In the spring of 1757 Frederick was again on the march. As Frederick operated in Bohemia, allied armies marched against Prussia from every direction. Faced with multiple threats, Frederick had no choice but to break his army into pieces, each tasked with defending and delaying the enemy while the king looked for an opportunity to attack. The best opportunity for success was in Saxony where the armies of Soubise and Saxe-Hildburghausen were advancing. These two armies were operating together but were not under a single command. In addition, Saxe-Hildburghausen’s army was a composite force made up of single regiments, some newly formed and barely trained, from a variety of different German principalities. This front offered the greatest chance for operational success, and in the early fall of 1757 Frederick moved the army under his command into northern Saxony.
The army of French general Prince de Soubise consisted of about 25,500 men of which 5,500 were cavalry, 22 percent of the force. The cavalry forces were mostly good quality cavalry of the line. Observers saw “well set up men on large, powerful horses. . . . [They] formed a regiment which lived up to the reputation of the French for having a fine-looking cavalry. We have to admit that the mounted arm of the French is in an incomparably better state than that of their infantry.”63 Their appearances aside, the French cavalry tactically still practiced much the same techniques as they had at end of the seventeenth century. Although the regulations of 1755 emphasized shock action, neither troops, horses, or officers had assimilated the new emphasis. Pistols and charging at the trot was still standard. The German army under Saxe-Hildburghausen was much smaller, totaling 10,800 men, of which about 30 percent, 3,300, were cavalry. Some of Saxe-Hildburghausen’s regiments were high quality, notably the Austrian cuirassier and hussar regiments, but most of the German state units were not of the same quality as the French and Austrians. Some of the cavalrymen in the German regiments had never been on a horse before beginning the campaign. These units were barely able to march as a group and were completely incapable of complex maneuvers. Still, in total, the two allied armies numbered almost 40,000 combatants, and though not of the highest quality, they had a significant numerical advantage over the Prussians.
Frederick assembled his army in Saxony by bringing in a variety of dispersed detachments. His army organized into three infantry components, the left and right wings, and the second line, and a cavalry component. The infantry numbered 16,000 while the cavalry counted 4,500, 22 percent of the force. The cavalry consisted of five cuirassier regiments, two dragoon regiments, and two regiments of hussars. Though outnumbered, Frederick’s troops were all superbly trained veterans. Both the cavalry and the infantry were the finest in the world at that time.
On November 5, 1757, the two armies faced each other across two-and-half miles of open rolling terrain. The allies were in their camp south of the town of Mücheln arrayed on line facing east with the German force in the south and the French to the north. The Prussians were also in a camp, between the town of Bedra in the north and Rossbach in the south. Frederick set up his headquarters in Rossbach. Both sides were considering attacking. Frederick had reconnoitered the allied camp and discovered that it was a well-prepared defensive position. He believed his outnumbered army could succeed, but he was in no hurry to attack because he recognized that any attack against the strong defensive position would incur heavy casualties. Saxe-Hildburghausen, though commanding the smaller force, was the senior of the two allied commanders and was also considering attacking. Though he was in a good defensive position, he was concerned that his line of communication to Freyberg, his logistics base, was exposed. He also knew that he outnumbered Frederick and recognized that the exposed left flank of the Prussian force was vulnerable. He convinced the reluctant General Soubise, who had secretly received orders from the French government to begin to disengage from the front, to support his action.
Saxe-Hildburghausen’s plan was simple, aggressive, and tactically sound. He proposed to deploy a screening force in front of his positions, then turn the allied army from its position on line into two columns and march the army south and then east on to the flank of the Prussians. Then it would be a simple matter of halting the army in column, facing to the left (north) and being in the perfect position on line to assault the Prussian left flank. Unfortunately, though a sound plan, the quality of the troops available, as well as the dysfunctional command structure, made it difficult to execute.
The allies determined that the French contingent would lead the army. This required the French to swing behind the Germans and move south. The German contingent would then fall in behind. Once given the order it took the French army three hours to break camp and begin the march. Once they were clear to the south the Germans followed. Neither army was very good at march discipline, and the two march columns got confused and eventually became four. As the armies reached their southern turning point and swung east, further confusion of march units resulted in the formation of a fifth column. Saxe-Hildburghausen rode forward with an advance guard consisting of most of the allied cavalry. Soubise marched with the lead elements of the French army. This left the German regiments further back in the column under their own command.
As the marching armies cleared the town of Zeuchfeld, about 1:00 p.m., Soubise called a halt. He was not enthusiastic about continuing the maneuver and argued for reforming the army in place where it was. The new position covered the road to Freyberg and threatened the Prussian flank. Saxe-Hildburghausen was disgusted with this view. He had reports that the Prussians were retreating and argued for speed in the march to trap the Prussians before they escaped the flanking maneuver. French officers supported Saxe-Hildburghausen and the march continued. Saxe-Hildburghausen continued to move with the advance guard two miles ahead of the marching main body.
As the allies maneuvered, Frederick was enjoying lunch with his generals in Rossbach. His scouts had reported the breaking of the allied camp, but Frederick was sure that the allies were retreating along their line of communications. He did not feel a need to hurry to follow them though he gave orders for a detachment to prepare to do that. As the allies reached Zeuchfeld, observers in Rossbach could see the marching allied infantry turning east. Frederick berated the officer who brought the report. Despite the king’s opinion, General Seydlitz, chief of the Prussian cavalry, sent word for the cavalry to prepare to move. Seeing the cavalry saddling and mounting, the Prussian artillery also prepared to move—all without orders from the king. Soon, after a third messenger arrived indicating that the allied infantry were now on the flank of the Prussian line, the king was finally convinced that the enemy was maneuvering for battle. He immediately dispatched Seydlitz to intercept the allies with the Prussian cavalry. Seydlitz held a quick conference with his commanders, most of whom were senior to him, and famously remarked “Gentlemen, I obey the king, and you obey me!”64 He then led the waiting mounted regiments east out of the Prussian camp.
The allies had stolen a march on the Prussians, and by the time the Prussians were aware of the threat, the allies were almost ready to spring a trap. In these circumstances most eighteenth-century armies would have focused on extracting themselves from the predicament. However, no army in the eighteenth century was as responsive to its commander’s orders as the Prussians, and few commanders were as bold as Frederick. Rather than break camp and extricate his army from the trap that Saxe-Hildburghausen was setting up, Frederick determined to reverse the trap.
It was about 2:30 p.m. when Seydlitz’s cavalry galloped to the east behind the mass of Janus hill. The hill screened his movement from the marching allies. After a move of about three miles, he wheeled his regiments into line and brought them up to the crest of the eastern edge of the ridge. Simultaneously, the Prussian artillery occupied the top of Janus hill facing south where they could see the allied advance guard of cavalry moving east in column formation. Saxe-Hildburghausen could see Prussian hussars to his left flank but assumed they were screening the Prussian retreat that he thought was happen
ing.
Seydlitz calmly formed his seven regiments of 3,300 troopers into two lines. Each regiment formed in two ranks of horsemen. Two cuirassier and one dragoon regiment, 1,500 troops, made up the first line, while the second line consisted of three cuirassier regiments and one dragoon regiment totaling 1,800 men. Seydlitz, ever intolerant of poor horsemanship, observed a captain of one of the cuirassier regiments who was unable to control his horse and was disturbing the ranks. He ordered the captain out of the formation.
The first indication that the allies had of the Prussian threat was the artillery fire into their flank from Janus hill about 3:15 p.m. The allied generals perceived the artillery as covering fire for the Prussian retreat and the allied advance guard continued to move east without changing from their column formation. About the same time, Austrian hussars ranging ahead of the advance guard sent back word that a large force of Prussians was maneuvering against them. Saxe-Hildburghausen’s response to the hussar report was “How can that possibly be. . . . You hussars are useless! A waste of the rations the Empress gives you!”65
At 3:30 p.m. the Prussian artillery ceased fire, and at that moment over the crest of the ridge in front of the allied advance guard trotted the first line of Seydlitz’s cavalry. The commander of the Austrian hussars commented “the enemy cavalry came trotting over the hill, closed up so tightly that there was no interval between squadrons.”66 As the Prussians came on at a trot, Seydlitz, at their head, threw his long-stemmed Dutch pipe in the air to signal the charge. The Prussian cavalry then moved to the gallop with drawn sabers and swept down on the surprised allies.
The allied commanders instantly recognized that the Prussian cavalry attack was a major attack and not a covering move. The lead elements of Austrian cavalry quickly moved from their column formation into line to receive the charge. Supported by Austrian hussars and dragoons, they were partly formed when they met the Prussian first line. This bought time for the German cavalry to advance into the melee and for forward French cavalry to spur forward in support the Austrians. Soubise, to the rear, understood the importance of the cavalry confrontation and led forward additional French cavalry and called for the cavalry reserve. The quick allied reaction checked the initial charge of Seydlitz’s first line. However, as the Prussian and allied cavalry traded sword blows and pistol fire, the Prussian First Hussar Regiment, 1,000 strong, charged. The hussars, who had maneuvered to the southeast, charged into the right rear of the allied cavalry reinforcements as they came up. This attack threw the arriving allied cavalry into confusion. At this point the second and stronger line of Prussian heavy cavalry surged into the battle at a gallop. The melee swirled for perhaps 20 or 30 minutes as several German regiments disintegrated under the Prussian attack, and the others tried vainly to retain their cohesion. Both allied commanders, Soubise and Saxe-Hildburghausen were in the midst of the action, fighting for their lives. Soubise sustained a saber cut to his ear while Saxe-Hildburghausen took a bruising blow across his shoulders from the flat of a Prussian hussar’s saber. Neither was in a position to command the army.
The allied cavalry outnumbered the Prussians almost two to one, but the Prussians had training, discipline, and the shock and momentum of a surprise attack executed at the gallop. The Prussians also launched their attack in mass while the allied cavalry were committed to the fight as individual regiments. Psychologically, the Prussians had a huge advantage, and as the less well trained German regiments broke the psychological advantage increased. Once the two cavalry forces made contact individual combat dominated. Each individual cavalryman had the capability to fight or flee—each cavalryman had to make that judgment for himself. For the Prussian cavalrymen there was no question of their psychological state: they had supreme confidence in their training, their leaders, and their plan—they fought. For the individual allied cavalry the decision was not as clear. The quick disintegration of the German cavalry, the disciplined advance of the Prussians, their enemy’s ability to maneuver with cohesion at the gallop, and the surprise of it all cracked the will of the allied cavalry. The horses took their attitude from their riders. Increasingly the allied horses sensed panic. Within a half hour the entire allied force was broken and streaming to the rear.
The destruction of the allied advance guard and cavalry was only the opening move of the battle. As the Prussian cavalry were setting the tone for the battle, the Prussian infantry were demonstrating the value of the precision drill for which they were world famous. They had broken camp formed on line behind the western edge of the Janus hill, and as the cavalry drove the allied advance guard from the field, they marched over the western portion of the hill. They then pivoted on the town of Lunstadt and conducted a massive wheel to put themselves on line astride the advance of the main body of the allied army.
As the enemy cavalry fled from the field the Prussian cavalry did not pursue. Instead, Seydlitz recalled his cavalry and moved them to the south of the town of Tagewerben where they were reformed into their original two battle lines out of sight, but no more than a thousand yards from the flank of the advancing allied infantry columns. The allied infantry knew that a disaster had occurred to the advance guard and the cavalry from the stream of refugees flooding past their columns. However, leaderless, they were not in a position to understand the scope of the disaster, the enemy maneuvers, or to make any grand change in their disposition. They literally marched into a trap even more dangerous than the one sprung on the allied cavalry. As the Prussian infantry line took its position it brought the French infantry, still moving in column, under devastating musket and artillery fire. One by one, the infantry regiments tried to form lines while under Prussian fire. The French infantry in front took the brunt of the Prussian fire and slowly gave ground. The German infantry coming up from the rear moved forward on the French right and was partly successful in coming on line. The Prussian cavalry then emerged at a gallop from the low ground to the right of the allied line of advance and hit both of these formations in the flank . Already weakened by the fire of the Prussian infantry, the surprise flank attack of Seydlitz’s cavalry crumbled the formations of the allied infantry. Whole battalions turned and ran, and other battalions further to rear fled without even coming in contact with the Prussians. The complete destruction of the army was only avoided because far to the rear the covering forces of Generals St. Germain and Loudon, tasked with keeping watch on the Prussian camp, were uncommitted and in good order. They were able to reposition and check the Prussian cavalry and allow some time for the broken formations to flee. By 4:45 p.m. the Prussians had swept the allied army from the battlefield. The battle had lasted from the opening salvo of artillery to the route of the infantry, about 90 minutes. Frederick’s infantry were only in battle for about 15 minutes of that time, and only seven battalions of infantry (out of 27) engaged in the fight. Saxe-Hildburghausen later reported to the Austrian emperor that “it was a stroke of utmost good fortune . . . that night fell, otherwise, by God, nobody would have escaped.”67
The strategic, operational, and tactical losses to the allies at Rossbach were immense. At the strategic level the Prussian victory threw the French government, never enthusiastic about operations against Prussia, into chaos. The Prussian people and Prussia’s alley, Hanover, were heartened. At the operational level, it eliminated the western threat to Prussia, allowing Prussian forces to redeploy to the east and southeast. This created the ability to mass forces against the Austrians and win decisively at the battle of Leuthen one month later. The remnants of the two allied armies retreated in different directions and were no longer a threat. Together the total allied losses from all causes including prisoners was about 10,000. Virtually all the artillery was lost, and over 10,000 muskets were thrown into the Saale River. Most of the survivors were unarmed, and most of the surviving cavalry were without horses. In comparison, Frederick’s forces suffered less than 200 killed.
The cavalry action at Rossbach was the most successful employment of cavalry of the
early modern period, and one of the most successful uses of cavalry since the days of Hannibal and Alexander. A variety of factors combined to make the success at Rossbach possible. Terrain and the actions of the enemy were major factors. Janus hill was critical in the action because it allowed to the Prussians to maneuver out of sight of the enemy commanders and then achieve surprise once they were in position. In addition, the flank march of the allied army placed it in a very vulnerable position. However, these two factors would have been for nothing if the Prussian cavalry was not able to maneuver with speed and precision to take advantage of them. This maneuvering was only possible because of the training, and in particular the horsemanship training, the quality of the Prussian Holsteiner horses, and the visionary leadership of Frederick and Seydlitz.
Training, discipline, and horsemanship were also factors which permitted the Prussian cavalry to win in the close combat of the charge. The speed of charge gave them both a physical and a psychological advantage over their opponents. Speed negated any role of defending cavalry pistol fire. If the French and Austrian cavalry used their pistols at all they were so ineffective that there is no historical mention of it. The discipline which permitted them to regroup and charge again against the infantry ensured the complete destruction of the enemy armies. The training program of the Prussians, which required every cavalry type to train in the basic maneuvers of the arm, permitted the dragoons, and even the hussars, to contribute to the decisive combat of the battle. No other hussars could have charged with the effect that the Prussian had, and this was directly a result of the unique Prussian training requirements. Rossbach became the icon of cavalry success to all cavalrymen of every nation. It inspired cavalryman and generals for generations. For the next 150 years every cavalry general dreamed of repeating Rossbach with themselves in the role of Seydlitz.
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