After the Reich

by Giles MacDonogh

  This cunning confusion over the two Neisse rivers added greatly to the Polish cull. Not only were the Poles to be richly rewarded with their half of East Prussia, Danzig, all of Hinter Pomerania and a large chunk of Brandenburg east of the Oder and the so-called ‘border area’, they were now to receive such stock German towns as Brieg, Bunzlau, Frankenstein, Glatz, Glogau, Goldberg, Grünberg, Hirschberg, Landeshut, Liegnitz, Ohlau, Sagan, Waldenburg and Warmbrunn, containing altogether some 2.8 million Germans.76 In all they would be awarded 21 per cent of Germany’s pre-1937 territory, while the Russians made off with 3,500 square miles of East Prussia. All in all Germany would lose a quarter of its extent, and a large part of the arable land that had fed it in the past. In return the Poles were meant to shut up about Poland east of the Bug, and accept their place in Stalin’s world.

  Truman and Churchill were giving way at every point. Stalin talked of Königsberg as a conquest next. This was booty - not in keeping with Churchill’s and Roosevelt’s high-minded utterances in Newfoundland in 1941 - but Byrnes thought Churchill understood Stalin’s desire to grab a colony or two. The status of the city had been discussed at Teheran. The Soviet Union ‘should have an ice-free port at the expense of Germany’. Stalin added that the Russians had suffered so much at the hands of Germany that they were anxious to have some piece of German territory as some small satisfaction to tens of millions of Soviet citizens. Besides, Roosevelt and Churchill had already agreed. Churchill made a weak attempt to backtrack. He said it would be difficult to admit that East Prussia did not exist and that Königsberg would not come under the authority of the Allied Control Council. Once more, the region’s ultimate status would be left for the peace conference that was never to be.77

  The conference then heard a report from Field Marshal Alexander about the British Sector of Vienna. The area contained 500,000 people, but the British had no means of feeding them, their zone being hundreds of miles to the south and west of the city. Stalin promised to look into the matter with Renner. On the 24 July he generously agreed to feed the British charges for the time being.

  The conference returned to the thorny matter of the Polish border on the 25th. Churchill and Eden had met the Polish delegates, headed by Bierut, the previous day. Bierut was a Soviet pawn who simply lied to and stonewalled the British leader, but all the same he provided a rather more generous estimate of the number of Germans remaining beyond the Oder. He believed there were a million and half of them. At the next session Churchill said that the question of the transfer of populations from Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland should be discussed: ‘This area was part of the Russian Zone and the Poles are driving the Germans out. He felt this ought not to be done without consideration being given to the question of food supply, reparation and other matters which had not yet been decided’. In his reply, Stalin came close to being frank. The Poles, he said, ‘were taking their revenge upon the Germans . . . for the injuries the Germans had caused them in the course of the centuries’. Churchill expressed a material consideration once more - that revenge took the form of throwing the Germans into the American and British Zones to be fed.78

  Truman reminded Stalin that the Poles were his responsibility too, and that he was also at the mercy of the Senate; and that they might easily refuse to ratify any proposed treaty. Stalin brought up another bargaining counter, one that was not in his hands: the Ruhr. This was in the British Zone, and the British were having a hard time keeping the French out. Churchill announced that he was leaving for Britain. ‘What a pity!’ said Stalin. ‘I hope to be back,’ replied the British premier. Stalin suggested that, judging from his rival’s face, ‘he did not think Mr Attlee was looking forward to taking over Churchill’s authority’, apparently adding, ‘He does not look like a greedy man.’ The British left Alexander Cadogan to mind the fort.79

  There was no meeting on 26 July, as the British were absent. Truman flew to Frankfurt-am-Main to visit Eisenhower. On the way to Schloss Berckheim, General Bolling’s palatial headquarters in Weinheim, he drove through unscathed villages, and saw healthy-looking Germans. Eisenhower was based in the big IG Farben building in Frankfurt, which reminded Truman of the Pentagon. The British delegation had still not returned on 27 July and Truman relaxed with Eugene List’s piano-playing. He wrote to his mother and sister of this ‘Godforsaken country’. ‘To think that millions of Russians, Poles, English and Americans were slaughtered all for the folly of one crazy egotist by the name of Hitler. I hope it won’t happen again.’80 The day before he had met a Lieutenant Hitler, who came from the solidly German town of St Louis.

  Churchill had very much expected to be back, but Attlee won by a landslide and became prime minister on the 26th. On the 27th he unexpectedly named the former docker Ernest Bevin as foreign secretary. Bevin himself thought he was destined for the Treasury, and that Hugh Dalton would get the Foreign Office. Attlee had even told Dalton as much when he saw him that morning. The Foreign Office, however, was not happy with Dalton, possibly fearing that the Old Etonian economist would be ‘too soft’ on the Russians. The permanent under-secretary, Cadogan, thought Bevin ‘the heavyweight of the cabinet’. A further deciding factor was the king’s antipathy towards Dalton. He too preferred Bevin.81

  Bevin had no problem thinking himself into the role of chief diplomat. As he told his private secretary Nicholas Henderson, he knew all about ‘foreigners’. He had had plenty of experience of ships’ captains. ‘Oh yes, I can handle them,’ he said. As it was, he was devoted to the old guard at the Foreign Office and the Foreign Office liked him too, because he did not prevent them from shaping government policy. Bevin was strongly anti-Soviet and had become fed up with Churchill’s softness towards them. He thought the Conservatives had thrown too many ‘baubles at the Soviets’. On 28 July, badly overweight and heavily dependent on drink and cigarettes, Bevin went to Brize Norton to take his first flight.82

  Truman was introduced to Ernest Bevin. Both he and Byrnes were rather shocked by his aggressiveness towards the Soviets. When he got to his digs, Bevin told General Sir Hastings Ismay that he was ‘not going to have Britain barged about’.83 His passion for the British Empire would not have been popular with the Americans or the Russians. Britain, however, had far less might than the other two. Economically it was on its back: six years of war had cost a quarter of the country’s pre-war wealth; its income was reduced by half; exports were just a third of what they had been, and its merchant fleet was down by 30 per cent. It had also lost 40 per cent of its markets - chiefly to the Americans. Together with these problems, the colonies were crawling with nationalists who were looked on with sympathy by the other two powers round the Russian table in Potsdam.84 Despite the limited affections of the Americans, Britain had only one way to turn. The Americans were avowed enemies of colonialism and the sterling bloc, which they saw as a threat to the open world economy.85

  Naturally Stalin knew Attlee well. The later arrival of the British meant that the conference did not kick off until 10.15 p.m. on the 28th. Bevin was seeing the Russian leader for the first time. He decided he was like a ‘renaissance despot’ - it was always yes or no, ‘though you could only count on him if it was no’. Bevin immediately protested about the Oder-Neisse Line.86 For the time being, however, the conference continued to discuss booty. Stalin agreed that he would not seek reparations from Austria (he was insisting on payments from Italy). He would find another way of making off with the booty he desired - by sequestering ‘German’ assets. Truman was growing impatient with the reparations issue. He realised all too well that when these countries were bankrupted by reparations they would need bailing out by the United States. It was after midnight when the meeting broke up.87

  The 29th was the second Sunday of the conference. Truman attended a church service in Babelsberg. Stalin had caught a cold and had stayed in bed, thereby postponing the end. Truman thought he was faking the illness, and that he was merely disappointed that Churchill had been replaced by Attlee. Molotov
took his place at the table. Zhukov remarked that Attlee was rather more reserved than Churchill, but that he continued Churchill’s line of argument.88 Truman’s original suppositions about Stalin had been revised - he had never met such stubborn characters before and hoped he would never do so again.89

  The American secretary of state James Byrnes read out a statement offering a definition of Poland’s western borders that would prevail until the matter could be decided by the peace conference. The area was to be administered by the Poles ‘until Poland’s final western border was fixed’ by the peace conference.90 Byrnes drew a line starting at Swinemünde, west of Stettin, and proceeding down the Oder to the Neisse before following the Eastern Neisse to the Czech frontier. The Poles would also administer Danzig and the lower half of East Prussia. It would not be considered a part of the Soviet Zone.91

  Molotov immediately objected: he wanted the border fixed at the Görlitzer or Western Neisse. Truman thought he ‘requested a very large concession on our part’. That was a considerable understatement. Truman was already annoyed by the Russian-Polish fait accompli. The Russians had warned their clients in Poland and Czechoslovakia to put a temporary stop to their expulsions, at least until such time as the Allies could find places for them within the shrunken Germany. The miserable German population in Silesia were hoping vainly for justice from Potsdam. The Polish authorities had now declared them to be ‘outside the law, without possessions or honour’.92 The final decision was pure whitewash.eq Molotov returned to the Ruhr. It was the bit of western Germany the Russians wanted and had failed to occupy. Now he demanded two milliard dollars or its equivalent - five to six million tons of machinery. Russian reparations had already been fixed at Yalta. They were to receive a quarter of the equipment in the Ruhr. There were other little points of that nature to clear up. The naval issue was settled by a three-part division.93

  Stalin continued indisposed. Truman wrote to his mother and sister. He was not convinced that Stalin was ill. Perhaps the generalissimo genuinely missed Churchill, for it was certain that Attlee would make just as many concessions, if not more. Stalin did not please the American leader: ‘You never saw a more pig-headed people as the Russians. I hope I never have to hold another conference with them.’94

  The end drew near. The eleventh and penultimate meeting took place on the 31st. The Ruhr was British, and Bevin fixed the Russian share at 10 to 15 per cent. That meant 15 per cent in commodities or 10 in reparations. Bevin also held out for the Eastern Neisse, but Byrnes was ready to concede and grant the Russians the plum they longed for. Truman added forlornly that it was only a temporary measure. Bevin was still insisting on the 1937 borders and hoping for a deal of some sort before he would concede. The Americans pulled the carpet out from under his feet. He wanted to know if the British could also give away parts of their zone to other countries.er Truman added in what was no doubt a resigned tone: ‘we all agreed on the Polish question’. Stalin said, ‘Stettin is in Polish territory.’ Bevin added, ‘Yes, we should inform the French.’ And they decided to tell the French. The French had wanted it thus all along.95

  The Anglo-Americans had lain prostrate while the Russians had walked all over them. Truman thought the Polish compromise was ‘the best we were able to get’.96 It begs a number of questions: had Stalin placed the border at Berlin and the Spree, would the Allies have consented? Berlin had a Slavic history too, as indeed did Magdeburg. Why not fix Poland’s border at the Elbe? For the Germans on the right bank of the Oder, however, Potsdam gave an ambiguous verdict, leaving the Oder-Neisse issue open until 1974 and later. The final decision was to be left until a peace treaty was agreed. This never happened. The Oder-Neisse Line therefore became a temporary frontier until a permanent one was fixed at a later conference. In the meantime the Poles resumed their expulsions from the areas allotted to them by the Soviets. The cities of Breslau and Stettin felt this decision acutely. The Anglo-Americans had not intended to leave them in Poland, either permanently or temporarily. They had planned to divide Breslau, leaving the bulk of the city in German hands, and the right-bank suburbs were to go to Poland. At Yalta Churchill had said, ‘It would be a great pity to stuff the Polish goose so full of German food that it died of indigestion.’97 Zhukov claimed that the Oder-Neisse Line had been settled at Yalta, and that Churchill was backtracking.98 Without Churchill’s at best limp resistance, Truman agreed to the Oder-Neisse Line including the Eastern Neisse and Breslau.99

  At the next meeting Stalin was after booty again. He wanted a line drawn from the Baltic to the Adriatic, and the opportunity to appropriate any German property to the east of that marker. They discussed war criminals: the Russians wanted the Krupps indicted. Krupps had made possibly the greatest demands on the Nazi government for Russian slave labour and raw materials. The Russians complained that Rudolf Hess was living comfortably in England. Bevin replied that the British would send the Allies a bill for his upkeep.100 Attlee thought the Russians had Goebbels. Stalin was evasive. He wanted to have a list of war criminals who might be in the Soviet Union, but the Americans opposed this. Stalin asked for just three names, at which Attlee suggested Hitler: ‘Stalin replied that we do not have Hitler at our disposition but that he had no objection to naming him.’101

  Stalin reverted to the western Polish border at the last meeting, which began at 10.40 p.m. on 1 August. Molotov had amended the line on the map. Stalin said that he wanted it fixed immediately west of Swinemünde, but that the precise location would be decided by the Poles and Russians. Bevin objected. ‘No,’ he said, ‘the British could not cut themselves out of this . . . The line must be recognised by the United Nations.’ The delegates continued to bicker about Swinemünde and how many other German villages to the west of the coastal town would fall to Poland. The session broke up at 3 a.m.102

  The Potsdam Conference laid down the guidelines for the transfer of populations. An estimated 3.5 million Germans were to be brought out of the new Poland and settled in the British and Soviet Zones in an orderly and humane manner as enshrined in Article 13. A schedule was drawn up which foresaw the entire number crossing the frontier before August 1946.103

  The Big Three agreed to create a number of ‘central agencies’ that would be law in all four zones. The French smelled a rat: central agencies smacked of the ‘Reich’. ‘There is thus a German state,’ complained de Gaulle; that was ‘inadmissible’.104 It was not only the French who were unhappy. Potsdam ended in recrimination. The path to the Cold War was open. From now on decisions would be taken at the regular meetings of the Allied foreign ministers. The Russians had the dropping of the US atom bombs on Japan to concentrate their minds. On 22 August Truman put an end to Lease-Lend while de Gaulle was on a visit to America. Franco-American relations were marked by mutual incomprehension. France, which had signed a treaty with Soviet Russia in December, was playing the communist card. It was easily done with the Communist Party the largest in the French Assembly.105

  The Western Allies were shocked that they had made so many concessions to the Soviets. They had managed the conference badly. Soviet power was at its height, while the British were at the nadir of their fortunes. The death of Roosevelt in April had meant that the only delegation to have maintained the same dramatis personae at Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam had been the Soviets, and they had known how to invoke past agreements.106 Although Truman had accepted Morgenthau’s resignation, it was only at Potsdam that the politician’s thinking really became a dead letter.107 One of the most influential critics of Potsdam was the diplomat George Kennan, who was stationed in Moscow and knew the Soviet leaders well. He viewed the whole conference with ‘unmitigated scepticism and despair’. ‘I cannot recall any political document the reading of which filled me with a greater sense of depression than the communiqué to which President Truman set his name at the conclusion of these confused and unreal discussions.’ Quadripartite control was, thought Kennan, ‘Unreal and unworkable’.108

  He believed that the agre
ement was wrong, point by point. War crimes needed to be settled by immediate execution, and there was no common ground to be found with the Soviets. ‘In all fairness’ the granting of Königsberg to the Soviet Union had been agreed by Churchill and Roosevelt, ‘but the casualness and frivolity with which these decisions were made . . . the apparent indifference on the American side’ appalled Kennan. He also showed how Truman and Byrnes had been hoodwinked. The Russians required an ice-free port, and felt they deserved one after the sacrifices made by the Soviet people. Kennan pointed out that they already had three - Ventspils, Libau (Liepaja) and Baltisky - and Königsberg was forty-nine kilometres from the sea. The result was a disaster ‘without parallel’ in modern times.

  Not only were the East Prussian population subjected to the most ghastly fate imaginable (and in many cases it was unimaginable), but - as Kennan pointed out - it resulted in the most terrible squandering of the resources of a rich agricultural province. Gone were 1.4 million head of cattle, 1.85 million pigs, four million tons of wheat, fifteen million tons of rye and 40 million tons of potatoes in a yearly average.109

  Some Germans, however, were relieved to hear the outcome of the Potsdam Conference. For Ruth Friedrich it was as if a ‘stone had fallen from our hearts: so there is not to be a fresh war but they were going to rebuild and rule together’. The order was enshrined in Control Council Proclamation No. 1 of 5 June, which informed the German people that the four powers would jointly govern Germany.110