The Portable Machiavelli

by Niccolo Machiavelli

  CHAPTER LIII. THE PEOPLE, DECEIVED BY A FALSE APPEARANCE OF GOOD, OFTEN PRONOUNCE THEIR OWN RUIN; AND HOW GREAT HOPES AND EXTRAVAGANT PROMISES EASILY MOVE THEM

  [The people are often deceived by a false appearance of good unless they are persuaded otherwise by someone worthy of their confidence. When the people have no one to trust, ruin may sometimes ensue. Furthermore, it is always easier to convince the people to follow a proposal which seems bold or certain, even if danger lurks behind it, than to follow one which appears cowardly or uncertain, even if it conceals security. The truth of this statement is demonstrated by numerous examples, both ancient and modern. Fabius Maximus, for instance, was unable to convince the Romans that a prudent policy was best in opposing Hannibal, and the result was the crushing defeat of Rome at Cannae, one which almost destroyed the republic. Furthermore, such a policy brings ruin to the citizens who are charged with carrying it out, for when victory seems certain to the people but defeat is the result of their boldness, the commander is blamed for the people’s errors of judgment and is often punished.]

  CHAPTER LIV. HOW MUCH AUTHORITY A RESPECTED MAN HAS IN CHECKING AN INCENSED CROWD

  [When the populace is incensed or riotous, only a man of reputation or influence can deal with them. Examples of this can be found in both Roman and Florentine history.]

  CHAPTER LV. HOW EASILY MATTERS ARE CONDUCTED IN A CITY WHERE THE POPULACE IS NOT CORRUPTED; WHERE EQUALITY EXISTS, NO PRINCIPALITY CAN BE ESTABLISHED, AND WHERE EQUALITY DOES NOT EXIST, A REPUBLIC CANNOT BE ESTABLISHED

  Although what is to be feared or expected from corrupt cities has been amply discussed above, it does not seem beside my purpose to consider one of the senate’s decisions concerning the vow made by Camillus to give Apollo a tenth part of the spoils taken from the Veienti. Since these spoils were already in the hands of the Roman people, with no way of keeping a record of them, the senate passed an edict ordering each man to give back to the public treasury the tenth part of what he had taken. And while this decision was not carried out—for the senate later found another means of satisfying Apollo by atoning for the people—it is nevertheless evident from such a decision how much the senate trusted in the goodness of the populace and how it judged that no one would fail to return exactly what the edict ordered. And, on the other hand, it is clear that the people did not think about cheating in regard to the edict by returning less than they should; instead, they decided to free themselves from the edict by openly demonstrating their indignation. This example, along with many others presented above, demonstrates how much goodness and religion there was in the Roman people and how much good was to be expected from them.

  Truly, where this goodness does not exist nothing good can be expected, just as nothing good can be hoped for from those countries which, in our times, are clearly corrupt, as is Italy, above all others—and even France and Spain share some part of this corruption. If as many disorders do not seem to arise in those countries as they do daily in Italy, it is not so much because of the goodness of their people (which, in large measure, no longer exists) but rather because of their king, who keeps them united through his own ability and the still-unspoiled institutions of these kingdoms. It is most clear that in Germany this goodness and religion are still strong among the people, with the result that many republics flourish there in liberty and observe their laws in such a way that no one outside or inside these republics dares seize them. I should like to give an example, similar to that of the Roman senate and the populace discussed above, to show how true it is that a large portion of that ancient goodness still does exist in these kingdoms. When the need arises for these republics in Germany to spend a certain amount of money for the public good, the magistrates or councils who have the authority to do so assess every citizen of the city one or two percent of his wealth. After a decision has been reached, each man, according to the law of the land, appears before the tax collectors and, having first sworn to pay the proper sum, throws into a chest set aside for this purpose whatever his conscience tells him he should pay—a payment for which there is no other witness except the man who pays. From this one can see just how much goodness and religion there still is among these men. And one must assume that each man pays the correct sum, for if this were not the case the tax would not bring in the amount estimated on the basis of past collections made in this manner; such fraud would be revealed and, because of this, some other means would be put into use. Such goodness is all the more to be admired in these times, inasmuch as it is so rare; indeed, it seems to have survived only in that country.

  This is the result of two things: first, they do not have many dealings with their neighbors, for their neighbors have not visited them, nor have they visited their neighbors; they have been content to enjoy the goods, to live on the foods, and to clothe themselves with the wool that their own country provides. As a result, the motive for any interchange and the beginning of any corruption has been removed, for they have had no opportunity to acquire the customs of France, Spain, or Italy—nations which, taken together, represent the corruption of the world. The second reason is that such republics as these, where a free and uncorrupted government has been maintained, do not allow any of their citizens to be or to live in the style of a gentleman; indeed, they maintain among themselves a complete equality and are most hostile to those lords or gentlemen who live in that country. And if, by chance, any such men fall into their hands, they kill them as instigators of corruption and the cause of all evil.

  To clarify what the title of “gentleman” means, let me say that I call gentlemen all those who live off the revenue from their properties in a state of idleness and luxury, without paying any attention to the cultivation of land or to any other occupation necessary to make a living. Such men as these are pernicious in any republic or any country; but more pernicious than these men are those who, in addition to the aforementioned fortunes, possess castles and have subjects who obey them. The Kingdom of Naples, the papal states, Romagna, and Lombardy are full of these two kinds of men. As a result, in these lands no republic has ever arisen or any ordered political body survived, for men like these are completely opposed to any form of free government. And to introduce a republic into countries organized in such a fashion would not be possible; if someone who was their master wanted to reorganize them, there would be no other way than to establish a kingdom there. The reason is this: where the material is so corrupt that laws are not sufficient to check this corruption, one must establish, along with these laws, a source of greater force, that is, a kingly authority with absolute and all-inclusive power to check the excessive ambition and corruption of the powerful.

  This statement can be verified with the example of Tuscany, where for a long time three republics have existed in a small territory: Florence, Siena, and Lucca; although they are subject to these three republics, the other cities of the province do maintain, or would like to maintain, their liberty—a fact demonstrated by their spirit and their institutions. This all comes from the fact that in that province there are no lords of castles and few or no gentlemen at all, but there exists so much equality there that a prudent man with a knowledge of ancient civilizations could introduce a civic form of government. But to her great misfortune this province has not, up to this time, been able to find a man with the understanding and power to do this.

  And so from this discussion I draw these conclusions: anyone wishing to set up a republic where there are many gentlemen cannot do so unless he first does away with all of them, and anyone wishing to establish a kingdom or a principality where there is much equality will never do so unless he pulls out of that equal condition many ambitious and restless men and makes them gentlemen—and not in name only—by giving them castles and possessions and granting them favors in goods and retainers, so that when he is in their midst he maintains his power through their support, and they further their ambition through him, while the rest are obliged to endure the yoke that force and nothing else can ever make them en
dure. And since in this manner a proportion is established between those who apply force and those against whom it is applied, men remain fixed, each in his own rank. Since the establishment of a republic in a country suitable for a kingdom or a kingdom in a country suitable for a republic is a task for a man of rare intelligence and authority, there have been many who wished to do this but few who knew how to carry it out. This is so because the greatness of the task in part frightens men and in part hinders them so much that they fail at the very outset.

  I know that this opinion of mine—that where gentlemen exist one cannot organize a republic—would seem to be in direct opposition to the Venetian republic, where no one may hold any rank except those who are gentlemen, but to this objection I answer that this example does not contradict my opinion; for the gentlemen in that republic are more so in name than in fact; they do not have great incomes from their possessions since their great wealth is founded upon trade and movable goods; furthermore, none of them own castles or have any jurisdiction over men. Hence, that title of gentlemen which they possess is one of dignity and reputation and not founded on any of those things which produce what are called gentlemen in other cities. And since other republics have their divisions under various names, Venice is thus divided into gentlemen and commoners; the Venetians allow only the former to hold (or rather, to be able to hold) all the offices; the others are completely excluded from them. This arrangement does not create trouble in that city for the reasons explained elsewhere; therefore, the founder of a republic should organize it where there already exists, or has existed, great equality; the founder of a principality, on the other hand, should organize it where there is great inequality—otherwise he will create something that is out of proportion and that is of short duration.

  CHAPTER LVI. BEFORE MOMENTOUS EVENTS OCCUR IN A CITY OR PROVINCE, THERE ARE SIGNS THAT FORETELL THEM OR MEN WHO PREDICT THEM

  [The invasion of Italy by King Charles VIII of France was foretold by the priest Girolamo Savonarola. Before the death of Lorenzo de’ Medici and the expulsion of Piero Soderini from Florence, the cathedral of the city was struck by lightning. In classical times, a voice announced to Marcus Caedicius that the Gauls were about to attack Rome. The explanation of this phenomenon is unclear, some philosophers claiming that the air is filled with spirits who take pity on men and warn them of impending disaster, but whatever the explanation, the phenomenon does exist.]

  CHAPTER LVII. THE PEOPLE ARE STRONG WHEN UNITED BUT WEAK AS INDIVIDUALS

  After the ruin of their native city following the invasion of the Gauls, many Romans went to live in Veii despite the decree and order of the senate, which, in order to remedy this disobedience, commanded everyone by public edicts to return to live in Rome within a certain period of time and under prescribed penalties. At first these edicts were ridiculed by those against whom they were directed; then, when the time to obey them drew near, everyone obeyed. Livy writes these words: “They were fierce when united, but when isolated the fear of each one rendered them obedient.”46 And, truly, nothing can demonstrate the nature of the masses better, in this respect, than what is shown in this passage. Many times the masses are bold in speaking out against the prince’s decision; then, when they see the penalty is at hand, they do not trust one another and run to obey. Thus, it seems clear that you should not pay too much attention to what the people say about their own good or bad inclination, as long as your government is organized in such a way as to be able to maintain its good inclination or, if it is unfavorably disposed, to be able to provide that it will not harm you.

  This refers to those unfavorable inclinations which the people possess, born from a cause other than having lost either their liberty or a prince they loved and who is still alive. The unfavorable inclinations that arise from these causes are, above all else, formidable and require strong remedies to check them; the other unfavorable inclinations of the people are easily remedied when the people have no leaders to whom they can turn. On the one hand, there is nothing more formidable than an unrestrained multitude without a leader, yet, on the other, there is nothing that is weaker; for in spite of the fact that it may have taken up arms, it is easy to put down provided you have a refuge where you can escape the first onslaught; for, when the people’s spirits cool off a bit and each man sees that he must return home, they all begin to have doubts about themselves and start thinking about obtaining their own safety, either by escape or by coming to terms. Therefore, if the multitude, stirred up in this manner, wishes to avoid these dangers, it should immediately choose one man from its midst as a leader to direct it, to keep it united, and to make provision for its defense, as did the Roman populace when it left Rome after the death of Virginia and chose twenty tribunes from among its number to provide for its safety. If this is not done, then what Livy says in the words cited above always happens: when united, the people are strong, but when each man later begins to think about his own personal danger, he becomes cowardly and weak.

  CHAPTER LVIII. THE MASSES ARE WISER AND MORE CONSTANT THAN A PRINCE

  Nothing can be more unreliable and more inconstant than the masses, as our own Livy declares and as all other historians affirm. In the recounting of the actions of men, we often read that the masses condemn someone to death and then repent later, wishing that he were still alive, as is evident in what the Roman people did with Manlius Capitolinus, whom they first condemned to death and then wished to have back alive. And the words of the author are these: “As soon as he ceased to represent a danger, the people immediately were seized by remorse.”47 And elsewhere, when he is explaining the events in Syracuse after the death of Hieronymus, the grandson of Hiero, he declares: “Such is the nature of the masses—either to obey humbly or to rule arrogantly.”48

  I do not know whether, in undertaking to defend an argument which, as I have mentioned, all writers have attacked, I may not be taking on a task so difficult and so full of problems that I shall either have to abandon it in shame or follow it with great pains. But be that as it may, I do not, nor shall I ever, think it wrong to defend an opinion with reasons without employing either authority or force. Let me say, therefore, that all men, and especially princes, can be accused individually of that fault for which writers blame the masses: for anyone not regulated by law will make the same errors that the uncontrolled masses will make. And this is obvious, for there are, and have been, many princes who have been able to break the bounds that could restrain them; nor shall we count among these the kings who arose in Egypt when, in that ancient time, the province was ruled by laws, nor those who arose in Sparta, nor those in our own times who arose in France, a kingdom more regulated by laws than any other kingdom that we have any knowledge of in our own day. The kings who arose under such constitutions are not to be considered among those whose individual nature we ought to consider here in order to see if it resembles that of the masses, for they should be compared to the masses regulated by laws in the same fashion as they are; and we shall find in the masses that same goodness we discover in such kings and shall see that the masses neither obey humbly nor rule arrogantly. The Roman people were like this, for while the Roman republic endured without corruption, it never obeyed humbly nor ruled arrogantly; on the contrary, it held its position honorably through its institutions and magistrates. And when it was necessary to band together against some powerful man, as in the case of Manlius, the decemvirs, and others who sought to oppress it, it did so; when it was necessary to obey the dictators and the consuls for the public welfare, it did so. And if the Roman people regretted the death of Manlius Capitolinus, it is not surprising, for they regretted the loss of his virtues, which were such that the memory of them aroused everyone’s compassion; and it would have had the power to produce the same effect in a prince, since all writers declare that ability is praised and admired even in one’s enemies; and if Manlius had been resurrected because of such an opinion, the people of Rome would have pronounced upon him the same sentence that they did when th
ey had him removed from prison and shortly thereafter condemned him to death; nevertheless we see princes, reputed to be wise, who have had someone executed and then wished him returned to life, as Alexander did in the case of Clitus and his other friends and as Herod did with Mariamne. But when our historian speaks of the nature of the masses, he does not mean those who are regulated by law, as the Romans were; he speaks of the uncontrolled masses, like those of Syracuse, which committed crimes typical of undisciplined and infuriated men, as did Alexander the Great and Herod in the instances mentioned. But the nature of the masses is no more to be condemned than that of princes, for both err when there is nothing to control them. There are many examples of this, in addition to the ones I have mentioned, both among the Roman emperors and other tyrants and princes; and in them we witness as much lack of stability and variation of behavior as may ever be found in any multitude.

  Therefore, I come to a conclusion contrary to the common opinion, which declares that when the people hold power they are unstable, changeable, and ungrateful; I affirm, rather, that the people are no more susceptible to these sins than are individual princes. And if one were to blame both the people and princes alike, he might be telling the truth, but if princes are to be excluded from this charge, then he would be deceiving himself, because a people which have power and are well organized will be no less stable, prudent, and grateful than a prince; in fact, they may be more so, even though the prince is thought wise; and, on the other hand, a prince freed from the restraint of law will be more ungrateful, changeable, and imprudent than the people. And the changeability of their behavior does not arise from a different nature, for it is the same in all men, and if there is one better than the other, it is the people; it comes, rather, from having greater or lesser respect for the laws under which they both live. And anyone who considers the Roman people will see that they were opposed to the very title of king for four hundred years and were lovers of the glory and the common good of their city; and he will see many examples that testify to both characteristics. If anyone should cite, to the contrary, the ingratitude that the people showed toward Scipio, I would make the same reply I did earlier on this subject, where I showed that the people are less ungrateful than princes. But, concerning prudence and stability, let me say that the people are more prudent, more reliable, and have better judgment than a prince does. And it is not without reason that the voice of the people is likened to that of God: for it is evident that popular opinion has marvelous power in predicting, so much so that it would appear to foresee its own good and evil fortune through some occult ability. As for its judgment in various matters, when the people hear two equally able speakers, each arguing different opinions, only very rarely does it happen that they do not choose the better opinion and are incapable of understanding the truth of what they hear. And if they err in matters of courage or profit, as was mentioned above, a prince will often err because of his own passions, which are much stronger than those of the people. It is also evident that the people make better choices in electing magistrates than does a prince, for one can never persuade the people that it is good to elect to public office an infamous man of corrupt habits—something that a prince can easily be persuaded to do in a thousand ways; and when the people begin to feel an aversion for something, we see them persist in this aversion for many years—something we do not observe in a prince. For both of these characteristics I find it sufficient to cite the Roman people as evidence, for in so many hundreds of years, in so many elections of consuls and tribunes, the people did not make even four elections which they were forced to regret. And, as I have said, they so hated the very name of king that no amount of meritorious service rendered by one of their citizens seeking to gain the title could persuade the people to forget the just penalties he deserved for this ambition; furthermore, it is evident that cities in which people are the rulers increase their territories in a very short time, much more so than cities which have always been under a prince, just as Rome did after the expulsion of the kings and Athens did after she freed herself of Pisistratus. This is the result of nothing other than the fact that government by the people is better than government by princes. Nor do I wish everything that our historian says in the aforementioned passage and elsewhere to be cited against this opinion of mine, for if we were to discuss all the faults of the people and all those of princes, all the glories of the people and all those of princes, it would be evident that the people are far superior in goodness and in glory. And if princes are superior to the people in instituting laws, forming civic communities, and establishing statutes and new institutions, then the people are so much more superior in maintaining the things thus established that they attain, without a doubt, the same glory as those who established them.