By the early eighteenth century, two thoroughly modern types of saddle designs developed. One was a very deep curved seat which sloped gracefully down from the rounded pommel and then up to the cantle. The other was a very flat seat in which the pommel and the cantle rose almost vertically from the seat. Both types had a wooden frame built on a pair of short padded wooden side bars which lifted the saddle off direct contact with the horse’s spine. Saddles included a leather flap that laid between the leg and the girth, and some designs included a sweat flap between the girth and the horse’s body. Buckles under the saddle flap attached the girth to the saddle. A folded wool blanket placed under the saddle prevented rubbing against the horse. Adjusting the folding of the blanket ensured the proper fit of the saddle to the horse’s body. The need to attach pistol holsters, coats, water bottles, and a variety of other essential field gear required additional buckles and fasteners placed about the pommel and cantle. In the last quarter of the eighteenth century a leather-lined cloth or sheepskin covering called a shabraque covered the saddle. The shabraque protected the saddle from the elements and added additional comfort to the seat. Usually the shabraque displayed intricately designed regimental or royal markings. By the middle of the eighteenth century both types of saddle seats were in use in all the European armies, and all were very modern looking. In fact, the British army saddle used at the end of the eighteenth century was not significantly different in its essential design from the Universal Pattern (UP) saddle model 1912 issued to British troopers in the First World War. British army ceremonial mounted units continue to use this model saddle today.58
EARLY MODERN CAVALRY IN BATTLE
The capabilities and employment of cavalry evolved greatly over the early modern period of warfare. A study of how two great captains of the period, Gustavus Adolphus and Frederick the Great, integrated cavalry into battle, reveals how commanders used the capabilities of the war horse and rider to influence battle.
Lützen, 1632
King Gustavus Adolphus landed in Germany with his Swedish Army in 1630 and won a string of victories culminating at Breitenfeld in 1631.59 He built a reputation as an unbeatable tactician, and Protestant forces flocked to his banner. In the spring of 1632, he launched a new campaign determined to follow up his successes of the previous year. His goal was to knock the Hapsburg Empire’s ally, Bavaria, out of the war. However, the campaign did not go well as the Imperial resistance under their accomplished commander, Albrecht Eusebius von Wallenstein, was much more significant than anticipated. The two armies met and fought an inconclusive battle at Alte Feste in September 1632 then broke contact and maneuvered for advantage. Neither side had good intelligence of either their opponent’s size or intentions.
In early November, Wallenstein concentrated his forces in Saxony, well north of the Swedish army which was still operating in Bavaria. His goal was to eliminate Saxony from the Protestant coalition and to cut the Swedish direct line of communications to north Germany. In response Gustav march his army north, covering over 375 miles in 17 days. Throughout November, the two armies maneuvered and skirmished in Saxony. Finally Wallenstein came to the incorrect conclusion that Adolphus did not want to give battle and that the Swedes were preparing to go into winter quarters. The Imperial army then made preparations to do the same. Capitalizing on Wallenstein’s inaccurate analysis, on November 15 Adolphus moved his army toward Lützen with the intent of catching the Imperial army scattered in its winter cantonments. The plan was to engage the scattered Imperial forces piecemeal and defeat them through sheer weight of numbers. As he marched to Lützen, a small Imperial group commanded by Rudolf Freiherr von Colloredo intercepted Adolphus’s army at the Rippach River. The small Imperial force had no hope of stopping the Swedish army, but they fought an inspired delaying action while dispatching messengers to sound the alarm to the rest of the Imperial forces. Adolphus’s intent was to push on and destroy the Imperial army the next day. The lost time at the crossing, however, allowed Wallenstein to take steps to assemble the Imperial army, completely changing the tactical situation.
All through the night and into the morning of November 16 the Imperial army alerted units and put them on the road to Lützen. At about 5:00 a.m. the Swedish army awoke and began the short march to Lützen. At about 8:30 a.m. Imperial forces spotted the Swedes, and by 9:00 a.m. the Swedish army knew they were confronting a tired but mostly assembled Imperial army on the outskirts of the town. The only major Imperial force not assembled at Lützen was Feldmarschal Gottfried Heinrich Graf zu Pappenheim’s corps. This 6,000-man force was stilling moving to join Wallenstein when the battle began.
The armies that met at Lützen were not the heavy cavalry dominated armies of Medieval times, but rather balanced forces consisting of infantry, artillery, and cavalry forces. The Swedish army numbered 20,000 of which 6,000 were cavalry, 30 percent of the force. The Swedish cavalry, like the army, was a composite force that consisted of both Swedish and Germany forces. The best cavalry were the Swedish regiments. The Swedish cavalry were not heavily armored and relied on the sword as their attack weapon. The allied German cavalry were of different types. The most important were cuirassiers who wore plate armor and fought with their pistols. The Imperial army numbered 13,500 of which 5,000 were cavalry of different types, a total of 37 percent of the force. Pappenheim’s force was another 6,000 men of which half were cavalry. The Imperial cavalry were of three types: cuirassiers, mounted harquebusiers, and Croatian light cavalry. The cuirassiers were the most important and capable. They occupied all the most forward positions. The harquebusiers could be of value except most of them were inexperienced. The Croatian light cavalry were capable scouts and raiders but not capable of contributing to the main battle.
In the fog of the early morning, the Swedish army could observe the Imperial army deployed in a battle line along the Lützen to Leipzig road. The right of the Imperial line anchored on a mud-brick wall that surrounded the town of Lützen. Musketeers deployed within the mud wall were able to fire through loopholes in the wall. Within 200 yards of the wall, next to three large windmills, the Imperials positioned the main Imperial artillery battery of 13 large-caliber guns. The center of the battle line consisted of five large formations of pikes and muskets. The left flank of the infantry anchored their position on a seven-gun artillery battery located near the road ditch. The Imperial cavalry echeloned to the right and left rear of the main infantry formations in positions to protect the flanks. The second battle line, positioned about 200 yards to the rear, consisted of two infantry pike formations and several additional squadrons of cavalry. In front of the main Imperial positions, musketeers deployed as skirmishers in the ditches that ran on both sides of the Leipzig road. In addition, Croatian light cavalry deployed across the front of the army and on both flanks. The most vulnerable portion of the Imperial position was the open left flank where no natural obstacle existed to aid the defenders. The flank had a heavy cavalry presence but no infantry. To compensate for this weakness Wallenstein created a mock infantry position using baggage drivers and camp followers.
The Swedish army deployed slowly because of the fog and because of difficulty crossing the Flossgraben stream that lay between them and the Imperials. By mid-morning, they formed about 700 yards south of the Imperial army in two battle lines though not all of their artillery was in position. The first battle line consisted of an infantry center with four pike and musket brigades. The right flank infantry brigade was the Swedish brigade and to its right were deployed six squadrons of Swedish cavalry with supporting companies of musketeers. On the left flank of the army were six squadrons of the German cavalry supported by musketeers. The second battle line was virtually identical to the first. Four infantry brigades made up the center while cavalry squadrons occupied both wings. The major difference between the first and second battle lines was that the second line cavalry were less numerous and were not supported by musketeers.
The battle began at around 10:00 a.m. with an
artillery duel between the two sides. Infantry and cavalry formations stood their ground and endured the fire. During the artillery exchange Gustavus moved three squadrons of cavalry from his second rank far out to his right flank to guard against a flanking attack. Also during this period, Wallenstein had the town of Lützen put to the torch in order to deny its use to the enemy. Smoke from the burning buildings was blown directly across the battlefield replacing the morning fog, obscuring the entire area. At 11:00 a.m., Gustavus ordered the first battle forward to attack.
The Swedish battle line stepped off as a unit to attack: a single line one-and-a-half miles long. The reserve line followed but remained 500 to 600 yards back. As the army advanced smoke enveloped it, and the battle dissolved into three separate attacks: right wing, center, and left wing.
The right wing attack was made by six regiments of Gustavus’s elite Swedish cavalry supported by five 200-man companies of musketeers. The Swedes advanced with regiments on line, each regiment ranked three horses deep. Gustavus advanced with the right wing cavalry and could identify the Croatian light cavalry to his front and behind them the Imperial cuirassiers. He gave orders accordingly: “As for those fellowes [the Croatian light cavalry] I care not for them, but charge me those blacke fellowes soundly: for they are the men that will undoe us.”60 As the Swedish cavalry line approached the Leipzig road they found that the ditches on either side, in addition to filled with enemy musketeers, were also impassable to the horses. Therefore, the squadrons turned east, away from the main battle area looking for a place to cross. The Croat light cavalry dispersed without engaging the Swedes. The accompanying Swedish musketeers took on the task of capturing the ditches and the Leipzig road.
The six squadrons of Swedish cavalry managed to find a place to cross the road. The smoke on the battlefield made observation difficult, and the right wing front line commander, Överste Torsten Stålhandske, led the three lead squadrons in an attack against the mock position of baggage drivers. The other three squadrons turned toward the Imperial cavalry and met in a confusion of charge, countercharge, and melee in the midst of the smoke. Rittmeister Octavio Piccolomini, commanding one of the Imperial cuirassier squadrons, claimed that the successful stand of the Imperial cavalry on the left was largely due to “the blessed Madonna and their cuirasses of proof.”61 It was during this action that Gustavus, traveling with one of the trail squadrons and not wearing any armor, was killed. The Imperial cuirassiers repulsed the Swedish cavalry attack.
As the Imperials beat back the three squadrons from the immediate left flank of the Imperial army, Stålhandske assembled the other three squadron for a much deeper attack on the flank. After scattering the fake baggage wagon position, he was in a good position to circle behind and attack the Imperial rear. At this point, about noon, most of the cavalry component of Pappenheim’s corps arrived—several squadrons, totaling 2,000 horses, led by Pappenheim himself. Immediately Pappenheim led a countercharge against Stålhandske’s Swedes. He also dispatched his Croatian light cavalry on a wide-flanking movement to attempt to get around the Swedish flank. Both attacks failed. Swedish musketeers and regimental guns that had caught up with Stålhandske’s cavalry defeated Pappenheim’s main attack. The three Protestant squadrons of the second line sent to secure the far right flank just before the battle began thwarting the Croatians flanking effort. Though unsuccessful in pushing the Swedes back, the attacks fixed the Swedish attack and stabilized the situation on the Imperial left wing. Stålhandske later moved his force back across the Leipzig road when word came of Gustavus’s death.
On the Swedish left flank, the allied German cavalry, commanded by Duke Bernhard of Sachsen-Weimar, advanced in good order to the Leipzig road. Neither the Croatian light cavalry or the musketeers in the road ditch gave them any problems. They then trotted forward into the four squadrons of the Imperial right wing cavalry. The Imperial cuirassiers had determined to meet the Protestant charge at the halt. As the two forces closed, the Germans put the steel of their swords against the aimed pistol fire of the Imperials. A fierce melee then resulted with the Protestant cavalry having to deal with the Imperial cavalry as well as musketeers firing at their rear and flank from the mud-brick city wall of Lützen. One Imperial squadron of mounted harquebusiers routed, but the Imperial cuirassiers stood firm. Eventually, the Protestant cavalry broke off the attack and moved back across the road to reform. Both sides suffered heavy casualties.
Bernhard reformed his squadrons and brought forth several squadrons of the left wing second line. He then renewed his attack. Bernhard’s reinforced cavalry had the advantage of numbers and began to push back the Imperial cuirassiers and to overlap the right flank of the Imperial line. However, before the completion of the decisive flanking movement, Heinrich Holk, Wallenstein’s second in command and most-trusted subordinate, arrived with Pappenheim’s cavalry who he had rallied. He led a countercharge into the left flank of Bernhard’s cavalry and began to push them back. This was a pistol charge executed at the trot. Holk’s countercharge had the advantage of numbers, a flank position, and the energy of fresh horses and troopers. This attack pushed Bernhard’s cavalry back across the Leipzig road for the second time.
By 3:00 p.m. the Imperials had successfully survived cavalry attacks on both flanks. In the center, the Imperial artillery and infantry had also held firm against the enemy musket and pike brigades. The Imperial artillery, in particular the windmill battery, had devastated the attacking infantry formations. The battle paused as the Swedish and allied German commanders reformed and prepared for a final assault.
When the new assault came, about 3:30 p.m., it consisted of the fresh brigades of the Swedish second line that had not been committed in the earlier attacks. The battle renewed in the manner of the previous fighting. The two cavalry forces fought on the wings to attempt to clear the enemy’s horse from the field. Neither was successful. Piccolomini, emerging as the leader of the left wing Imperial cavalry, had six horses shot out from under him and was wounded five times. His cuirassier squadron made 10 separate charges and suffered 200 killed or wounded of the 500 who started the battle. On the Swedish side, Bernhard’s German squadron had attacked 15 times and barely mounted 50 troopers of the 500 who started the battle. Though the Imperial line was never broken, the weight of the Protestant attack slowly pushed it back. Finally, as dark closed in on the battlefield, the protestant infantry captured the Imperial windmill battery that had been the mainstay of the defense. With that triumph, fighting gradually diminished and then ended. Both sides were emotionally and physically exhausted. In the dark, the Swedes withdrew back across the Leipzig road. In the darkness Pappenheim’s infantry arrived as reinforcements, and the Imperial commanders argued for an attack at first light. Wallenstein vetoed the option and ordered his army to withdraw. The next morning the Swedish army was in possession of the battlefield.
Although generally thought of as a Protestant victory, Lützen was a curious battle in which bought sides could and did argue for the right of claiming victory. The reality was that at the tactical level the battle was a draw. Swedish losses were about 1,500 dead and another 3,500 wounded. Imperial casualties were about 3,000 total dead and wounded. A the operational level the Swedish army achieved its objective of pushing Wallenstein out of Saxony, and, having lost all its artillery, Wallenstein’s army was no longer a viable combat force. Strategically, the battle’s major consequence was the loss of Gustavus Adolphus, the Protestant’s most brilliant commander and the focus of political unity for Protestant forces.
The battle demonstrated some important points about seventeenth-century cavalry warfare. First, in line with ancient cavalry operations, the battle showed that without cavalry success on the flanks, battle devolved into an infantry slugfest which was both costly, and often, as in this case, indecisive. The inability of the Swedish army to overcome the Imperials despite its numerical superiority, and arguably the tactical superiority of its infantry and artillery, was largely due to the per
formance of the Imperial cavalry. Including Pappenheim’s cavalry, the Imperial cavalry actually outnumbered the Swedes 7,000 to 5,000. The late arrival of the Pappenheim as well as limited effectiveness of the light cavalry components prevented the Imperials from taking the offensive, but their numbers still allowed them to retain control of both flanks throughout the battle—even if just barely. Neither cavalry force appeared to be able to create an offensive capability that was decisive. Numbers are part of the reason. Another reason was the employment of cavalry in small squadrons with little mass. The average squadron size was about 300 men while the largest was 500. The largest concentration of cavalry strength was the charges by Bernhard and Pappenheim, but Bernhard’s force only numbered about 1,500 men and Pappenheim’s about a thousand. Neither had a significant numerical advantage over their opponent. Another reason for the lack of decisive results is that the cavalry maneuvered at the trot and relied extensively on pistols. This eliminated much of the shock value of a charge. Still, without a doubt the outcome of Lützen was directly attributable to the outcome of cavalry battle. It is easy to envision that success by the Swedish cavalry on either flank would have resulted in a catastrophe on the scale of the ancient battle of Cannae. The survival of the Imperial army is directly attributable to the successful defense of the flanks by the Imperial horse squadrons.
Rossbach, 1757
By 1756 Frederick the Great of Prussia had built a substantial military force based on the foundation that his father had given him. That force had been tested in two wars, the First Silesian War (1740–42), and the Second Silesian War (1744–45), and in both instances had bested the respected forces of Austria. In 1756, the Austrians built a coalition to assist them regaining their dominant position in central Europe. Frederick was aware of the negotiations going on between Austria, France, a coalition of German principalities, Sweden, and Russia. Frederick’s only allies were Great Britain and Hanover.62 Frederick determined not to allow the alliance gathering against to him to gain the initiative and he opened the war in 1756 with a preemptive invasion of Saxony.
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