The Second World War in 100 Facts

by Clive Pearson

  When the war did commence the inadequacies of the line became evident. French generals had previously decreed that it was not necessary to extend the line opposite the Ardennes forest as it was impenetrable. Alas, it soon became clear that this was exactly where the main German attack was coming from and Allied positions were soon compromised. In the initial offensive only one part of the line at Sedan was overrun by the Germans but the rest was untouched. By the beginning of June 1940 German forces had penetrated deep into French territory leaving the line isolated from the rest of France and irrelevant to the conflict. At the end of the war with Germany the line lay largely intact – a huge useless white elephant.

  11. FRENCH GENERALS AND THEIR MEN WERE NOT FIT FOR PURPOSE

  By the spring of 1940 the Allies felt more or less ready for a conflict with Germany whenever it should come. The French had a large and well-equipped army, which on paper was formidable enough and roughly on a par in size to the German one. In addition, Britain had sent out its own army called the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) to give support to the French on the Franco-Belgian border. The British having a smaller force went along with French strategy and dispositions. The problem was that on arrival British generals weren’t entirely pleased with what they observed in the French Army.

  It’s often a good idea to have skilled, experienced generals to lead an army. However, it is not particularly good to have elderly commanders who are well passed their best and are, moreover, unsuited to high command. Let me give examples of what I mean. Firstly, there was General Maurice Gamelin, Commander-in-Chief of all Allied forces. He was sixty-seven and clearly out of his depth. He was generally described as small, quiet and singularly lacking in vigour and charisma. More importantly, he possessed a distinct inability to give any clear orders. His deputy was no better. General Alphonse Georges was Commander-in-Chief for the North-East Front. He had been severely wounded in the 1934 assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia in Marseilles. Thereafter Georges had remained something of a physical and psychological wreck, who had great difficulty keeping cool in a crisis. A further unfortunate fact was that these two generals were barely on speaking terms – just the sort of chaps you need, then, to galvanise your troops as German tanks appear on the horizon.

  Gamelin and Georges were fatally wedded to strategies of the First World War. The Allied and German forces, they believed, would once more fight each other in trenches. The Maginot Line would protect France in the south. Along the unprotected North-East Front with Belgium, though, the concept was one of a long line with tanks interspersed in small groups. Allied forces would advance into Belgium and dig in when hostilities began. There appeared to be little acknowledgement that the next war would be one of movement and manoeuvre. Indeed, the most frightening aspect of French dispositions was that almost all their forces were committed to the front line with virtually none in reserve. There was no plan B should the Germans break through the line.

  If the generals did not inspire confidence French soldiers inspired even less. British generals were horrified with their slovenliness. In November 1939 General Alan Brooke visited French General Corap’s 9th Army, which was stationed just north of Sedan. He noted that the French soldiers were unshaven with the horses ungroomed and they showed a general lack of pride. He went on to say, ‘What shook me most however was the look in the men’s faces, their disgruntled and insubordinate looks… ’

  Sedan was to be the site of the German breakthrough.

  12. THE BRITISH DID NOT REALLY BETRAY THE FRENCH AT DUNKIRK

  This statement is not really true, although it is a controversial view held by many. The truth is that at times British general staff did not keep their French allies completely informed of their intentions. However, there were reasons for this. During the headlong retreat communications were not always easy and all too often the whereabouts of French and British commanders was not known. Sometimes relations were indeed rather frosty between Allied commanders. More importantly some messages were not passed on correctly leading to misunderstandings.

  The German offensive commenced on 10 May 1940. Upon receiving the information that German units were advancing into Holland, Allied armies immediately moved into Belgium, as planned, and dug in along the River Dyle. However, hardly had they done this when news reached French and British commanders that German panzers had already crossed the River Meuse at Sedan. The French commander, Gamelin, had placed inadequate forces there believing the Ardennes forest to be impenetrable. With no reserves to confront them the Germans were able to advance rapidly. It soon became obvious that the BEF and other French forces in Belgium had fallen into a trap. By 20 May Heinz Guderian’s 2nd Panzer division had reached the sea near Abbeville cutting the Allied armies off from the rest of France. French attempts at a counter-attack against the armoured thrust proved desultory.

  By 25 May Lord Gort, the British general in charge of the BEF, decided to call off his own counter-attack and head for Dunkirk, the only available port on the French coast. The intention was to evacuate the BEF. It was now that confusion about British intentions came about. Although Winston Churchill made it clear to his French counterpart that the British were intent on evacuation, this message was not passed on to French commanders. Some French generals believed that the British were pulling back in order to create a fortified position into which Allied forces could retreat. In the end it was more about poor communication than betrayal.

  British generals, on the other hand, had every right to feel that they themselves had been let down. Too many French units were subject to low morale and defeatism and disintegrated before the German advance. Nevertheless, by 30 May substantial numbers of French and British troops were able to retreat back behind a perimeter around Dunkirk.

  Irrespective of nationality, Allied soldiers were taken on board by all the British vessels that participated in the evacuation. By the night of 2–3 June all BEF forces had been evacuated but Churchill insisted that the Royal Navy and the myriad of smaller vessels should go back once more to pick up the remaining French troops left on the beaches. In the end, although 40,000 Frenchmen were taken prisoner at Dunkirk, 120,000 were evacuated to Britain. In addition, all high-ranking French generals were taken to safety.

  Admiral Jean Abrial, the overall French commander at Dunkirk, described the British effort as ‘magnifique’.

  13. HITLER SPARES THE BRITISH ARMY

  One of the great mysteries of the Second World War is why Hitler did not make the most of his opportunity in May and June 1940 to destroy the British forces that found themselves surrounded at Dunkirk. A myth has grown up that the Führer wanted to negotiate peace terms with the British and so held back his panzers in the hope that the British would come to him begging for clemency. The surprise is that there is no evidence from historians to support this hypothesis.

  In truth it is most likely that the great all-seeing, all-knowing dictator was nervous and fearful that his forces were overextended. In the campaign against France he tended to defer to his generals, in particular Gerd von Rundstedt, the commander of Army Group A. This unit had burst through at Sedan and driven a wedge between the allied armies in northern France. Hitler and his commanders became concerned that the German panzers risked becoming isolated as they raced ahead and left the infantry behind. As a result of this there were several ‘halt’ orders as the German high command sought to rein in their wayward tank commanders. These orders gave the British BEF commander, Lord Gort, vital time to extricate his forces.

  The final halt order on 24 May gave the British a further forty-eight hours to reinforce the Dunkirk perimeter. Hitler now further compounded his error by declaring that the land around Dunkirk was not suitable for tanks as it was too marshy and full of canals. The infantry and the air force (Luftwaffe) led by Hermann Goering would finish the job. His panzer generals were furious as they saw an easy victory slipping through their fingers. Nevertheless, the German leadership still confidently expected a huge All
ied army to fall into their hands.

  All this provided the British with time to commence ‘Operation Dynamo’ – the code name for the evacuation of troops from Dunkirk, which began on 26 May. A vast armada of 860 vessels was mobilised to save the beleaguered forces stranded on the beaches. Taking part were over 200 Royal Navy ships and hundreds of civilian craft including liners, pleasure steamers, barges, trawlers, ferries and yachts. By 4 June, despite facing the gauntlet of constant Luftwaffe and U-boat attacks, the bulk of the BEF had been shipped back to Britain and safety. Although they lost all their equipment and 65,000 vehicles, the soldiers of the BEF would soon be redeployed to carry on the struggle.

  Hitler had expected an easy victory at Dunkirk. The fact that the BEF escaped was not due to any negotiating ploy but poor generalship. The British people heaved a collective sigh of relief and evoked the ‘Dunkirk spirit’. Winston Churchill described it as ‘a miracle of deliverance’. For Hitler it turned into something approaching a disaster. He did indeed hope that Britain would agree to peace terms. His failure to force Britain to the negotiating table meant that ultimately he was to end up with a war on two fronts.

  14. HITLER RUBS SALT IN THE WOUND AT COMPIÈGNE

  After the surprise German breakthrough at Sedan, France’s top commanders, generals Gamelin and Georges, collapsed into tears and despondency. Further bad news followed with the British retreat and escape at Dunkirk. Now the might of the Wehrmacht (German armed forces) was turned on the rest of France. German forces cut through the French Army at such speed that even the Germans themselves were astounded. By 14 June Hitler’s troops entered a rather desolate and empty Paris and four days later the French government asked for an armistice. It had taken only six weeks for Germany to lay waste that once great power.

  The Nazi dictator performed a little jig on hearing the news of France’s capitulation. It was a victory to savour. Twenty-two years earlier at the end of the long and bitter conflict of the First World War it was Germany that had had to ask for an armistice. After four years of horrific trench warfare Germany had lost and the Allies had forced her to sign the hated Treaty of Versailles. Now France would be made to pay for that humiliation.

  Under Hitler’s terms three-fifths of France (in the north and west) would come directly under German occupation. The rump of France in the south would become Vichy France and a vassal of the Third Reich. French leaders signed the surrender at Compiègne in the very same railway carriage that Germany had signed the Armistice in 1918.

  For the French it was a poignant reminder of their sad reversal of fortune.

  15. A SCARLET PIMPERNEL HELPS THE ALLIED CAUSE

  A rather bedraggled and unshaven individual was ushered into the office of Harold Macmillan, a future prime minister, but at that time a junior minister in Churchill’s government. The man in question had just escaped from war-torn France and he had a remarkable story to tell. It was Charles Howard, the 20th Earl of Suffolk.

  The earl was an extraordinary character whose life was surrounded by legends and stories of derring-do, which often turned out to be true. To his friends he was known as ‘wild Jack’ Howard and he sported a pair of guns, which he named Oscar and Genevieve.

  Charles Howard was born into one of the finest noble families in England. His mother was the daughter of one of the richest men in America, the founder of the Marshall Field department store. However, Charles decided not to follow the usual route of a young nobleman. Instead he married an actress and went off to the University of Edinburgh where he immersed himself in science. In early 1940, at the age of thirty-three, he was appointed as the British government’s liaison officer with France’s Armament’s Ministry in Paris.

  By the beginning of June the situation in Paris was becoming critical. Many in the French government were clearing their offices and heading for Bordeaux. On 10 June Charles Howard joined them but not before he had assembled thirty-three top scientists to accompany him. With him also were a colleague and their two secretaries. On arrival at Bordeaux the situation was chaotic, but eventually he found a British tramp named SS Broomhead, which was rescuing refugees at the time.

  It soon became clear that the 20th Earl had been organising much more than just these scientists. After a while two notable physicists arrived by the names of Hans van Halben and Frédéric Joliot-Curie. Together they had been doing top-secret research on nuclear fusion. With them came 52 gallons of heavy water that had been extricated from Norway and which the Germans would have dearly liked to get their hands on to create their own nuclear bomb. Also on the quayside were 600 tons of valuable machine tools and the managing director of the Antwerp Diamond Bank, who carried with him a parcel containing gem diamonds worth £400 million in today’s terms.

  At first the French government would not allow the earl to escape with such a cargo. Only after he had personally berated France’s new prime minister, Marshall Petain, was he given the go-ahead. Several days later the vessel arrived safely back in British shores. Herbert Morrison, a British government minister, later recorded ‘A considerable service has been rendered to the Allied cause by the safe arrival of this shipload.’

  After this the intrepid earl set about defusing bombs during the Blitz. He successfully dealt with thirty-four bombs but, sadly, a booby-trapped one killed him and his team in May 1941.

  The earl deserves the title of the Scarlet Pimpernel of the Second World War.

  16. MUSSOLINI EXPECTS EASY PICKINGS BUT GETS SOME NASTY SHOCKS INSTEAD

  Adolf Hitler was not the only dictator who harboured great imperial pretensions at this time. His Italian ally and fellow dictator Benito Mussolini wanted to carve out a vast empire encompassing large parts of the Mediterranean and Africa. He saw himself as some kind of reincarnated Caesar creating a new Roman empire.

  Mussolini’s direction of foreign policy, however, was less that of a great general or a shrewd statesman but rather one that was more akin to an opportunistic vulture. Italy had already previously gained a colonial empire but from 1935 Il Duce was set upon acquiring new territory. In 1935 he had launched the invasion of Ethiopia and in May 1939 he had seized Albania forcing the flight of King Zog. These had been easy victories achieved over vastly inferior forces.

  Believing that Britain and France were the two main countries that were likely to thwart him in his ambitions he had teamed up with Hitler in the Rome-Berlin Axis in 1936. This had been further strengthened into a military alliance in the Pact of Steel in May 1939. Mussolini ignored those around him who warned that tying himself to Hitler would lead to disaster.

  At the beginning of the war it seemed that the Italian dictator had indeed backed the right horse. Hitler had easily despatched Poland and when France seemed to be on the point of defeat, Mussolini decided to seize his moment. On 10 June 1940 he stood on a balcony in Piazza Venezia in Rome and made a fateful speech. In his usual oratorical style he folded his arms and rolled his eyes and declared that Italy was now at war with the Allies.

  Italian forces immediately attacked France and Mussolini was rewarded with some small pieces of French territory. In September, believing the British to be virtually defeated, he decided to send 250,000 troops into Egypt from the neighbouring Italian colony of Libya. Instead of advancing on the Suez Canal directly, however, his forces were told to halt 65 miles from Cairo and await further orders. The weaknesses of the Italian Army soon became apparent. Poorly equipped and trained and suffering from low morale, they all too quickly succumbed to a smaller British force. Within two months 130,000 Italian prisoners had been taken and the British were at the gates of Tripoli, the Libyan capital. It had been a catastrophic reversal.

  In October the dictator had also attacked Greece hoping for an easy victory. Italian forces moved forward from Albania but in the mountainous and wintry conditions the Greeks were able to put up valiant resistance. Embarrassingly, the Duce’s troops soon found themselves pushed back into Albania in an ignominious retreat. It was at this moment, however, tha
t Hitler decided to send in German forces to North Africa and the Balkans to save his feckless friend.

  Mussolini’s great imperial pretensions had rapidly turned into farce. His fate and that of his country was now in the hands of his Nazi ally.

  17. HITLER HOPES FOR PEACE WITH BRITAIN

  After the fall of France in June 1940 the German dictator hoped that Britain would quickly see her position was hopeless and come to terms. For Hitler Britain was the wrong enemy anyway. Ideologically, Britain was a fellow Anglo-Saxon power with whom he wanted to divide up the world. He admired Britain, with her vast empire, and was prepared to let the British keep it intact. In exchange he expected Britain to allow him a free hand in Europe. It could only be a matter of time before the British came to their senses.

  Indeed, to begin with, he took time out hoping that the British would get in touch. He toured Paris and then returned to his mountain retreat and awaited events. Some early indiscretions by British diplomats hinting that Britain was ready to negotiate only encouraged Hitler in his thinking. However, back in Britain Churchill and his cabinet were adamant that any talks with Hitler would only be from a position of weakness leading to a humiliating peace settlement. It was better to struggle on. After all, Britain still had a strong navy and air force and any invasion attempt by the Germans would be fraught with difficulty. However, the British Army was severely weakened after Dunkirk and it was unclear if a determined Nazi onslaught could actually be held back.