War Horse

by Louis A. DiMarco

  Once in contact, the Mongol force approached the enemy in five parallel lines facing the enemy. Scout detachments, deployed in a thin line of skirmishers, advanced well forward and to the flanks of the main lines. The troops in each line aligned tightly stirrup to stirrup. The first two lines consisted of heavy cavalry while horse archers made up the following three lines. As much as 200 yards separated the lines themselves. As the formation approached maximum bow range, the heavy cavalry created gaps in their formation permitting the first line of horse archers to pass to the front and charge. As the first line of horse archers passed through, the heavy cavalry closed ranks behind them and charged. The rear ranks of horse archers may have halted at this point. The lead rank of horse archers, turned obliquely across the front of the enemy formation firing rapidly as they moved. The rear ranks of archers elevated their bows and fired indirectly into the enemy formation over the heads of the charging archers and the heavy cavalry. As the lead rank of horse archers turned away from the enemy formation the heavy cavalry charge with its lances and armored horses crashed into the now disrupted enemy formation.

  The heavy cavalry charge was the decisive point in the attack. The archers set the conditions for success. As Di Plano Carpioni noted, the purpose of the archer was to wear down the enemy: “only when the men and horses are worn down by arrows, do they come to close quarters.” The attack speed was described as a “wolf lope” but probably was a slow controlled canter. During the approach the Mongols maintained silence throughout the formation. As the unit broke into the gallop for the culmination of the attack, a great kettledrum that accompanied the commander beat the tempo of the attack and the attacking cavalry gave a war yell. The shout and drum, coming after the silent approach, was calculated to create terror in the enemy formation.53

  The ability of the Mongol cavalry to attack was facilitated by one of its most effective tactics: the feigned retreat. This tactic was a favorite of horse-archer armies. It took advantage of the horse archer’s tactical mobility and firepower. It also indicated a sophisticated understanding of the psychology of combat. The horse-archer attack was designed to infuriate as well as damage the adversary. The archers played upon the inability of many enemies to return fire and timed their retreat to take advantage of the enemy’s desire to close with them in hand-to-hand combat. The feigned withdraw caused the enemy to break from their tight defensive formation and expose themselves as they pursued the retreating horse men. This set the enemy up for a surprise cavalry charge as well as ambush by concealed archer attacks from the flanks. The feigned retreat caused the enemy cavalry to exhaust their horses making them vulnerable to countercharge by rested Mongol cavalry.

  The Mongol army followed a campaign cycle that was unusual for most horse-powered armies. The preferred campaign season, unlike European armies, was the winter.54 The Mongols did not like the spring season because swollen rivers and heavy rains inhibited their mobility. The summer season was used to build their logistics base, train, and most important, get their horses fit. Campaigning began with the first hard freeze. In winter the rivers were frozen, so instead of being obstacles to operational-level mobility, they could be crossed easily or could be used as highways along which the steppe horse armies could move rapidly. While the weather confined other armies in their bases, the ability of the Mongol horses to forage grass from under the snow allowed them to stay in the field. The goal of Mongol campaigns was to achieve the campaign objective by spring. Another characteristic of the Mongol campaigns was operational and strategic vision and patience. No other armies before, and few since, could match the Mongol armies ability to visual a campaign conducted over several years in pursuit of a strategic objective. Additionally, the Mongol leaders were also able to visualize how several simultaneous campaigns, each covering great expanses of space and time, fit together to achieve strategic ends.

  STEPPE CAVALRY AT WAR: THE INVASION OF EUROPE

  Analyzing individual battles does much to increase our understanding of how the employment of horses and riders led to victory. However, analyzing the Mongol army in battle does not completely demonstrate how and why the Mongol cavalry conquered the world. To understand the capability of the Mongol cavalry requires an analysis of the cavalry army on a complete campaign. The Mongol army was one of the first to wage war on the scale of campaigns rather than battles. One of the most important and effective campaigns executed by the Mongols was the invasion of Europe conducted between 1237 and 1242.

  The Reconnaissance

  The idea for a campaign to the west was conceived by the great Mongol general Subotai who approached Genghis Khan at the conclusion of the Khwarizmian campaign and suggested that he and General Jebe be permitted to conduct a long reconnaissance of the region west of the Caspian Sea to investigate the reports of “narrow-faced men with light hair and blue eyes.” The Khan gave his permission for the 30,000-man force to embark on the mission with the condition that it return to Mongolia within three years.55

  The reconnaissance force consisted of three tumen, two under the command of Subotai, and the other under the command of Jebe: a total of about 30,000 men. The entire force was under Subotai’s command. The force spent the summer of 1220 in northern Persia south of the Caspian Sea and then marched north in the winter of 1220–21. For two years the Mongols moved steadily across the steppe, noting the conditions of the land and people, establishing an intelligence network, and defeating several European and tribal armies despite being outnumbered. In late 1223 Subotai’s and Jebe’s forces rejoined the main army of Genghis Khan near the Aral Sea. The “men with light hair and blue eyes”—Russians—were mystified by the force that had assaulted them. One Russian commented, “We do not know where these evil Tartars came from nor where they went.”56

  This Mongol reconnaissance was one of the greatest cavalry raids of all time. Subotai’s force traveled more than 5,500 miles over three years and fought a dozen successful battles against superior numbers. Most important, they brought back the information that there existed a steppe corridor from central Asia to the doorstep of Europe sufficient to sustain the invasion of a large cavalry army. Additionally, Subotai left behind a network of spies and messengers that continued to update the Mongols on the political and military events of the region.

  The Conquest of Russia

  Based on the information provided by Subotai and his intelligence network, the Mongols put together an extensive plan for the invasion of Europe. The invasion plan envisioned seizing all of Europe from the Urals to the Atlantic. The first phase was to conquer all the land to the end of the steppe. In subsequent phases, the army would move on its own schedule in a systematic conquest of Europe, one region at a time. The conquest of China would be the model. The plan required an army of 150,000 men and would take between 16 and 18 years to complete. The new Khan, Ogedei, appointed a grandson of Genghis, Batu Khan, to command the expedition. Subotai would be second in command and the chief planner.57

  The offensive into Europe was only one of several operations undertaken simultaneously by the Mongols, but it was the primary task in the summer of 1236. The Mongols assembled several units of Chinese and Persian engineers to operate siege equipment. The core of the army was 50,000 veteran Mongol horsemen. Conquered central Asian steppe tribes supplied another 50,000 or more troops. Because they shared the basic horse and archery skills necessary to be part of the Mongol military system, the incorporation of these tribes into the army was relatively easy. Just as the original eastern steppe tribes were broken up to form tumen, the Mongols distributed the central Asian tribesmen among new mingghan and tumen, all officered by veteran Mongols. The army spent the summer of 1236 training and fattening their horses for the coming winter campaign.

  In the fall of 1236 Subotai led a small contingent of the army to systematically conquer the land of the Bulgars and other unconquered steppe tribes east of the Volga River.58 In the early winter of 1237 the main army under Batu Khan crossed the Volga River and mov
ed northwest. The plan was to capture the northern Russian principalities first. This would eliminate any flank threat to the main thrust west across the steppe. The campaign to subdue northern Russia relied on speed to defeat the disunit-ed Russian princes before they understood the threat and could unite in defense.

  The first to fall were the Russian cities of the Riazan principality. The Mongols captured the towns of Riazan, Pronsk, and Kolomna in a matter of weeks. In all cases the Mongol attacks were ruthless. The Russians built their northern cities within a wooden palisade that was hardly a challenge to the Chinese and Persian engineers. They assembled the light catapults from their pack horses and easily breached the walls. Then Mongol cavalry rode through the breach shooting and slaying without regard to age or gender. They put the entire citizenry of the pillaged towns to the sword as part an intentional strategy of creating terror among the population. The only survivors were those deliberately spared and allowed to escape in order to spread the word of the approaching invaders.

  The destruction of the cities of Riazan demonstrated to the Grand Duke of Suzdalia, the most powerful of the northern princes, the danger approaching, but this knowledge did nothing to slow the Mongol advance. In February 1238 Moscow fell to the invaders, followed in early March by the capital city of Vladimir where the royal family of Suzdalia died along with all the other city inhabitants. The army then split into two formations. Half of the army under Batu Khan proceeded northwest with the objective of capturing northern Russia’s most prosperous city, Novgorod. The other half of the army, under Subotai, moved north to destroy the last remaining Russian army under the Grand Duke. Batu’s advance continued to be irresistible as the towns of Dmitrov, Tyer, and Torzhok all fell to the Mongols. However, Torzhok took two weeks to capture, and at the completion of the siege the spring thaw came and turned the 60 miles between Batu and Novgorod into a marshy mass of swollen rivers and muddy fields. Meanwhile Subotai surrounded and destroyed the army of the Grand Duke. With the changing season Batu called a temporary halt to the campaign, and the Mongol army moved south.

  In the summer of 1238, Batu Khan’s army established itself in the Don River basin in what is today western Ukraine. There the army received new horses and recruits for the losses it suffered. The army rested and trained on the banks of the Don for 18 months, regaining its strength and planning the second phase of the conquest of Russia. The Mongols began the 1240 campaign by marching west into the Russian provinces of Pereiaslav and Chernigov. Following the east bank of the Dnieper River north, the Mongols sacked the province capitals of Pereiaslav and Chernigov before turning their attention to Kiev, the cultural and religious center of Russia. In November 1240, the Mongols attacked Kiev, breaching its one wooden gate and gaining entry into the city. Once inside the city the battle was over. The Mongols proceeded street by street, methodically killing the citizens and burning the wooden buildings to the ground, and plundered the accumulated relics of the Russian church. Kiev was the final Russian stronghold, and after destroying the city the Mongols advanced west, virtually unopposed, to the borders of Hungary.

  The Conquest of Poland and Hungary

  The conquest of western Russia was the opening move in a very complex plan to conquer Hungary, the most powerful kingdom in Eastern Europe. The future conquest of central Europe would make use of Hungary as the main operational base. Batu Khan had an army of about 100,000 at his disposal for the operation. The plan for Hungary called for a major diversionary attack into Poland to prevent forces moving from Poland to reinforce King Bela IV of Hungary, while the main army crossed the Carpathian Mountains in three widely separated march columns. The columns would then unite at point to be designated east of the Danube River.

  The diversionary attack into Poland consisted of two tumen under the command of the princes Baidar and Kadan. They moved out in the middle of the winter of 1240–41 and struck the Polish city of Lublin in February. Lublin fell with little resistance. The Mongols then crossed the frozen Vistula River and captured the city of Sandomir. By late February, the Mongols had still not encountered a major Polish army, and the princes were concerned about successfully accomplishing their mission of preventing Polish reinforcement of Hungary. To increase their ability to locate the Polish army the two commanders decided on the bold move of dividing their relatively small force in half. Kadan and his tumen of 10,000 men struck north while Baidar and his similar size force continued west toward Cracow.

  At Cracow the Mongols feigned retreat and lured the army of Vladimir, the Palatine of Sandomir and Cracow, out from the city walls. Eleven miles from the city the Mongols turned on the Poles and destroyed them in a hail of arrows. Hearing the news of the defeat, the citizens of Cracow abandoned the city and, on March 24, 1241, the Mongols arrived and pillaged and burned it. Baidar and Kadan continued their advances, destroying villages and towns as they marched. Ultimately the two tumen linked up at Breslau. There they prepared for a siege when scouts reported that a large Polish army was near. Breaking off the siege the Mongols raced to meet the army of Henry of Silesia.

  Henry of Silesia assembled an army of 25,000 at the town of Liegnitz with the intent of going to the aid of the king of Hungary. Duke Henry’s army was an assort-ed collection of peasant levies and men-at-arms. His best troops were the knights of his own retinue as well as a sizable contingent of Teutonic knights under their Prussian landmeister, Poppo von Osterna. In addition there were small contingents of Templar and Hospitaller knights. Backing up the mounted men-at-arms were contingents of infantry levies from Poland, Silesia, and German gold miners from Silesia. The European levies were poorly armed with field tools. In size the Europeans had a slight advantage, but that was the only advantage they had.

  The Mongol army attacked with a mingghan advance guard of 1,000 archers. Henry deployed with his cavalry in front, backed up by his infantry levies. As the Mongol advance guard moved forward Henry ordered his Silesian cavalry to charge and disperse the archers. Several volleys of arrows met the advancing Silesians forcing them to retreat. Henry then ordered the Polish cavalry and the Teutonic knights forward. These units closed with the archers and began to push them back. Henry then committed his last mounted force, his personal guard and the Templars. As they rode forward the Mongol advance guard retreated.

  The retreat of the Mongol advance guard was a carefully timed maneuver. As the European cavalry pursued the retreating archers, the Mongol heavy cavalry moved forward and countercharged the advancing Europeans. Mongol catapults fired smoke pots behind the European cavalry creating a haze that separated the battle from the infantry levies to the rear. Also, fresh mingghans of archers moved to both flanks and poured a devastating fire into the flanks of the attacking European cavalry. Attacked from three sides the European cavalry suffered tremendous casualties and broke and ran from the battlefield pursued by the Mongols. The Mongol archers then advanced through the smoke and attacked the almost defenseless infantry. Showers of arrows systematically destroyed the hapless formations. Henry tried to escape the battlefield, but archers rode him down and killed him and his attendants. There were few survivors of Henry’s army.

  Ironically, unknown to Henry but tracked by Mongol scouts, a 50,000-man strong European army under Wenceslas of Bohemia was less then a day’s march away and moving to join Henry. The Mongol commanders were aware of the intentions of Wenceslas and executed their attack knowing that if they delayed the combined European armies would be too strong for them to confront. After the battle, in the face of Wenceslas’s large army, the Mongol force broke apart into small contingents and continued to raid throughout the month of April to ensure that Wenceslas did not move to the aid of Hungary. In May, with their mission a success, they retreated to the Danube and rejoined the main Mongol army.

  As Baidar and Kadan caused chaos in Poland, the three columns of the main army completed their crossing of the Carpathians. The main army, 70,000 strong, advanced toward the city of Pest on the east bank of the Danube River. Th
e Mongol army remained within sight of Pest until word came that the northern diversion was successful and no reinforcements would be arriving in Hungary. With that knowledge, Batu Khan began to withdraw his army east toward the Sajo River. The withdrawal to the Sajo River was a carefully thought-out and planned maneuver designed to place the Hungarian army in a position where it could be destroyed.

  Upon arriving at the river the Mongols crossed on a single bridge, moved an additional ten miles, and then encamped in wooded hills. The Hungarian army followed the retreating Mongols to the river crossing. King Bela ordered a strong reconnaissance force across the bridge, and they reported that the far side of the river was clear of any sign of the Mongols. The bulk of King Bela’s 100,000-man army made camp on the west side of the river inside a fortified wagon laager.

  During the night the Mongol army came out of its hidden positions and Batu Khan led a force of 40,000 back to the Sajo River crossing. As the Hungarian army woke up on the morning of April 11, 1241, the Mongols attacked the force on the east bank of the river. The small Hungarian security force on the east bank repulsed the initial attack against the bridge. This bought time for the Hungarians to form a battle line on the west bank and withdraw their force from the east bank. The Hungarians easily repulsed several Mongol attacks across the narrow span. Batu then brought up seven catapults that fired into the massed ranks of the defenders on the west bank. Taking advantage of the confusion caused by the artillery fire, the Mongols forced the crossing of the bridge and established a foothold on the west bank. The Mongols slowly expanded their foothold while repelling repeated counterattacks by the Hungarian army. Mongol casualties were heavy, nonetheless Batu began to thin his ranks in order to lengthen his line and encircle the Hungarians. This was a risky maneuver as the Mongol line was already hard pressed to hold its position.