The Resistance

by Matthew Cobb

  341 Guéhenno (2002), pp. 250–1.

  342 Courtois (1980), pp. 263–4.

  343 Cordier (1999), p. 272.

  344 Durand (1994).

  345 Cordier (1999), p. 273.

  346 Foot (2004), p. 205.

  347 Belot (2003), p. 252.

  348 Cordier (1999), pp. 277–9.

  349 The exchange rate – a difficult thing to calculate accurately across time – is taken from Baumel (1999), p. 107.

  350 See messages quoted in Cordier (1999), p. 277. The PCF may also have received arms from Free French agent Raymond Laverdet, who was part of an SOE/BCRA operation called DASTARD – Berlière & Liaigre (2007), p. 156.

  351 Berlière & Liaigre (2007), p. 425, n. 220, and photo on p. 157.

  352 Berlière & Liaigre (2007) is entirely devoted to the activities of the détachement Valmy.

  353 Berlière & Liaigre (2007), p. 156.

  354 Cordier (1999), p. 281.

  355 Berlière & Liaigre (2004), p. 173.

  356 Berlière & Liaigre (2004), p. 242.

  357 Described in Grelot’s last letter, written on the day of his execution. Krivopissko (2006), p. 164.

  358 Letter reproduced on the website devoted to the martyrs of the Lycée Buffon:

  http://pagesperso-orange.fr/memoire78/pages/bu.html (accessed August 2008). See also the French Defence Ministry pamphlet Les cinq étudiants du Lycée Buffon (Collection Memoire et Citoyenneté no 31, n.d., n.p.). The family archives of the Benoît family, including many letters from Pierre, have been put online by his niece:

  http://pagesperso-orange.fr/AnnetteBenoit/Benoit.htm (accessed August 2008).

  359 Most of what we know about Turma-Vengeance comes from François Wetterwald’s post-war memoir (Wetterwald, 1946). While many of the other Resistance movements and intelligence circuits have been studied intensively by French historians, there has been no work on this group. Wetterwald claims that by mid-1943 the group had over 10,000 members (Wetterwald, 1946, p. 46). The overall balance sheet would tend to support this: there were 30,000 officially attested members, of whom 584 died (389 did not return from deportation, 96 were executed, while 78 were killed during the fighting after D-Day). The Turma-Vengeance archives have been deposited in the BDIC in Nanterre, outside Paris, where they remain, unexploited (BDIC – F Delta res 844, Fonds Turma-Vengeance). These archives contain 17,873 documents grouped in 704 files; the inventory alone runs to 250 pages (http://www.bdic.fr/pdf/turma.pdf – accessed August 2008). Many of those documents are ‘demandes d’attestation d’états de service’ – post-war requests from members to have their work for the group officially vouched for. Much of the published material relating to the group has been placed online by Marc Chantran: the group, however, awaits its biographer. http://chantran.vengeance.free.fr (accessed August 2008).

  360 All the information on Keller is taken from Rouxel (1999). A Parisian street and a nearby public swimming pool are named after Keller; the swimming pool entrance hall contains a small display about Keller, who is a symbol of the Resistance work undertaken by PTT workers.

  361 D’Astier’s view was not shared by most of the members of Libération. His close comrade François Copeau later explained that he felt no particular loyalty to Libération, and that the reason why he had joined d’Astier’s group was largely a matter of chance: ‘I could just have easily stumbled upon Combat,’ he recalled (Noguères et al., 1969, p. 548).

  362 Cordier (1999), p. 191.

  363 D’Astier told Basin he had to get to London urgently to meet de Gaulle. Basin demurred, saying it was not so straightforward, and that d’Astier would have to be mandated by all the Resistance groups. Two weeks later, d’Astier met Basin again and told him that there had been a meeting, and everyone had agreed he should go. This was a complete lie, and Basin did not have the wit to check it out.

  364 Douzou (1995), p. 107.

  365 Passy (1947b), p. 81.

  366 The impact of d’Astier’s trip to the USA is hard to discern. Tuquoi (1987), p. 133, claims that d’Astier’s US press conference received very favourable coverage in Time-Life magazine, including a cover photo. This is all wrong. Apart from the fact that Time-Life is an anachronism (the two magazines were separate at the time), there was no coverage at all of d’Astier’s visit in Time, nor was his photo used on the cover of Life. Passy (1947b), pp. 83–6, has a caustically negative view of the effect of d’Astier’s visit. For d’Astier’s novelized version of his exploits, see d’Astier (1958).

  367 Foot (2004), pp. 184–7, and Bourdet (1975), pp. 74–9. For a less jaundiced view, see the recent sympathetic history of the Carte circuit by Thomas Rabino (Rabino, 2008). However, much of the novel information in Rabino’s account is based on Girard’s unpublished memoirs, which should be read with a pinch of salt.

  368 Rabino (2008), p. 121.

  369 Mackenzie (2000), p. 267. This book, written immediately after the war, was classified as top secret for over half a century. Even in its finally published version, several sections are marked ‘Paragraph deleted on the grounds of national security’. M. R. D. Foot provides an excellent introduction describing the fate of Mackenzie’s manuscript.

  370 Mackenzie (2000), p. 567.

  371 Cordier (1999), p. 317.

  372 Cordier (1999), p. 318.

  373 NA HS 7/232, p. 3798.

  374 Bourdet (1975), p. 118.

  375 Cordier (1999), p. 179.

  376 Bourdet (1975), p. 124.

  377 Tillon (1977) pp. 356 and 359.

  378 At its height, Combat was produced by fourteen different printers around the country, and had a print-run of 400,000. In the northern zone, Défense de la France was similarly influential. Both journals continued into the post-war world; Combat closed in 1974; Défense de la France became France-Soir, which still exists.

  379 Cordier (1999), p. 176.

  380 This was highlighted by General Gubbins of SOE, who in October 1941, after discussing with Moulin, had dismissed Frenay’s movement with a curt ‘the organization does not possess a clear programme for the future’ (Belot 2006a, p. 154).

  381 For an overall view of the demarcation line, yesterday and today, see Webster & Webster (2004).

  382 Pineau (1960), p. 134.

  383 Pineau (1960), p. 136.

  384 Rémy (1948), pp. 101–2.

  385 Piquet-Wicks (1957), pp. 142 and 144.

  386 Piquet-Wicks (1957), pp. 162–8; Terrisse (1993), p. 225.

  387 Baumel (1999), pp. 13–8 and 169–70. Much of Baumel’s book is equally powerful.

  388 Guéhenno (2002), p. 244.

  389 Schroeder (2000), pp. 130–1.

  390 Schroeder (2000), p. 134.

  391 Veillon (1995), p. 220.

  392 For a recent detailed and extensive account of how the Resistance saw the Jewish question, and how this changed over time, see Poznanski (2008).

  393 Vinen (2006), pp. 142–3.

  394 Veillon (1995), p. 244; Vinen (2006), p. 142.

  395 Berr (2008), p. 100. Details of solidarity expressed by French people from Schroeder (2000), p. 141; Veillon (1995), pp. 239–40.

  396 Vinen (2006), pp. 143–4.

  397 Meyer (2002), p. 156, quotes the report from the Nazi commander.

  398 Chevrillon (1995), pp. 60–1. Claude Chevrillon was Renée’s elder cousin. She went on to play a vital role as a Resistance radio operator in the Paris region (see Chapter 6).

  399 Défense de la France 20 (30 July 1942). In Granet (1961), p. 102.

  400 Cordier (1999), p. 196.

  401 Cordier (1993b), p. 626. For a detailed discussion of the relation between Combat and the Jews see Belot (2004). For a detailed examination of how the Resistance dealt with the ‘Jewish question’, see Poznanski (2008).

  402 Courtois & Rayski (1987), p. 147.

  403 http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1942/420702a.html (accessed August 2008).

  404 Kersaudy (1981), p. 187. The Afrika Korps were on their way to besiege
the British 8th Army in Tobruk. For over ten days Rommel tried to take the French positions at Bir Hakeim. This delay in the German advance on Tobruk allowed key British forces to retreat and regroup in Egypt before Tobruk finally surrendered. Abandoning their positions under the cover of thick fog, the French retreated safely with relatively minor losses. As well as laying the basis for the British defeat of Rommel in the first battle of El Alamein a month later, Bir Hakeim restored the reputation of French soldiers following the catastrophe of the fall of France. Churchill’s speech was made in the House of Commons debate following the fall of Tobruk.

  405 Churchill explained that the Americans were still under the illusion that Vichy would come over to the Allied cause and reassured de Gaulle that the British had no designs on the French Empire. As a result, the Free French did not dissolve (indeed, it was during one of these discussions that Churchill apparently suggested they adopt the title ‘Fighting French’) and they did not decamp to Moscow. For descriptions of the Madagascar affair, and of events in the French colony of New Caledonia in South East Asia, where the Americans simply took over without reference to de Gaulle, see Kersaudy (1981), pp. 185–92, and Crémieux-Brilhac (2001), pp. 393–401 and 405–8.

  406 See NA HS 7/246, pp. 3–5, for summaries of Moulin’s messages describing the demonstrations.

  407 Le Franc-Tireur 8 (June 1942).

  CHAPTER 6

  408 For the full details of Giraud’s escape and journey to France, see Cointet (2005) and Granier (1971).

  409 Letters that were not joined up within handwritten words were the key to the code. See one of Mme. Giraud’s letters in Granier (1971) opposite p. 241.

  410 Fourcade (1973), p. 125.

  411 Bourdet (1975), pp. 141–2.

  412 Pierquin (1983), p. 78.

  413 See, for example, Perkins (1962), pp. 297 and 334 et seq. The Allies had first tried to involve General Weygand, but he turned them down flat, unable to imagine breaking with discipline.

  414 For full details of TORCH and its background, which are only touched on here, see Funk (1974) and Verrier (1991).

  415 Fourcade (1973), p. 154.

  416 Perkins (1962), p. 415.

  417 Fourcade (1973), p. 165. By an odd coincidence, they were broadcasting from a villa owned by a man called Giraud when the Nazis homed in on their radio transmission. On another whim, General Giraud insisted that the (British) submarine have a US crew (Fourcade, 1973, p. 156). The arrests of the ALLIANCE members were of such importance that MI6 tried to save what they could of the circuit by getting the BBC to broadcast an immediate warning to the remaining members making reference to the animal code names used by the circuit: ‘Beware! In the south of France, the animals are ill with the plague’ (Fourcade, 1973, p. 171).

  418 Although Darlan’s presence in Algiers appears to have been a coincidence, the US began contacts with him in mid-October. Perkins (1962), pp. 398–401 and 404 et seq. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander of Operation TORCH, was saddled with the negotiations with Giraud: ‘It isn’t this operation that’s wearing me down – it’s the petty intrigue and the necessity of dealing with little, selfish, conceited worms that call themselves men . . . Giraud, in his first conference with me, even made a point of his rank. Can you beat it? Yet he’s supposed to be the high-minded man that is to rally all North Africa behind him and save France.’ Thomas (1996), p. 95. Jean Monnet, an economist working for the British in Washington, later wrote of Giraud: ‘If his ingrained sense of hierarchy had not made it unbearable for him, a five-star general, to take orders from a two-star general only recently promoted [de Gaulle], he would willingly have confined himself to a military command. But the honour of his caste was too much for him: in the end he lost everything because he wanted to concede nothing.’ Thomas (1996), p. 111.

  419 Domenach-Lallich (2005), pp. 103–4.

  420 See the entry on ‘Camouflage du Matériel’ (the title given to this programme) in Marcot et al. (2006), p. 169.

  421 Frenay (1976), p. 226.

  422 Some of the arms may have made their way into the hands of the Resistance. An SOE note from July 1943 describes the handing over of ‘135 tonnes of arms’, which was organized at two meetings held in Lyons on 8 February (NA KV 6/24).

  423 Crémieux-Brilhac (2001), pp. 579–81.

  424 This is Philip’s verbatim account from 1947, based on his notes taken at the time. A version from the US point of view was written by Sumner Welles, Under-Secretary of State, who observed the encounter. Although less florid, it has a similar tone. In particular, Roosevelt is recorded as saying ‘any decision as to which French people will administer liberated territory will be decided by the American government alone’. For full details, and archival sources, see Crémieux-Brilhac (2001), pp. 579–81.

  425 Cordier (1999), p. 202.

  426 Foot (2004), p. 198.

  427 Thomas (1996), pp. 96–7.

  428 For an account by one of de la Chapelle’s co-conspirators, see Faivre (1975). Two days later, de la Chapelle was executed with indecent haste, encouraging speculation that the assassination was a put-up job by the Allies. There is, however, no evidence for this understandable view.

  429 Passy (1947b), p. 371.

  430 Verrier (1991), p. 247.

  431 Cointet (2005), p. 292. In the same speech (written by Jean Monnet) Giraud sang the praises of the Resistance – ‘the franc-tireurs, the saboteurs, the hostages, the deported, the heroic multitude who have fallen for the cause of liberty’ (Cointet, 2005, p. 292). George Bernard Shaw was impressed by the speech, but not by Giraud, who he immediately realized had not actually written it: ‘No soldier since Caesar, Cromwell or Wellington has been able to realize such an exploit.’ Cointet (2005), p. 293.

  432 The struggle between de Gaulle and the Allies, with Giraud acting as the hapless fall-guy, is a fascinating and complex political story, but sadly it is outside the scope of this book. The wartime diaries of Harold Macmillan, who was appointed British Resident-Minister to North Africa, give an acerbic and often amusing first-hand account of the events (Macmillan, 1984). Kersaudy (1981, 2004), Thomas (1996) and Crémieux-Brilhac (2001) all provide good summaries of the struggle. The most detailed account is Cointet (2005), but the most rounded political analysis can be found in Belot (2006a). Cordier (1999) describes the Resistance’s influence over this struggle in the first half of 1943. Giraud’s downfall, partly a consequence of his own political naivety and incompetence, led Macmillan to comment in 1944: ‘I would suppose that never in the whole history of politics has any man frittered away so large a capital in so short a time’ (Thomas, 1996, p. 86). Giraud would, however, play an important part in the liberation of Corsica (see Chapter 7).

  433 Paul Paillole, head of the clandestine Travaux Ruraux run by Vichy counter-intelligence, fled over the border to Spain, made his way to London and later turned up in North Africa, running counter-intelligence first for Giraud, then for de Gaulle. But Paillole was a rare example.

  434 Teissier du Cros (1962), pp. 217–8.

  435 On the same operation Pineau’s one-time RAF pilot, Guy Lockhart, managed to escape back to London.

  436 See Pineau (1960), pp. 261–71, for the full story.

  437 Fourcade (1973), p. 189.

  438 Frenay (1976), pp. 194–6.

  439 Levy (1998), p. 78. Levy’s first description of the events gave the name of the landing field as EPINARD (Noguères et al., 1969, p. 589). There is no record of any such place (Verity, 2000). In his posthumous memoirs, Levy called the field MARGUERITE; this appears to be correct (Verity, 2000, p. 193).

  440 Noguères et al. (1969), pp. 589–90.

  441 Cordier (1999), p. 200.

  442 For a biography of Delestraint, see Guillin (1995).

  443 A summary of this document was published by Passy (1947b), pp. 272–3, according to which the Secret Army was allowed to carry out industrial sabotage, including the ‘neutralization’ of factories working for the Germans. The version used her
e is from Cordier (1999), pp. 200–1, and is based on the original archival source.

  444 Passy (1947b), p. 248. A slightly different version is given by Frenay in his memoirs written twenty-five years later (Frenay, 1976, p. 218). The heart of the matter is identical, however.

  445 Rémy (1966), pp. 198–215.

  446 Cordier (1999), p. 284.

  447 Cordier (1999), p. 284.

  448 All quotes from Cordier (1999), p. 284.

  449 See Cordier (1999), pp. 273–83, for an account of how Moulin’s contacts helped lay the basis for Rémy’s work.

  450 Bourdet (1975), p. 217.

  451 Pierre Brossolette ‘La France devant les Français combattants’; speech to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 17 November 1942. CH 8/876.

  452 Cordier (1999), p. 400.

  453 The Socialist Daniel Mayer pointed out the fundamental weakness of Brossolette’s ideas in a letter to his comrade: ‘The national leaders of the Resistance imagine that the political parties are dead and will never return. They imagine – wrongly – that they are the single party of tomorrow (a kind of left fascism, or in any case, a Resistance fascism)’. Moulin undoubtedly shared Mayer’s opinion. Cordier (1999), p. 244.

  454 Baynac (2007), pp. 559–60.

  455 Verity (2000), p. 64.

  456 Verity (2000), p. 65.

  457 Verity (2000), p. 195.

  458 It was initially called the Conseil de la Résistance, but it is now generally known by the name that was eventually adopted, the Conseil National de la Résistance, or CNR.

  459 Wieviorka (1996).

  460 Brossolette succeeded in involving Ceux de la Libération and Ceux de la Résistance, and he became particularly close to the OCM, which he saw as providing the basis of the military leadership in the northern zone. For a sympathetic summary of the BRUMAIRE mission, see Piketty (1998), pp. 267–72. Claude Bourdet provided a vigorous defence of the importance of the northern zone Coordinating Committee in his intervention at a meeting to mark the fortieth anniversary of the CNR (Bédarida & Azéma, 1983, p. 43).