After the Sheikhs

by Davidson, Christopher

  Qatar: champion or charlatan?

  As the smallest of the Gulf monarchies, with a tiny national population and one of the world’s highest GDP per capita, the Qatari ruling family and its government have largely escaped the past year unscathed, with few serious opponents emerging and with no significant calls for political reform. Indeed, the November 2011 announcement that elections would be held in 2013 for Qatar’s Advisory Council was less a concession to popular demands and more a case of being a top-down, pre-emptive strike by a forward-thinking ruler. Moreover, with 2011 and 2012 witnessing Qatar’s public and diplomatic support for various Arab Spring movements elsewhere in the region—as an extension of its described role as peace-broker and mediator—the emirate has been careful to distance itself from its neighbouring Gulf monarchies and their predominantly anti-Arab Spring, counter-revolutionary stances. This strategy, although high risk, has allowed Qatar’s ruler165 to avoid losing legitimacy in the manner of his peers, and in many respects has allowed him to capitalise on the Arab Spring despite being one of the region’s most autocratic rulers.

  Most notably, after Qatar’s Al-Jazeera news network seemed to have played a pivotal role in galvanising support for the Tunisian and Egyptian protestors in early 2011 by relentlessly broadcasting the events that led to their dictators’ respective downfalls, Qatar then took a leading role in efforts to solve the Libyan crisis, ultimately backing the Benghazi-based rebel government in its campaign to oust Muammar Gaddafi’s regime. In April 2011 Qatar became the first country in the world to offer diplomatic recognition to the Libyan National Transitional Council, and Doha hosted a meeting of the Libya Contact Group—a collection of entities committed to finding a ‘new political direction’ for the war-torn country.166 Remarkably, Qatar then despatched six of its fighter jets to contribute to the NATO-led no fly zone over Libya,167 and in the latter days of the conflict was believed to have provided weapons and even small detachments of special forces to facilitate the rebels’ storming of Tripoli. Since then Qatar has been similarly supportive of the Syrian opposition, having formally recognised the Free Syrian Army and the coalition of rebel movements working towards Bashar Al-Assad’s ouster. Most dramatically, in January 2012 the Qatari ruler made a public call for Arab troops to intervene in Syria, stating in a high profile interview on CBS News that the rest of the Arab world had a duty to ‘stop the killing’.168 Since then, there have been very frequent reports that Qatar is among a handful of countries actively arming the Syrian rebels.169

  Qatar’s Arab Spring policy has not been without its obstacles, however. Despite the official line, as summed up by a prominent member of the ruling family, being that ‘we believe in democracy, freedom, dialogue, and we believe in that for the entire region’ and despite the aim seeming to be ‘[hoping] that the people of the Middle East will see us as a model, and they can follow us if they think it is useful’,170 the Qatari ruling family is still treated with suspicion by revolutionary forces in the region. A number of Gulf nationals and even Qatari nationals have voiced their suspicions, seemingly believing that the emirate’s maverick foreign policy and public support for democratic movements is simply another aspect of the monarchy’s wily survival strategy. The most obvious discrepancy has been the Qatari position on the Bahraini revolution, as although Qatari forces did not contribute to the Saudi-led military intervention, and although Al-Jazeera did eventually broadcast the ‘Shouting in the Dark’ documentary, this seemed to be an inconsistent response when compared with Qatar’s vociferous and high profile support for Tunisian, Egyptian, Libyan, and Syrian protestors. Notably, Qatar did not publicly condemn the brutal crackdowns in Bahrain, and the Arabic version of Al-Jazeera has been heavily criticised for shying away from covering the events in Manama. Moreover, when a live discussion programme on Al-Jazeera English was scheduled following a repeat broadcast of ‘Shouting in the Dark’, the producers removed a prominent Bahraini human rights activist from the three person line-up at the last minute, permitting only a member of the Bahraini government and the author to put forward their views.171

  Following senior resignations at Al-Jazeera Arabic in 2011, seemingly as a result of the network’s inability to offer fair coverage of the Arab Spring, suspicions over Qatar’s intentions continued to mount. These were further exacerbated following the widespread dissemination in 2011 of a leaked US cable, originally dating from 2009, which described the Qatari regime’s apparent manipulation of the network to suit its policy objectives. Referring to several memoranda, the cables claimed that Al-Jazeera was being built up by the Qatari ruling family as a ‘bargaining tool to repair relationships with other countries’, and cited the example of Qatar’s improved relations with Saudi Arabia being based on the network’s ‘toning down of criticism of the Saudi royal family’. Before concluding that Al-Jazeera was ‘proving itself a useful tool for the station’s political masters’, the cable also damningly claimed that the Qatari prime minister172 had told a prominent US senator173 that Qatar had proposed a bargain with Hosni Mubarak which involved ‘stopping [Al-Jazeera] broadcasts in Egypt for one year in exchange for a change in Cairo’s position on Israel-Palestinian negotiations’.174

  Meanwhile, on a domestic level there continues to be criticism that the Qatari authorities promote self-censorship of the media, with local newspapers and television stations being unable to cover a number of delicate issues in the emirate. Indeed, further to the difficulties faced by the Doha Centre for Media Freedom, the leaked cable also commented that the US embassy had ‘assessed a steady lack of overall media freedom in Qatar’ and believed that ‘although overt and official censorship is not present, self and discreet official censorship continues to render Qatar’s domestic media tame and ineffective’.175 There has also been criticism that the Qatari authorities—in much the same way as the other Gulf monarchies—are quite prepared to repress their own citizens, if necessary. In March 2011, for example, Amnesty International reported that a Qatari blogger and human rights activist176—the founder of an organisation that monitors cases of arbitrary detention in the emirate—was himself seized. He was reportedly arrested by eight members of Qatar’s security services and his home, car, and computer were searched without warrant.177

  CONCLUSION

  The state formation processes of the smaller Gulf monarchies, and in particular their historic relationships with Britain and other foreign powers, are crucial to understanding the political institutions that developed—especially those that fit with the neo-patriarchy and liberalised autocracy arguments. Equally, in Saudi Arabia knowledge of the state that formed around the long-running alliance between the ruling family and the religious establishment remains central to any contemporary analysis. Important too have been the various components of the ruling bargains or social contracts that have been constructed by these polities. As per the rentier state model, the distribution of wealth along with the creation of a national identity and the formation of an indigenous rentier elite class that sits above all expatriates have been paramount. But other, non-economic legitimacy resources also clearly matter. As expected by revised modernisation theory approaches, Michael Hudson’s mosaic model, and observers of these regimes’ re-orientalisation strategies, these bargains have included cults of personality, the co-option of religion, tribal heritage, and other traditional sources of power and authority.

  The survival explanations can now be pressed even further, appreciating how the Gulf monarchies have applied aspects of their domestic strategies to both the wider region and even the international community. Notably, the distribution of rentier wealth has by no means been limited to national populations; it is increasingly used to buy influence and goodwill elsewhere, especially in other Arab and Muslim countries. Similarly, extensive and often costly peacekeeping missions are despatched to nearby conflict zones, which have again positioned the Gulf monarchies as benevolent, wealthy neighbours. More subtly these states have attempted to buy influence and support in Western
and Eastern superpowers, with headline-grabbing sovereign wealth investments, selective development assistance, and with the generous sponsorship of projects run by prestigious universities, museums, and other respected cultural and opinionmaking centres of excellence. In this manner the Gulf monarchies have become quintessential brokers of Joseph Nye’s ‘soft power’ approach1—as the various ruling families and their governments have not only sought to use their resources to provide payments to key external actors, but have also tried to position themselves as attractive, well-meaning, and responsible members of the international community.

  Internal pressures and weaknesses are nonetheless already manifest, or soon to be so, in all of the Gulf monarchies. Affecting the six regimes’ ability to keep distributing wealth and meeting the expectations of citizens, the region’s declining natural resources and looming ‘youth bulge’ now really matter, as do the mounting challenges of unsustainable subsidies, labour nationalisation, and ‘voluntary unemployment’. In many ways, these are the by-products of rentier state structures—in particular the cradle-to-grave welfare systems that continue to underpin political acquiescence. Corruption and the squandering of national resources by the ruling families and their neo-patriarchal governments is also a growing concern. These polities—which do not have legal-rational authority—are now playing host to unaccountable elites and decision-makers. These have been allowed to squander national resources by financing prestige projects, making duplicate investments, and accumulating vast personal wealth. Further interconnected internal pressures are also evident, including increasing poverty among Gulf nationals, even in the wealthiest of the monarchies, along with rising real unemployment, and a widening wealth gap between the richest and poorest citizens. Discrimination against certain sections of society is equally noticeable, especially relating to the hundreds of thousands of stateless persons living in the Gulf monarchies and the rights of Shia citizens and other religious sects that have lived there for centuries. The more extensive use of censorship is similarly worrying, as although the regimes have largely been effective in choking off channels of free expression, they are now required to deploy the latest and most sophisticated technologies. In this manner, and as predicted by Michael Ross,2 the Gulf’s rentier wealth is not always being used to distribute wealth to citizens, but is instead being used to finance powerful, expensive, and highly sophisticated police state apparatuses.

  External pressures are having a similarly negative impact on the Gulf monarchies’ ruling bargains or socio-economic contracts. The dangers of rapid economic liberalisation in many of these states—and most particularly those that have opened up to foreign direct investment and tourism—are already apparent. Various relaxations have taken place, often without the consent of citizens, as governments have tried to make their countries more appealing to foreign investors, residents, and visitors, despite necessarily eroding religious and tribal heritage legitimacy resources. The monarchies’ close military relationships with the Western and other non-Muslim powers are becoming another major source of concern for citizens as there are a growing number of foreign military bases being established on their soil and there has been accelerating spending on imported armaments. Also disquieting is the hawkish and seemingly dangerous stance being taken on Iran, and the monarchies’ discreet efforts to improve relations with Israel, despite official boycotts being in place and again regardless of public opinion, Meanwhile the lack of collective security and basic unity between the six monarchies, in particular their inability to settle long-running disputes and strengthen the existing Gulf Co-operation Council, and the frequent coup attempts in the region, all continue to expose these states to malicious neighbours and other foreign interests.

  Most of the earlier opposition groups that challenged the Gulf monarchies were successfully contained, as the various regimes were able to co-opt most of the modernising forces impacting on the region and keep the number of dissidents small. But the post-2011 opposition has been markedly different, with new pro-reform and pro-democracy figures and movements emerging in the region that can no longer be placed into the old categories. In particular, the impact of new, ‘greater’ modernising forces on the Gulf monarchies is becoming vitally important, especially relating to improved education and more advanced communication technologies. These include satellite television, and crucially social media and other peer-to-peer networking. Despite their best efforts the regimes seem unable to co-opt these effectively. Connecting back to the modernisation theory debate, these new forces may soon validate earlier lines of thinking, in addition to more recent writings such as Ronald Inglehart’s co-authored 2005 book Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy,3 as an increasing number of Gulf nationals are now able to share information freely amongst themselves in an educated manner, and can communicate more easily with activists in revolutionary Arab states and with the rest of the international community. Added to this, the Arab Spring revolutions elsewhere in the Middle East seem to be serving as catalysts for the beginning of the new movements in the Gulf, or at the very least have emboldened hitherto frightened opposition voices. Further eroding their stability, many of the Gulf monarchies have erred in their foreign policy since the onset of the Arab Spring, having openly positioned themselves on the side of other Arab authoritarian regimes and thus presented themselves as ‘status quo powers’—essentially trying to counter the pro-reform momentum that has been building in the region.

  Of the six monarchies, Bahrain’s has by far the bleakest future, with little hope that the ruling family can restore sufficient legitimacy to ever govern again without resorting to martial law and extensive repression. It is currently being kept afloat by its regional allies—namely Saudi Arabia and the UAE—which will have to continue committing troops and supplying the kingdom with financial assistance. Although—unlike the other regimes that have faced Arab Spring revolutions—the Bahraini ruling family is not yet facing significant pressure from the international community, this will change within the next year or so, as the weight of evidence against the authorities grows. But for the time being the US and other Western powers are still willing to treat the revolution as an exceptional case, mainly due to the presence of the US Navy base in Bahrain and its potential front line role in any regional conflict with Iran. As described, the temporary block on the US arms trade to Bahrain has been lifted, and senior British and American police advisors have now been appointed by the king.4 Dozens of ill-researched opinion pieces have also been appearing in Western newspapers highlighting the supposed connection between Bahrain’s opposition and Iran. As a good example of the kingdom’s latest soft power strategy, these fear-mongering pieces have usually been written by Western academics, former diplomats, and other distinguished personalities who have been approached and paid by public relations companies employed by the Bahraini government. In most cases they have presented a skewed and inaccurate picture of the Bahraini opposition and have made unsubstantiated claims about Iran’s intentions in the Gulf monarchies. References to the Bassiouni report’s findings on the lack of Iranian connections are never discussed, and explanations are rarely made that most Bahraini Shia do not subscribe to the Iranian doctrine of wilayet-e-faqih or rule by clerics, and instead look to Iraqi Shia clerics,5 rather than Iranians, for direction.6

  Although the Omani ruling family’s outlook is less precarious than Bahrain’s, with the state not suffering from the same levels of sectarian strife or discrimination, nor having had to invite troops from neighbouring countries to assist in suppressing protests, there are nonetheless serious concerns about political stability. As with Bahrain, Oman only has limited resources and cannot rely indefinitely on creating public sector opportunities for its citizens in order to appease protests and demands. Indeed, Oman’s stability already rests on external assistance, mostly from Saudi Arabia, and over the next year or two this will serve to delegitimise the aging, heirless ruler and his government. Moreover, when fresh protests erupt—either as
a result of continuing government corruption or the state’s likely failure to deliver on its economic promises—these will undoubtedly be met with an even heavier response than the 2011 riots, as the ruler’s new backers will be unwilling to tolerate fresh challenges to another monarchy on its doorstep.

  In many ways the kingpin of the Gulf monarchies, Saudi Arabia’s ruling family may appear more stable than its Bahraini and Omani neighbours given that its government still has the ability to keep distributing wealth in order to appease citizens; but in reality the Saudi system is equally unsustainable and probably prone to implosion within the next couple of years. With ongoing demonstrations regardless of the new subsidies and job creation schemes, and with increasingly repressive tactics being used to suppress freedom of expression, the kingdom is now looking very brittle. If, as is likely, conditions in Bahrain deteriorate further, then more serious protests and even revolutionary activity will occur, especially in Saudi’s Shia-dominated Eastern Province. And if unemployment, the wealth gap, and other socio-economic problems remain unchecked it is probable that insurgency will spread further across Sunni communities, thus helping the reform movement gain much broader support beyond the Shia population.