War Horse

by Louis A. DiMarco

  Horses and Horsemanship

  Horses and horsemanship had reached their modern form before World War II. The challenge of the war was to provide enough trained horses and riders to meet the large requirements of operations on the eastern front. As the war ended, an additional challenge was to save some of the most valuable breeds from being lost in the whirlwind of destruction that characterized the last year of the war.

  Horses

  Germany maintained about 1,100,000 horses in military service throughout the war,. The bulk of these horses were in the supply and transport service, or in the field artillery. The well-organized German remount system continued to produce quality warmblood horses for the German army until the last year of the war. The German horses, being very finely bred, were stressed by the extremely difficult physical conditions of the eastern front. The logistics system on the eastern front was fragile and strained by partisan attacks, distance, and terrain and weather conditions. Horses starved along with the men, especially in the winter months when the horses could not forage on the countryside. Still, over the course of the war, the German horses adapted, survived, and continued to provide valuable service. After the war a German cavalry general described the perfect breed for operations in Russia as “a highly bred horse, small and sturdy, with short legs and broad ribs.” This, however, was not a description of the finely bred warmbloods, which were the most common horses in the German remount system. Instead it more closely described the mounts of the Red Army cavalry.56

  The Soviet cavalry mounts, though suffering through roughly the same conditions as the German horses, fared much better. Soviet cavalry mounts were broadly of two different types. The foremost was the Don horse type described previously. The Budenny breed augmented the Don breed. The Budenny was similar to the Don, and developed from the Don by introducing more Thoroughbred blood into the breed. The Soviets developed the Budenny on State stud farms in the Don River region in the 1920s and 30s. They named the breed for Marshall S. M. Budenny, a hero of the Soviet cavalry forces during the revolution. However, many of the cavalry’s best horses were lost in the massive defeats that occurred in the opening months of the war. As the Germans advanced, the state stud farms evacuated to the east, and they could not meet all the army’s remount requirements. To continue to mount the large Soviet cavalry force required drawing on other sources for horses. Mongolia provided 6 million horses as a gift to the Soviet war effort in World War II.57 These small Mongolian mounts were physically perfect for the harsh conditions of warfare on the eastern front. The Mongolian horses were augmented by a variety of other ponies bred for the harsh conditions of the steppe. The Germans called the generic ponies found on the steppe Panje ponies. The Panje was a type of small steppe horse that in modern breeds is represented by the Carpathian pony of eastern Europe and the Konik pony of Poland. These small ponies were perfect for draft work on the eastern front, and when remounts were scarce they were employed as saddle horses. Both sides made extensive use of Panje ponies, though the Germans did not use them as a cavalry mount to any large extent. Soviet cavalry did use the robust ponies. The small horses, especially when shod for conditions, were particularly mobile in winter months. This capability was similar to the winter campaign ability of the mounted Mongols using similar horses in the same geographic area 600 years earlier.

  Horsemanship

  The horsemanship of German units and their allies was excellent, especially among allies such as the Cossacks and the Hungarians. Prewar Reichswehr cavalry were also exceptionally well trained horsemen. Troopers and NCOs who had 12 years of service typically had more than 3,000 hours of training time in the saddle. The Cossacks serving with the Germans were excellent horsemen, but their traditional style of riding was not perfectly suited to the German cavalry way of doing things. After the war General Major Burkhard Mueller-Hillebrand described the Cossacks riding style: “The Cossacks were natural horsemen, to whom the German school of riding is completely foreign. They are accustomed to riding over rough ground, and usually travel at a fast trot or a Cossack gallop, a gait that frequently caused injury to the legs of German horses. The Cossack is extremely interested in the welfare of his horse, and makes it his inseparable companion. But while he gives it plenty of forage, he does not appreciate the value of grooming.”58 Fortunately, General Pannwitz, commanding the Cossacks, understood that for the Cossacks to be effective they could not be molded to the German army system.

  Soviet cavalry horsemanship and horse mastership was generally fair but was a constant training challenge as the cavalry had to quickly integrate large numbers of replacements to make up for losses. In 1936, the Soviet Union designated some of its line cavalry regiments and divisions as Cossack units and uniformed them in a variation of traditional Cossack dress. These units were Cossack in name only. The designation of Cossack units was an effort to link the Soviet regime to Russian history, to falsely portray the integration of Cossacks into the Soviet military and society, and for propaganda purposes both domestically and internationally. During the war the Soviets widely published the success of “Cossack” divisions and corps for propaganda purposes.

  During World War II Soviet cavalry regiments were manned by conscripts from all over the Soviet Union. They were melded together into squadrons and regiments by a small group of professional cavalrymen of the prewar Soviet army. All units, including the new Cossack units, used standard army equipment. Unlike the authentic Cossacks in German service, Soviet Cossacks, like all Soviet cavalrymen, wore spurs. Soviet Cossack cavalry were issued government shashka swords with the traditional hilts without a guard. On parade some also wore the traditional cherkesska and burka. Pictures showing Soviet Cossack cavalry in traditional garb were often staged. Another item that became general issue for all Soviet cavalry, including non-Cossack units, was a Cossack style sheepskin hat called a kubanka.59 Unfortunately, though they could be dressed as Cossacks, and called Cossacks, the Red Army cavalry could not ride like Cossacks. Lieutenant Yakushin described his first experience with a horse when he arrived in the 24th Guards Cavalry Regiment as a replacement.

  The duty NCO offered me a selection of dragoon saddles. I pointed my finger at the first one I saw, and as I did not yet know how to saddle a horse, ordered him to do it for me. Then, as I had no clue how to mount a horse using stirrups, I left the stables and started looking for a suitable elevation from which I could lower myself onto my new steed. After several attempts, I dragged my horse into a ditch and mounted it. I was lucky this operation took place in complete darkness and that no one saw me: otherwise, my reputation in the regiment would have been lost for a long time—if not for good—and I would have become an eternal object of fun.60

  Yakushin’s experience is representative of many if not most Soviet replacement cavalrymen. However, Soviet cavalrymen learned by experience and quickly became knowledgeable working horsemen, if not experts.

  Saving the Breeds

  World War II was extremely hard on horses. Like all previous wars, horses, because of their size and their inability to take cover quickly, suffered casualties at rates significantly higher than their riders. Because of the massive scale of total war, several famous horse breeds were almost completely wiped out. It was only to through the intercession of knowledgeable and dedicated horsemen that some of these breeds were saved from complete extinction. The German Trakehner breed is one of those that was almost lost in the closing months of the war.

  In the fall of 1944, the Soviets launched an offensive into East Prussia which threatened the Trakehner stud farm and the precious breeding stock of mares and stallions. The Nazi district leader prohibited the people and horses from evacuating. Finally, as the Russians closed in, an evacuation in the dead of winter was permitted. Eventually, 2 central stud stallions, 28 mares, and six foals were evacuated to Holstein where they remained under German control within the British occupation zone at the end of the war. The private breeders, without government resources, had a more diffi
cult time evacuating and saving their horses. Prized East Prussian warmbloods were harnessed to wagons loaded with families and personal possessions. Using frozen back roads and trails, fighting freezing weather and dwindling rations, the horses and owners struggled to the west. Some were killed in Russian air attacks on the convoys of refugees, while others were overtaken by advancing Soviet ground forces who often pillaged the refugees and butchered the horses. Still others died of the cold and exposure. Some of the refugees stopped in central Germany. These were caught up in the Russian occupation as the Russian offensive swept to the Elbe River in the spring. About 1500 purebred broodmares arrived in areas that became part of West Germany. Over half of these survivors, however, were lost in the chaotic conditions immediately after the war. Fortunately, about 700 registered mares and 60 stallions survived to rebuild the Trakehner breed in West Germany after the war.61

  Another famous rescue was that of the Spanish Riding School’s Lipizzaner brood mares. These irreplaceable horses were rescued through the efforts of one of the American cavalry’s top horsemen, Colonel Charles Hancock “Hank” Reed, who commanded the American 2nd Cavalry Group (Mechanized) during World War II. Reed’s group was closing on the Czechoslovakian border in the last weeks of the war when it captured a German intelligence unit. In conversations with the German unit commander, a Luftwaffe general and horse enthusiast, Reed learned about the location of a German remount depot at Hostau, across the German frontier in Czechoslovakia. A few nights later, German army veterinarian, Captain Lessing, arrived at Reed’s headquarters to request American protection of the horse herd at Hostau. The Germans were concerned that the valuable horses would be slaughtered by advancing Russian troops. Reed understood that to protect the horses they would have to be evacuated to Germany, because Czechoslovakia was designated to be occupied by the Soviets. Reed had strict orders not to advance into Czechoslovakia. Nonetheless, Colonel Reed agreed to provide protection and to evacuate the horses. He then sent a message to his higher headquarters, the 3rd U.S. Army under General George Patton, informing them of his intended action. Patton was also a horseman and had shared horse cavalry assignments with Reed, and he approved the mission.

  Reed launched an attack into Czechoslovakia and secured the surrender of the horse herd. The American also liberated about 400 allied prisoners of war. According to Colonel Reed, the horse herd “consisted of about 300 Lipizzaners, the Piber [Austrian] Breeding Herd plus the Royal Lipizzaner Stud from [Hungary]—well mixed together. Over one-hundred of the best Arabs in Europe, about two-hundred Thoroughbred and trotting bred race horses collected from all of Europe—finally about 600 Cossack breeding horses—Don and Urals.” Once the herd was prepared to move, Reed organized an evacuation using the Cossacks in the German service, the German officers, and an American armored cavalry escort. They moved the horse herd into Germany where they fell under American control. Colonel Reed was willing to undertake the Lipizzaner rescue because he thought it could be accomplished with no casualties, and because he completely understood the traditions and history invested in the Lipizzaner mares. The Austrian mares were returned to the Spanish Riding School, thus preserving hundreds of years of horsemanship history. The remainder of the herd became the property of the U.S. army. Eventually the U.S. army remount system shipped some of the Hungarian Lipizzaners to the United States. Later they were sold by the army and perpetuated the Lipizzaner breed in the United States.62

  The two world wars proved to be the last to feature major military operations conducted by horse-mounted forces. The history of cavalry in those wars validated much of the previous understanding of the value of mounted military units. It also demonstrated that the practical use of large-scale horse-mounted forces had come to an end.

  Cavalry operations in the world wars, despite their diminishing importance, continued to demonstrate that a calvary force’s success in battle was most dependent on the psychological factors among the attackers and defenders. It was no accident that cavalry leaders talked about the “moral” superiority of one cavalry force over another. Once one side achieved that psychological advantage, tactical success usually followed. Thus, under the right circumstances, even in World War II, cavalry forces could execute successful charges. The success of the DMC in the closing weeks of World War I was possible because once the confidence of the defending Turks was shattered, the speed and shock of the subsequent cavalry operations prevented them from reestablishing the coherence of their formations. One of the values of Soviet cavalry in World War II was the alarm that the cry “Cossacks!” spread through the German army. It didn’t matter that Soviet cavalry were not real Cossacks.

  The world wars also demonstrated why the conditions for instilling fear on the part of cavalry became rarer. The increasing capability of small arms, rifles, and machine guns, and the accompanying confidence in these weapons, made infantry more certain of their ability to defeat a cavalry charge. This realization, combined with the lethality of the modern small arms, made the prospects of a successful cavalry charge executed against prepared infantry almost impossible. Thus, though Soviet cavalry might spread terror through the rear areas of the German army, German infantry had no real fear of cavalry.

  Probably the most important factor in the demise of large cavalry formations was the advance in automotive technology. Firepower did not make cavalry obsolete on the battlefield, but the ability of vehicles to match the cross-country mobility of cavalry did. When this technology was matched with the industrial capability to build hundreds of thousands of motor vehicles relatively cheaply, the major military characteristic of the horse, its mobility, was superseded. The combination of automotive technology, armor, and cannon in the form of battle tanks created the first weapons system able to match both the mobility of the horse and the shock effect of the cavalry charge. In the years after World War II, automotive technology and industrial capacity continued to increase to such an extent that the last of the large horse cavalry formations, those of the Soviet Union’s Red Army, disbanded in the mid-1950s.

  EPILOGUE

  At the end of World War II, after more than 3,000 years of usefulness, large-scale horse formations became obsolete—replaced by modern transportation and weaponry. The Western allies never reconstructed the horse formations that they abandoned during the war, while the horse units of the Axis powers were destroyed. Only the Russians retained a large cavalry force, which remained in the Soviet military well into the 1950s, until it too was dismantled. What is amazing is not that the horse disappeared from military history, but that it lasted so long and then disappeared so swiftly. At the end of World War II several million horses were still in military service all over the world, and riding was an essential skill for all professional officers. Within a generation the number of horses in military service could be counted in the thousands, and riding skills became almost unknown in modern armies.

  Technological development—more specifically the speed of that development— brought about this dramatic change. For thousands of years technology had evolved slowly and predictably, in a linear fashion. Beginning in the nineteenth century, the Industrial Revolution spurred advances in science and manufacturing at an unprecedented rate. Technological change rapidly diminished the capability of the war horse to the point it could no longer make a unique contribution to military operations.

  Before World War II, two characteristics of the horse made it an important military asset. The first was its mobility. Horses could move large bodies of troops 25 to 30 miles a day for extended periods of time and transport troops even faster in an emergency. Armies could maneuver at speeds and over distances that allowed them to achieve regional and even continental-scale effects. The Mongol armies were accomplished at leveraging the operational and strategic mobility of the horse. Operational mobility was the key to Alexander the Great’s pursuit of Darius after Gaugamela in 331 BC and the U.S. cavalry’s pursuit of the Nez Perce Indians in 1877. The mobility of the horse also had tactical be
nefits. Cavalry forces, moving at many times the speed of dismounted troops, were able to act and react quickly and could change the course of a tactical situation in minutes, as the Goth cavalry did at Adrianople in 378 AD.

  The second major characteristic of the horse was its shock effect. The size and speed of horses, particularly when massed, allowed for the psychological dominance of one side over the other. This was the essence of the well-executed cavalry charge. Often physical contact was not necessary. Most cavalry charges were won or lost before the two sides came together. The earthshaking thunder of hooves, the dust, the noise, and the sheer mass of legions of massive animals advancing at speeds of up to 40 miles per hour was enough to destroy the will to fight of all but the most disciplined troops. The charge of Cossacks in 1944 used essentially the same techniques and sought the same effects as the charge of Medieval knights a thousand years earlier.

  The horse itself, through its mobility and mass, was a significant asset in battle. Horse and rider together added a third dimension to mounted operations—firepower. Saladin’s army at Hattin, the Mongol forces of Genghis Khan, Buford’s cavalry division at Gettysburg, and Chauvel’s Desert Mounted Corps all put these aspects together. Whether the firepower was the composite bow or the breechloading repeating carbine did not matter. Horses and riders could move quickly anywhere on the battlefield, indeed anywhere in the theater of operations, could ride down and terrify troops, and could stand off and destroy the enemy with handheld weapons, and when combined with the best commanders it was a weapons system that could win wars and conquer continents.