. It suited Maximilian in the spring of 1517 to embarrass Henry with news of internal opposition, while it was in the French interest in 1518 to put it around that Wolsey was about to be deposed. The point is not that all talk of opposition from foreign sources should be discounted, only that it must be treated with the greatest care. It was one thing for someone at the English court to let slip a few critical remarks to a foreign ambassador; but quite another for him to want, or be able, to translate that criticism into action. And in the spring of 1518 there is no real evidence of any significant opposition.
It is known why Suffolk was viewed with some suspicion at this time. During the negotiations with the French in the previous November he had apparently put the French ambassadors ‘in comfort of the restitution of Tournai’.148 This is in itself a rather interesting misdemeanour, for one of the arguments here has been that both Henry and Wolsey were themselves keen to return Tournai – but for the best possible price. So they must have been annoyed, and perhaps a little suspicious, to find Suffolk undermining their bargaining position by suggesting to the French that Tournai was theirs for the asking. Moreover, given his previous close relationship with Francis, Suffolk must anyway have seemed the most likely leader of any plot, if, as the pope alleged, it was being master-minded by the French. Far less is known about Buckingham, also mentioned in Henry’s letter, and what little there is makes him a most unlikely collaborator with the French.149 Neither is there any evidence that any of the other noblemen were pro-French, and it is most unlikely that either Henry or Wolsey thought that they were. But if that is the case, why the fuss at Abingdon and Woodstock? A possible scenario might be as follows.