CHAPTER XX. WHAT SORT OF DANGER A PRINCE OR A REPUBLIC EMPLOYING AUXILIARY OR MERCENARY TROOPS INCURS
If I had not discussed at length in another work of mine the question of how useless mercenary or auxiliary troops are and how useful are one’s own soldiers, I would extend my discussion in this chapter further than I plan to do, but since I have spoken of the matter elsewhere at length I shall be brief here. Yet I do not think that it is a matter to pass over lightly, since I have found so much concerning auxiliary troops in Livy. Auxiliary soldiers are those that a prince or a republic sends to your aid at their own expense and command. Turning to Livy’s text, let me say that the Romans defeated two of the Samnites’ armies in two different places by using their own troops, which they sent to the aid of the Capuans, and thus liberated the Capuans from the war which the Samnites were waging against them; then, wishing to return to Rome, they left behind two legions in the city of Capua to defend them, so that the Capuans would not again be deprived of a garrison and again be the victims of the Samnites. Rotting in idleness, these legions began to enjoy this city, so much so that they forgot their fatherland and reverence for the senate and began thinking about taking up arms and making themselves the rulers of that land which they had defended with their strength, since they felt that the inhabitants were not worthy to own property they did not know how to defend. The Romans, who foresaw all this, took measures to crush and correct it, as will be discussed at length when I deal with conspiracies.
Let me say again that of all the many kinds of troops, auxiliaries are the most harmful: for the prince or republic that employs them has no authority over them whatsoever; only the one who sends them has authority over them, for auxiliaries are troops sent to your aid by a prince, as I have said, under his own generals, his own flags, and are paid by him—as was the army that the Romans sent to Capua. When they have conquered, such soldiers as these in most cases plunder the one who has hired them as well as the one against whom they are hired, and they do this either because of the wickedness of the prince who sends them or because of their own ambition. And while the intention of the Romans was not to break the treaty and the other agreements they had made with the Capuans, the conquest of the city nevertheless appeared so simple to these soldiers that they were persuaded to consider taking from the Capuans their land and their state. One could give many examples of this, but I wish this one to suffice: that of the people of Reggio, whose lives and city were taken by a legion that the Romans had sent there as a garrison. A prince (or a republic) should therefore adopt any policy except that of bringing auxiliaries into his state for his defense when he has to rely completely upon them; for any pact or agreement with the enemy, no matter how harsh, will be lighter on him when compared to the other means. And if past events are studied closely and present ones are reviewed, it will be discovered that for everyone who has succeeded in this, there are countless others who have been disappointed. And a prince or an ambitious republic cannot have a better opportunity to seize a city or a province than to be invited to send its own armies to the latter’s defense. Therefore, anyone who is so ambitious that he calls in such assistance not only to defend himself but also to attack others seeks to acquire what he cannot hold and what can easily be taken from him by the very persons who acquire it for him. But the ambition of men is so great that in order to satisfy a desire of the moment they fail to consider the evil that may result from it in a brief period of time. Nor are they moved by ancient examples in this matter any more than in the others that have been discussed; for if they were moved by them they would see that the more generosity they show toward their neighbors and the less inclined they are to seize their territory, the more likely these neighbors are to throw themselves into their lap, as will be explained below by the example of the Capuans.
CHAPTER XXI. THE FIRST PRAETOR THE ROMANS SENT ANYWHERE WAS SENT TO CAPUA, AND THIS OCCURRED AFTER FOUR HUNDRED YEARS OF WAGING WAR
[Unlike other nations, the Romans imposed as few conditions as possible upon the cities they conquered when they did not destroy them. For instance, the first praetor sent abroad was sent to Capua, and this was four hundred years after the city came under Roman control and was done at the request of the city itself. Rome’s success with this policy was due to the fact that the natives of the cities governed themselves and so there was no foreign government to arouse their anger. An example of such policy can be found in Florence today, for while the Pistoians have long been under Florentine control by their own free choice, such other cities as Lucca and Siena have resisted Florentine control. Had Florence treated these cities as she did Pistoia, all of Tuscany would have belonged to her.]
CHAPTER XXII. HOW OFTEN THE OPINIONS OF MEN ARE WRONG IN JUDGING IMPORTANT MATTERS
[Men frequently hold erroneous opinions; and unless decisions are made by men of great ability, they will be based upon mistaken ideas. But such men are usually not in a position of authority in corrupt republics, for they are put out of office by envious and ambitious opponents, and their ability is recognized too late. An example of this is the decision of Pope Leo X to remain neutral during the invasion of the Duchy of Milan by Francis I, King of France, based upon his assumption that it would be to the Church’s advantage to fall upon the victor of that struggle. However, after the king’s victory over the Swiss at Marignano in 1515, the Pope did not dare attack the French. A victorious army should never be attacked on the supposition that the victory has weakened it enough to make it easy prey for another army, for the losses suffered are made up for by the reputation of the victory itself. Only if they could have been defeated before their victory should they be attacked afterward. The Latins made this mistake when Numicius, their praetor, urged them to attack Rome after a Roman victory, as a result of which they were defeated.]
CHAPTER XXIII. HOW FAR THE ROMANS AVOIDED A MIDDLE COURSE IN PUNISHING SUBJECTS FOR SOME ACTION THAT REQUIRED PUNISHMENT
“The situation in Latium was now such that they could endure neither peace nor war.”56 Of all the unhappy situations, the most unhappy is that of a prince or a republic reduced to such a state that he or it can neither accept peace nor carry on war: reduced to such a state as this are those who are harmed by the conditions of a peace treaty to the point where in waging war they are either forced to become the prey of those who assist them or to remain the prey of the enemy. And one comes to all these extremes through bad advice, bad decisions, and from failing to measure well one’s forces, as was mentioned above; for the republic or prince that does measure them well will only with difficulty be brought to the condition into which the Latins led themselves: when they should not have made an agreement with the Romans they did so, and when they should not have begun a war against them they did so; and thus they acted in such a manner that both the friendship and the enmity of the Romans were equally harmful to them. The Latins were therefore conquered and completely subjugated, first by Manlius Torquatus and later by Camillus; the latter forced them to surrender and to put themselves into the hands of the Romans; next, stationing garrisons in all the cities of Latium and taking hostages from all of them, he returned to Rome and announced to the senate that all of Latium was in the hands of the Roman people.
Because such punishment is noteworthy and deserves to be observed so that it may be imitated by rulers in similar cases, I should like to cite the words Livy placed in the mouth of Camillus, which bear witness both to the means the Romans employed in expanding and to the fact that in governmental decisions the Romans always avoided a middle course of action and took extreme ones. For a government is nothing more than the control of subjects in such a way that they cannot harm you or even wish to harm you. This is achieved either by making yourself completely safe against them, removing from them every means of doing you harm, or by doing good to them in such a way that it would not be reasonable for them to desire a change of Fortune. All this is quite clear both from Camillus’s statement and from the judgment on it given by the senate.
His words were these: “The immortal gods have made you so powerful that they have placed in your hands the power to decide whether or not Latium is to exist. Insofar as the Latins are concerned, you may obtain a perpetual peace either by acting cruelly or by pardoning them. Do you wish to be cruel to those who have surrendered and are conquered? In that case, you can destroy all of Latium. Do you wish, following the example of your ancestors, to increase Roman power by granting citizenship to the defeated? The material for increasing Rome’s glory is at hand. Certainly the most stable government is that under which all are pleased to obey. Above all, while the Latins are still stunned with terror, you must subjugate their spirits either with punishment or with benefits.”57 The decision of the senate followed these remarks and was in accord with the words of the consul. City by city, all those citizens who were of importance were brought forth and were either granted favors or destroyed; the Romans bestowed exemptions, privileges, citizenship, and in every way assured the safety of those citizens who were favored, while they destroyed the cities of the others, sent colonies there, and led the citizens back to Rome, scattering them in such a way that they could never again do harm by means of arms or plots. The Romans, as I have said before, never employed a neutral course in such matters of importance.
Rulers should imitate this judgment. The Florentines should have adopted this policy when Arezzo and the entire Valdichiana rebelled in 1502. If they had done this, they would have made their empire secure and the city of Florence most great, and they would have given her those fields which she lacked for sustenance. But they employed that middle course, which is most harmful in judging men; some of the Aretines they banished and some they condemned to death; they took their offices and their ancient ranks away from everyone in the city, and they left the city intact. And if, in the course of deliberation, any citizen advised that Arezzo be destroyed, those who appeared to be wiser said that to destroy her would bring little honor to the republic, for it would appear that Florence lacked the force to hold her. Such reasons as these are the kind that appear to be true but are not: for with this same reasoning one would never be able to execute a parricide or a wicked and infamous man, as it would be shameful for the ruler to demonstrate that he did not have the forces to keep a single man in check. And men who hold such opinions do not see that individual men and the city as a whole sometimes sin against a state to such a degree that, to set an example to others and for his own protection, a ruler has no alternative but to destroy them. Honor consists in having the ability and knowing how to punish them, not in holding them under control and incurring a thousand dangers: for a ruler who does not punish a man who errs in such a way that he cannot err again is considered either ignorant or cowardly.
The necessity of the judgment imposed by the Romans is also confirmed by the sentence they pronounced on the Privernates. Two things in Livy’s text should be noted: first, as was said above, that subjects should either be given benefits or destroyed; second, how much generosity of spirit and speaking the truth avails in the presence of wise men. The Roman senate gathered to pass judgment on the people of Privernum, who, having rebelled, were afterward returned by force to Roman obedience. Many citizens were sent by the people of Privernum to implore the pardon of the senate; when, in their presence, one of the senators asked one of the people: “What punishment do you think the Privernates deserve?” the citizen of Privernum replied: “That which those who feel themselves worthy of liberty deserve.” To this the consul answered: “But if we free you from punishment, what kind of peace can we expect to have with you?” To that the man replied: “If you grant us a good one, a loyal and lasting peace; if you give us a bad one, not an enduring one.” Whereupon the wisest part of the senate, in spite of the anger of many, said “that they had been listening to the words of a brave man worthy to be free, and that they did not believe it possible for any people, or any individual, to remain longer in the condition which he deplored. Peace would be certain when it was made by men who were pacified voluntarily, while loyalty could not be expected from anyone who was willing to reduce himself to servitude.” On the basis of these words they decided that the Privernates should become Roman citizens and honored them with the privileges of citizenship, saying: “Only those who think of nothing but liberty are worthy of becoming Romans.”58 This true and noble response pleased their noble spirits, for any other reply would have been false and base; and those who believe otherwise about men, especially about those who are accustomed to being or appearing to be free, deceive themselves in this matter; and according to this deception they make decisions which are neither good for themselves nor likely to satisfy anyone. From this cause arise the frequent rebellions and the downfall of states.
But to return to our argument, let me conclude that because of the judgment pronounced on the Latins, when powerful cities accustomed to living in freedom are judged, it is necessary either to destroy them or to show them kindness—otherwise every judgment is made in vain. And what must be avoided above all is a middle course of action, which is harmful, as was the case with the Samnites when they trapped the Romans at the Caudine Forks and did not follow the advice of an old man who advised that the Romans either be allowed to leave with honor or that they all be killed; choosing the middle course of action, they disarmed them and put them under the yoke, thus allowing them to go away full of shame and indignation. As a result, shortly thereafter they learned to their distress that the old man’s counsel had been useful and that their own decision was damaging, as will be discussed at greater length in the proper place.
CHAPTER XXIV. FORTRESSES ARE GENERALLY MUCH MORE HARMFUL THAN USEFUL
It will perhaps seem to the wise men of our times a poorly considered matter that the Romans, in their desire to secure themselves from the peoples of Latium and the city of Privemum, did not think about building some fortresses there to serve as a check to keep these people faithful, especially since there is a saying in Florence, cited by our wise men, that Pisa and other cities like it must be held by fortresses. And if the Romans had been like them, they too would have considered building them; but because they were of different abilities, judgment, and power, they did not build them. While Rome lived in freedom and kept her laws and her strong institutions, she never built fortresses in order to hold on to either cities or provinces; she did, however, preserve some of those which were already built. Seeing, therefore, how the Romans proceeded in this matter, as well as how the rulers in our own times act, I should now like to consider the question of whether it is good to build fortresses and whether they bring harm or advantage to those who build them. First we must consider whether fortresses are built as defenses against the enemy or against one’s own subjects.
In the first case they are not necessary, and in the second case they are harmful. So, beginning with the reasons why they are harmful in the second instance, let me say concerning a monarchy or a republic that is afraid of its subjects and of their rebellion, that such fear must arise from the hatred its citizens feel for their ruler—hatred for his evil conduct, which arises from his belief that he can hold them with force, or from his lack of prudence in governing them; and one of the things that makes him believe that he can rule by force is that he already possesses fortresses to hold his subjects in subjection. For the evil deeds that are the reason for their hatred arise, in good measure, from the fact that the prince or republic possesses fortresses which, when this is the case, are far more harmful than useful. First, as I have said, they make you more audacious and violent toward your subjects; and second, there is not the safety in them that you imagine. For all the force and violence employed to hold a people down is useless, except for two kinds: either you always maintain a good army ready to take to the field, as the Romans did, or you must scatter, destroy, disorganize, and disunite the people to such an extent that they cannot unite to attack you. If you reduce them to poverty, “to those despoiled, arms remain”;59 if you disarm them, “rage will provide them wi
th weapons”;60 if you kill their leaders and continue to injure the others, their leaders are reborn like heads of the Hydra; if you build fortresses, they are useful in times of peace because they encourage you to mistreat your subjects, but in times of war they are most useless, for they are attacked both by the enemy and by your own people—nor is it possible for them to offer resistance to both one and the other. And if they were ever useless, they are especially so in our times because of artillery, for through its destructive force small places and those behind which embankments cannot be placed are impossible to defend, as was said earlier.
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