When Miners March

by William C. Blizzard

  Lawyer Represents Client

  It is not known whether or not Haynes succeeded in killing or maiming any coal miners, but he certainly made attempts, later describing how the miners scattered and took to cover when the bombs were dropped. For his contribution to “law and order” Haynes was paid $400 by the coal operators, who must have congratulated themselves that they lived in an age which boasted such efficient weapons for use against coal miners.

  Aside from the general barrage, each side sent out patrols. The three men that operators admit were killed on their side (and in this case there is no reason to doubt their estimate) met their deaths as a result of patrol action. How many coal miners were killed will never be known, as the miners through their years of struggle did not permit the opposition to learn of their casualties if they could prevent it, and the same policy evidently was followed at Blair Mountain. It appears, however, that they had far more men killed and wounded than the coal operators. The brutality of the Logan deputies has been pointed out, and it was again shown in some of the fighting at Blair Mountain. For instance, one miner killed, a Negro, was shot 11 times. Is it not clearly evident that this butchery sprang from pure sadism, with racist overtones, but it is not difficult to believe.

  Among prominent Charleston citizens who were on Blair Mountain, supposedly shouldering a gun for the coal operators, were Ben B. Brown, a lawyer, and George L. Coyle, a merchant. Brown, in courtroom testimony, spoke proudly of his part in the affair. “I had a verbal commission (from the governor),” he said, “and I left my work just as did old man Putnam in the Revolutionary War.” Brown was not quite accurate here, as he had not left his work, but was merely continuing it as attorney for the coal operators. It must be said that Mr. Brown was more zealous than the usual run of lawyers in defending the interests of his clients.

  There was a great deal of shooting done around Blair Mountain, that is certain, to cause so little loss of life. The reason for this seems to be that the miners made no real concerted push toward Logan in an attempt to crack the enemy lines during the days of active battle from Aug. 31 through the first two or three days of September. Had they done so there would have been heavy loss of life on both sides, although the miners would have won. That they were confident that they could defeat Chafin’s army is shown by the remarks of Phil Murray when he reported on the West Virginia situation to the 28th consecutive and 5th biennial convention of the UMW:

  Estimates Are Elastic

  “I visited the battle front, met with large numbers of the citizens’ army, discussed every phase of the so-called insurrection with them, and am satisfied in my own mind that if Federal troops had not arrived in the State of West Virginia, as it was self-evident to any casual observer that the outcome was inevitable, as the citizens’ army was making steady advance into the camp of the enemy.”

  There is little reason to dwell in detail upon some of the shootings that went on between small groups of miners and deputies. It is sufficient to note that there was a good bit of this, and that John Gore, an assistant of Don Chafin’s, was killed, along with two other deputies named Cafago and Muncy. When asked for the correct password by a Union patrol they answered instead “amen.” A battle ensued in which they were killed. How many were really killed and wounded in the Armed March, as we have said, will never be known. Coal operator Walter Thurmond told the Kenyon Committee that he had heard estimates of from 300 to 500. As the chairman of the committee pointed out, this was quite an elastic estimate. All estimates as to detail of the Armed March must remain elastic. It was that kind of battle. Eye witnesses who were not participants were not welcome, as we shall show in our next installment.

  Chapter Ten: Deputies Shoot Reporters

  2/4/1953 (Fifty-fourth)

  The situation in West Virginia during the closing days of August and early days of September, 1921, had developed into a shooting war between coal operators and coal miners, and sympathizers of both sides. As Phil Murray pointed out, the miners were not alone in their battle:

  “The general impression has been created by the Governor that this moment of protest, or ‘invasion’ as they call it, was confined to members of the United Mine Workers of America. Nothing could be further from the truth. As a matter of fact, and from my own personal observation, I know that the men who were on the firing line, fighting for abolition of the guards and Baldwin-Felts system, consisted of miners, railroad men, merchants, doctors, ministers of the gospel and almost every element of the citizenry of those communities and throughout the state.”

  The miners were not made to feel better during their march when they received news that C. Frank Keeney, their District 17 president, and Sec.-Treas. Fred Mooney, had been indicted on a murder charge in Mingo County. What the miners felt that this meant is related by William Petry, UMW organizer:

  “That meant that they, too, were to be done away with, like Sid Hatfield and Ed Chambers. Keeney and Mooney disappeared. Where they are I don’t know, but I’m assured they are safe from the hired gunmen at present.”

  In miners’ parlance, the Union leaders were “hiding out,” an indication that they also were firmly convinced of just what fate the operators desired for them. Petry amplifies his statement concerning the murder charge: “As a matter of fact, Keeney and Mooney were 250 miles away attending a state labor convention when the killing of a mine guard (with) which they are charged took place in Mingo county.”

  Leaders of other unions supported the UMW marchers. For instance, here is a statement of James Lord, then President of the Mining Department, American Federation of Labor:

  “This cry from Mingo county is the cry of the disinherited and the oppressed, that had run out all down the vistas of time, and will never be stilled until this country, and every other country, is in reality and in fact, a government of the people, for the people and by the people.”

  Such was the feeling as the firing went on near the Boone county – Logan county line. As we pointed out in the last installment, non-participants, such as newspaper men, were not precisely welcomed by either side. The miners were aware of the fact that they had seldom received a friendly press, and West Virginia coal operators were afraid of out-of-state reporters over whom they had no control.

  Some little noise was made in the press over the fact that a group of Washington, D.C. and New York “war correspondents” were fired upon and actually shot while covering the West Virginia scene near Blair Mountain. That one reporter was wounded seems borne out by the facts; but there is evidence to show that the coal miners were not the culprits, despite editorial intimation to the contrary and the undoubted fact that the miners had no reason to love many gentlemen of the fourth estate. Here is the story as given in the Sept. 10, 1921 issue of the newspaper, Labor, published in Washington, D.C. The story is under the byline of Clint C. Houston:

  “A party of Washington and New York newspaper correspondents had a narrow escape from the rifle fire of Morgan’s army. They were traveling along a mountain ridge on their way to Logan, seat of Logan county, when bullets began to sing all about them, coming form the point where Morgan’s men were located. Boy den Sparkes, of the New York Tribune, received a scalp wound and was hit in the leg. Miss Mildred Morris, of Washington, representing the International Press Service, received a sting on the head by one of the bullets.

  “The corresponding were rescued from their perilous position by two miners one of them was shot in an ankle while guiding the party to a place of safety. When the correspondents reached the line held by the state police they were arrested as spies, but were finally released by showing military passes signed by General Bandholtz, of the War Department, who had arrived on the scene ahead of the Federal troops.

  “The ‘defenders’ who fired upon the correspondents were under the command of Sheriff Don Chafin, of Logan County, who has long been a tool of the coal operators…”

  The Boyden Sparkes referred to as receiving a scalp wound wrote an article describing the dispersal o
f the Union miners which we shall quote as fully as possible, despite the fact that Sparkes obviously did not have the background to understand the coal miners of West Virginia. For the article is well-written and unconsciously revealing in many ways.

  Federal Troops Intervene

  Governor Morgan, as soon as he heard that the March had started again after the Sharples incident, immediately got in touch with President Warren G. Harding who in turn summoned General Bandholtz for a conference. Bandholtz had returned to Washington on Aug. 28, saw Harding on the 30th, and was ordered back to West Virginia, arriving at Charleston Sept. 1. The General then wired the Adjutant General to send Federal troops at once to the Mountain State. By the second day of September there were 170 troops at Madison, and by the 3rd 700 soldiers around that town and Jeffrey, with smaller groups scattered elsewhere. There were, in all, between 1,500 and 2,000 troops in the coal fields, plus a number of bombing and observation planes. Gen. Billy Mitchell, of later “airpower” fame, was on the scene in case the opportunity presented itself to test his theories as to the effectiveness of the newest military weapon.

  It is clear that the federal men were in many cases sympathetic toward the miners, although individual sympathies would have meant nothing if there had been a showdown battle between them and the coaldiggers. There would have been slaughter. One man, who said he was a pilot in the armed forces in 1921, told this writer that he was ordered to fly a bomber to Charleston from an airfield in Virginia, and that he jettisoned his bombs in the James River. General Bandholtz himself manifested anger over the Sharples incident, blaming the coal operator deputies and state police for being responsible for the second phase of the Armed March.

  The coal miners were angry men, but they were a long distance from being fools. They surrendered to the soldiers without the latter being required to fire a shot. Their plight, however, after they returned home, was far from a happy one, for the troops left the coal fields within a few days without any sort of change in the status quo being recommended by federal or state officials. As a writer for the Charleston Gazette recently put it, in the usual newspaper fashion, “local authorities again took over administration of law and justice” in the affected counties.

  After we give the story of Boyden Sparkes concerning the surrender to federal troops, we shall speak more fully of the sort of “law and justice” the miners received after the Armed March. The miners and their leaders were, in fact, left to the tender mercies of their enemies.

  The exhaustive investigation by the Kenyon Committee might as well not have occurred, insofar as remedial action by federal or state governments was concerned. The miners in West Virginia remained under industrial autocracy.

  2/5/1953 (Fifty-fifth)

  As we have said, we are going to quote at length from an article which appeared originally in Leslie’s Weekly. It was written by the newspaper man who was shot, according to the evidence we have given, by the Don Chafin forces on Blair Mountain. We use it not because we consider the analysis in line with sound thinking. We don’t. We consider it an authentic eyewitness account of the surrender of the miners to the federal troops in Sept., 1921, at least on one front. And there is the added reason that it points out certain of the Logan coal operator attributes with some accuracy:

  “JACK DALTON VERSES BILL BLIZZARD – IN THESE TWO LEADERS ARE PERSONIFIED THE CONFLICTING IDEALS THAT HAVE LED TO CIVIL WAR IN WEST VIRGINIA.

  “(By BOYDEN SPARKS)

  “(Editor’s note – Mr. Sparks, the author of this article, was sent down to the scene of hostilities in West Virginia as the staff correspondent of a New York newspaper, in the course of a thorough investigation of the conflict, including interviews with the leaders of both sides, he exposed himself to rifle fire and came away with bullet wounds in the leg and scalp. He insists, however, on a strict neutrality of attitude, since both sides shot at him.)

  “In one of the old melodramas that toured the country before the movies came along to provide daily thrillers the hero through clenched teeth would shout: ‘Now then, Jack Dalton, gimme them papers.’

  “Then came the awful struggle on the edge of the precipice. So it was something of a surprise to discover that Jack Dalton is still cast in the role of villain in West Virginia’s mine war, or at least that part of it which raged along the Logan – Boone County line until the federal troops forced a temporary suspension of hostilities.

  “Jack Dalton is the principal owner of the largest nonunion coal operation in West Virginia. He is president of the Main Island Creek Coal Co., which is operating about 27 mines on its 27,000 acres of Logan County coal land. It has other property in other counties.

  “It was with the intention of forcing the unionization of those mines that a red-badged army recently sought to invade Logan County from the neighboring and unionized County of Boone. To that mob, or army, if you would have it so, Jack Dalton represents ‘privilege’ and ‘the interests’ and ‘Wall Street,’ and yet he used to be a miner himself. His career, in fact, suggests one of Horatio Alger’s boy heroes and is complete justification for those who argue that America offers every youth a chance to get to the top.

  Very Fancy Diggings

  “Bill Jones was the first man down there in the West Virginia hills to mention Dalton to me. Jones is the general superintendent of the Main Island Creek Coal Co. I had gone with him to Omar, the center of their operation, to see for myself how nonunion miners are treated by their employers. All shooting had stopped two days before.

  “ ‘You’ll sleep in our president’s house,’ said Jones, easing his six-shotter into a fresh position on the front of his khaki breeches. ‘He is in Huntington now, but the house is open.’

  “We mounted the steps of a large frame house with a pyramidal roof. On one side were the railroad tracks. Across the muddy street was the rambling Young Men’s Civic Association, a clubhouse conducted by the company for their employees. Unlocking the door, Jones led the way through a deserted lower floor to a large bedroom upstairs. It was furnished in golden oak.

  “ ‘Dalton’s a great guy,” said Jones. ‘He used to be a miner himself. Came up here with $10,000 and opened up this field. We’re getting out 40,000,000 tons a year.’

  “I went into the adjoining bedroom. It was as large as an ordinary apartment house living room. The tub was enormous, and there was a wonderful shower. Here was a miner’s long suppressed desire to be utterly clean and free from coal grime finally expressed in several thousand dollars worth of plumbing. I used both baths and then crawled into the massive golden oak bed with an armful of newspapers….

  “I met him (Dalton) the following day in Huntington, at the offices of the Main Island Creek Coal Co., which occupy an entire floor of one of Huntington’s tall, modern business buildings. He proved to be wide, stoop shouldered, clean shaven and dark. He is big, and when he shakes hands you feel the power of muscles developed digging coal far back inside of a West Virginia mountain. Dalton was in the room where his board of directors meet. This is furnished in mahogany. Maps of his companies’ properties hang on the wall. Half a dozen of his executives were there. Each of them told me something about the depredations of Union miners. They whispered tragically of nationalization; of the winter suffering of the nation if ever the Guyan field is unionized and a general strike is called. Dalton merely listened. He puffed steadily at a black cigar, but sat impassive sphinx-like.

  Chafin King of Logan

  “One of his executives, when the boss was out of hearing, said: ‘He’s a born trader. He’d rather trade than eat.’

  “But I think that the important thing is that he used to be a miner, a nonunion miner, and that he is determined that his miners shall continue to be nonunion. When the unions are willing to use force to effect organization, Jack Dalton is willing to use force to prevent it.

  “His weapon – and the weapon of the other coal operators in the field – is Sheriff Don Chafin and his deputies. And whatever you may think of the system, the
coal operators pay their salaries, and the deputies make of Logan County a region utterly unhealthy for Union organizers and agitators. Be sure, however, that Jack Dalton cares little what you think.

  “Chafin, whose mother was a Hatfield, a woman of the feudist clan, is called the king of Logan County. Yet, if there were no Chafin I believe that Dalton would have another king on the shrieval throne. Chafin is merely a convenient instrument, ready forged and tempered with Hatfield blood.

  “So much for Logan County, where each miner deals independently with his boss. Across the ridge in Boone County it is different. There collective bargaining is the method of dealing between miners and operators; and, it may be said, the operators there sing in a different key. Some of them openly supported the miners’ army when it mobilized there in the Coal River Valley.

  “If there is a king in Boone County I should say it was Bill Blizzard. At least Blizzard was the dictator while the miners’ army had a firing line that extended the full length of the Logan – Boone County line. Blizzard is a sub-district president of the United Mine Workers. His territory includes all of Boone County, and would include Logan if that county was organized.