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We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young

Page 50

by Harold G. Moore


  Vietnamese Military

  Senior General Vo Nguyen Giap, Senior General Chu Huy Man, Lieutenant General Nguyen Huu An, Major General Hoang Phuong

  Chapter Notes

  Sources cited here are listed in order of appearance of an individual quoted, or the authors’ statement of a fact, in a given chapter; each note is numbered for ease of subsequent reference.

  Prologue

  1. Army pay information was taken from U.S. Army Register (U.S. Government Printing Office), January 1, 1965, vol. 1, pp. 785-86.

  2. Information on the numbers of Americans killed in the Pleiku campaign was compiled from the March 4, 1966, after-action report of the 1st Cavalry Division, covering operations from October 23 to November 26, 1965, and the subsequent change of status from “missing in action” to “killed in action” of four men of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cav and one man of Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Cav. In addition to the 1st Cavalry Division personnel, one U.S. Air Force A-1E Skyraider pilot was killed in action in the campaign.

  3. Regimental Strengths and Losses at Gettysburg, by Busey and Martin, was used for the Gettysburg comparison. Triumph Without Victory: The Unreported History of the Persian Gulf War, by the staff of U.S. News & World Report, was used for the Persian Gulf War comparison.

  1. Heat of Battle

  1. All quotations and information from Robert H. Edwards in this and all subsequent chapters are from one or more of the following sources: unpublished 42-page U.S. Army Infantry School monograph, dated February 6, 1967, by then-Captain Edwards covering his personal experiences in LZ X-Ray. Transcript of August 28, 1967, interview of Edwards by Major John A. Cash of the Office, Chief of Military History (OCMH). Letter, May 5, 1983, from Edwards to Galloway, with completed questionnaire and personal recollections. Taped discussion of X-Ray battle on May 21, 1983, between Edwards, Lt. Col. L. R. (Ray) Lefebvre (ret.) and Moore. Edwards letters to Moore dated June 12, 1988, and August 22, 1988. Taped discussion between Edwards and Moore at Ia Drang reunion, Fort Benning, August 1990. Telephone interview, Moore/Edwards, August 28, 1991. Edwards letters to Moore, August 19, 1991; December 1, 1991; December 11, 1991. Telephone interview with Moore, January 30, 1992.

  2. Recorded interview/discussion, Moore/Ernest E. Paolone at Ia Drang reunions, July 1988 and November 1989.

  3. Undated written statements, from about late November-early December 1965, by Platoon Sgt. Glenn A. Kennedy, Sgt. James P. Castleberry, and PFC Ervin L. Brown, Jr., in support of a recommendation for an award of valor for then-Captain Edwards.

  4. 1965 Terrain/Topo Map Sheet #6536 III Series L 7014, PL. YA BO, Vietnam; Cambodia. Scale 1:50,000. Army Map Service, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. “Map Information as of 1965.”

  5. Unless otherwise noted, all quotations and information in this and subsequent chapters, from Senior General Vo Nguyen Giap, Senior General Chu Huy Man, Lt. Gen. Nguyen Huu An, and Maj. Gen. Hoang Phuong are from the authors’ recorded interviews with Giap and Phuong in September 1990, and the authors’ recorded interviews and discussions with Man, An, and Phuong in November 1991, in Hanoi.

  6. All quotations and information from Arthur Viera, Jr., in this and subsequent chapters are from one or more of the following sources: Telephone interview, August 28, 1991, Moore/Viera. Undated (1966 or 1967) feature article on Viera from the Providence (R.I.) Journal-Bulletin.

  It is clear from Viera’s statements that Lieutenant Neil Kroger died heroically. Unfortunately, Viera is the only survivor of the 1st Platoon of Charlie Company whom the authors have been able to locate; thus we have no other details of Kroger’s death.

  7. All quotations from Clinton S. Poley in this and subsequent chapters are from: Poley letters to Moore dated February 10, 1969; July 7, 1988; and September 1990, with details of the X-Ray battle. Interviews of Poley at the July 1988, summer 1989, November 1989, and July 1991 Ia Drang reunions. Sketch by Poley and Moore of locations of fighting positions of Poley and other 2nd Platoon, Charlie Company personnel. Article, “A Band of Brothers” by Joseph L. Galloway in BRAVO Veterans Outlook, December/January 1990. Multiple telephone discussions by Moore and Galloway with Poley, 1988-1992.

  8. All quotations and information from retired SFC Robert Jemison, Jr., in this and subsequent chapters are from the following sources: Undated 1984 response by Jemison to our questionnaire with statement on battle. Moore interview of Jemison, summer 1984. Galloway telephone interviews with Jemison, October 1990. Moore telephone interview with Jemison, August 28, 1991.

  9. All quotations and comments from Air Force Col. Charlie W. Hastings (ret.) in this and subsequent chapters are from the following sources: Hastings letter to Moore, April 21, 1988. Telephone interview, Moore/Hastings, fall 1988, on air support at X-Ray. Telephone interviews, Galloway/Hastings, October 1990, December 1991, and May 1992.

  2. The Roots of Conflict

  1. On the birth of battlefield airmobility and the 11th Air Assault Division (Test): chapter 1 of Gen. John Tolson’s monograph Vietnam Studies: Airmobility 1961-71; Moore’s memories of his service in the Airmobility Division of Army Staffin the Pentagon in 1958-1959. Airmobile: The Helicopter War in Vietnam, by Jim Meskos, contains little-known information on the early days of the helicopter.

  2. For the 11th Air Assault tests and subsequent formation of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), Tolson’s monograph and Moore’s personal records and recollections.

  3. On the temper of the times and the situation in Vietnam: The authors’ memories of those days; generally, see Bernard Fall’s The Two Viet-Nams and Street Without Joy; Neil Sheehan’s A Bright Shining Lie; David Halberstam’s The Best and the Brightest and The Making of a Quagmire; Stanley Karnow’s Vietnam: A History; Lt. Gen. Philip B. Davidson’s Vietnam at War: The History 1946-1975; and Dave R. Palmer’s Summons of the Trumpet.

  4. For political-military decisions in Washington and Hanoi, and actions on troop buildups in South Vietnam in 1964-1965: Karnow, Palmer, and Davidson books.

  5. On the February 6, 1965, sapper attack at Pleiku, and President Johnson’s bombing decisions: Karnow, pp. 412-415. Chapter 2 of Mark Clodfelter’s The Limits of Air Power contains more detailed information.

  6. The Marine and logistics buildup in March and April and the President’s Mekong River development speech: The World Almanac of the Vietnam War, edited by John S. Bowman. Also see Karnow, pp. 415-19.

  7. Westmoreland’s spring 1965 requests for U.S. reinforcements and 173rd Airborne Brigade operations: Karnow, p. 422. An excellent description of the 173rd deployment and ground operations from May 5 through November 9, 1965, can be found in Shelby L. Stanton’s The Rise and Fall of an American Army, pp. 45-48.

  8. President Johnson’s guns-and-butter decisions on the conduct of the Vietnam War are extensively covered in the books cited in n. 3 for this ch.; Maj. Gen. John K. Singlaub’s Hazardous Duty, pp. 277-83, describes the impact on the Army of the Johnson refusal to declare an emergency and extend enlistments.

  9. The June 1965 Hanoi decision to change the plan of attack in the Central Highlands, and General Man’s comments, are from the authors’ November 4, 1991, interview with Man in Hanoi.

  10. Activities at Fort Benning, Georgia, the summer of 1965: written records; Army documents; and Moore’s personal recollections. Moore and his battalion officers and NCOs watched the president’s televised address ordering the 1st Cavalry Division to Vietnam on a small TV set at battalion headquarters.

  11. General H. K. Johnson’s aborted trip to the White House to resign as Army Chief of Staff in protest: Singlaub’s Hazardous Duty, p. 283. Also “The Paramenters of Military Ethics: Introduction,” by Col. Harry Summers, Jr., p. 27. Tran script Galloway interview with Lt. Gen. Stanley Larsen, August 19, 1990, and Galloway discussions with Summers and Singlaub, May 5–6, 1992.

  12. Details of the North Vietnamese troop movement south and the Ia Drang sanctuary: From “The Lure and the Ambush,” an unpublished article-length monograph, dated December 1965, by Majors
William P. Boyle and Robert Samabria. On file at the Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C.

  13. Biographical data concerning the officers and NCOs are from division and battalion records; the West Point Register of Graduates; questionnaire responses and written biographies provided at our request; and (as in the case of Sgt. Maj. Plumley), personal interviews.

  14. Data on organization and equipment of an airmobile infantry battalion from Army Tables of Organization and Equipment (T/O&Es) of the period. Available from Headquarters, Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Washington, D.C.

  15. Remarks by Vietnamese generals Giap, Man, An, and Phuong, here and elsewhere in this book, are from their taped interviews with the authors in Hanoi in 1990 and 1991.

  16. In an interview with Galloway at his U.S. Central Command headquarters in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in late January 1991, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf de tailed his participation with the South Vietnamese Airborne Task Force as a blocking force along the Cambodian border in the final days of the Ia Drang campaign.

  17. Notes on the rapidly dwindling strength of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry and activities at An Khe base camp in the fall of 1965 are from two of Moore’s personal notebooks.

  18. Descriptions of the attack on Plei Me, the hospital fight, and the November 3 ambush are based on the division after-action report, as well as a report dated November 6, 1965, which Lt. Col. Stockton wrote to division headquarters. Despite his troubles with Brig. Gen. Knowles and division headquarters, Stock ton was on the colonel’s promotion list and got his eagles in late November. He was then transferred out of the 1st Cavalry Division at Knowles’s insistence. Knowles discussion with Galloway at the August 1990 Ia Drang reunion at Fort Benning, and in a telephone discussion with Galloway in April 1992.

  3. Boots and Saddles

  1. In a June 20, 1983, letter to Moore, Knowles detailed his discussion with Lt. Gen. Larsen which resulted in Moore’s battalion being ordered into the Ia Drang Valley.

  2. Viet Cong attack on 3rd Brigade command post: from division after-action report.

  3. Catecka Tea Plantation and manager’s villa: Galloway’s observations and notes during his twenty-four-hour stay at 3rd Brigade headquarters, November 13–14, 1965.

  4. ARA attack on Nadal’s Alpha Company troops: Nadal letter to Moore.

  5. All quotations and information from Lt. Col. Bruce Crandall (ret.) in this and subsequent chapters are from: Questionnaire, letter, and written statement, Crandall to Galloway, June 4, 1984. Copy of a Crandall letter dated November 20, 1965, addressed to himself at his home address, with a notation that it was not to be opened until his return from Vietnam. Crandall wrote his observations on the Ia Drang campaign while they were fresh. Moore/Crandall inter views, taped, in 1984 and 1985 in Colorado. Tape of Crandall’s speech at Ia Drang reunion, Fort Benning, Georgia, August 1990. Telephone interviews, Galloway/Crandall, October 1990. Crandall statement to authors, January 1992.

  6. Winkel’s quotes on aviator training are extracted from a lengthy written description to Moore in November 1988 and from his completed questionnaire plus a detailed written statement to authors, summer 1983.

  7. Information on manpower shortages came from 1st Battalion, 7th Cav headquarters records of November 1965, plus Moore notebooks of that time, and are included in Moore’s December 9, 1965, after-action report. When a battalion is as understrength as this, the captains and lieutenants try to do the jobs of the missing officers and NCOs, and the remaining NCOs also try to do the jobs of missing NCOs and missing troopers in the ranks. The result is additional degradation of unit integrity and effectiveness, and higher officer and NCO casualties: exactly what happened in LZ X-Ray.

  4. The Land and the Enemy

  1. The description of the Central Highlands is from map studies and from personal observations of the authors. On the Montagnards: Personal observations of the authors. An especially good source is the book Special Forces of the United States Army 1952/1982, by Lt. Col. Ian D. W. Sutherland (ret.), pp. 113, 114, 259, 272. Also, Norman Lewis’s A Dragon Apparent is a good source.

  2. For information on North Vietnamese troop training and travel down the Ho Chi Minh Trail: “The Training, Infiltration and Operations of a North Vietnamese Soldier from 12 April 1963 to 11 June 1966 in North and South Vietnam and Laos (Based on a Personal Interview by a Battalion Civil Affairs Officer),” a monograph by Captain Jerry P. Laird, Advance Course Class 68-1, Roster Number 91, Advisory Group Number 9 of the Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, January 4, 1968. The People’s Army soldier was a Sgt. Chien from the village of Hanan on the coast southeast of Hanoi. He entered South Vietnam in January 1966 and surrendered in June 1966. Laird interviewed Chien for fourteen hours.

  3. For the travels of the 320th, 33rd, and 66th PAVN regiments down the trail and into South Vietnam, the Boyle and Samabria monograph (n. 12, ch. 2) was a valuable reference. The authors used captured diaries, interrogation reports, and Knowledgeability Briefs of 35 People’s Army POWs.

  4. For all quotations from Giap, Man, An, and Phuong in this chapter, see n. 5, ch. 1.

  5. On the results of the Plei Me attack as it affected Man’s forces: Boyle and Samabria monograph (see n. 12, ch. 2); Man, An, and Phuong, recorded statements (n. 5, ch. 1).

  6. Information on the organization and strengths of the People’s Army B-3 Front: Man, An, Phuong interviews (n. 5, ch. 1); and an undated, declassified U.S. Army Intelligence Document in the files of the OCMH, Army, which details the history, organization, and strengths of all units of the B-3 Front.

  5. Into the Valley

  1. Dillon’s report of a Mandarin-language radio intercept: Dillon letter to Galloway, summer 1983. Undated 1987 letter Dillon to Moore commenting on the intercept and other matters. The frag order is “Copy #9 dated 131500 Nov 65, Frag 0 65-12,” in Moore’s possession.

  2. It was Moore’s personal practice always to land with the first wave of assault helicopters, and to put out operations orders verbally and personally. Listeners could thus discern the emphasis he placed on various elements of the concept.

  3. Both Dillon and Moore recall Brown’s remarks and his obvious concern.

  4. The news back home on Saturday, November 13, 1965, is excerpted from The New York Times.

  5. Dillon’s quote on an air assault: letter to Galloway (n. 1, above).

  6. Crandall’s quotes: letter to Galloway, June 4, 1984.

  7. The precise time of the landing is from the Battalion Operations Journal of November 14, 1965.

  8. General An’s quotes: n. 5, ch. 1.

  9. All quotations and information for Master Sgt. Larry M. Gilreath (ret.) in this and subsequent chapters are from: taped interview, Gilreath/Moore, May 1985. Tape recording and letter, undated, from Gilreath to Moore, late 1985. Letter and annotated photographs and sketches, from Gilreath to Moore, August 28, 1988.

  10. Hastings’s comment: letter to Moore, April 21, 1988.

  6. The Battle Begins

  1. A treasure trove of research material was opened to the authors in August 1988, when numerous 1965 First Cavalry Division veterans gathered in Orlando, Florida, for the first Ia Drang Alumni Reunion. All participants were urged to bring their photos, their letters, their newspaper and magazine clip pings, their Army orders—and their memories. Moore did a slide show and talk on the battle at X-Ray, then threw the floor open to comments, questions, and remembrances of the audience. The entire proceeding was recorded and videotaped. Moore followed up with a number of taped interviews with individuals. There have been seven reunions of Ia Drang veterans since the first in August 1988. Those gatherings and the October 29, 1990, U.S. News & World Report cover article on the twenty-fifth anniversary of Ia Drang, written by Galloway, brought in literally scores more veterans of X-Ray and Albany—as well as the families of a number of Ia Drang casualties—who have contributed to the historical record.

  2. All quotations and information fro
m Colonel John D. Herren (ret.) in this and subsequent chapters are from: transcript of Major John Cash’s interview of Herren, August 21, 1967; Herren’s undated (1967) letter to Major John Cash; Herren interview with Major Cash, March 19, 1968; long detailed battle narrative, complete with several map sketches, from Herren to Galloway, April 29, 1983; written response from Herren, undated (1987), to Moore, detailing answers to 12 specific questions, including notations on three aerial photos of the battlefield; letter, Herren to Moore, July 25, 1988; letter and sketch maps, Herren to Moore, November 10, 1988; telephone interview, Herren/Galloway, October 1990; letter and chapter revisions, Herren to Moore, December 1991.

  3. All quotations and information from Galen E Bungum for this chapter and subsequent ones are from: letter to Moore entitled “My Ia Drang Valley Story,” April 20, 1988; letter answering specific Moore questions, September 9, 1988; interview with authors at the August 1990 Ia Drang reunion at Fort Benning; telephone interviews, Bungum/Galloway, October 1990.

  4. Platoon Sgt. Gilreath’s letter/maps/photos/sketches to Moore, August 28, 1988.

  5. All quotations and recollections in this and subsequent chapters from Dennis J. Deal are from: three hours of taped statements to the authors in 1983; sketches and manuscript he provided Moore at the 1986 1st Cavalry Division Association reunion; interview, Deal/Moore, at 1988 Ia Drang reunion; multiple telephone and personal interviews with both authors, 1989-1991; letter to Moore, December 1, 1991.

  6. For Sgt. Jimmie Jakes’s comments: his 1983 response to authors’ questionnaire; telephone discussion with Moore, December 31, 1988; and Jakes letter to Moore, January 3, 1989.

  7. Retired CSM William Roland’s quote is from his completed questionnaire, April 1983.

  8. All quotations, comments, and information from SFC Ernie Savage in this and subsequent chapters are from: undated (1967) transcript of an interview of Savage by Major John Cash; two recorded interviews, Savage/Moore, May 1983 and June 13, 1986; recordings and notes taken at the 1988 Ia Drang reunion. At the 1988 session, Savage and others of Lieutenant Herrick’s platoon used a screened slide aerial photo to pinpoint the precise location of the Lost Platoon during its ordeal.

 

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