The Marshall Plan
Page 71
76 Lovett to Marshall, December 9, 1947, in FRUS, 1947, II: 759; Berger and Ritschl (1995:227); Ritschl (June 15, 2012); Ritschl (June 25, 2012).
77 Smith (1990:230).
78 Smith (1990:453–54). The German word was not quite as pejorative as the official translation, as Semler meant it to refer specifically to American corn—which many Germans disliked.
79 Henry J. Kellermann, memorandum, October 31, 1947, 862.00/10-3147, RG 59, National Archives.
80 Stauffer, memorandum, April 30, 1948, 862.5043/4-3048, RG 59, National Archives.
81 Murphy to State Department, September 16, 1947, 740.00119 Control (Germany)/19-1647, RG 59, National Archives.
82 Gimbel (1968:117).
83 Smith (1990:392–93).
84 Schröder (1986:315).
85 See, for example, Van Hook (2004:69–89).
86 Smith (1990:234).
87 Murphy to H. Freeman Matthews, April 27, 1947, in FRUS, 1947, II: 910; Clay to Daniel Noce, April 29, 1947, in FRUS, 1947, II: 914.
88 Clayton, memorandum of conversation with Marshall, June 20, 1947, in FRUS, 1947, II: 929.
89 Kennan, memorandum, July 18, 1947, in FRUS, 1947, III: 332.
90 Robertson, memorandum, July 5, 1947, FO371/645514, Foreign Office, UKNA.
91 See, for example, Giersch, Paqué, and Schmieding (1993:1–2).
92 Smith (1990:452).
93 Smith (1990:484–85); Backer (1983:227–28).
94 Clay to Draper, October 20, 1947, Box 72, OSA 004 Germany File, RG 335, National Archives.
95 Buchanan (2006 [2012]:57).
96 Berger and Ritschl (1995:221–22). Since German unification in 1990 the planned reparations conference has never been held, and it is widely accepted that the country’s war debts have been extinguished.
97 Folder: “January–June 1949,” Box 72, Press Conference File, Secretary of State Files, Acheson Papers, Truman Library.
98 Smith (1990:235).
99 Gimbel (1968:152); Clay to Marshall, May 2, 1947, in Smith I (1974:346–49).
100 Price (1955:123); Ungerer (1997:26).
101 Eichengreen and Braga de Macedo (March 2001).
102 Richard Clarke, memorandum, “The Future of Sterling,” February 25, 1948, T236/2398, Treasury Papers, UKNA.
103 Eichengreen (1996:106).
104 Erhard (1953); Milward (1991).
105 Schröder (1986:321).
106 Kennan I (1967:447–48).
107 Milward (April 1989:252).
108 Milward (2004:62–63).
109 This is an argument with which Eichengreen disagrees. See, for example, Eichengreen and Uzan (April 1992).
110 Burnham (1990:99); “American Assistance,” July 22, 1948, T232/101, Treasury Papers, UKNA.
111 Milward (2004:69–70).
112 Smith (1990:360).
113 Milward (April 1989:243–44); “Economic Consequences of Receiving No European Recovery Aid,” June 23, 1948, Cabinet Paper CP (48) 161, CAB 129/28, UKNA; Bossuat (Spring 1984).
114 French calorie consumption in 1947 was 14.2 percent below 1949 levels. Sources: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (1950:74) and (1952:19).
115 Milward (1984:105, footnote 20).
116 Milward (April 1989:246).
117 Milward (April 1989:246–47).
118 Note, too, that German raw material imports surged after the outbreak of the Korean War, pushing the country into a balance of payments deficit that its neighbors would never have financed on their own. The Marshall-funded EPU allowed Germany to finance the ramping-up of its export industry, which would come to fulfill the American ambition of supplying western Europe’s capital goods needs. See, for example, Giersch, Paqué, and Schmieding (1993:16–18) and Berger and Ritschl (1995:229–40).
119 Price (1955); Jones (1955).
120 See in particular Kolko and Kolko (1972).
121 Huempfer (2016).
122 The State Department chose to err on the side of deutschmark undervaluation, authorizing a greater devaluation than the West German authorities requested. McCloy to Acheson, September 20, 1949, in FRUS, 1949, III: 449; Webb to McCloy, September 21, 1949, in FRUS, 1949, III: 450; Bruce to Webb, September 22, 1949, in FRUS, 1949, III: 451–52.
123 See Steil (2013).
124 Kolko and Kolko (1972:360).
125 Central Intelligence Group, “Strategy of Soviet Delay in Treaty Ratification,” Weekly Summary Excerpt, July 25, 1947, in Kuhns (1997:124); Pechnatov and Edmondson (2001:132–33).
126 See, for example, Gimbel (1968:163–67).
127 National Security Council, report for the president, “Report by the National Security Council on U.S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security,” NSC 20/4, November 23, 1948, in FRUS, 1948, I: 662–69.
128 Mackinder (April 1904).
129 Grieder (2000:12); Djilas (1962:139); Pechatnov (2010:109).
130 Policy Planning Staff, “Considerations Affecting the Conclusion of a North Atlantic Security Pact,” PPS/43, November 23, 1948, in FRUS, 1948, III: 287.
131 Gaddis (1982 [2005]:389).
132 Lodge to Vandeberg then Marshall, October 20, 1947, 840.50 Recovery/10-2047, RG 59, National Archives.
133 Abelshauser (1991:367).
134 Hillary Clinton (June 2, 2011): www.marshallfoundation.org/SecretaryClintonremarksJune22011.htm. See also Yacoubian (January 11, 2012); Oweis (October 22, 2011); Bloomberg View (January 13, 2013); and Frattini (May 26, 2011).
135 Troianovski and Karnitsching (July 31, 2013) and Jordans (June 4, 2013). See also Maier (June 9, 2012); Soros (June 26, 2012); Crafts (June 2012); and Agnew (August 6, 2012).
136 Thompson (March 12, 2014).
137 Casey, Solomon, and Mitnick (July 25, 2014).
138 Eichengreen (July 20, 2011); Peel (February 22, 2012); Crafts (July 2, 2012).
139 Davis (June 22, 2011).
140 Maiello (December 7, 2009).
141 Wall Street Journal (November 12, 2014); Page (November 9, 2014).
142 Gore (2006:11).
143 Tcherneva (May 12, 2016).
144 Judt (2005:156).
145 See, for example, Deaton (September 2013 [October 12, 2015]).
146 Lutz and Desai (January 5, 2015).
147 Gaddis (1982 [2005]:380–85).
CHAPTER 14: ECHOES
1 Sarotte (2009:39–45); Hertle (1996:173–74); “Kontrollen eigelstellt—nicht mehr in der Lage.—Punkt,” published transcript of an interview with Jäger, in Hertle (1996:380–89); New York Times (November 10, 1989:A5); Sarotte (2014:139–53).
2 Sarotte (2009:63).
3 Zelikow and Rice (1995:103); Sarotte (2009:52–53); “Vor dem Schöneberger Rathaus in Berlin am 10. November 1989,” in Auswärtiges Amt (1995:618–22).
4 See, for example, Simms (2013).
5 Sarotte (2009:64, 73–77, 79, 82–83); Teltschik (1991:60–61).
6 Sarotte (2009:55); Press reports, Folder 11, Box 108, 8c Monthly Files, Series 8, Baker Papers, Mudd Library, Princeton University.
7 Sarotte (2009:80).
8 Sarotte (2009:79).
9 Sarotte (2009:80–81); “Information von Wjatschleslaw Kotschemassow, UdSSR-Botschafter in der DDR, an Hans Modrow, DDR-Ministerpräsident, über ein Treffen mit den Bonner Botschaftern der USA, Großbritanniens und Frankreichs am 11; Dezember 1989 in Westberlin (Auszüge),” reprinted as Document 10 in Nakath, Neugebauer, and Stephan (1998:93–97).
10 Putin (2000:69); Sarotte (2009:19, 85–86, 93–94, 195).
11 National Security Archive (November 18, 2009); Sarotte (2009:71); Teltschik (1991:40–42); “SU und ‘deutsche Frage,’ ” Document 112A, in Deutsche Einheit Sonderedition: 616–18.
12 Sarotte (2009:77, 107–15, 136–37); “President Gorbachev Interview to Soviet and German Journalists,” in Freedman (1990:507); “Schreiben des Außenministers Baker an Bundeskanzler Kohl, 10. Februar 1990,” Document 173, in Deutsche Einheit Sonderedition: 793
–94; “Schreiben des Präsidenten Bush an Bundeskanzler Kohl, 9. Februar 1990,” reproduced in English as Document 170 in Deutsche Einheit Sonderedition: 784–85; Zelikow and Rice (1995:183–84).
13 Sarotte (2009:138–40); Harvey Sicherman to Dennis Ross and Robert Zoellick, memorandum, March 12, 1990, Folder 14, Box 176, Series 12, Baker Papers, Mudd Library, Princeton University.
14 Sarotte (2009:104); Ritter (2006:31); Schäuble (1991:293).
15 Sarotte (2009:142, 147, 159, 164–67); Szabo (1992:93); “Vorlage des Ministerialdirektors Teltschik an Bundeskanzler Kohl,” May 8, 1990, Document 270, in Deutsche Einheit Sonderedition: 1096–98; “Gespräch des Ministerialdirektors Teltschik mit Botschafter Karski und dem stellvertretenden Abteilungsleiter Sulek, Bonn, 19; März 1990,” Document 223, in Deutsche Einheit Sonderedition: 956n1; “Initiative Kohl-Mitterrand zur Europäischen Union: Botschaft des Staatspräsidenten der Französischen Republik, François Mitterrand, und des Bundeskanzlers der Bundesrepublik Deutscheland, Helmut Kohl, an den irischen Premierminister und amtierenden Präsidenten des Europäischen Rates, Charles Haughey, vom 18. April 1990,” in Auswärtiges Amt (1995:669–70); Time (June 4, 1990).
16 See Zelikow and Rice (1995:356–63) on the troop deal.
17 Albright (June 5, 1997): http://gos.sbc.edu/a/albright3.html.
18 Steel (1980:442); Bohlen (1969).
19 “The President’s News Conference with President Boris Yeltsin of Russia in Helsinki,” March 21, 1997, in Public Papers of the Presidents: William J. Clinton, 1997.
20 Halle (1967:132, 136).
21 Friedman (October 2008 [April 15, 2012]). Sestanovich (April 14, 2015) argues that NATO was not and is not a military threat to Russia. Unless Article 5 is worthless, however, it is impossible to accept this. Countries that join NATO have attacked Russian military forces outside Russia and have joined in military actions that Russia opposes, all under the protective umbrella of Article 5.
22 More precisely, the Soviet Union incorporated the eastern territories of Ukraine and Belorussia in 1922. The western parts would be incorporated in September 1939. The Republic of Belorussia would change its name to Belarus in 1991.
23 Friedman (January 25, 2016).
24 Asmus (2002:10).
25 Bush and Scowcroft (1998:514); New York Times (June 15, 1990); Plokhy (2014:25).
26 Asmus (2002:23–24).
27 The Council on Foreign and Defense Policy is a nongovernmental body established by veteran diplomats.
28 Gorskii (June 2001:29); Greene (June 2012).
29 Asmus (2002:115).
30 Gorbachev (2016:307–8).
31 Steel (May 26, 1997).
32 Asmus (2002:45, 122); Nunn (June 22, 1995): http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_24781.htm?selectedLocale=en.
33 Talbott (2002:132–33).
34 Asmus (2002:35, 43, 66, 70, 74); Clinton, “The President’s News Conference with President Boris Yeltsin of Russia in Helsinki,” March 21, 1997, in Public Papers of the Presidents: William J. Clinton, 1997; Asmus, Kugler, and Larrabee (September/October 1993:35).
35 NATO revised its military strategy in the summer of 1990 and stated that it no longer considered the Soviet Union a threat. (Asmus:2002:5, 26).
36 This is how Asmus (2002:25, 35, 54, 84) characterizes President Clinton’s aims in expanding NATO.
37 Haslam (January 1998:124).
38 Gingrich et al. (1994:112–13).
39 BBC (undated); Sanders (March 6, 2014).
40 See, for example, Friedman (December 28, 2015).
41 Gorbachev (2016:309).
42 Finkel (January 30, 2016); Galeotti (November 26, 2015); Government of the Russian Federation (February 15, 2016). Medvedev did not deny the airspace incursion, as earlier Russian commentators had, but said that the Russian plane “might have flown in for a few seconds and immediately left.”
43 Albright (February 18, 1997): http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_25715.htm?selectedLocale=en.
44 Madeleine Albright, statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, October 7, 1947, in Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (1998:24).
45 See, for example, Dobbs (July 8, 1997).
46 Holbrooke and Danner (Winter 1997/1998). See also Holbrooke (March/April 1995).
47 Cohen (September 18, 1997).
48 Albright (February 15, 1997).
49 Asmus, Kugler, and Larrabee (1997 [Autumn 1996:7]). For an opposing view at the time, see Perlmutter and Carpenter (January/February 1998). CNN (1997).
50 Danner (Fall 1997).
51 Holbrooke and Danner (Winter 1997/1998).
52 Government of the Russian Federation (2000:10); Asmus, Kugler, and Larrabee (September/October 1993:31).
53 Shlapak and Johnson (2016).
54 “[W]hile fostering a cooperative relationship with Russia is desirable, it is important for America to send a clear message about its global priorities. If a choice must be made between a larger Europe-Atlantic system and a better relationship with Russia, the former must rank higher.” Brzezinski (September/October 1997). Asmus (January/February 2008:101, 103) argued that NATO acted to “consolidate democratic change” in eastern Europe and “indirectly encourage[d] democratization in Russia.”
55 Sestanovich (April 14, 2015).
56 Tóth (July 27, 2014); Simon (July 28, 2014).
57 Asmus (January/February 2008:100).
58 Greene (June 2012:9, 12).
59 Malling (March 2015).
60 Lukyanov (May/June 2016:32); Izvestia (August 11, 2008).
61 Ullman (August 12, 1999).
62 Jones (June 1, 2015).
63 Zubok (2007:66); Zubok and Pleshakov (1996:50); Pechatnov and Edmondson (2001:108–10).
64 Blome, Diekmann, and Biskup (January 11, 2016).
65 BBC (November 18, 2014).
66 Shchetko and Cullison (December 23, 2014).
67 Quoted in Rapoza (June 6, 2016). Italics added.
68 The conversation is recounted by Peres in Samuels (September 29, 2016).
69 Kennan (February 5, 1997).
70 Pechatnov and Edmondson (2001:95); Pechatnov (2006:257).
71 See, for example, Light (2006:67–68).
72 Government of the Russian Federation (2000:9–10).
73 Light (2006:51, 63–64); Greene (June 2012); Barysch (2005:118).
74 Kantchev (February 25, 2016).
75 Government of the Russian Federation (2000:10).
76 A Russian official with whom I spoke was highly critical of Polish influence over EU Ukraine policy. See Lowe (February 24, 2014); Foy (December 15, 2015); and Menkiszak (November 18, 2014). Johnson and Robinson (2005:13).
77 Government of the Russian Federation (February 13, 2016).
78 Pravda, “On the Forthcoming Conference in Paris,” June 25, 1947, RGASPI, Fond 495, op. 261, file 119.
79 Mangasarian (May 15, 2014). See also Miller (February 26, 2016): http://mashable.com/2016/02/26/russia-europe-brexit/#8ZYEdG7wkqq8.
80 Greene (June 2012:18).
81 Rettman (November 17, 2014).
82 Birnbaum (May 22, 2015).
83 Halle (1967:156).
84 For a Russian perspective, see Bordachev (2005:57). For a German perspective, see Voigt (March 1996), who draws “a conceptual linkage between the enlargement of the EU and of NATO.” On the American side, Asmus echoed Voigt on “a loose link between the EU and NATO.” Asmus and Larrabee (November/December 1996). Kupchan proposed a merger of the EU and NATO into an Atlantic Union (AU). Kupchan (May/June 1996). For a later American perspective, see Drozdiak (May/June 2010).
EU leaders have also long coveted an independent European defense capacity to supplement NATO. See, for example, Norman and Barnes (September 13, 2016). The initiative received a further boost from the election of Donald Trump as U.S. president in November 2016: see, for example, Barnes and Norman (November 15, 2016); and Emmott (November 30, 2016).
85 See, for example, Gaddis (February 26, 2
009:7).
86 See, for example, Shlapak and Johnson (2016), which concludes that “as currently postured, NATO cannot successfully defend the territory of its most exposed members” in the Baltics. As of February 2017, twenty-three of the twenty-eight NATO countries had voted to support Montenegro’s accession, which Russia strongly opposes.
87 Kennan, quoted in Friedman (May 2, 1998).
88 Contemporary Western public support for NATO is weak. See, for example, Stokes (March 18, 2016).
INDEX
A note about the index: The pages referenced in this index refer to the page numbers in the print edition. Clicking on a page number will take you to the ebook location that corresponds to the beginning of that page in the print edition. For a comprehensive list of locations of any word or phrase, use your reading system’s search function.
Page numbers in italics refer to illustrations.
Abelshauser, Werner, 373–74
Acheson, Dean:
anticommunism of, 92–93, 355, 362
as assistant secretary of state, 18, 22, 32–34, 37, 51, 89, 98, 101–2
British interests as viewed by, 22, 32–33, 51, 125
at CFM meetings, 322–25, 329–34
Clayton compared with, 225, 226, 262, 341
congressional testimony of, 70, 225–26, 319, 346
European recovery supported by, 42, 311–13, 318, 326–34, 341, 355, 362, 372, 374, 394
FDR as viewed by, 38, 88, 89, 341
Greek and Turkish aid supported by, 18, 32–33, 36–38, 42, 45, 50, 51–52
Kennan compared with, 26, 28–29, 30, 33, 37, 50, 91, 98–102, 326–27, 328
Marshall Plan supported by, 70, 86, 96, 98–102, 108, 110, 111, 112, 114, 199, 247 309–10, 311, 313, 319, 320, 324, 346, 372, 407
Marshall’s relationship with, 22, 27–28, 32–35, 70, 86, 93, 94–96, 110, 111–12, 113, 309, 310
memos of, 51–53
Molotov as viewed by, 129, 133
NATO supported by, 313, 319, 320–22, 327, 394
postwar planning as viewed by, 9, 11, 19, 20, 22, 311–12, 326–27, 328
press coverage of, 36–37, 50, 96, 111, 199, 324
as secretary of state, 302, 306, 309–13, 326, 328–34, 336, 355, 372, 407
Soviet Union as viewed by, 25–28, 30, 35, 40, 42, 43, 50, 51–52, 91, 92–93, 98, 129, 133, 311, 313, 336, 373