War Horse
Page 3
Kadesh was located astride one of the key valley approaches from the Mediterranean Sea to the interior plains of northern Syria. During the time of Ramses II, Kadesh had been a vassal of Egypt, but the ruler of Kadesh wanted to test the political expediency of changing allegiances. Ramses decided to use military force to prevent an alliance between Kadesh and the Hittite Kingdom. In April, he marched his assembled army from Egypt through Canaan and on to Kadesh. By mid-May the Egyptians were within a day’s march of the city.
The Egyptian army marched in five divisions. Four marched under the direct command of the pharaoh and organized in march units separated by about 6 miles— less than half a day’s march. The Egyptians named the four divisions for Egyptian gods, in order of the march: Amun, P’Re, Ptah, and Sutekh. Each division’s strength was about 5,000 soldiers, of which about 4,500 were infantry. Each march unit had its own integral chariot force. This force likely consisted of five 50-chariot squadrons. The chariot force deployed in a screen to the flanks, forward, and to the rear of the infantry main body. The division baggage section trailed the main formation within the chariot screen. Pharaoh Ramses and his entourage traveled with the lead division.
The fifth march unit was the Ne’arin. Historians are uncertain exactly in which way the Ne’arin differed from the main army. Ne’arin literally translates into “young men,” and some believe that the unit consisted of relatively new recruits. Other historians believe the unit contained veterans who had remained in the region as garrisons after previous campaigns. Whatever the specific connotation, the unit was certainly the equal of the other Egyptian divisions as it included its own infantry and chariot force. The Ne’arin marched to Kadesh by a different route and carefully timed their arrival to coincide with that of the main body.
As the Egyptian lead element approached Kadesh, two alleged deserters came to the Egyptian camp and provided information that the Hittite army was far to the north and not a threat to the Egyptians. The next day the Amun division crossed the Orontes River at a ford and moved approximately 3 miles north and encamped within sight of (and west of) Kadesh. The Egyptians set up a light fortification around their camp using shields. As the Egyptian division made camp, they captured two Hittite scouts. Upon harsh interrogation they revealed the location of the Hittite army—only a few kilometers east of the Egyptian camp, shielded from sight by high ground, the city, and the citadel of Kadesh. The pharaoh immediately dispatched his chief military adviser, the vizier, to contact each of the other three division commanders and order them to rapidly reinforce the pharaoh at Kadesh.
On the day after the pharaoh’s arrival at Kadesh, the P’Re division forded the Orontes River and began the last leg of their quick march to reinforce the pharaoh before the Hittites could mass against him. As the division crossed the plain west of Kadesh, almost in sight of the pharaoh’s camp, the march column of the P’Re division was struck by a charging formation of Hittite chariots. The Egyptian sources put the number of enemy chariots at 2,500. Most analysts believe it was much smaller. Still, it had to be a sizable force, possibly as many as 1,000, because the Hittites quickly penetrated the Egyptian chariot screen, and the heavy chariots were in and among the surprised Egyptian infantry. The P’Re division broke. The charging charioteers ran down, trampled, or speared the infantrymen in the path of the charge, a zone likely 1,000 to 1,600 yards wide. The shock of the attack caused the rest of the column to turn and retreat—many northward to the perceived safety of the pharaoh and his Amun division encampment.
The Hittite chariots charged through the Egyptians, then wheeled north and attacked the encampment of Amun. Elements of the P’Re fleeing north were caught up in the continuing battle, but the division baggage at the trail of the column, a lucrative target, was not attacked. The action to the south of the Amun camp did not go unnoticed. The division scrambled to affix harnesses, man chariots, and form the infantry. In the midst of this frantic preparation, the Hittite heavy chariots crashed into the southern and western perimeter of the camp.
As the Hittites broke into the Egyptian camp, the Egyptian infantry panicked. The focus of the Hittite chariot crews, however, was not on the Egyptian warriors but on plunder. This slowed the Hittite attack, allowing the pharaoh the opportunity to mount his Amun chariot force, along with his personal bodyguard, and rally a counterattack. Unlike the Hittite attack, the Egyptians based their technique on maneuverability and firepower. Using the speed and swiftness of their chariots, the Egyptians, led by Ramses II wearing his gold mail coat, avoided close combat and charged and darted through their own camp pouring a withering fire of arrows into the vulnerable Hittite force. At first the Hittites, focused on the riches of the camp and the remnants of the Amun infantry, were unaware of the silent deadly fire decimating charioteers and horses. By the time they knew what was happening, the positions of the Egyptians and Hittites were reversed. Panic spread through the Hittites as they realized they were outnumbered, dismounted, and alone deep in the midst of the revitalized Egyptians.
Under devastatingly accurate fire from the circling Egyptian chariots, the Hittites remounted and fought to extricate themselves from what had become a trap. Without archers they could not fire back, and their slower, less maneuverable chariots could not close on the Egyptian vehicles. More importantly, their horse teams were physically spent after charging through the P’Re division and then the Amun encampment. So, with men and horses exhausted, the Hittite charioteers attempted to retreat to the crossing point of the Orontes River. Whipping their tired mounts into a frenzy the Hittites were punished heavily as the retreating force raced for survival. They left behind a trail of dead and injured horses and men along with broken chariots. Egyptian chariot runners followed closely behind the pharaoh and quickly dispatched the disabled. The Egyptians destroyed the bulk of the Hittite chariot force before it could escape.
King Muwatallish observed the advance of his chariots with see-sawing emotions: he saw their early success, but then dust obscured the battlefield; however, glimpses through the swirling air revealed that the tide of battle had turned. To attempt to save his retreating chariots, Muwatallish ordered his available forces (consisting of his personal guard, the allied leaders, and their guards) in a direct attack against the Egyptian camp. Egyptian records indicate that this force numbered 1,000 chariots, but this estimate is also likely exaggerated. Possibly it was half that number. Still, it was a powerful force, and if this counterattack was successful it would take the unprepared Egyptian camp by surprise and divert the Egyptian chariots away from their pursuit of the fleeing Hittite chariots. The assembled elite around King Muwatallish moved quickly to a ford north of the city of Kadesh. The crossing of the Orontes River was disorganized and time-consuming, but as the chariot force emerged from the ford and reorganized, the Egyptian camp appeared to be unguarded since the Egyptian chariots had departed to the south in pursuit of the first group of Hittites.
As soon as the Hittite force was organized, it attacked the Egyptian camp. As they closed the distance, a line of chariots suddenly rode out to meet them. This was the chariot element of the Ne’arin force arriving to support the main Egyptian army. The Ne’arin deployed to meet the new Hittite attack. The Egyptian chariots, supported by their chariot runners and the following main body of infantry, completely disrupted the new Hittite attack. The hastily assembled Hittite composite force did not have the cohesion of a formal unit, and the Ne’arin chariots broke it apart. The heavy Hittite chariots turned and raced back to the river under a rain of deadly fire from the Egyptian composite bows. The Hittites lost numerous leaders to the chariot archers as well as to the fast flowing waters of the river. The King of Kadesh was among the attacking force; he barely managed to avoid drowning in the scramble to get back across the river.
As the broken remnants of the Hittite chariot force dragged themselves back across the Orontes River, the Egyptians regrouped at their camp. Late in the afternoon the Ptah division arrived to reinforce the Egypti
ans. Both sides declined to initiate additional operations. The Orontes River, positioned as it was between the two forces, would have put any attacking force at a significant disadvantage. The tactical results of the battle were inconclusive. At the end of the day, the relative position of the two forces had not changed. However both forces were significantly weakened and unable to resume offensive action. The Egyptians had suffered a major setback with the destruction the P’Re division and the assault on the Amun division camp. On the other hand, the cost to the Hittite forces was significant as Ramses’ counterattack, combined with the counterattack of the Ne’arin formation, resulted in the complete rout of the bulk of the Hittite chariot force. Ultimately, however, the battle was a strategic defeat for the Egyptians because they did not achieve their objective— regaining control over the important city of Kadesh.
The battle of Kadesh demonstrates the two most important ways chariots fought in the ancient world and provides a comparison of two different approaches to chariot operations. The Hittite tactic was to use the chariot as a close combat weapon relying on mass, speed, and shock-action to achieve decisive effects. The Egyptian approach was more sophisticated. Egyptian chariots relied on speed and maneuverability to avoid close combat while simultaneously using composite bows to inflict casualties and disrupt formations from secure stand-off distances. The Hittite chariots were particularly vulnerable to this fire because the horses were a much easier and, in many ways, more lucrative target than the crews or infantry. A downed Hittite horse effectively stopped the entire chariot system including the three-man crew. One arrow would not have nearly the same effect when fired at an infantry formation or even at a chariot crewman. Once the chariot system stopped, chariot runners or infantry easily dealt with the crew. The battle clearly shows that Egyptian chariots had little difficulty dispatching a superior number of heavy chariots, despite the Hittite’s initial advantage of surprise. Firepower was clearly superior to shock action.
The battle of Kadesh eventually resulted in compromise: a mutually agreed sphere of influence for the Egyptian and Hittite kingdoms. This balance of power remained stable for about a hundred years, until around 1200 BC, when the entire region was threatened by an invasion of a group called by scholars the Sea People. The Sea People forced Egypt out of Palestine, and the Levant, and back to Egypt proper. The Hittite army, built around the offensive chariot, was not able to resist invasion. The Sea People swept away the chariot empire of the Hittites, although they did not replace it. The power vacuum in the central Middle East was filled by a new empire that, like the Hittite, was backed by a horse-centric army.24
THE ASSYRIANS
The Assyrians acquired a chariot tradition directly from the Mitanni, of whom they were a vassal kingdom. Around 1250 BC they successfully defeated the Mitanni, and with the demise of the Hittites, the Assyrians became the dominant power in the central Middle East. The chariot was vital to their army, and they adopted the Egyptian chariot battle tactics. The Assyrians are particularly important in the history of the war horse because it was during their dominance of the Middle East that the transition from chariot to cavalry took place.
Assyrian charioteers, like their Hittite and Egyptian counterparts, were the elite of the army, the favored arm of the nobility, and the decisive arm of battle. The Assyrian king went to battle in his war chariot. The Assyrians were an infantry-based army with chariots serving as an elite arm that was carefully employed to achieve victory. As in previous times, the chariot was an expensive vehicle to build and operate, and it had limitations that could be exploited by the enemy.
The transition from chariot to horse and rider was a function of two factors: cost and maneuverability. Cost may have been particularly important to the Assyrians who in the early period of the kingdom relied entirely on an agricultural economy. The kingdom did not possess a wealth of natural resources such as iron and wood. As these materials had to be imported, they were expensive and difficult to obtain rapidly, thus increasing the costs and difficulty of building and maintaining chariots.
With regard to maneuverability, Assyrian chariots more closely resembled the heavy chariots of the Hittites, rather than the light, nimble chariots of the Egyptians. They were more durable, but less maneuverable. Assyria’s heartland was the upper Tigris River, and the kingdom’s borders offered no significant natural barriers to potential invading forces. The terrain beyond the borders to the North and East was mountainous, thus affording sanctuary to raiders. For this reason the Assyrian army frequently campaigned in rough terrain north against the Urartu Kingdom and east against the Elam. Campaigning in difficult terrain damaged and restricted the maneuverability of the Assyrian chariots.
Because of the limitations on the chariot, the Assyrians were forced to consider a cost-effective substitute. They gradually adopted the idea of a chariotless chariot system—that is, the chariot itself was eliminated, but the crew and the horses were retained. By the early ninth century BC, the Assyrians had formed the first formally organized cavalry force. The Assyrian cavalry first relegated chariots to a supporting arm, then to transport vehicles, and ultimately to a military anachronism used exclusively in military ceremonies.
Assyrian cavalry operated in teams of two men. The leader was the archer and his partner the shield man. In combat they rode side by side, the archer firing his composite bow, while the shield man held both horses’ reins and protected the riders. This system, though somewhat awkward in combat, was less expensive, more mobile, faster, and offered similar firepower capability to the chariot system. Other Middle Eastern kingdoms soon followed the Assyrian example, and chariots rapidly disappeared from the ancient battlefield.
The early Assyrian cavalry, under the reign of Ashurnasipal II (884–859 BC), was not a perfect weapons system, however. Horsemanship was in its infancy
and the accepted riding technique was a carry-over from generations of riding donkeys. The position of the rider was to the rear of the horse, over his loins—the accepted position for riding donkeys because of their low withers and the low carriage of their head and neck.25 The horse was controlled by reins connected to a snaffle bit. The rider rode bareback and barefooted. He maintained his position on the horse primarily through gripping the horse’s back with his knees. This awkward position was unstable for the rider, made cantering impractical, and hindered using the bow.
By the reign of Tiglath-Pilser III (744–727 BC), the Assyrian cavalry had made tremendous strides in its horsemanship, and consequently, cavalry’s utility as a military force. Assyrian reliefs from the time illustrate the rider sitting forward on the horse, with the leg position dropped in order to grip the belly of the horse with the lower leg, while the upper leg grips with the thigh. Improved horsemanship permitted more accurate use of the bow and the addition of a short sword and a lance to the horseman’s arsenal, making him a more versatile threat on the battlefield. His position on the horse also permitted comfortable and secure riding at the canter. During this period, the cavalryman also began to wear scale armor. Stone reliefs of Assyrian horsemen from the reign of Ashurbanipal (668–627 BC) show leggings on the rider’s lower leg and scale armor on the horse. Assyrian cavalry began to represent the embodiment of all-purpose cavalry as it would appear in most tribes and empires of the ancient world: a horse and rider lightly armored, equipped with bow, sword, and lance, positioned forward on the horse, riding bareback or with just a cloth or skin between the rider and horse, and controlling the horse through a snaffle bit.26
The Assyrian empire fell toward the end of the seventh century BC as it was pressured by the Medes and the Scythians in the north and from Babylonia to the south. Nineveh, the capital of Assyria, was captured and destroyed in 612 BC essentially bringing the kingdom to an end.27 The Scythians, who were influential in the downfall of the Assyrians, rose to prominence in their place. In fact, they became the first of the steppe nomadic horse peoples to organize their significant military skills to undertake offensive operati
ons against the sedentary empires of Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. Though they were the first, they would not be the last.
With the fall of the Assyrians, in the middle of the first millennia BC, the ancient world was left with three major power centers. The Persian Empire rose in the Tigris and Euphrates valley and eventually encompassed all the land that had once been Babylonia, Assyria, Mitanni, and Hittite. The Greek city-states expanded and became the most influential power on the Aegean and the Mediterranean coasts. From the European steppes, the Scythians pushed down on both sides of the Black Sea into Anatolia. Inevitably, these powers would clash. Two of these empires relied heavily on the horse in their military systems. Thus the cavalry would prove to be a crucial element in these historic confrontations.
Chapter Two
CAVALRY ARMIES
A great horse, in a sense, becomes a king. It is not surprising that kings were made by the first great horses.—JOHN KEEGAN, A History of Warfare
The Assyrians demonstrated that powerful cavalry forces were an important component of an effective military system that could not only win battles but also conquer territory. The Persians, who came to dominate the Middle East and built their army around an even more powerful cavalry force, inherited that precedent. Their main opponents, the Greeks, had an effective military system also but built around the heavily armored infantry soldier—the hoplite. The Greeks, however, were not conquerors. Their military system focused on winning battles, not waging campaigns. This changed when Macedonia, with its very capable cavalry arm, became the dominant Greek state. The Macedonians added effective cavalry to the already proven hoplite tradition. This addition created an army that was capable of winning both battles and campaigns and was perhaps the most capable military of the ancient world.