I should like to discuss this matter in more detail. Either you, prince, wish to hold the people of your city in check with these fortresses or you, prince or republic, wish to bridle a city taken in war. I shall now turn to the prince and say to him that nothing can be more useless in holding one’s citizens in check than such fortresses, for the reasons given above; for it makes you readier and less hesitant in oppressing your people, and this oppression makes them so disposed to your downfall and fires them up in such a way that the fortress, which is the cause of this, can no longer defend you. Therefore, in order to keep himself good, a wise and good prince will never build a fortress so as not to give his sons a reason to become sorry; they will thus rely not on fortresses but on the goodwill of their subjects. Though Count Francesco Sforza was held to be wise when he became Duke of Milan, let me say that in this regard he was not wise, for the result of building such a fortress shows that it did harm to his heirs and did not provide for their security. Thinking that because of this fortress they could live securely and could oppress their citizens and subjects, they indulged in every sort of violence, making themselves so hated that they lost their state at the first attack of the enemy. Nor did that fortress defend or prove of any use to them in wartime; and in peacetime it did them a great deal of harm. If they had not possessed it and had, through lack of prudence, treated their citizens badly, they would have discovered the danger sooner and would have drawn back; they would then have been able to resist the French attack more courageously with their subjects as their friend (without the fortress) rather than as their enemy (with the fortress). These fortresses do not help you in any way, for they are lost either through the treachery of those who guard them, through the violence of those who attack them, or through starvation. And if you expect them to help you regain a state that has been lost where only the fortress remains in your hands, you must have an army with which you can attack the one who has driven you out of the city: and when you possess this army, you will recover your state in any case, just as if the fortress did not exist—even more easily, in fact, for the men will be friendlier to you than they would be if you had treated them badly on account of the arrogance which the fortress itself provokes. Experience has shown how the fortress of Milan has, in adverse times, done neither the Sforza family nor the French any good at all; on the contrary, it has brought much harm and damage to both of them, for because of the fortress they have not thought about a more honest means of holding onto that state. Guidobaldo, Duke of Urbino and son of Frederick, who was, in his times, an esteemed general, was driven out of his state by Cesare Borgia, son of Pope Alexander VI; later, when he returned as a result of an unforeseen event, he had all the fortresses in the province destroyed, judging them harmful. Since he was loved by his people, out of respect for them he did not want to have fortresses; as for the enemy, he saw that he could not defend his fortresses since they required an army in the field to defend them. He therefore decided to destroy all of them.
When Pope Julius II, after having driven the Bentivoglio family from Bologna, constructed a fortress in that city and allowed its people to be tormented by one of his governors to such an extent that they rebelled, he immediately lost the fortress; and thus the fortress was of no use to him and did him harm; although, if he had acted differently, it might have benefited him. Niccolò da Castello, father of the Vitelli family, returned to his native city, from which he had been exiled, and immediately demolished two fortresses which Pope Sixtus IV had built there, believing that not the fortresses but the goodwill of the people would have to maintain him in that state. But above all other examples, the most recent and most notable in every respect, and the most appropriate to demonstrate the uselessness of building fortresses and the usefulness of demolishing them, is that of Genoa in these times. Everyone knows how, in 1507, Genoa rebelled against King Louis XII of France, who came in person together with all his forces, to reconquer the city; and when he did so, he built a fortress, the strongest of all those that had been recorded up until the present, for it was impregnable in its site as well as in every other way, situated as it was on the top of the hills extending to the sea, called Codefà by the Genoese; and with it he dominated the entire port and a great part of the city of Genoa. Then, in 1512, when the French forces were driven out of Italy, Genoa, notwithstanding the fortress, rebelled, and Ottaviano Fregoso seized control of it; with great effort, he took the fortress at the end of sixteen months, because of starvation. Everyone believed, and many advised, that he ought to preserve it as his refuge for an eventual emergency; but as he was a most prudent man, he realized that the will of men (and not fortresses) maintains rulers in a state, and he destroyed it. And thus, not founding his state upon the fortress but rather upon his ability and prudence, he held it and still holds it now. And whereas to change the government of Genoa it was once sufficient to employ only a thousand foot soldiers, his adversaries have attacked him with ten thousand and have not been able to harm him. It is evident from this, therefore, that the demolition of the fortress did not harm Ottaviano and the construction of it did not defend the king. For if he had come into Italy with an army, he could have recovered Genoa, though he did not have a fortress there; but if he had not come into Italy with an army, he could not have held Genoa, even if he did have a fortress there. Consequently, it was expensive for the king to build it and shameful for him to lose it; for Ottaviano, its reacquisition was glorious and its destruction was profitable.
But let us come to republics that build fortresses not in their own country but in the lands they conquer. And to demonstrate the fallacy of this procedure—if the example of France and Genoa does not suffice—I am sure that of Florence and Pisa will. The Florentines built fortresses there to hold that city, not realizing that if they wished to hold the city—a city that had always been opposed to the very name of Florence, since it had lived in liberty, and had turned to rebellion as a last resort to preserve its freedom—it was necessary to follow the Roman method, that is, either to make her an ally or to destroy her. The strength of fortresses is shown by what occurred at the arrival of King Charles, to whom the fortresses surrendered, either because of the infidelity of those who guarded them or out of fear of a greater evil; if they had not existed there, the Florentines would not have based their possession of Pisa upon them, and the king would not have been able to deprive the Florentines of the city in that way. And the methods with which she had been held until that time would perhaps have been sufficient to hold her, without a doubt, they would have given no worse an account of themselves than the fortresses did.
I conclude, therefore, that to hold one’s native city by means of a fortress is harmful, and for holding conquered lands fortresses are useless. I would have the authority of the Romans suffice, who tore down walls instead of building them in the lands they wished to hold by force. And if anyone, against this opinion of mine, would cite the example of Tarentum in ancient times or Brescia in modem times, places which were recovered from rebellious subjects, by means of fortresses, I reply that for the recovery of Tarentum, Fabius Maximus was sent at the beginning of a year with an entire army, which would have been sufficient to recover it even if there had been no fortress there; and though Fabius used that method, if the fortress had not existed he would have used some other which would have produced the same effect. And I do not know of what use a fortress is if, in retaking a city, you need a consular army and a Fabius Maximus as general. That the Romans would have retaken it anyway is evident from the example of Capua, where there was no fortress; yet, by virtue of their army, the Romans recaptured it.
But let us come to Brescia. What occurred in that rebellion rarely happens: that is to say, the fortress remains in your hands after the city has revolted, and you have a great army nearby, as was the army of the French; for when Monseigneur de Foix, the king’s general, learned of the loss of Brescia while he was in Bologna with his army, he lost no time and left immediately for Brescia; arriving the
re in three days, he retook the city by means of the fortress. However, the fortress of Brescia, to do any good, needed a Monseigneur de Foix and a French army to provide aid for it in three days. So this example, as opposed to the contrary examples, is not sufficient since many fortresses have been taken and retaken in the wars of our day with the same fortune in which the countryside is taken and retaken, not only in Lombardy but also in Romagna, in the Kingdom of Naples, and in all parts of Italy. But as for building fortresses to defend oneself from foreign enemies, let me say that they are not necessary for those peoples and kingdoms that have good armies, and for those that lack good armies they are useless, for good armies are sufficient for self-defense, while fortresses without good armies cannot protect you. And this is seen through the experience of those who have been considered excellent in governmental affairs and in other matters as well, such as the Romans and the Spartans; for if the Romans did not construct fortresses, the Spartans not only refrained from doing so but did not even allow their city to have walls, for they wanted the ability of the individual—and no other defense—to protect them. This is the reason why, when a Spartan was asked by an Athenian if the walls of Athens seemed beautiful to him, he replied: “Yes, if they are inhabited by women.”
The prince who has good armies, therefore, will find that fortresses on his shores and the frontiers of his state are sometimes able, perhaps, to hold the enemy off for a few days until order is restored; they can be useful, but they are not essential. But when a prince does not have a good army, having fortresses in his state or at his frontiers is either harmful or useless to him; harmful, for they are easily lost, and when they are lost they can be used to wage war against him; or if they are so strong that the enemy cannot occupy them, they are left behind by the hostile army and are of no benefit. For good armies enter enemy territory without regard for cities or fortresses, which are left behind them when they meet no determined resistance. This is evident from ancient history and from the actions of Francesco Maria, who, in recent times, left ten enemy cities behind him without any hesitation in order to attack Urbino. Therefore, a prince who can build a good army can do so without building fortresses, and a prince who does not have a good army should not build them. He should fortify the city in which he lives, keep it well supplied and its citizens well disposed in order to sustain an enemy attack long enough for either an accord or outside assistance to free him. All other plans are expensive in peacetime and useless in wartime. And thus, anyone who considers all I have said will see that the Romans, so wise in every other institution of theirs, were also prudent in their judgment about the Latins and the Privernates, for, giving no thought to fortresses, they made themselves secure with abler and wiser methods.
CHAPTER XXV. THAT AN ASSAULT UPON A CITY DIVIDED BY INTERNAL STRIFE, IN ORDER TO OCCUPY IT AS A RESULT OF THIS STRIFE, IS AN ERRONEOUS POLICY
[Roman history demonstrates that whenever Rome’s enemies attacked her, hoping to capitalize on her internal strife, the result was the unification of factions within the city and Roman victory. A more intelligent policy would have been to encourage such internal conflicts during peacetime while acting as arbitrator among the factions. Florence did this in Pistoia and acquired control of the city in that way, but it never succeeded in gaining control of Siena when it attempted to capitalize on that city’s internal strife. Filippo Visconti, the Duke of Milan, consistently failed to defeat the Florentines when he tried to use their disunity to his advantage, for his attacks always unified the city against him.]
CHAPTER XXVI. INSULTS AND ABUSE AROUSE HATRED AGAINST THOSE WHO EMPLOY THEM, WITHOUT PRODUCING ANY BENEFIT
[Prudent men do not resort to threats or insults, for neither makes your enemy weaker but, rather, arouses his suspicion or his hatred of you. The Romans always avoided this, and several instances in their history prove that they were correct in doing so.]
CHAPTER XXVII. PRUDENT PRINCES AND REPUBLICS OUGHT TO BE SATISFIED WITH WINNING, FOR WHEN THAT IS NOT ENOUGH THEY GENERALLY LOSE
The use of insulting language against the enemy arises, in most cases, from an insolence caused either by victory or by the false hope of victory, and this false hope makes men not only err in speaking but also in their actions. For when this hope enters men’s breasts it causes them to go beyond their mark and, in most cases, to lose the opportunity of possessing a certain good by hoping to obtain a better one that is uncertain. And because this is a matter which merits consideration, for men often deceive themselves about it and thus damage their state, I choose to demonstrate it in detail with ancient and modem examples, since I am unable to give a clear demonstration solely with arguments.
After he had defeated the Romans at Cannae, Hannibal sent his envoys to Carthage to announce the victory and to ask for assistance. The senate debated over what was to be done. Hanno, an old and prudent Carthaginian citizen, advised them to use this victory wisely in making peace with the Romans, since they had conquered and they might obtain it with honorable conditions, but they could not hope to make such a peace after a defeat; for the intention of the Carthaginians should be to demonstrate to the Romans that defeating them was sufficient, and that after they had enjoyed a victory they did not seek to lose it in hopes of a greater one. This policy was not adopted, though it was later recognized as a very wise one by the Carthaginian senate—the opportunity had been lost. After Alexander the Great had taken the entire East, the Republic of Tyre—in those times a noble and powerful republic because its city was surrounded by the sea, like that of the Venetians—recognized Alexander’s greatness and sent envoys to tell him that they wished to be his good servants and to give him the obedience he wanted, but that they were not ready to accept either him or his soldiers in the city; whereupon Alexander, outraged that one city wished to close against him those gates which the entire world had opened for him, rebuffed them and besieged the city, not accepting their conditions. Since the city was surrounded by water and well furnished with provisions and other munitions necessary for its defense, it resisted; after four months Alexander realized that one city, to its glory, was taking from him more time than many others he had conquered had taken from him, and decided to try agreement and to concede to them what they themselves had asked. But the people of Tyre had become arrogant, and not only would they not accept the agreement but they killed those who came to negotiate it. Angered by this, Alexander set himself to the siege with such force that he took and demolished the city and killed and enslaved its men.
In 1512 a Spanish army entered Florentine territory to restore the Medici in Florence and to levy a tribute upon the city. They had been brought there by citizens in the city who had given the Spanish hope that as soon as they were inside Florentine territory the inhabitants would take up arms in their favor; but once they entered the plain and no one showed himself, they tried to make a truce, since they were short of provisions; growing arrogant because of this, the people of Florence refused to accept it, and from this came the loss of Prato and the downfall of the Florentine state.
Rulers who are attacked cannot, then, commit a greater error than to refuse every agreement, especially when it is offered to them when the attack is carried out by men who are much more powerful than they are, for there will never be an offer so unfavorable that it will not, to some degree, ensure the well-being of him who accepts it and will not in some manner represent a partial victory for him. For it should have been enough for the people of Tyre that Alexander accepted those conditions which he had originally refused, and their victory should have been great enough when they had forced such a man to condescend to their will with his arms in hand. It should have been enough, as well, for the Florentines—because it was a great victory for them—if the Spanish army acceded to some of their demands and did not fulfill all their own goals, since the aim of that army was to change the state in Florence, to shift it away from an alliance with France, and to get money from it. Since the army had achieved the last two of these three object
ives and the people retained one of their objectives, namely, the preservation of their state, each side had obtained within the limits of the agreement a certain amount of honor and satisfaction. The people should not have cared about the two other things as long as they were left alive, nor should they have wished to place the matter in any way at the discretion of Fortune (although they foresaw an even greater and almost certain victory), thus risking their last stake, something which no prudent man ever risks unless he is forced to do so.
Hannibal, having left Italy, where he had won glory for sixteen years, was recalled by his Carthaginians to rescue his native city. He found Hasdrubal and Syphax defeated, the Kingdom of Numidia lost, and Carthage restricted to within the limits of her city walls, with no other refuge left her except himself and his army. Realizing that this was the last stake in the destiny of his fatherland, he did not wish to risk losing the city until he had tried every other remedy; and he was not ashamed to ask for peace, judging that if there was any remedy for his fatherland it was in peace and not in war. But when, later on, peace was denied him, he did not wish to avoid fighting even if he had to lose, believing that he might yet be able to win or, losing, lose gloriously. And if Hannibal—who was so able and whose army was intact—first sought peace rather than war when he realized that in losing the battle his native city would become enslaved, what should a man of less ability and experience do? But men make this error because they do not know how to limit their hopes; basing themselves on these hopes, without measuring themselves in other ways, they come to ruin.
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