CHAPTER XXVIII. HOW DANGEROUS IT IS FOR A REPUBLIC OR A PRINCE NOT TO AVENGE A PUBLIC OR PRIVATE INJURY
[Offenses committed against private individuals, like those committed against an entire people, are dangerous, for if the injured man does not receive satisfaction he will seek to avenge himself. An excellent example of this is the assassination of Philip, King of Macedonia and the father of Alexander the Great, by Pausanias, a man who requested justice from Philip but to whom it had been denied.]
CHAPTER XXIX. FORTUNE BLINDS MEN’S MINDS WHEN SHE DOES NOT WANT THEM TO OPPOSE HER PLANS
If we consider carefully how human affairs proceed, we will see that many times things happen and incidents occur against which the heavens do not wish any provision to be made. And if what I am discussing happened in Rome, where there was so much ability, religion, and order, it is no wonder that it occurs much more frequently in a city or province that lacks these three above-mentioned qualities. Since this instance is very noteworthy in illustrating the power of Heaven over human affairs, Livy explains it at length and with the most effective language, saying that since Heaven, for some reason, wanted the Romans to recognize its power, it first caused those Fabii who went to the Gauls as envoys to make a mistake, and as a result of their action the Gauls were incited to wage war upon Rome; then it commanded that nothing worthy of the Roman people be done in Rome to stop that war; before this it had arranged for Camillus, perhaps the sole remedy for such a great evil, to be exiled to Ardea; then, when the Gauls came toward Rome, those who had created a dictator many times to deal with the attack of the Volscians and other nearby enemies of theirs failed to do so on this occasion. Also, in choosing their soldiers they did so in a feeble manner, without much care, and they were so slow in taking up arms that they barely managed to meet the Gauls on the river Allia, only ten miles away from Rome. There the tribunes set up their camp without any of their usual caution: without first inspecting the spot or surrounding it with a trench or stockade; not using any precautions, human or divine. And in drawing up the order of battle they allowed their ranks to be thin and weak so that neither the soldiers nor the generals accomplished anything worthy of Roman discipline. Then they fought without bloodshed, for they fled before they were attacked; the greater part of them went to Veii, while the rest retreated to Rome, where, without even going to their homes, they immediately entered the Capitol; the senate, not thinking of defending Rome, did not even close the city gates—not to mention anything else—and part of the people fled while others went with the soldiers to the Capitol. Yet, in defending the Capitol they used methods that were not disorderly, for they did not burden it with useless people; they stocked it with all the grain they could so that they might survive during a siege. As for the useless crowd of old people, women, and children, the greater number fled to surrounding cities and the rest remained inside Rome at the mercy of the Gauls. Thus, one who reads about the deeds accomplished by the Roman people so many years earlier and then reads about these later times would not, under any circumstance, believe that it was the same people. When Livy described all the aforementioned disorders, he concluded with these words: “Fortune blinds men’s minds to such an extent when she does not wish them to oppose her gathering might”61 This conclusion could not be more true; thus, men who normally live under great adversity, or with success, deserve less praise or blame, for in most cases it is evident that they have been driven to a grand or a disastrous action by a great opportunity that the heavens have granted them by giving or taking away from them the chance to act effectively.
Fortune certainly does this, for when she wishes to bring about great things she chooses a man of such spirit and ability that he recognizes the opportunities she offers him. In like manner, when she wishes to bring about great disasters, she puts men there who will contribute to that downfall. And should there be someone present who could oppose her, she either kills him or has him deprived of all means to achieve anything good.
We see from this passage that in order to make Rome greater and to lead her to the grandeur she attained, Fortune found it necessary to strike her down (as we shall discuss at length in the beginning of the following book) even though she did not wish to ruin her completely. Therefore, we see that she had Camillus exiled but not executed; she had Rome, but not the Capitol, taken; she commanded the Romans not to think of any good measure to protect Rome, but later not to overlook any good preparation in the defense of the Capitol. In order that Rome might be taken, she arranged for the majority of the soldiers who had been defeated at the river Allia to go to Veii, thus cutting off all avenues for the defense of the city of Rome. Yet in arranging this she prepared everything for Rome’s recovery, having brought an entire Roman army to Veii and Camillus to Ardea in order to be able to achieve a great undertaking under a general untarnished by any disgrace of defeat and with a reputation intact for the recovery of his native city.
In confirmation of the things discussed, some modern examples might be cited, but we shall omit them, not judging them necessary, as this should be enough to satisfy anyone. Again, let me affirm as true, according to what is evident from all the histories, that men can assist Fortune but not oppose her; they can weave her schemes but they cannot break them. They should never give up, for not knowing her goals as she travels through crooked and unknown roads, men always have hope, and with hope they should never despair in whatever fortune and whatever difficulty they find themselves.
CHAPTER XXX. TRULY POWERFUL REPUBLICS AND PRINCES DO NOT BUY FRIENDSHIPS WITH MONEY BUT RATHER WITH THEIR ABILITY AND THE REPUTATION OF THEIR FORCES
The Romans were being besieged in the Capitol, and although they were expecting assistance from Veii and Camillus, as a result of hunger they came to an agreement with the Gauls to ransom themselves for a certain amount of gold. Just as they were in the process of weighing out the gold, according to the agreement, Camillus arrived with his army: Fortune brought this about, the historian says, “so that the Romans might not survive by having ransomed themselves with gold.”62 This is worthy of note not only in this instance but also in the course of this republic’s history, where it is clear that cities were never bought with money nor peace ever purchased with money but always by force of arms—something, I believe, which has never been true of any other republic. Among the other signs by means of which the power of a strong state is recognized is the way in which it lives with its neighbors. And when it governs itself in such a way that its neighbors, in order to keep it as a friend, become its tributaries, then this is a certain sign that that state is powerful; but when these same neighbors get money from her, even if they are inferior to her, then this is a great sign of weakness.
Read all the Roman histories and you will see that the Massilians, the Aedui, the Rhodians, Hiero of Syracuse, Eumenes, and Masinissa—all near the borders of the Roman empire—competed in payment and tribute for the empire’s needs in order to have its friendship, seeking nothing from it but to be defended. The contrary is seen in weak states: beginning with our own Florence, in past times, when her reputation was highest, there was no insignificant lord in Romagna who did not receive some payment from her; moreover, she gave this to the Perugians, the inhabitants of Città di Castello, and to all her other neighbors. If this city had been armed and vigorous, everything would have been the opposite: those cities would have given money to her to obtain her protection and would not have sought to sell their own friendship but to purchase hers. Nor did the Florentines alone live in this cowardice, but also the Venetians and the King of France, who, with so great a kingdom, lived as a tributary to the Swiss and to the King of England. All this came from having disarmed his people and from the fact that this king and the other rulers named earlier preferred to enjoy the immediate benefit of being able to despoil the people (and to avoid a danger more imaginary than real) rather than to accomplish things that would make them secure and their states happy forever. This disorder, even if it gives rise to tranquillity
for a while, is always, in time, a cause of emergencies, damage, and incurable disasters. It would take too long to recount how often the Florentines, the Venetians, and the Kingdom of France have bought themselves out of wars and how often they have been subjected to a disgrace to which the Romans were subjected only once. It would take too long to recount how many cities the Florentines and the Venetians bought in which disorder could later be seen, for things bought with gold cannot be defended with steel. The Romans observed this noble attitude and this way of living as long as they lived in freedom, but later, when they came under the rule of emperors and the emperors began to be evil and to love the shade more than the sun, the Romans also began to buy themselves off—first from the Parthians, then from the Germans, then from other nearby peoples—and this was the beginning of the downfall of so great an empire.
Similar difficulties, then, arise from having disarmed your people, and from this results another, still greater, difficulty: the closer the enemy gets to you, the weaker he will find you; for anyone who lives in the way mentioned earlier treats those subjects inside his empire badly and those on the borders of his empire well in order to have men well disposed to keeping the enemy at a distance. From this it follows that in order to keep his enemy at a distance, he pays those lords and people close to his borders. The result is that these kinds of states put up a minimum amount of resistance on their borders, but when the enemy has crossed them they have no remedy whatsoever. And they do not realize that their method of proceeding is contrary to any good institution, for the heart and the vital organs of a body, not its extremities, should be protected, since without the latter the body lives, but if the former is harmed it dies; and these states do not protect the heart, but keep their hands and feet protected instead.
What this error has brought about in Florence has been seen and is still seen every day: for when an army passes her borders and enters her body near the heart, she has no other remedy left. A few years ago the same thing was true with the Venetians; if their city had not been protected by the seas, it would have seen its end. This has not been the case so often in France, for that kingdom is so large that it has few superior enemies; nevertheless, when the English attacked that kingdom in 1513, the entire country trembled; the king himself, as well as everyone else, felt that a single defeat might take the kingdom and his government from him. The opposite was true with the Romans, for the closer the enemy approached to Rome, the more powerful it found that city in resisting him. And this is evident from Hannibal’s invasion of Italy, for after three defeats and so many slain generals and soldiers, the Romans were able not only to hold out against the enemy but also to win the war. All this arose from the fact that they had protected their heart well and had been less concerned with their extremities: the foundation of Rome’s state was the people of Rome, the associated Latin cities, and the other allied cities in Italy and their colonies; from them they drew enough soldiers to fight and to hold the world. And that this is true is evident from the question that Hanno, the Carthaginian, posed to the envoys of Hannibal after the defeat of Cannae. After they had glorified Hannibal’s exploits, they were asked by Hanno if anyone had come from the Roman people to ask for peace, and if any of the cities of the Latin nations or the colonies had rebelled against the Romans; when both questions were answered in the negative, Hanno said: “This war is still as undecided as it was before.”63
We see, therefore, both from this discussion and from what we have said many times elsewhere, what a difference there is in the method of proceeding between present republics and ancient ones. We also see miraculous losses and gains because of this, for where men possess little ability Fortune demonstrates her power all the more; and since she is changeable, republics and states often change, and they will continue to do so until someone arises so devoted to antiquity that he will rule Fortune in such a way that she will have no reason to demonstrate, with every revolution of the sun, how powerful she can be.
CHAPTER XXXI. HOW DANGEROUS IT IS TO BELIEVE EXILES
It does not seem beside the point to discuss, somewhere in these discourses, how dangerous a thing it is to believe those who have been driven from their native city, for such men as these have to be dealt with every day by those in authority. And I am doing this especially since it can be demonstrated with a memorable example cited by Livy in his history—even though it is outside the topic of his argument. When Alexander the Great passed over into Asia with his army, Alexander of Epirus, his brother-in-law and uncle, came with his men into Italy, called there by the exiled Lucanians, who led him to believe that he could take possession of that country with their assistance. Whereupon, on the basis of their word and in that hope, he came into Italy and was killed by them after their fellow citizens promised to take them back into their native city if they killed him. Therefore, it should be clear how vain are the words and promises of those who find themselves shut out of their native city. As far as their loyalty is concerned, one has to realize that anytime they find they can return to their native city by some means not requiring your support, they will abandon you and ally themselves with others, notwithstanding any promise they may have made to you. And as for their vain promises and hopes, their burning desire to return home is so great that they naturally believe many things that are false, and to these they skillfully add many more, so that between what they believe and what they say they believe they fill you with so much hope that, should you base a decision on this, either you incur useless expenses or you undertake an enterprise that leads you to ruin.
I should like the example of Alexander to suffice, along with that of Themistocles of Athens, who, after being declared a rebel, fled to Darius in Asia; there he made such promises if the king would attack Greece that Darius undertook the invasion. When, later on, Themistocles could not keep these promises, he poisoned himself, either out of shame or because he feared punishment. And if this error was committed by Themistocles, a most excellent man, what must one think of those of lesser ability who more readily allow themselves to be drawn by their desire and passion to commit even greater errors. Therefore, a prince should be slow to undertake actions based upon the report of an exiled man, for in most cases he will either end up in shame or suffer grave damage. Furthermore, since cities are seldom taken by stealth or through information supplied by those from the inside, it does not seem beside my subject to discuss this matter in the following chapter, adding to this the many methods used by the Romans in conquering cities.
CHAPTER XXXII. ON THE MEANS EMPLOYED BY THE ROMANS IN TAKING CITIES
[The Romans always believed that laying siege to a city was the least practical means of taking it. When they took a city, they preferred to take it by assault or persuade it to surrender by means of a combination of force and deceit. Using treachery is the least desirable method since the slightest error can result in failure. The Romans preferred to force cities to surrender, not by long sieges, but by defeating the enemy in the field and by raids upon his surrounding territories; for a victory on the battlefield produced immediate results, while the outcome of a long siege was always doubtful and, even when successful, might take many years.]
CHAPTER XXXIII. HOW THE ROMANS BESTOWED GREAT AUTHORITY UPON THEIR MILITARY LEADERS
[Although the Roman senate reserved for itself the right to begin wars and to ratify treaties, it granted much discretionary power to the commanders in the field. This was a wise policy, for if the senate had controlled every aspect of a war it would have forced the commander to be more cautious and to act more slowly; furthermore, the glory of the final victory would have to be shared with the senate. But the senate wisely decided that the commander’s love of glory would be sufficient to regulate his conduct. Today, however, the republics of Venice and Florence act in precisely the opposite manner, for if their military men have merely to set up an artillery piece, they want to know all about it, and this mistaken policy has led us to our present difficulties.]
BOOK III
CHAPTER I. IN ORDER FOR A RELIGIOUS GROUP OR A REPUBLIC TO EXIST FOR A LONG TIME, IT IS NECESSARY OFTEN TO BRING IT BACK TO ITS BEGINNINGS
It is a sure fact that all things of this world have a limit to their existence; but those which complete the entire life cycle ordained for them by Heaven are those which do not let their bodies fall into disorder but, rather, keep them in an orderly fashion so that no change occurs, or, if it does, it is a healthy change and not a damaging one. And since I am speaking of mixed bodies, such as republics and religious groups, let me say that those changes are healthy which bring such bodies back to their beginnings. It follows that among such states or groups, those having the best organization and longest life span are those that can often renew themselves through their own institutions or can arrive at such a renewal through some incident outside their own operation. And it is clearer than the light of the sun that without such renewals these bodies do not endure.
The means of renewing them is to bring them back to their beginnings, for all the origins of religious groups, republics, and kingdoms contain within themselves some goodness by means of which they have gained their initial reputation and their first growth. Since, in the course of time, this goodness becomes corrupted, if nothing intervenes that may bring it up to the proper mark, that body is, of necessity, killed by such corruption. And doctors of medicine say, when speaking of the body of man: “Every day it absorbs something that requires a remedy from time to time.” This return to beginnings, in the case of republics, is accomplished either by an external event or as a result of internal foresight. As for the first method, it is evident that Rome had to be captured by the Gauls in order for her to be reborn; and in being reborn she had to take on new life and new strength and adopt once more the observance of religion and justice, both of which were becoming corrupt. This point is made very clear in Livy’s history, where he demonstrates that in calling out their army against the Gauls, and in creating tribunes with consular authority, the Romans observed no religious ceremony. And, in the same way, they not only failed to punish the three Fabii, who had fought against the Franks “contrary to the law of nations,” but they made them tribunes. And one may presume, too, that they were taking less account of the good laws instituted by Romulus and other prudent rulers than was reasonable and necessary for maintaining a free government. This external reversal occurred so that all the institutions of that city might be revived, as well as to show the people that it was not only necessary to maintain religion and justice but that they should also honor their good citizens and count their abilities for more than those conveniences which they felt were lacking on account of their actions. We see that this was precisely what occurred: for as soon as Rome was recaptured, the Romans renewed all the institutions of their ancient religion and punished the Fabii who had fought “contrary to the law of nations”; they then honored the ability and virtue of Camillus, so much so that the senate and the others put their envy aside and placed in his hands all the responsibility of the republic. It is necessary, therefore, as has been mentioned, that men living together under any kind of institution should often come to know themselves, either because of such external events or because of internal ones. As for the latter, they usually arise either from a law, which often obliges the men who reside in that body to examine their affairs, or, more often, by one good man born among them who, with his exemplary deeds and his able works, produces the same effect as does that law.
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