After the Sheikhs

by Davidson, Christopher

  The use of UAE air infrastructure has also proved to be a key area of co-operation with the US military, as after 9/11 Dubai International Airport’s Terminal 2 became one of the busiest airports involved in invasion of Afghanistan. For some years since it was one of the few airports in the world that had regular flights to Baghdad and Kabul, with a high proportion of seats being reserved for American military personnel or for employees of big US contractors such as Halliburton. Also important have been the airport’s military freight facilities, with many commercial companies using it to ship US military goods and even armoured vehicles. Shrouded in secrecy for many years Abu Dhabi has also been making available its airbase in Al-Dhafrah to the US Air Force and to the CIA, with RQ-4 Global Hawk unmanned reconnaissance aircraft being stationed there and with KC-10 tanker aircraft having used the base to support operations in Afghanistan. Most embarrassingly for the UAE authorities, in the summer of 2005 it was revealed that US drones and U2 aircraft were also being serviced in Al-Dhafrah, following the crash landing of an unmanned spy plane on its return to Abu Dhabi from a mission in Afghanistan. The incident prompted the US Air Force to confirm that its 380th Air Expeditionary Wing had been based there since 200229 and at the time it was thought that there were over 100 US military personnel stationed in Al-Dhafrah.30 The UAE has also been secretly making available an airbase in Pakistan to the US military. Following a leaked US diplomatic cable and a Reuters report describing the base as a ‘mystery wrapped in a riddle’, it emerged that the Al-Shamsi base in Baluchistan had been leased by the Pakistani government to the UAE since 1992, but had then been sub-leased more recently by the UAE to the US, presumably to facilitate the latter’s operations in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. According to the cable ‘the UAE government desired to keep details of the UAE co-operation with the US military in Afghanistan and Pakistan confidential, because the government is concerned that public acknowledgement of this assistance could pose risks to the UAE security within the UAE and in Pakistan’.31

  Despite pleas and offers of financial aid from certain Gulf rulers to keep British servicemen based in the region after their independence,32 Britain’s military role in the Gulf monarchies has been greatly reduced since 1971. Nonetheless the Royal Air Force continues to deploy an expeditionary air wing at Qatar’s Al-Udeid base, and has its own desert air base at Thumrait in Oman.33 Moreover, other Western powers have recently been establishing bases in the region—sometimes openly, and sometimes covertly. Most prominent has been the aforementioned French base in Abu Dhabi, opened at Dhafrah in 2009. Although Abu Dhabi’s former ruler, Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahyan, had long forbidden the overt presence of Western servicemen in Abu Dhabi, sensing the risk it would carry, it seems that his successors have been much less cautious. If anything, the French base—dubbed the ‘Peace Camp’—was inaugurated with considerable fanfare, with even the French president being in attendance.34 It was followed up by announcements that the French Navy would begin using facilities at Abu Dhabi’s Port Zayed, and that UAE diplomats could begin using French embassies in countries where there was no UAE presence.35 Moreover, writing in a high profile opinion editorial for one of the UAE’s state-backed newspapers, the French president openly stated his case, claiming that ‘We have been strategic partners for fifteen years, linked by the defence accord we signed in 1995. With this permanent base, our commitment alongside you becomes even stronger. This base proves that our country is prepared to commit itself fully, together with you, to the security of the region’. Later in his article he also claimed that the base ‘…proves that France is prepared to take every risk for its friends. The message is clear: we will stand by you under all circumstances, even the most difficult’ before concluding that ‘…it is in adversity that one recognises one’s friends. You should know that you can always count on us if the security of the region were ever to be threatened’.36

  Canada has also been operating military bases in the Gulf monarchies, with a little-known military camp—dubbed ‘Mirage’—located outside Dubai and used as a rest and supply station for Canadian and Australian troops fighting in Afghanistan. Following a dispute over air landing rights for UAE airlines in Canada in 2010—likely the combined result of Canadian protectionism for Air Canada37 and the UAE’s alleged lobbying against Canada’s bid for a UN Security Council seat38—existence of the camp finally became public knowledge when it was closed down by the UAE authorities in an apparent tit-for-tat retaliation. When the dust settles, however, it is likely that the camp will quietly re-open and Canadian access resume.

  The Western military presence in Gulf monarchies will accelerate following an announcement by the US CENTCOM commander39 that at least four Gulf states were due to receive the latest US antimissile systems—new versions of the Patriot anti-missile batteries—presumably in an effort to assuage fears of Iranian missile attacks. Tellingly, the general was unable to reveal exactly which states had agreed to deploy the US weapons, with one media report explaining that ‘many countries in the Gulf region are hesitant to be publicly identified as accepting American military aid and the troops that come with it. The names of countries where the antimissile systems are deployed are classified, but many of them are an open secret’. Nevertheless it is widely understood that the unnamed states are Kuwait, the UAE, Qatar, and Bahrain, and that the US will now also keep Aegis cruisers equipped with early warning radar on patrol in the Persian Gulf at all times.40

  Equally, if not more, problematic than hosting so many foreign military bases, has been the Gulf monarchies’ ever-rising spending on Western armaments. With most of the arms being sourced from the US, Britain, and France, it seems this has become another price that these states must pay for their external security guarantees. Indeed, even if the purchased equipment is never used, is inappropriate for defensive capabilities, or is seemingly superfluous to the requirements of the Gulf monarchies’ described peacekeeping operations, it has long been regarded as a necessary part of the overall cost of their protection, much like the aforementioned sovereign wealth investments and the soft power strategies employed in the West. In recent years there have been many signs that this spending has been getting out of hand, with the Gulf monarchies now being by far the biggest arms purchasers in the world—at least as a proportion of their GDP. This even includes the poorer Gulf monarchies, which, as discussed, are now grappling with declining resources and serious socio-economic pressures. With more and more information on their purchases appearing in the public domain, it will become much harder for governments and ruling families to justify these massive and usually opaque transactions to increasingly beleaguered national populations.

  According to World Bank and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute data on total military spending, Saudi Arabia devoted somewhere between 10 and 11 per cent of GDP in 2010 to its military. This was the highest such proportion in the world and more than double the military spending of major military powers such as the US and Russia, and nearly five times greater than that of Britain, France, and China. Incredibly, the comparatively indigent state of Oman is the second biggest spender as a proportion of its GDP, with close to 10 per cent having been devoted to its military in 2009. The UAE is in third place among the Gulf monarchies, spending somewhere between 5 and 6 per cent of GDP on its military in recent years—still higher than the US and Russia. Meanwhile the other Gulf monarchies have all been spending between 3 and 5 per cent on their militaries—a significantly higher proportion than other parts of the developing world.41

  Most of the purchases have been valued at several billion dollars at a time, and have ranged from tanks and warplanes to naval vessels and missile systems. The Saudi and UAE procurements have tended to win the highest profile headlines given their commensurately higher GDPs than other Gulf monarchies and correspondingly greater ability to buy the very latest equipment. In 2009 alone it was reported that the UAE had purchased nearly $8 billion of US military equipment, making it the US’ biggest arms cust
omer that year, while Saudi Arabia had purchased about $3.3 billion of American hardware.42 And in late 2010, after having invited fifty US-based arms manufactures to the country to ‘see the opportunities for growth first hand’,43 it was reported that the UAE had spent close to $70 billion on arms in recent years and had accounted for nearly 60 per cent of the Gulf states’ total purchases of tanks and rockets between 2005 and 2009. In addition to American arms, these imports are thought to have also been sourced from France, Russia, and Italy, and have included corvettes, frigates, and air defence systems.44 Moreover, with Abu Dhabi hosting the annual International Defence Exhibition (IDEX) and with Dubai hosting the biannual Dubai Air Show, the UAE has cemented its role as the region’s premier arms bazaar, with scores of major international weapons suppliers using these events to showcase their latest products to representatives from all of the Gulf monarchies and other nearby states.

  In the aftermath of the Arab Spring and increased conflict in the broader region it is likely that all six states are increasing their military spending further. In December 2011 the US government announced it had finalised a $30 billion sale of Boeing-manufactured F15 fighter jets to the Saudi Royal Air Force.45 With regards the UAE, following 2011’s IDEX it was announced that Boeing would be delivering new military transport aircraft, while France’s Nexter Corporation would provide support for the UAE’s LeClerc battle tanks and the US’ Goodrich Corporation would provide spare parts for its air force. Most controversially, it was also reported that a partnership was planned between a UAE-based company and the US-based General Atomics Aeronautical Systems with the aim of selling Predator drones to the UAE. If successful, this would be the first time that US drone technology has been sold to a foreign buyer.46

  Unsurprisingly, in addition to stiff criticism from domestic opponents, most of whom argue that the purchases are a colossal waste of precious national resources and send the wrong signals about the intentions of the Gulf monarchies, the recent sales have also generated opposition in the West. In the US, for example, the pro-Israel lobby repeatedly argues that the sale of such high grade equipment to the Gulf monarchies will erode Israel’s ‘qualitative edge’ in the region. Moreover, given the protests and other opposition movements that are stirring the Gulf—as discussed later—some Western governments have sought to stem the supply of equipment to states that are likely to use it to repress their own people. In early 2012 for example several American congressmen sought to block proposed arms sales to Bahrain worth over $50 million, given the pitched battles raging on Bahrain’s streets between protestors and security forces at the time.47 Although sales were resumed in May 2012, items such as teargas canisters and ‘crowd control’ weapons were withheld from trade.48 Other Western governments have baulked at the procedures associated with selling arms to the Gulf monarchies, with increasing opposition developing against what are perceived as corrupt practices. The British government’s long-running investigation into allegations of bribery surrounding the massive $86 billion Al-Yamanah arms deal to Saudi Arabia is well known, even though it was eventually called off. But more recently the German government has been forced to investigate alleged bribes and kickbacks connected to the sale of 200 German Leopard tanks to Saudi Arabia. Moreover, critics have argued that the sale ‘…contravened Germany’s strict rules on arms exports, which ban the sale of weapons to countries in crisis zones, those engaged in armed conflicts, and those with questionable human rights records’.49

  Antagonising Iran

  The increasing belligerence demonstrated towards Iran in recent years by some Gulf monarchies is symptomatic of the latter’s reliance on Western security guarantees and the presence of Western military bases on their soil; thus they have little choice but to align themselves with Western policies regarding Iran, and if that involves helping to enforce sanctions or otherwise limit Iran’s influence in the region then in practice there is little room for them to manoeuvre. Moreover, given the associated requirement of purchasing massive quantities of armaments from their principal guarantors, it can also be argued that it is in the interests of the governments and military-industrial establishments of the vendor countries to pit the Gulf monarchies against their most powerful neighbour. Ideally, in terms of arms sales, this should develop into a tense and bitter cold war situation where both sides view each other as a posing a military threat, thus encouraging the further militarisation of the region and further expensive procurements. In this light, the Gulf monarchies’ present stance against Iran can be explained in the context of a dependent, core-periphery relationship:50 even if the centre of gravity of the Gulf monarchies’ economic relations may be steadily shifting eastwards, the Western powers are nevertheless still recognised as their principal security providers and can thus dragoon them into hawkish positions.

  There are increasing signs that the posturing against Iran—no matter how dangerous—is also being viewed by certain Gulf monarchies as a convenient mechanism with which to contain domestic opposition. In addition to the routine creation of a nearby bogeyman state with which to frighten their national populations and thus help distract from some of the various socio-economic pathologies and pressures that are building, the branding of Iran as a dangerous and unpredictable Shia-dominated enemy intent on acquiring nuclear weapons also helps to justify the sectarian manipulation that is taking place in several Gulf monarchies. It also serves to delegitimise any revolutionary actors and tarnish protestors on the grounds that they are agents of Iran. Indeed—as will be shown in the following chapter—since the beginning of the Arab Spring the Gulf monarchies’ governments have gone to great lengths to highlight the presence of any Shia in opposition movements, and to some extent this has allowed them to brand their opponents and critics as being fifth columnists rather than as pro-reform activists. Thus far, the strategy has enjoyed some limited success, with large sections of the national Sunni populations being quick to accuse Shia activists of being traitors, and with many Western opinion-makers continuing to lend support to the Gulf monarchies on the grounds that the alternative would be Iran-style theocratic, revolutionary and anti-Western governments. Such opinions have helped fuel what some writers have described as the ‘geopolitical fantasy’ of a ‘Shia crescent’ that would extend all the way from Afghanistan to the Lebanon, including the Gulf states, which would be headquartered in Tehran.51

  The risks of such rabid elite-level anti-Iranianism in the Gulf monarchies are undoubtedly serious, and possibly existential. Self-evidently these states are allowing themselves to be considered legitimate targets, or the ‘front line’, of any fresh conflict in the Persian Gulf. In this sense, their external survival strategies—in particular relating to the distribution of development aid in the region and the long-running efforts to position themselves as benign, active neutrals and peace-brokers—are being badly undermined by the current generation of Gulf rulers. It is unlikely that their fathers would have allowed such an escalation to have taken place, no matter how much they distrusted Iran. Most previous confrontations—including even the 1971 seizure of three UAE islands by the Shah’s Iran—were usually sidelined in favour of shared economic interests or the substantial Iranian-origin expatriate populations resident in many Gulf monarchies.

  At the forefront of the antagonism are Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE—or more specifically sections of the Abu Dhabi ruling family. According to a recently leaked US diplomatic cable, in 2008 the Saudi king had ‘repeatedly exhorted the US to cut off the head of the snake’ in reference to Iran, its perceived military capabilities, and the nuclear weapon-building programme that Iranian officials continue to deny exists.52 The former Saudi intelligence chief has gone on the record stating that Saudi Arabia should ‘consider acquiring nuclear weapons to counter Iran…’,53 and in another leaked cable from 2008 the veteran Saudi minister for foreign affairs54 suggested a US or NATO-backed offensive in southern Lebanon to end the Iranian-backed Hezbollah’s grip on power. Warning US officials that a Hezb
ollah victory in Lebanese elections would likely lead to an ‘Iranian takeover’ of the state, he claimed that the situation in Beirut was ‘entirely military… and the solution must be military as well’. He also argued that of all the regional fronts on which Iran was advancing, Lebanon would be the ‘easiest battle to win’ for the ‘anti-Iranian allies’.55 Similarly, in a cable despatched in 2009 the Bahraini king had urged US military officials to ‘forcefully take action to terminate Iran’s nuclear programme, by whatever means necessary’. Moreover, he argued that ‘…the danger of letting it go on is greater than the danger of stopping it’.56 Closely connected to the sectarian policies in Bahrain and in particular the discrimination against its Shia population, the kingdom took maximum advantage of the region’s anti-Iranian sentiments in early 2011 by announcing that it would deport all those Shia ‘with links to Hezbollah and Iran’s Revolutionary Guard’. In practice, this meant expelling hundreds of long-serving Lebanese expatriates, much as the UAE had been doing since 2009, suspending all flights between Manama and Beirut, and warning Bahraini nationals not to travel to Lebanon due to ‘threats and interference by terrorists’.57

  The reaction from Abu Dhabi appears originally to have been more hesitant—perhaps because the more moderate policies of its former ruler still prevailed. In a leaked cable from 2006 the American Embassy in Abu Dhabi claimed that the UAE believed ‘the threat from al-Qaeda would be minor compared to if Iran had nukes… but that it was reluctant to take any action that might provoke its neighbour’. The cable also explained that UAE officials had asked US officials to ‘…only seek their help as a very last resort’ and had stated that ‘if you can solve something without involving the UAE, please do so’.58 Nevertheless, as Abu Dhabi’s forceful crown prince, Muhammad bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, and his five full brothers gained control over most aspects of foreign policy and the security establishment, the emirate’s views quickly began to fall into line with those of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Since 2007 Western embassy officials have been repeatedly encouraged by the crown prince’s circle to get more troops on the ground in an effort to counter Iranian hegemony. And in summer 2009, as recorded in another leaked US diplomatic cable, the crown prince had warned the US of appeasing Iran and had stated that ‘Ahmedinejad is Hitler’.59 A few months later, the Qatar-based commander of US CENTCOM appeared to express his agreement with the UAE’s new stance, stating on the record at a major security conference in Bahrain that ‘the Emirati Air Force itself could take out the entire Iranian Air Force, I believe, given that it’s got… somewhere around 70 Block 60 F-16 fighters, which are better than the US’ F-16 fighters’.60 Even more belligerently, in a summer 2010 interview with the American magazine The Atlantic, the UAE’s ambassador to the US (an Abu Dhabi national)61 openly stated his country’s preference for war. When asked ‘Do you want the US to stop the Iranian nuclear program by force?’ he replied on the record with ‘Absolutely, absolutely. I think we are at risk of an Iranian nuclear program far more than you [the US] are at risk… I am suggesting that I think out of every country in the region, the UAE is most vulnerable to Iran. Our military, who has existed for the past forty years, wake up, dream, breathe, eat, sleep the Iranian threat. It’s the only conventional military threat our military plans for, trains for, equips for, that’s it, there’s no other threat, there’s no country in the region that is a threat to the UAE, it’s only Iran’.62