The Vatican Pimpernel

by Brian Fleming

  More and more escapees were now heading towards Rome seeking assistance. While it is probably true to say that, by and large, they were safer in the countryside, Rome was a fairly obvious objective for anyone in those circumstances. The idea was to make contact with one’s own embassy, or that of a neutral country, or indeed take advantage of the long-standing and worldwide tradition of sanctuary in monasteries, convents and other religious houses. Many of these people had escaped from the prisoner-of-war camps and others had managed to get away from their captors on train journeys which were bringing them to camps in Germany. In the early months, many of those who came to Rome managed to hide safely in the Vatican, which cannot have been too difficult given that it extends to approximately 10,000 rooms. We can be fairly certain that O’Flaherty was involved with many of these cases. However, the fact that such an escape route existed became well known. This embarrassed the Vatican authorities and compromised their diplomatic situation. Orders were issued to the Swiss Guard that anyone seeking refuge in the Vatican or on papal property was to be refused. This created a new difficulty for the Monsignor in his efforts to assist people. One of the first large groups he dealt with was fourteen British prisoners of war to whom the Swiss Guard had refused entry to the Vatican for sanctuary.

  Standing forlornly and dangerously conspicuous in the vast St Peter’s Square, dressed in an assortment of clothes they had acquired somehow, they simply did not look like tourists or devout Catholics come to see the Pope. One of the Irish priests who live in St Monica’s Monastery, opposite the Holy Office behind the Bernini Colonnade, approached them and soon found out their predicament. They were taken into St Monica’s for an hour or two while O’Flaherty was consulted.18

  O’Flaherty arranged with the help of a friend, Antonio Call, a policeman with strong anti-Fascist sympathies, to smuggle them into the Vatican two and three at a time. In light of the new arrangement, however, they were expelled the next day and so O’Flaherty with the help of Fr Giuseppe Clozner arranged to have them housed, rather incredibly, in an Italian police barracks where they were cared for by the staff until such time as the Germans occupied Rome the following September. Unfortunately, all but two were recaptured at that stage. However, this was an early indication of O’Flaherty’s extensive range of contacts and the willingness of many people, irrespective of their circumstances, to help him.

  Three South Africans, a Corporal De Villiers and two Privates, Crout and Dally, having escaped in the north of Italy, walked to Rome and sought O’Flaherty’s help. He arranged to place them in private accommodation. En route there, he was stopped by three German SS officers who fortunately only asked for directions. At the same time, he arranged for two American pilots, who had been forced to parachute near Rome, to be placed in safety. Then he heard that a Sergeant Wyndham was in hospital in Rome and, having arranged for his discharge, the Monsignor placed him with a family who were willing to help.

  The Germans cast continuous doubts on the situation of the diplomats in the Vatican. In October 1942 after a visit by the Head of the Gestapo, Himmler, a story reached the Vatican that he had demanded the expulsion of all the diplomats, and it was only because the Italian authorities protested that a decision was made not to go ahead. Rumours ebbed and flowed for the remaining years of the War as to possible intrusions and takeovers of the Vatican by the German authorities. There were even suggestions from time to time of a plot to kidnap the Pope. It was also suggested that there were actually agents of the Gestapo in the Vatican. Information garnered by American code breakers, which was made public after the War, confirmed that this was in fact the case.

  The legal situation in relation to the diplomats was not very clear. The wording of the Lateran Treaty was, as we have seen, fairly vague. Everyone knew that in these circumstances it was of huge importance that the Vatican and its diplomats behave in accordance with the conditions laid down for them. The reality for all of those living in the Vatican was indeed rather tenuous. The Vatican is an extremely small area and has no water supply of its own. At any stage, the Italians could have forced the situation by switching off the supply of this necessity.

  In December 1941, the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbour and, in response, the Americans declared war. Taylor returned to Washington leaving Tittmann in charge of relations with the Holy See. In diplomatic terms, Tittmann’s status was unclear. Essentially his role was to provide logistical support to a personal friend of the President of the United States, who had the status of Ambassador but not the rank or title. So while the Vatican authorities were happy to offer him the same sanctuary as D’Arcy Osborne and the others, the Italian Government was opposed. Roosevelt decided to face down any likely domestic opposition and, within a couple of days, Tittmann was appointed to the rank of Chargé d’Affaires. He took up residence in the Hospice Santa Marta on 16 November 1941 and quickly developed a close personal friendship with his British counterpart. This filled a gap for D’Arcy Osborne. Previously he had been very friendly with the French Ambassador, d’Ormesson. However, the latter had been withdrawn by the Vichy Government, which came to power after the collapse of France, and had been replaced by Bérard, who did not communicate with Allied diplomats at all.

  The police and the Italian authorities had a good idea of the views of senior Vatican personnel on the political situation. Montini was regularly the focus of attack in the Fascist newspapers. The police relied for their information on Italian servants working in the Vatican, as well as undercover agents. They even went to the extent of stationing agents in churches to monitor those who might approach the clergy for help. D’Arcy Osborne was also a focus of attention as he was the leading Allied diplomat living within the Vatican. However, insofar as we know, the authorities had still not become aware of O’Flaherty and his activities to any significant degree. While the absence of records means that information is rather sketchy we can say with certainty now that by November 1943 O’Flaherty and his colleagues had placed in excess of a thousand people in safety.

  3

  The Germans Take Charge

  The latter months of 1942 and early 1943 saw the beginnings of a re-evaluation of Italian involvement in the War by some in positions of authority. By March 1943, there were signs in army circles that many were willing to consider the possibility of a coup d’état. The British and American authorities began to consider the terms they would apply to any armistice should one be sought by the Italians. The possibility that the Pope might fulfil the role of peacemaker received active consideration inside and outside the Vatican. A message was transmitted to Mussolini by the Vatican authorities emphasising their concern at the damage that was being caused to Italy by the War and underlining that the Pope was available, as always, to do what he could to help alleviate the suffering of the people. Mussolini, however, still thought victory was possible and was not of a frame of mind to consider the possibility of surrender and so did not explore this offer of assistance. At the same time, suggestions came to him from the King and those around him that a change of policy would be appropriate. He informed the King that it would take three months to prepare for a possible peace move.

  At the same time, he expected that there would be an attack in Sicily as the Allied Forces, following their victory in Tunisia, were now in a position to commit men to such a tactic. Hitler also anticipated such an attack and offered Mussolini five additional German divisions but this was declined. There is no doubt that Hitler was anxious to stiffen the resolve of Mussolini as he realised the strategic importance of the Italian Dictator to the German cause.

  In Italy we can rely only on the Duce. There are strong fears that he may be got rid of or neutralised in some way. The Royal Family, all leading members of the Officer Corps, the clergy, the Jews and broad sectors of the Civil Society are hostile or negative towards us … the broad masses are apathetic and lacking in leadership.1

  In the meantime, the British authorities were anxious to get D’Arcy Osborne home to be fully bri
efed on these moves, as communication on such delicate matters, other than in a face-to-face session, was highly dangerous. In accordance with the terms of the Lateran Treaty, Ambassadors to the Vatican had a free right of communication with their home country. However, Italy had made it a condition that this could only refer to matters within the Vatican. The papal authorities felt that they, as a result, had a moral obligation to come to the assistance of the diplomats who were facing difficulties in this regard and so offered the use of the Vatican diplomatic bag. These bags went by papal courier to Berne or Lisbon where they were handed over to the British Embassies and then in turn sent on to London. However, there was always the risk that information could be leaked and so the authorities in London were very anxious for a meeting. D’Arcy Osborne could only leave the Vatican with the permission of the Italian authorities. This he finally secured through the good offices of Monsignor Montini who used sympathetic contacts available to him in the Foreign Affairs section of the Italian Government. At that stage, some in authority were anxious for peace and so were willing to co-operate with the Vatican authorities whom they looked to as suitable mediators in these matters. D’Arcy Osborne left Rome on 18 April 1943 and returned on 8 June. On the day after his return he visited Monsignor Tardini and reported the official British Government line which was that Italy would have to surrender unconditionally. At the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, Roosevelt and Churchill had agreed that, in the event of Germany and or Japan seeking an armistice, the Allied position would be to require them to surrender unconditionally. There was no formal agreement with regard to Italy. The British Government was now taking the view that the same requirement for an unconditional surrender should apply, a position which D’Arcy Osborne felt was unduly harsh. No progress was made for the next few weeks. However, on 10 July the Allied Forces invaded Sicily. Although their progress was delayed, within four or five weeks they had taken the island. This experience made it clear to Italy’s ruling class that they must change sides.

  The invasion of Sicily has, at last, obliged the mass of the Italian public to realise the seriousness of their military situation. Up to now they appeared indifferent and the enemy was so far away. Besides, the German Army was invincible. Today things have somewhat changed. The Allies have planted their feet solidly on Italian soil … Three weeks ago the Duce assured the Fascist leaders that any enemy soldier who polluted the sacred soil of Italy would not live to tell the tale. This was but a repetition of the cry from the other side of the Alps that the European fortress was unassailable.2

  (MacWhite, 15 July 1943)

  Hitler had foreseen this and had flown to Italy to meet Mussolini, such was his level of concern. Mussolini, meanwhile, had promised the Italian King that at his meeting with Hitler he would raise the possibility of an Italian withdrawal from the War. When he did not fulfil this undertaking, the King decided that he must withdraw his support from the Dictator. At the same time, members of the Fascist Grand Council had requested Mussolini to call a meeting, which he did. This body had not met for a number of years and indeed had always been merely a rubber stamp, so the Dictator did not anticipate problems. However, at this meeting, which started on 24 July and ran into 25 July, a motion of no confidence in Mussolini was passed by nineteen votes to seven. Included among those speaking and voting in favour of this motion was his son-in-law, Count Ciano. Mussolini felt, however, that he still had the support of the King and would remain in power. He was due to have an audience with the King later that day but when he arrived, he was very quickly arrested. Marshal Badoglio was appointed Prime Minister by the King.

  The most original creation of Fascism, said Mussolini one day, is the Grand Council. It expresses all the thoughts of the regime. It could even propose to modify the succession to the throne. Apparently, he did not anticipate that the time was not so far distant when the same Grand Council would appeal to the Monarchy to overthrow the man who had created it. And it was some of his erstwhile devoted supporters who took the initiative in the decision to do so … the sweeping nature of the defeat was apparently unexpected and would seem that Grandi who was indicated as the future duce had not even realised that the eclipse of Mussolini marked at the same time the collapse of the fascist regime and everything associated with it … The coup d’état had succeeded beyond the expectations of those who had plotted to bring it about. Without a hand being raised in his defence Mussolini was now behind prison bars reflecting perhaps on the instability of dictatorship. He had been ignominously dismissed from office by a King whom he had humiliated and despised but who, nevertheless, waited patiently for the opportunity to resume his royal prerogatives … on the fateful Sunday morning of July 25th, Mussolini still had the destinies of Italy within his grasp … some hours later, as the long summer evening was drawing to a close, the Rome radio, to the general surprise, announced that the King had accepted the resignation of Mussolini and had invested Marshal Badoglio with full power. It did not take the Italian public very long to realise the full import of the laconic statement. The people rushed into the streets shouting with joy and crying out ‘Long live the King’, ‘Long live free Italy’ and ‘Down with Mussolini’3

  (MacWhite, 27 July 1943)

  The Irish Legation was located quite close to Rome’s central barracks and the railway station terminus. Thomas Kiernan felt that, in the light of the Allied bombing, this was a dangerous place to keep his family so they moved to live on a temporary basis in one of the Vatican’s extra-territorial properties on the Via del Penitenziari close to St Peter’s Basilica. He describes the outpouring of joy in Rome at the fall of Mussolini:

  A few minutes before midnight we were raised from our beds by wild shouting of exultation. Broken-down cars loaded with young men were careering through Rome shouting their heads off. Mussolini is arrested … People who have been waiting like a condemned-to-death prisoner reacted now with all the wild abandon of reprieve. Not only reprieve, but complete liberty. Little did they, or any of us, anticipate that Rome’s travail was only then about to begin … We dressed hurriedly and went out, following the stream of improvised traffic. Suddenly a flame lit up the darkness … Blocked in the chaos of traffic we saw the flames rise to light the great Basilica.4

  The anti-Fascist forces within the city were breaking into the offices of the authorities and taking out furniture, paper, chairs and anything they could put their hands on and had lit a bonfire near St Peter’s. Another observer, a Swiss journalist named de Wyss, was alert to the political significance of the comments of the people:

  Hearing the news, people rushed into the streets just as they were; in night-gowns, night-shirts, pyjamas, some in trousers and bare to the waist, some in slippers, some barefoot, all howling, yelling, screaming … They shouted ‘Abasso Mussolini’ (down with Mussolini) … the publishing office of Il Tevere (a rabidly Fascist newspaper) was set on fire … I often heard anti-German shouts … many times, on seeing Germans, they shouted ‘out with the foreigners’ … I also saw them applauding a bonfire of Fascist insignia.5

  Unfortunately, the jubilation was short lived as Badoglio’s new Government announced that it would remain at war on Hitler’s side. Essentially this was a diversionary tactic. The new Prime Minister secretly entered immediately into direct negotiations with the Allies. It was fairly obvious to all observers – the Roman citizens, the diplomats and indeed the Germans – that this was what he intended to do.

  The situation here is still extremely delicate. There are now twelve German divisions in the peninsula and six more on the way … Three divisions in the neighbourhood of Rome are causing anxiety as it is feared they may seize both the King and the Pope in case of capitulation. ‘We regret’ said a cabinet member to me today ‘that the Allies have not a clearer comprehension of our painful situation. The forces are still four hundred miles away yet they want us to capitulate and at the same time fight the Germans. We are not in a position to continue fighting but we are unable to withdraw from the
conflict. All our people are disappointed that peace did not follow immediately after the fall of Mussolini.’6

  (MacWhite, 11 August 1943)

  Indeed, after the War it emerged that on 29 July German code breakers listened to a telephone conversation between Churchill and Roosevelt on the topic of an Italian Armistice. The new Italian Government was playing for time because they were aware that they did not have the forces to resist any German occupation. However, they exaggerated the possibilities that were open to the Allied Forces. They thought that the Allies could occupy Rome quite rapidly. However, a US General, Maxwell Taylor, went behind enemy lines to consider the possibilities of an air drop to secure Rome. He met Badoglio in Rome on 8 September but quickly realised that an air drop would not be sufficient to establish control of the city and he advised his Commander, Eisenhower, accordingly. Within the Vatican, D’Arcy Osborne and Tittmann were of the belief that the Germans were likely to take over Rome, and possibly the Vatican, so they began to destroy all confidential documents. Indeed, on 4 August, Cardinal Maglione held an urgent meeting of all his fellow Cardinals living in Rome. He advised them that the Italian Government was expecting a German coup and an invasion of the Vatican. Government sources had predicted to him that the Germans would seize the Pope and take him to Munich.

  German–Italian tension is increasing daily and anything may happen at any moment. The cordon of Italian troops in the immediate vicinity of Rome has been reinforced ostensibly against an Allied attack but in reality against the Germans who form another cordon eight or ten miles away.7