The Second World War in 100 Facts

by Clive Pearson

  53. THE T-34 TANK WAS A DECISIVE WEAPON FOR STALIN

  The T-34 tank had only just started production when Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941. However, despite its appearance in relatively low quantities German generals were immediately impressed by its performance and loudly extolled its virtues. Indeed for many experts it would soon become the best tank of the Second World War.

  So what was so remarkable about it? Just about everything, actually. To begin with its special design feature was heavily sloped armour, which made it difficult to knock out. Furthermore, its 76-mm gun was a highly effective weapon, particularly in the early years of the war. It was easy to manoeuvre and did not get bogged down in heavy mud or snow – pretty useful in Russia! Moreover, its simple design meant it was easy to mass-produce and repair. The Germans were so enamoured of the tank that any captured ones were immediately repainted and put to good use in their own army.

  Due to dislocation caused by the rapid enemy advance production of the tank didn’t get into full swing until the latter half of 1942. Stalingrad, though, remained a major production centre and, amazingly, in the battle there the tractor factory continued to roll out T-34s even as the fighting raged on around them.

  The T-34 was to play a decisive role in the crucial battles of Stalingrad and Kursk (May 1943). In the final analysis, however, it was sheer numbers that overwhelmed the invader. By the end of the war over 80,000 had been manufactured, making it the most produced tank of the Second World War.

  54. GOEBBELS DEMANDS TOTAL WAR

  Josef Goebbels was the least likely of all the Nazi leaders. He was rather unprepossessing being quite short and walking with a pronounced limp due to a deformed right foot. He hardly fitted, therefore, into the category of your idealised Aryan. On the other hand, he was one of the best-educated and most intelligent members of Hitler’s cabal. He had gained a doctorate from the University of Heidelberg in 1921, but it was his astute insight into the workings of the human mind that meant that he was well suited to running the Nazi Party propaganda machine.

  To begin with Goebbels had been a fierce critic of Hitler’s leadership of the party. However, at the Bamberg conference in 1926 he had been won over and thereafter offered the Führer his complete loyalty and devotion. Soon after the Nazis came to office in January 1933 Goebbels was rewarded with the position of Minister for Propaganda and Enlightenment. He soon showed his abilities by seizing control of all media outlets to get the Nazi message across. His greatest success prior to the war was to build up the image of the Nazi leader as an all-seeing, all-knowing genius. Historians have termed this ‘the Hitler Myth’.

  During the early years of the war Goebbels had found it easy to perpetuate this image of Hitler. Swift victories in Poland and France seemed to confirm all he was saying. However, failure to knock out Britain and setbacks in Russia began to tarnish the image. Defeat at Stalingrad presented the regime with an acute problem. Hitler and Goebbels had raised the German people’s expectations of a victory there. Instead, the opposite had occurred, raising doubts about the government’s honesty and competence. The ‘Hitler Myth’ had been fatally undermined. Not only had Hitler been directly responsible for the calamity, but also the German people suddenly realised that the war was perhaps lost.

  With Hitler retreating into the shadows Goebbels more and more became the main face of the regime. He had always been good at making speeches and he now had the task of telling the nation that the war at home could not now carry on as before. Until Stalingrad Germany had still continued to turn out luxury goods and many sections of society had not been fully mobilised. Now all that had to change. If Germany was to have any chance of holding back the vast Soviet armies now heading in their direction the whole of German society and its economy needed to be mobilised for the war effort.

  On the 18 February 1943 before a selected audience in the Sportpalast, Goebbels made his most famous speech: ‘Do you want total war’ he cried. ‘Yes!’ screamed back the crowd. ‘Do you want a war more radical and total than anything you can imagine today?’ ‘Yes!’ screamed the people again. Then, referring to the need for full mobilisation against the Russian hordes, he unfurled a historic slogan: ‘And storm, break loose!’

  The German people now understood what lay ahead for them.

  55. ALBERT SPEER PERFORMS A MIRACLE

  Albert Speer was an ambitious architect who worked his way up into the highest echelon of the Nazi regime. He ingratiated himself with Hitler and during the war was given the position of Minister of Armaments. The task of transforming German war production was one he set about with great zeal and efficiency and resulted in a remarkable turnaround.

  It would be unfair to describe Speer as fully subscribing to the Nazi belief system. There is no evidence that he was anti-Semitic, but like many at the time he joined the party for personal advancement. He was a talented architect who first came to Hitler’s notice with his design for the Nuremberg rally in 1933. Hitler took a special interest in architecture and the two men soon developed a close working relationship.

  Speer eventually became Hitler’s Chief Architect and was a regular visitor to his mountain retreat at Berchtesgaden. The two would spend hours together poring over designs of massive buildings, which Hitler intended would one day make up the centre of a new grandiose Berlin. If ever Hitler had a friend then Speer was this. The dictator commissioned Speer to create a new stadium for the Nuremberg rallies and a new chancellery. The construction of the latter Speer completed within a year by utilising shift work, working twenty-four hours round the clock.

  His impressive organisational abilities must have influenced Hitler in appointing him as Minister of Armaments in February 1942. Speer was reluctant at first but the Führer was adamant. It turned out to be an inspired choice.

  German armaments production prior to 1942 had been pitifully low in comparison with the Allies. This was partly to do with the disorganisation and fragmented nature of the Nazi state, but also the fact that the population and economy had not been fully mobilised. Speer approached the problem with a fresh mind and as one of his subordinates later noted, he didn’t know what was possible and what was impossible and sometimes even performed the impossible!

  The key to his success was the centralisation of all war production in himself with a central planning committee. He arranged for the factories to make single products and got the experts rather than the civil servants to supervise departments. Even in 1944 amid intensive Allied bombing production continued to increase exponentially. A few figures will suffice to give the reader a flavour. In the period from 1941 to 1944 tank production rose from 4,800 to 27,300 and aircraft production from 11,800 to 39,800. By the second half of 1944 there was sufficient equipment to provide for 270 army divisions even though there were just over half that number actually in the field.

  It was an incredible achievement and Hitler was so delighted that he once greeted him with a ‘Heil Speer’. But the reality was that it had come far too late and merely delayed the inevitable.

  56. MANSTEIN STABILISES THE FRONT AT KHARKOV

  Field-Marshal Fritz Erich von Manstein has been rated as the greatest German military strategist of the Second World War. His understanding of modern tank warfare and the art of thrust and manoeuvre was almost unrivalled. His cool, calm exterior was rarely ruffled. With his quick, clear mind he was noted for his speedy decision making.

  In the war against France in 1940 it had been his idea to launch the surprise attack through the Ardennes which had split the Allies and caused the British to retreat hastily back to Dunkirk. In the war in the Soviet Union his northern thrust had rapidly brought German armies to the gates of Leningrad. When posted to the southern front in the summer of 1942 he carried out a successful campaign that had crushed all Soviet resistance in the Crimea. It was little wonder that he was put forward three times for the post of Chief of Staff of the army. As Hitler held that post himself this suggestion was firmly rejected!

 
; Although Manstein had failed to relieve Stalingrad Hitler still esteemed the general and had much need of his services. His allotted task in early 1943 was to stabilise the southern front as the debacle of Stalingrad unfolded. Soviet armies were pressing and there was a danger of collapse.

  He first of all successfully extricated German forces that had ventured down into the Caucasus the previous year and were in danger of being cut off. He then pulled his forces back behind the River Mius, which was a distance of some 300 miles. This manoeuvre clearly aided the German recovery. Not only did it give the German armies a respite, but it also allowed time for fresh forces to join him; in particular, a whole SS Panzer corps had recently arrived from France and the local Luftwaffe (German Air Force) had been sent reinforcements.

  Manstein was helped now by Stalin’s erroneous strategy of pressing his forces forward all along the front. Soviet armies in the south were becoming dangerously overstretched and spread out far too thinly. Since Stalingrad they had travelled hundreds of miles in severe winter conditions and were short of supplies. The German general now saw his chance for a counterstroke.

  Kharkov lay to the north of the River Mius. It had been recently recaptured by Soviet forces and the Soviet high command believed that by advancing rapidly they could surround and cut off German forces to the south. Manstein now launched his surprise counter-offensive trapping Russian spearheads south of the city. After fierce fighting Kharkov itself soon fell to the Germans. As many as 90,000 Soviet soldiers were lost in the campaign. Manstein’s ‘mobile defence’ operation has since become a textbook model for military planners.

  It was a bitter defeat for the Russians. They had underestimated the strength of the German Army, which remained a fearsome behemoth. However, Manstein’s victory only brought a temporary respite. The whole front was creaking and further German setbacks were in the offing.

  57. THE DAMBUSTERS DIDN’T BUST ALL THE DAMS

  The Ruhr area can be considered the industrial heart of Germany. The British had the idea that if they could destroy the dams, which controlled the rivers that flowed through the region, they could strike a significant blow at the enemy war effort. The dilemma was how to go about it. Normal bombing from above was too inaccurate and would be unlikely to cause a breach even if a direct hit was scored. Somehow the dams would need to be struck from the side to have any impact.

  The British government gave the task of finding a solution to Dr Barnes Wallis. He had already designed the Wellesley and Wellington bombers with the latter becoming a mainstay of the British bomber force. After several experiments Wallis decided that a special portly-shaped ‘bouncing’ bomb would be needed. This would permit the bombs to get over the torpedo nets before striking the dams, after which the bombs would sink down and explode at the base of the dams. It meant it would be a tricky operation for the bomber crews as they would need to come in very low but then pull up quickly to avoid colliding with the dam parapet.

  A squadron of experienced flyers was quickly assembled, which was soon named 617 Squadron. In charge of organising the attack was Air-Vice Marshall the Hon. Ralph Cochrane. Specially converted Lancaster bombers would now be required to cater for the new ‘upkeep’ bomb, as it was now called. Struts or arms came down each side of the fuselage to carry the 7-foot-long cylindrical bomb. A small motor was attached to it to enable the bomb to be spinning backwards (at around 500 revolutions a minute) when it hit the water. In addition to these technical requirements getting the bombers to approach at the right height and speed would take a lot of practice.

  After three months of trial runs across mountainous areas in Scotland and Wales the crews were ready. On the night of 16–17 May 1943 three formations left England. The dams were well defended, so not only did they have to navigate precisely in the dark but they also had to endure a baptism of fire. The first group of nine successfully reached the Möhne Dam and after three attempts caused a huge breach allowing 330 million tons of water to be unleashed into the valley below. Similar destruction was caused on the Eder dam. Under increasing fog attempts made on the Sorpe and Ennepe dams proved ineffectual. This was a disappointment for the squadron as the destruction of the former dam in particular would have been far more cataclysmic. Of the nineteen planes that left eleven returned home with fifty-six crew members lost.

  In the aftermath of the raid some factories and land were ruined, but by the end of June full electricity and water production was restored. No follow-up raids were launched and so the final result was disappointing. Nevertheless, it was a huge psychological blow on the Reich.

  58. A GERMAN ARMY IS DESERTED IN THE DESERT

  After the defeat of El Alamein (Fact 50) in November 1942 the German General Erwin Rommel had managed an orderly withdrawal all the way back to Tunisia. It was a mighty achievement given that his forces were being constantly harassed from the air and on the ground by British forces under Bernard Montgomery advancing from Egypt. Rommel’s problems were compounded by the landing of largely American forces in north-west Africa (Operation Torch) in the autumn. He was therefore being squeezed in a vice with Allied forces coming from both East and West. Common sense now dictated that Rommel should beat a retreat back to the Italian Peninsula. Adolf Hitler, however, had other ideas!

  The German dictator was aware that his Italian ally, Mussolini, was facing a potentially disastrous situation. If the Allies managed to take control of Tunisia, then they would be only a stone’s throw from Italy itself with invasion surely in the offing. With this in mind Hitler decided to prop up the Axis forces in North Africa by sending in over 100,000 extra German troops to support Rommel. For the German commander this must have made no sense as Hitler was now effectively pouring men and arms into a lost situation. In addition, the Führer was offering him troops that he had steadfastly refused to give him only a few months earlier before the Battle of El Alamein.

  As mentioned before, Operation Torch had seen the landings of over 107,000 American and British forces in French Vichy-controlled Morocco and Algeria. Their task was to co-ordinate with Montgomery in the east and seize Tunisia. If the Allies were feeling confident about the developing situation they soon received a rude awakening. Raw, untested, American troops moving forward into Tunisia were given a severe mauling at the battle of the Kasserine Pass. Rommel’s surprise offensive had shown up the Allied lack of preparation and lamentably poor liaison. In the end Rommel pulled back due to lack of fuel and food supplies.

  Within a month, however, the situation had altered. The Axis forces had lost control of the air and found themselves squeezed on two fronts. General George Patton (‘Old blood and guts’) leading the American II corps scored a victory at El Guettar in the west while Monty leading the British Eighth Army to the south-east forced a German retreat at the Mareth Line.

  The Allies were also helped by a secret weapon. Ultra, from Bletchley Park, kept the Allied commanders informed of Axis convoys from Italy. It permitted the Allies, with pinpoint accuracy, to sink those Axis ships carrying arms and equipment. Rather craftily only food convoys were allowed through. The Germans were convinced that Italian spies were to blame.

  Constantly battered from the skies and lacking fuel and equipment, it could only be a matter of time before the Axis troops called it a day. Eventually, in May, 230,000 German and Italian troops surrendered. For Hitler it was a disaster to match Stalingrad. For the Allies the next stop was Sicily.

  59. KURSK WAS A BATTLE THAT HITLER COULDN’T WIN

  Imagine, if you will, a huge bulge jutting out into the middle of the German front line in Russia. It measures 120 miles wide and 90 miles deep. In the centre of the pocket lies the city of Kursk, once famed for its nightingales and bird-singing competitions. Very soon the area would only ring out to the deafening decibels of war.

  The Kursk salient was in fact a recent legacy of the Soviet Army’s reckless dash forward after the capitulation of Stalingrad in February 1943. The German front had eventually held leaving some Russian for
ces in a somewhat exposed position. Clearly a German counter-attack from north and south into the bottleneck of the salient would result in a huge Nazi victory. Manstein was keen to strike as early as March. Hitler demurred. Although he craved a success which would wipe out the memory of Stalingrad, he ordered a delay in which further forces could be brought to the front, including the new heavyweight Tiger tank. This was a massive beast weighing 54 tons and far heavier than anything the Soviets could field. Unfortunately, only twelve a week were being produced. Hitler, however, pinned his hopes on this tank being the key to victory.

  While the Nazi dictator delayed the Soviets rapidly set about building up their forces in the salient. Stalin knew of the impending attack from spies and other sources. Instead of launching an offensive he now heeded the advice of Zhukov to go for ‘defence in depth’. The Russian Army would absorb the attack and with forces held in reserve launch a massive counter-attack.

  When Hitler’s long-expected attack (Operation Citadel) came in July his forces were confronting an almost impossible gauntlet. Soviet defence lines stretched back 150 miles and over a million mines had been laid. One and a half million men had been stuffed into the pocket with a further half a million in reserve. In addition there were 20,000 artillery pieces lined up and waiting. Hitler’s Reich could barely match these numbers.

  The Germans were relying on the fighting prowess of their finest SS Panzer divisions to break through. In the event the outcome was predictable. In the north Field Marshal Walther Model’s armies could only manage an advance of 6 miles after five days, while in the south General Hermann Hoth’s forces gave up after penetrating 9 miles.