The King's Cardinal: The Rise and Fall of Thomas Wolsey (Pimlico)

by Gwyn, Peter

  No wonder Henry got excited. So did Wolsey – but with this very important proviso: he was all too aware of the difficulties yet to come, and therefore determined to move cautiously. This explains the differences between him and Henry that occurred while Wolsey was at Calais. The first concerned who should command a force of six thousand archers to be sent to the immediate aid of the emperor,50 the second whether the English merchants should make their usual autumn trip to Bordeaux to buy wine.51 The point about both is that Henry was anxious to get things moving, while Wolsey wanted business as usual. In Wolsey’s view there was no point in antagonizing the French until England was ready to declare war, and in the summer and autumn of 1521 she was not.52

  Both Wolsey and Henry were delighted with the new Imperial alliance.53 That being the case, why did Wolsey spend over three months at Calais pretending that he was interested in peace? In fact the explanations have already been given. To have suddenly blown his cover, and to have changed overnight his role of peacemaker to that of warmonger, as well as losing him room for manoeuvre, would have resulted in a damaging loss of credibility. As it was, when England did declare war, she did so as the defender of the Treaty of London, having apparently attempted every diplomatic means at her disposal to reconcile the warring parties. England had right on her side, and that always has its uses.54

  There was also the question of how to secure time to make the necessary preparations for war. It all boils down to a simple point that has never been sufficiently emphasized: the difference between a truce and a peace. It was the former that Wolsey was working for when he returned to Calais at the end of August, and he wanted it the better to prepare for war. So did Charles.55 It is true that Charles would have preferred an immediate English declaration, but that was because he was involved in the war already and was naturally anxious to come out of it with as much credit as possible. But he knew that he was short of money, he knew that he ought to return to Spain, and he knew that he was not ready for a major showdown with Francis. Thus, at Bruges, he came to see some advantages from a peace conference orchestrated by Wolsey and his own delegation, the purpose of which was to secure a truce at the moment of maximum advantage to himself.

  This was the plan, and throughout most of September it worked very well.56 By the beginning of October this was no longer the case, and by the beginning of November relations between Wolsey and the emperor were definitely bad. The rift was caused by the difficulties in deciding when the moment of maximum advantage had arrived. For Wolsey, the present war was so much men and money down the drain, thus hindering the ‘Great Enterprise’. Unless there were immediate and decisive successes to be gained, the sooner a truce was made the better.57 Charles’s desire for a truce fluctuated, depending entirely on how the war on France’s northeastern border was going. By early October the Imperialists were on the retreat, having already abandoned the siege of Mézières. Francis was now crossing the River Scheldt, poised either to raise the siege of Tournai or to do battle with the emperor outside Valenciennes. Charles was quite anxious for a truce, despite disliking many of its conditions. However, with things moving in their direction, the French were dragging their feet.58 To overcome this, Wolsey decided to impose the greatest possible pressure by sending delegations from Calais to negotiate directly with the two princes. But it was now the turn of the Imperialists to prove obstructive. By early November, the situation had changed. It was clear that Francis’s attempt to relieve Tournai had failed and that it was only a matter of time before the city would fall to the Imperialists. In Italy, also, the war was going well, with the French on the verge of losing Milan. On the other hand, the news of the French capture of Fuenterrabia, on Spain’s north-west border with France, close to the disputed kingdom of Navarre, on 19 October was very unwelcome, and for the emperor any truce that involved the acceptance of this unpleasant fact was out of the question, unless there was absolutely no alternative.59

  There is no doubt that Wolsey was angry with the emperor’s refusal to respond favourably to his diplomatic initiatives – and with reason.60 They had been made, as he thought, in order to rescue Charles from a difficult situation.61 No wonder he wrote to the delegation sent to Francis I that he was for his part

  sore tempested in mind by the untowardness of the chancellors and orators on every side putting so many difficulties and obstacles to condescend to any reasonable condiction of truce and abstinence of war, that night nor day I could have no quietness nor rest, so that almost my appetite and sleep … are sequesterate from me.

  Here, so it has been suggested, speaks a man worn out in the service of universal peace.62 That this is not so is shown by a letter Wolsey wrote to Henry a little later, on about 14 November. He had just received an explanation from the emperor of why this was the wrong moment to make a truce. In effect, the reasons have already been given: the war was going too well, except in and around Navarre where it was going too badly. Wolsey, as the apostle of peace, should have been distressed to hear this news. In fact, he wrote as follows:

  And, Sir, if the enterprise of Tournai succeed, and the expedition against Milan take effect, and the Spaniards determine themselves to revenge these outrages of the French king done against Naverre, Biscay, Fuenterrabia and other countries under the obeisance of the crown of Spain, his [the French king’s] dominions, power and substance shall be so well shaken, diminished, and extenuated, before you set forth your enterprises against him, that, God willing, he shall be easy enough to meddle with. And thus, Sir, the affairs standing in such train, as it is before expressed, better it is to suffer these princes to ruffle with the said French king, and invest him on all parts, for the consumption of his treasure, which is almost clearly extenuated, than suddenly to take this truce now, when he can do no more harm than he hath done. And to the intent your grace may understand in what state the matters of Italy stand, I send unto the same, at this time, certain copies of such news as lately came from thence; whereby there is some good hope and appearance that the affairs of the French king be like to decay there, and proceed from evil to worse.63

  The quarrel with the emperor was very quickly over because it had only ever been a quarrel over immediate tactics, not long-term aims. The truce could well be delayed until after Wolsey’s return to England. Meanwhile at Calais, there was a meeting with the Imperial delegation and the papal nuncio Ghinucci in order to discuss the terms of the alliance in the light of developments since the meeting at Bruges, and the inclusion of the papacy. On 24 November a new treaty was signed, and on the 27th Wolsey sailed for Dover.64

  Thus ended the conferences of Calais and Bruges. For Wolsey they had been a tour de force.65 It was true that all was not yet settled. The search for a truce, with Charles’s connivance, continued. So also did the bargaining; that was not settled until Charles’s visit to England the following summer, if indeed then. There was also a lot of work to be done if England was going to be ready for war, and to that end a commission was set up in March to look into the whole question of England’s military potential.66 Still, if his return to England was to bring him no rest, Wolsey must have derived some satisfaction from what had so far been achieved. For four months he had hoodwinked the French into believing that he was concerned with peace, while all the time he had been negotiating with the emperor on how best to bring them to their destruction. In doing this, he had engineered a situation in which even greater honour and fame might accrue to his master than that which had resulted from the Treaty of London.

  Mention of Henry’s honour may serve to introduce some final thoughts about Wolsey’s intentions at Calais and Bruges. The picture of him that has emerged from this account is that of the skilful political operator: opportunist, pragmatist, tough negotiator – these are the words that seem best to describe him. What they leave out is the whole question of motivation. Many motives have been ascribed to him, most of them unfavourable. Self-glorification – already touched on in another context – comes obviously to mind, and this
could include an excessive desire for material things. It was an aspect of his character that contemporaries were well aware of:67 the Imperialists were always bribing him with a bishopric, the French with a pension.68 However, as an explanation for what he did it does not help very much: as everybody was offering him rewards, it was easy for him to retain his freedom of action. However, one thing that not everybody could offer him was the papacy. The one person who might be able to do so was Charles v, and at Bruges he did offer to support Wolsey’s candidature at the next election. This has led some historians to see this as the key to Wolsey’s action in 1521: Wolsey wanted an Imperial alliance because he wanted to be pope. It now seems clear that this is not the case because he never genuinely wanted to become pope. Even so, the view still persists that the papal connection, very much nurtured by the cardinal protector of England and the pope’s cousin and chief confidant, Giulio de’ Medici (later Clement vii, provides the best explanation for Wolsey’s foreign policy. Without becoming too involved in the intricacies of papal politics, we must offer some comment on this view.69

  It may have been noticed that up until now there has been no reference to any papal connection. This has not been deliberate, but merely reflects the fact that it was during this time very little discussed.70 What evidence there is suggests that in responding to the Imperial proposals for an alliance Wolsey had no knowledge of the papal alliance with the emperor of 28 May.71 It is true that from mid-July onwards the new English ambassador at Rome, John Clerk, was reporting back the pope’s very strong anti-French feelings; but it is clear from these same reports that Clerk’s instructions were to defend Wolsey’s ostensible policy of trying to maintain the peace of Europe. Certainly there is no hint that he was to begin negotiations for an anti-French league.72 Just before he left for Calais, Wolsey did hint to the papal nuncio that he might be able to help Leo X against the French,73 but it was not until 25 August, the day the Treaty of Bruges was signed, that he wrote to Clerk informing him of the plot to deceive the French,74 and not until 13 September that Clerk told the pope.75 In other words, Wolsey told the pope of what he was doing only after the moves had been decided. At no time was there any consultation or negotiating with the pope because the pope was not in Wolsey’s confidence.

  Furthermore, it is clear that the pope was extremely suspicious of Wolsey’s activities at Calais, even after he knew of the Anglo-Imperial alliance. The fact is that because of the pope’s desire for immediate military success against the French in Italy and Wolsey’s plans for future military success in France, papal and English policies were not close. Leo X dreaded Wolsey’s desire for a truce and late in September suggested to the Imperial ambassador in Rome that someone ought to speak to the king of England and show him what sort of person Wolsey was.76 Wolsey, for his part, must have been pleased that the pope had sided with the emperor just because it increased the new alliance’s chances against the French, but he was in no sense led by him. In late October, he warned the emperor ‘not to regard matters of Italy and the pope so greatly as to damage the rest of his dominions’.77 On 20 November he made his views even clearer. After discussing the forthcoming inclusion of the papacy in the Anglo-Imperial alliance with the Imperial delegation, he went on to say that neither Henry nor Charles should be led by the pope, but rather they should lead him.

  In 1521 Wolsey did rather well out of the pope: greatly extended legatine powers both in scope and length of tenure, and the title of Defensor Fidei for Henry, though it might be said that the king had earned this himself with his famous book against Luther – the Assertio Septem Sacramentorum, In return, he gave very little. The explanation is that on the whole Leo X was more anxious for his help than Wolsey was for Leo’s. But the real point that is being made here is that as regards foreign affairs Wolsey considered the papacy just as he did any other foreign power – something to be manipulated for his master’s benefit. There was no ‘special relationship’, and therefore it cannot provide the key to what went on at Calais and Bruges.

  Another explanation of what went on there concentrates on Henry’s dynastic problems: a marriage between Mary and Charles was the best solution to the increasingly worrying fact that Catherine of Aragon had failed to provide Henry with a male heir.78 It does not seem very convincing. The marriage would not come into effect for at least seven years, and a costly war against France appears to be a high price for something that was so uncertain. Be that as it may, the chief defect of this thesis is that it is impossible to find any evidence for it. There was some discussion of the marriage terms, but nothing to suggest that this was anything more than the usual haggling. Certainly, if it was the central purpose of English foreign policy in 1521, Wolsey and Henry kept surprisingly quiet about it.

  Perhaps the best explanation is provided by Wolsey himself. On his return from the successful negotiations at Bruges, he sent Henry an assessment of the young emperor. It was a favourable one, particularly so because Charles had made it clear that, just as Henry had done, so he intended to place the burden of affairs on Wolsey’s shoulders.

  Wherefore, Sir, you have cause to give thanks to Almighty God, which have given your grace so to order and convene your affairs, that you be not only the ruler of this your realm, which is an angle of the world; but also by your wisdom and counsel, Spain, Italy, Almaine [Germany] and these Low Countries, which is the greatest part of Christendom, shall be ruled and governed. And as for France, this knot now being assuredly knit, shall not fail to do as your grace shall command. What honour this is to your highness, I doubt not but that your grace, of your high wisdom can right well consider.79

  This letter should not, of course, be taken at its face value – if there is one thing that all Wolsey’s subsequent actions make clear it is that he did not trust Charles an inch – but it does contain an essential truth. Henry’s honour is the explanation for Wolsey’s foreign policy.80 As has been shown, Wolsey was far too astute not to appreciate that particular policies had particular drawbacks, and this applied as much to the conduct of war as to the search for peace. The important thing was to dominate affairs, and by this means bring honour and glory to his master – and, of course, to himself. Not that I would want to end this chapter on a cynical note. At the end of his life, Wolsey realized that a choice had always had to be made between serving the king and serving God. He had chosen to serve the king, but in doing this he made the same choice as almost every other politically conscious man did in the sixteenth century.81 He devoted his considerable talents and energies to his chosen task, and, as far as the negotiations at Calais and Bruges were concerned, his monarch was extremely grateful.82

  1 This chapter follows very closely my article ‘Wolsey’s foreign policy’, HJ, 23.

  2 See pp.97 ff.

  3 Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, p.49 and more generally, pp.41-240. Scarisbrick’s treatment of Wolsey’s foreign policy is entirely responsible for my interest in Wolsey and thus the fons et origo of this book! Despite my many disagreements with his interpretation, I would like to express my great admiration for the skill with which it is presented. For other accounts of Wolsey’s concern for peace, see Mattingly, Journal of Modern History, x, and Russell, BIHR, xliv.

  4 Dumont, iv, pp.224-5; see also pp.80-81, 86-7 above.

  5 For Imperial policy at this time, see inter alia LP, iii, 1106, 1446.

  6 Elton, Reform and Reformation, p.84 for such scepticism; otherwise Russell, Field of Cloth of Gold.

  7LP, iii, 689; Ven. Cal., ii, 1259. 1298; iii, 60, 184.

  8LP, iii, 1212, 1257, 1283.

  9LP, iii, 936.

  10LP, iii, 1213; the recall is LP, iii, 1214.

  11LP, iii, 936.

  12LP, iii, 1044, 1098, 1149, 1162, 1213.

  13 Pastor, viii, pp.1-36.

  14 ‘For remembering the good amity that is betwixt us and France and our daughter honourably bestowed there, considering also that we be in peace with all Christian princes, what need have we to care for further amities, a
lliances or intelligence with the pope or the emperor than we have already.’ (LP, iii, 1150).

  15 Ibid.

  16LP, iii, 1257, 1258, 1283 for English efforts to thwart these moves.

  17LP, iii, 1213.

  18LP, iii, 1270, 1362, 1367, 1371, 1383, 1395, 1488.

  19LP, iii, 1271, 1283.

  20LP, iii, 1304, 1315.

  21LP, iii, 1303, 1304, 1310, 1315, 1331.

  22St. P, vi, p.72 (LP, iii, 1352).

  23LP, iii, 1362, 1371.

  24St. P, i, p.17 (LP, iii, 1383) also LP, iii, 1415, 1419.