The Marshall Plan
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Stalin, Josef Vissarionovich (1879–1953). Bolshevik revolutionary and Soviet dictator. Secretary general of the Communist Party, 1922–1953; chairman of the Council of Ministers, 1941–1953; chairman of the State Committee of Defense, 1941–1945; people’s commissar of defense, 1941–1946.
Steinbrück, Peer (1947– ). German Social Democratic politician. Finance minister, 2005–2009.
Steinhardt, Laurence (1892–1950). American diplomat. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, 1939–1941; ambassador to Czechoslovakia, 1944–1948.
Stimson, Henry (1867–1950). American statesman. Secretary of state, 1929–1933; secretary of war, 1940–1945; chairman of the Stimson Committee for the Marshall Plan to Aid European Recovery, 1947–1948.
Stránský, Jaroslav (1884–1973). Czechoslovak official. Justice minister in the London-based government-in-exile, 1942–1945; education minister, 1946–1948.
Sudoplatov, Pavel (1907–1996). Soviet spymaster and commando. One of the architects of the 1940 assassination of Leon Trotsky.
Suslov, Mikhail Andreevich (1902–1982). Soviet Communist Party ideologue and official. Head of the foreign policy department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, 1946–1947; chief of the Central Committee’s AgitProp department, 1947–1948, 1949–1952; editor in chief of Pravda, 1949–1950; secretary of the Central Committee, 1947–1982.
Svoboda, Ludvík (1895–1979). Czechoslovak Communist military leader and politician. Defense minister, 1945–1950; president, 1968–1975.
Taber, John (1880–1965). American politician. Congressman (R-NY), 1923–1963. Argued against the Marshall Plan on the grounds that Europeans simply needed to work as hard as Americans.
Taft, Robert (1889–1953). American politician. Senator (R-OH), 1939–1953. Opposed the Marshall Plan for being fiscally reckless.
Talbott, Strobe (1946– ). American scholar and official. Deputy secretary of state, 1994–2001; president of the Brookings Institution, 2002–2017. Expert on Russia.
Teltschik, Horst (1940– ). German businessman and official. Chancellor Kohl’s chief foreign policy adviser and political strategist during the process of German reunification.
Thatcher, Margaret (1925–2013). British stateswoman. Leader of the Conservative Party, 1975–1990; prime minister, 1979–1990. Cautioned that German reunification would unleash instability in central and eastern Europe.
Tito, Josip Broz (1892–1980). Yugoslav Communist leader. Premier, 1945–1953; president, 1953–1980. Defied Stalin to establish Yugoslavia as a nonaligned country.
Togliatti, Palmiro (1893–1964). Italian politician. Secretary and leader of the Italian Communist Party, 1926–1964.
Truman, Harry (1884–1972). American statesman. Senator (D-MO), 1935–1945; vice president, 1945; president, 1945–1953. Led the United States through the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War. A willing delegator, he assembled a formidable team of officials and diplomats to navigate this tumultuous period. Lent his name to the Truman Doctrine, a policy chiefly concerned with preventing Soviet-led Communist expansion.
Tunner, William (1906–1983). American air commander. Commander of the Combined Airlift Task Force, 1948–1949. Logistical genius who organized the Berlin airlift.
Ulbricht, Walter (1893–1973). East German leader. General secretary of the Communist Party, 1950–1971; chairman of the State Council, 1960–1973. A devoted follower of Stalin and first leader of East Germany.
Vandenberg, Arthur (1884–1951). American politician. Senator (R-MI), 1928–1951; chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1947–1949. An isolationist turned internationalist after Pearl Harbor, he was a master legislative tactician and the Marshall Plan’s most important advocate in Congress.
van der Beugel, Ernst (1918–2004). Dutch economist and diplomat. Delegate to the Committee of European Economic Co-operation, 1947; director of the division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs responsible for handling the Marshall Plan, 1948–1952.
Varga, Evgeny Samuilovich (1879–1964). Soviet economist of Hungarian descent. Author of The Changes in Capitalist Economy Following World War II.
Vinson, Frederick (1890–1953). American Democratic politician and jurist. Treasury secretary, 1945–1946; chief justice of the Supreme Court, 1946–1953. A close friend of Truman’s.
Vursell, Charles (1881–1974). American politician. Congressman (R-IL), 1943–1959. Argued that Marshall aid would be better spent on strengthening the U.S. Air Force.
Vyshinsky, Andrei Januarievich (1883–1954). Soviet lawyer and diplomat. Prosecutor of the Soviet Union, 1935–1939; assistant chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars, 1939–1944; assistant people’s commissar of foreign affairs/assistant foreign minister, 1940–1949; foreign minister, 1949–1953. Served as Molotov’s first deputy for nearly a decade before replacing him in 1949.
Wałe˛sa, Lech (1943– ). Polish trade union leader and statesman. Chairman of Polish trade union Solidarity, 1980–1990; president, 1990–1995.
Wallace, Henry (1888–1965). American politician. Vice president, 1941–1945; secretary of commerce, 1945–1946. A presidential candidate who ran on the Progressive Party ticket in 1948, he condemned the Marshall Plan as belligerent and imperialistic.
Wellstone, Paul (1944–2002). American politician. Senator (D-MN), 1991–2002.
Wherry, Kenneth (1892–1951). American politician. Senator (R-NE), 1943–1951.
White, Harry Dexter (1892–1948). American economist and Treasury official. Sympathetic to the Soviet Union and an admirer of its economic system, he was considered a valuable agent of influence by Soviet intelligence.
White, William (1905–1994). American journalist. Correspondent for The New York Times.
Wiley, Alexander (1884–1967). American politician. Senator (R-WI), 1939–1963. Wanted the United States to secure strategic bases or materials in Europe in return for aid.
Wilson, Woodrow (1856–1924). American Democratic statesman. President, 1913–1921. Called for a post–World War I order based on “Fourteen Points,” among them self-determination and the elimination of trade barriers.
Wisner, Frank (1909–1965). American official. Deputy assistant secretary of state for the occupied areas, 1947–1948; assistant director for policy coordination at the CIA, 1948–1951.
Wörner, Manfred (1934–1994). German politician and diplomat. Secretary general of NATO, 1988–1994.
Wrong, Humphrey Hume (1894–1954). Canadian diplomat. Ambassador to the United States, 1946–1953.
Yanukovych, Viktor (1950– ). Ukrainian politician. Prime minister, 2002–2005, 2006–2007; president, 2010–2014.
Yazov, Dimtry Timofeevich (1924- ). Soviet military leader and official. The last defense minister of the Soviet Union, 1984-1991.
Yeltsin, Boris Nickolaevich (1931–2007). Russian statesman. First president of the Russian Federation, 1991–1999. Opposed NATO expansion after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Yezhov, Nikolai Ivanovich (1895–1940). Soviet Communist Party functionary and official. Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and chairman of its Commission of Party Control, 1935–1939; people’s commissar of internal affairs, 1936–1938. Organizer of mass repressions of 1936–1938. Arrested in 1939 and executed in 1940 on falsified charges of an attempted coup d’état.
Young, Owen (1874–1962). American businessman. Chairman of General Electric, 1922–1939, 1942–1945; member of the President’s Committee on Foreign Aid (Harriman Committee), 1947.
Zellerbach, James (18921963). American businessman and diplomat. Economic Cooperation Administration mission chief in Italy, 1948–1950.
Zenkl, Petr (1884–1975). Czechoslovak politician. Chairman of the National Socialist Party, 1945–1948.
Zhdanov, Andrei Alexandrovich (1896–1948). Soviet Communist Party leader and official. Member of the Politburo, 1939–1948; Communist Party Central Committee secretary responsible for ideology and foreign policy, 1934–1948.
Zoellick, Robert (1953– ). American diplomat. State Department counselor, 1989–1991; under secretary of state for economic and agricultural affairs, 1991–1992; trade representative, 2001–2005; deputy secretary of state, 2005–2006; president of the World Bank, 2007–2012.
Zorin, Valerian Alexandrovich (1902–1986). Soviet diplomat. Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, 1945–1947; assistant foreign minister, 1947–1955, 1956–1965.
APPENDIX A
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TRUMAN DOCTRINE SPEECH
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(transcript version)
March 12, 1947
MR. PRESIDENT, MR. SPEAKER, MEMBERS of the Congress of the United States:
The gravity of the situation which confronts the world today necessitates my appearance before a joint session of the Congress. The foreign policy and the national security of this country are involved. One aspect of the present situation, which I present to you at this time for your consideration and decision, concerns Greece and Turkey. The United States has received from the Greek Government an urgent appeal for financial and economic assistance. Preliminary reports from the American Economic Mission now in Greece and reports from the American Ambassador in Greece corroborate the statement of the Greek Government that assistance is imperative if Greece is to survive as a free nation.
I do not believe that the American people and the Congress wish to turn a deaf ear to the appeal of the Greek Government. Greece is not a rich country. Lack of sufficient natural resources has always forced the Greek people to work hard to make both ends meet. Since 1940, this industrious, peace loving country has suffered invasion, four years of cruel enemy occupation, and bitter internal strife.
When forces of liberation entered Greece they found that the retreating Germans had destroyed virtually all the railways, roads, port facilities, communications, and merchant marine. More than a thousand villages had been burned. Eighty-five percent of the children were tubercular. Livestock, poultry, and draft animals had almost disappeared. Inflation had wiped out practically all savings. As a result of these tragic conditions, a militant minority, exploiting human want and misery, was able to create political chaos which, until now, has made economic recovery impossible.
Greece is today without funds to finance the importation of those goods which are essential to bare subsistence. Under these circumstances, the people of Greece cannot make progress in solving their problems of reconstruction. Greece is in desperate need of financial and economic assistance to enable it to resume purchases of food, clothing, fuel, and seeds. These are indispensable for the subsistence of its people and are obtainable only from abroad. Greece must have help to import the goods necessary to restore internal order and security, so essential for economic and political recovery. The Greek Government has also asked for the assistance of experienced American administrators, economists, and technicians to insure that the financial and other aid given to Greece shall be used effectively in creating a stable and self-sustaining economy and in improving its public administration.
The very existence of the Greek state is today threatened by the terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by Communists, who defy the government’s authority at a number of points, particularly along the northern boundaries. A Commission appointed by the United Nations security Council is at present investigating disturbed conditions in northern Greece and alleged border violations along the frontiers between Greece on the one hand and Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia on the other.
Meanwhile, the Greek Government is unable to cope with the situation. The Greek army is small and poorly equipped. It needs supplies and equipment if it is to restore authority of the government throughout Greek territory. Greece must have assistance if it is to become a self-supporting and self-respecting democracy. The United States must supply this assistance. We have already extended to Greece certain types of relief and economic aid. But these are inadequate. There is no other country to which democratic Greece can turn. No other nation is willing and able to provide the necessary support for a democratic Greek government.
The British Government, which has been helping Greece, can give no further financial or economic aid after March 31st. Great Britain finds itself under the necessity of reducing or liquidating its commitments in several parts of the world, including Greece.
We have considered how the United Nations might assist in this crisis. But the situation is an urgent one, requiring immediate action, and the United Nations and its related organizations are not in a position to extend help of the kind that is required.
It is important to note that the Greek Government has asked for our aid in utilizing effectively the financial and other assistance we may give to Greece, and in improving its public administration. It is of the utmost importance that we supervise the use of any funds made available to Greece in such a manner that each dollar spent will count toward making Greece self-supporting, and will help to build an economy in which a healthy democracy can flourish.
No government is perfect. One of the chief virtues of a democracy, however, is that its defects are always visible and under democratic processes can be pointed out and corrected. The Government of Greece is not perfect. Nevertheless it represents eighty-five percent of the members of the Greek Parliament who were chosen in an election last year. Foreign observers, including 692 Americans, considered this election to be a fair expression of the views of the Greek people.
The Greek Government has been operating in an atmosphere of chaos and extremism. It has made mistakes. The extension of aid by this country does not mean that the United States condones everything that the Greek Government has done or will do. We have condemned in the past, and we condemn now, extremist measures of the right or the left. We have in the past advised tolerance, and we advise tolerance now.
Greek’s [sic] neighbor, Turkey, also deserves our attention. The future of Turkey, as an independent and economically sound state, is clearly no less important to the freedom-loving peoples of the world than the future of Greece. The circumstances in which Turkey finds itself today are considerably different from those of Greece. Turkey has been spared the disasters that have beset Greece. And during the war, the United States and Great Britain furnished Turkey with material aid.
Nevertheless, Turkey now needs our support. Since the war, Turkey has sought additional financial assistance from Great Britain and the United States for the purpose of effecting that modernization necessary for the maintenance of its national integrity. That integrity is essential to the preservation of order in the Middle East. The British government has informed us that, owing to its own difficulties, it can no longer extend financial or economic aid to Turkey. As in the case of Greece, if Turkey is to have the assistance it needs, the United States must supply it. We are the only country able to provide that help.
I am fully aware of the broad implications involved if the United States extends assistance to Greece and Turkey, and I shall discuss these implications with you at this time. One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion. This was a fundamental issue in the war with Germany and Japan. Our victory was won over countries which sought to impose their will, and their way of life, upon other nations.
To ensure the peaceful development of nations, free from coercion, the United States has taken a leading part in establishing the United Nations. The United Nations is designed to make possible lasting freedom and independence for all its members. We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive m
ovements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed upon free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace, and hence the security of the United States.
The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will. The Government of the United States has made frequent protests against coercion and intimidation in violation of the Yalta agreement in Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria. I must also state that in a number of other countries there have been similar developments.
At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one. One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression. The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.
I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.
I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.
I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.
The world is not static, and the status quo is not sacred. But we cannot allow changes in the status quo in violation of the Charter of the United Nations by such methods as coercion, or by such subterfuges as political infiltration. In helping free and independent nations to maintain their freedom, the United States will be giving effect to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.