After the Sheikhs

by Davidson, Christopher

  As regards mediating conflicts and disputes, in recent years—and especially since the 1995 accession of its current ruler, Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani—Qatar has been by far the most prominent regional peace-broker, having hosted countless conferences and been intimately involved in several key peace deals, often in countries that have benefited from its development assistance. Moreover, as will be discussed later in this book, since the advent of the Arab Spring in 2011 Hamad’s efforts have become even more prolific. Qatar’s newfound role should perhaps come as no surprise, given that it is the smallest and, per capita, the wealthiest of the Gulf monarchies. The country would be a valuable prize for any foreign aggressor, and given these precarious geo-strategic circumstances Qatar’s ruling family probably has the most to gain from positioning their state as the region’s active neutral par excellence or, as other observers have described it ‘the Switzerland of the Gulf’. An article in Qatar’s current constitution even underlines its commitment to such a strategy, while also carefully stating that it would never involve itself in the domestic affairs of another state: ‘…the foreign policy of the State is based on the principle of strengthening international peace and security by means of encouraging peaceful resolution of international disputes; and shall support the right of peoples to self-determination; and shall not interfere in the domestic affairs of states; and shall cooperate with peace-loving nations’.42

  Prior to 2011, Qatar’s most notable success was its role in ending the standoff in Lebanon between Hezbollah and the broad, anti-Syrian ‘March 14’ alliance. Following nearly a year and a half of city centre protests that began in December 2006, Hezbollah-aligned militias finally occupied central Beirut in May 2008 and for more than a week brought the country to a standstill. Promptly inviting representatives from all factions to Doha, Qatar’s ruler staged the Lebanese National Dialogue Conference which quickly resulted in the forming of a new national unity government and the appointing of a new Lebanese president.43 Known as the ‘Doha Agreement’, Qatar’s efforts in ending the deadlock were praised by the UN Security Council which stated that it ‘welcomed and strongly supported the agreement reached by Lebanese leaders in Doha… which constituted an essential step towards the resolution of the current crisis’. In Lebanon firework displays and music concerts were held across the country, with several banners featuring the Qatari ruler being prominently displayed.

  In 2007 Qatar then played a key role in brokering the extradition of six Bulgarian nurses from Libya. Having been accused of deliberately infecting over 400 children with HIV in 1998, they had been sentenced to death before having their sentences commuted to life imprisonment. Although France captured most of the headlines in facilitating their release, Nicolas Sarkozy conceded that ‘…some humanitarian mediation by the friendly government of Qatar was decisive in helping with the release of the medics’.44 Perhaps most controversially, Qatar was heavily involved in brokering the 2010 ceasefire in the Sudan between the Khartoum government and the Darfur rebels. Having invited the Sudanese president—Omar Al-Bashar—to Doha, despite an International Criminal Court arrest warrant having been issued for his alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity, the Qatari ruler also invited the presidents of Chad and Eritrea.45 A permanent truce was eventually signed in summer 2011, with Qatar’s role again being fêted by both regional players and the international community. Significantly, the signing session took place in a Doha hotel, presided over by the ruler and in the presence of several African heads of state in addition to UN and African Union representatives. Emphasising Qatar’s efforts, Hamad stated that ‘…the State of Qatar is keen to coordinate with its regional and international partners to see the people of Darfur and Sudan enjoy security and stability, as they are the two conditions for development and stability’.46 Also in East Africa, Qatar’s attempts to resolve the long-running border disputes between Eritrea and Djibouti have also received international attention, although success has not yet been forthcoming. In 2010 a high-ranking Qatari delegation arrived in Djibouti after previously visiting Eritrea. But without support from Ethiopia—which broke off relations with Qatar in 2008 on the grounds that ‘Qatar’s support for Eritrea had made it a major source of instability in the Horn of Africa’—an agreement was not reached.47

  As a more established regional peace-broker, the UAE has also had a number of successful interventions, albeit more low profile than Qatar’s efforts. The first example of such UAE mediation was in 1974 when Abu Dhabi’s ruler solved a territorial dispute between Egypt and Libya.48 More notably, in 1991 he then attempted to save Iraq from full scale invasion by meeting with the Saudi king and Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak in an effort to forge an agreement between Saddam Hussein and the displaced ruler of Kuwait, Jabar Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah.49 In early 2003 Abu Dhabi was again an active intermediary, proposing an emergency summit with the aim of diverting the US from attacking Iraq. A meeting was held in Sharm el-Sheikh and presided over by the Arab League Secretary-General.50 Saddam Hussein and his family were reportedly offered sanctuary in Abu Dhabi if they complied with American demands to leave Iraq.51 Since Khalifa bin Zayed Al-Nahyan’s succession as ruler of Abu Dhabi in 2004, the UAE’s has to some extent continued with these policies. In early 2007 the minister for foreign affairs flew to Iran to meet government representatives,52 and later that year (and within the space of just one week) Khalifa separately hosted both Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the US vice president Dick Cheney, seemingly in an effort to defuse the Iran-US nuclear standoff.53 In 2008 the UAE was again active, inviting the US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, who was en-route to East Asia, to Abu Dhabi to debrief US envoy William Burns on his Iran negotiations and also to meet with the UAE minister for foreign affairs. Crucially, just one week before, Abu Dhabi’s crown prince had received Ali Rida Sheikh Attar—an envoy of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and undersecretary to the Iranian minister for foreign affairs.54 Combined, these diplomatic actions earned the UAE praise during UN Security Council meetings in August 2008.55

  Soft power in the West: strategic investments and development assistance

  For many years the Gulf monarchies’ soft power strategy in the West was primarily an offshoot of their sovereign wealth funds. In addition to these funds’ investments in multinationals, blue-chip companies, and mature real estate; additional investments and associated sponsorships have been made in higher profile, headline-grabbing, ventures that may not necessarily turn a profit. The aim, it seems, has been to boost awareness of the Gulf monarchy in question with certain Western powers, at every level from government officials to members of the public. In almost all cases these brand-focused investments have been made in countries that either have a history of providing Gulf monarchies with protection or security guarantees, or can realistically be expected to provide assistance in a future emergency.

  For the same reasons that it has emerged as the most energetic regional peace-broker, Qatar is unsurprisingly the most active proponent of the strategy. The ruling family-owned Qatar Holdings, for example, bought London’s prestigious Harrods department store in 2010, after an earlier failed attempt to buy the British national grocery chain Sainsbury’s. Having paid $2.3 billion for Harrods—believed to be an overly generous offer—Qatar Holdings’ chairman (who is also Qatar’s prime minister and a key member of the ruling family) announced that the purchase would not only ‘add much value to its portfolio of investments’ but that Harrods was also ‘…a historical place. I know it’s important, not only for the British people, but it is important for tourism’. Similarly, the Qatar Holdings’ vice-chairman described the purchase as a ‘landmark transaction’ for Qatar.56 Meanwhile Qatar has been acquiring other iconic properties in London including the old Chelsea Barracks and the American Embassy building on Grosvenor Square. The building of Europe’s tallest skyscraper—the London Shard—was also financed mostly by Qatar, namely the Central Bank of Qatar, which holds an 80 per cent share. The $3 billion, 310 metre tower houses two duplex apartments spe
cifically for use by the Qatari ruling family, and its official opening ceremony in July 2012 was hosted by the Qatar Holdings’ chairman.57 When asked for comment, the Central Bank governor was clear about the rationale behind the investment, explaining that he was confident ‘…the Shard would become a symbol of the close ties between Qatar and the UK’. Likewise, the Qatari ambassador to the UK stated that ‘…the UK is a dear country to us… our investment is a long term investment, we don’t need the cash now… we think the UK is the right place to put our investment. The UK is a strategic partner with our country’.58

  Elsewhere in Europe Qatar has also been active, with the Qatar Foundation—chaired by the ruler’s wife—signing a record $230 million sponsorship deal in 2011 with Spain’s Barcelona Football Club,59 one of the biggest brands in international soccer. Having previously shied away from shirt sponsorship and preferring to display the UNICEF children’s charity logo, in 2010 an audit revealed that the club was nearly $500 million in debt. Although marketing experts were reported to have been working on finding a way of displaying both logos on the new shirts, it was admitted that if that proved impossible then the Qatar Foundation logo would take precedence.60 This now appears to be the case, with the UNICEF logo having been relegated to the back. In France, it has been the turn of Qatar’s largest sovereign wealth fund—the Qatar Investment Authority—which has also bought into soccer via a new, sports-focused investment vehicle, Qatar Sports Investments. In 2011 QSI took a controlling, 70 per cent stake in Paris St. Germain61 and promptly appointed a Qatari national as the club’s new president—the first non-French president in the club’s history.

  Although now out of the limelight, and a little less spendthrift since Dubai’s 2009 crash and the subsequent Abu Dhabi bailout packages, the UAE has also been a prominent brand-focused sovereign wealth investor in the West, and especially in Britain and the US. Dubai’s various investment vehicles have, for example, purchased the Carlton Tower and Lowndes hotels in central London along with a fashionable art deco hotel in Manhattan,62 and more conspicuously, the London Eye and the Madame Tussauds waxworks,63 which were acquired in 2006 by Dubai International Capital. In 2007 Dubai’s Nakheel even purchased the decommissioned iconic British cruise liner the QE2 for about $100 million, planning to convert it into a floating hotel.64 Most successful, in terms of branding, has been Dubai’s Emirates airline’s $150 million fifteen year naming rights for London’s Arsenal Football Club’s new stadium, which was opened in 2006 in parallel with an eight year Emirates shirt sponsorship deal for the club.65 Now simply referred to as the ‘Emirates Stadium’, the Emirates logo is emblazoned on the side of the building and has become a key London landmark.

  Abu Dhabi’s iconic investments in the West are now also numerous, with the Abu Dhabi Investment Company having paid a reported $800 million just before the beginning of the 2008 credit crunch for the famous Chrysler Building in New York—a staple of Hollywood movie Manhattan panorama shots.66 Equally conspicuous, in 2005 the crown prince’s Mubadala Development Company purchased a 5 per cent stake, worth $130 million, in Italy’s celebrated Ferrari car manufacturer.67 Significantly, this was followed up by Mubadala’s sponsoring of the Ferrari Formula One team which involved the Mubadala logo appearing prominently on the nosecones of Ferrari F1 cars.68 Soccer, too, has been a priority for Abu Dhabi, exemplified by the Abu Dhabi United Group for Development and Investment’s purchase of Manchester City Football Club for about $360 million in summer 2008.69 Led by one of the crown prince’s younger brothers (and a deputy prime minister of the UAE), Mansour bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, the group quickly installed one of the crown prince’s right hand men (who also serves as the chairman of Abu Dhabi’s Executive Affairs Authority) as the club’s new chairman. Mirroring Emirates’ naming of the Arsenal stadium, Abu Dhabi’s airline—Etihad Airways—has now paid $642 million for naming rights for Manchester City’s stadium, which was originally built to host the Commonwealth Games in 2002. The club’s former chief executive officer70 described it as ‘one of the most important arrangements in the history of world football’.71 Today, Abu Dhabi’s association with Manchester City is widely reported and discussed in the British newspapers, with its chairman being a frequent subject of articles in the sports supplements.

  The other Gulf monarchies have also made high profile purchases in the West, although due to greater caution or more limited resources they have tended to capture less attention. Kuwait’s Investment Dar, for example, currently owns 51 per cent of Britain’s Aston Martin luxury car company72—a brand normally associated with James Bond and other British action movies. Even Bahrain has been active, despite more modest sovereign wealth investment capabilities, with the state-backed Mumtalakat Holding Company taking a 30 per cent stake in Britain’s McLaren Group in 2007—manufacturer of the McLaren supercar and owner of the multiple F1 championship-winning McLaren Formula One team.73 In 2011 Mumtalakat increased its stake to 50 per cent, perhaps explaining McLaren’s initial reluctance to boycott the 2011 Bahrain Grand Prix following the first wave of protests in the kingdom, as discussed later in the book.

  The Gulf monarchies’ hosting of increasingly high profile international sports events can also be considered a component of this strategy, as although these are not directly connected to investments in Western companies and are also intended to contribute to economic diversification (namely supporting nascent tourism industries) in the region, they nonetheless make a strong contribution to the international sports industry and help boost awareness of the Gulf monarchies among primarily western audiences. Alongside Bahrain, Abu Dhabi also hosts an annual Formula One Grand Prix, while Dubai hosts an ATP tennis tournament and European PGA golf tournament, among numerous other events. Qatar’s hosting of the 2022 FIFA World Cup is now by far the strongest example. Having defeated bids from several other countries, including the US and Japan, Qatar has committed to massive spending in order to create the necessary infrastructure for the event, including at least twelve brand new, world class stadiums. It has been estimated that the total cost will be around $211 billion, with $163 billion being spent on the stadiums and $47 billion being spent on transport infrastructure. Thus a decade looms of lucrative contracts for construction companies and sports-related industries, with Qatar likely to keep winning soccerrelated headlines in Western and other international newspapers for years to come. Meanwhile Qatar is also intending to bid for both the 2017 World Athletics Championships and the 2020 Olympic Games.74

  Offering further evidence of the Gulf monarchies’ soft power strategy has been the increasing number of explicit gifts and donations to institutions and organisations in the West. In some senses, even though these involve wealth transfers from developing countries to developed countries, they can be viewed as a form of development assistance. Unsurprisingly, Qatar has been particularly active in this regard with its ambassador to the US visiting New Orleans in 2006 and pledging $100 million to help the victims of Hurricane Katrina. When asked to explain, the ambassador stated that this ‘wasn’t about improving Qatar’s image in the US… or about public diplomacy’. Nevertheless, Qatar’s gift was one of the largest foreign grants in the wake of Katrina, with one prominent Louisiana observer predicting that ‘the [Qatari] ambassador would be met with lots of questions and praise for his country’s benevolence when he comes to the region’.75 But even more directly underlining the emirate’s soft power strategy, when Qatar’s prime minister was thanked by a US dignitary for the gift, he reportedly replied that ‘We might have our own Katrina one day’,76 clearly hinting at Qatar’s vulnerability and potential need for US protection. Another recent example of Qatari development assistance to the West is its setting up of a $50 million fund in 2011 to help young entrepreneurs in Paris’ impoverished and predominantly immigrant North African suburbs or banlieues. Described as ‘part of a broadening effort by the small country to expand its international presence through investment and diplomacy’ the gift is likely to be well received by
the French government, which has been accused of abandoning these restive, high unemployment, districts.77

  The UAE has similarly been involved in urban regeneration projects, With Abu Dhabi having signed an agreement worth a reported $1.5 billion with Manchester City Council and regeneration body New East Manchester in 2011 to develop an 80 acre site close to the soccer stadium, thus tying in with Abu Dhabi’s ownership of Manchester City Football Club. There are plans to build a cluster of new sporting facilities in addition to a swimming pool with the aim of ‘using sport to inspire and transform the lives of children in an area with massive deprivation—and some of the lowest life expectancies in Britain’.78 In September 2009, at the exact time when the UAE was waiting for the US Congress to ratify its civilian nuclear deal (which had been delayed due to allegations concerning the Abu Dhabi ruling family, as discussed later), a large donation was made to the Children’s National Medical Center in Washington, DC. Amounting to $150 million—reportedly the largest ever grant given to paediatric surgery—the money has been channelled via the Abu Dhabi government-backed Sheikh Zayed Institute and, according to the Center’s president, will ‘…allow us to serve the world for the next 100 years’.79 Connecting the strategies of development assistance to the West and support for Islamic credentials, both the UAE and Saudi Arabia have also been building new mosques in Western Europe. Most recently, in late 2010 construction work was completed on Europe’s largest mosque, in the Netherlands, financed by Dubai’s Al-Maktoum Foundation—named after the emirate’s ruling family. Located in Rotterdam, the mosque can accommodate 3,000 worshippers, boasts two fifty metre tall minarets, and also houses a centre for ‘charity, mutual understanding, and forgiveness’. Strongly opposed by Dutch far-right movements, which have stated that ‘this horrible thing doesn’t belong here but in Saudi Arabia’, the mosque is nevertheless likely to prove extremely popular with Rotterdam’s substantial Muslim population.80