This benefit, then, arises in republics either through the ability of one man or through the strength of a law; as for the latter, the institutions that brought the Roman republic back toward its beginnings were the tribunes of the plebeians, the censors, and all the laws that checked the ambition and the insolence of the citizens. Such laws needed to be given life by the ability of one citizen who would courageously fight for their application against the power of those who might transgress against them. Concerning the application of such laws before the capture of Rome by the Gauls, the most notable examples were the death of the sons of Brutus, the death of the decemvirs,64 and the death of Spurius Melius, the grain dealer. After the taking of Rome, we may cite the death of Manlius Capitolinus, the death of the son of Manlius Torquatus, the punishment by Papirius Cursor of Fabius, his master of cavalry, and the accusations brought against the Scipios. Because of their extraordinary and striking nature, the occurrence of each of these events made men return to their proper position; and as they became more rare, they gave men more time to become corrupted and to behave in a more dangerous and disorderly fashion. For this reason, not more than ten years should pass between one act of enforcement of the law and the next because after that amount of time has elapsed men begin to change their habits and to break the laws; and if nothing arises that recalls the penalty to their minds and renews the fear in their hearts, the delinquents will multiply in such a short time that they will not be punishable without danger. Those who governed the Florentine state from 1434 until 1494 used to say, in this regard, that it was necessary to reorganize the state every five years; otherwise it would be very difficult to maintain it; and by “reorganizing the state” they meant striking that same terror and fear into the hearts of men that they had instilled when they first constituted it, at which time they punished those men who, according to that old way of ruling, governed badly. When the memory of such punishment disappears, men grow bold and attempt to devise new plans to spread sedition; it is therefore necessary to make provision against this by bringing the state back toward its beginnings.
This return to origins in republics also arises from the simple ability of one man, without the necessity of any law moving people to action; his conduct will be of such renown and of such an exemplary character that good men will desire to imitate it and evil men will be ashamed to lead a life contrary to it. Those in Rome who provided particularly good examples were Horatius Cocles, Scaevola, Fabricius, the two Decii, Regulus Atilius, and several others; with their unusual and virtuous examples, these men created almost the same effect in Rome that its laws and institutions had created. And if the aforementioned punishments, together with these individual examples, had occurred at least every ten years in that city, it would have necessarily followed that the city would have never been corrupted; but since both of these occurred less frequently, the corrupting influences began to multiply, for after Marcus Regulus no similar example was witnessed in the city; and although there were the two Catos in Rome, there was such a space of time between Marcus Regulus and the two of them, and then between the two of them themselves, and they remained so isolated, that they could not achieve any good effect with their good examples—especially the last Cato, who, finding the better part of the city corrupted, could not, with his example, improve the citizens. And this should suffice as far as republics are concerned.
As for religious groups, these renewals are still seen to be necessary, as is evident from the example of our own religion, which would have been completely extinguished if it had not been brought back to its beginnings by Saint Francis and Saint Dominic: for with their poverty and the example of the life of Christ these two saints restored religion to the hearts of men whence it had vanished; and their new institutions were so powerful that they prevented the dishonesty of priests and the heads of the religion from ruining it. They continued to live in poverty and had such a reputation with the people in the confessional and in their preaching that they made them understand that it is evil to speak evil of what is evil and that it was good to live in obedience under the priests’ control, and that the errors of priests should be left for God to punish: and thus, these church rulers do their worst, for they can have no fear of a punishment they do not see and in which they do not believe; therefore, this renewal has maintained, and still maintains, our religion.
Kingdoms also need to be renewed and to bring back their laws to their beginnings. What a good effect this achieves can be seen in the Kingdom of France, which lives under laws and regulations more than any other kingdom. The parliaments are the upholders of these laws and regulations, especially that of Paris, which is renewed every time it takes an action against a prince of that kingdom or goes against the king in its judgments. And it has maintained itself until now by being the obstinate opponent of the nobility of that kingdom; but should it, at any time, fail to punish the nobility and allow such offenses to increase, then the consequence will doubtless be that either these offenses will have to be corrected amidst great disorder or the kingdom will fall apart.
It may be concluded, then, that there is nothing more necessary in a political community, whether it be a religious group, a kingdom, or a republic, than to restore to it the reputation that it had at its beginnings and to strive to see that there are either good laws or good men to produce this effect without having to resort to external forces; although this may sometimes be the best remedy, as it was in Rome, it is such a dangerous one that there is no reason to desire it. In order to demonstrate to everyone to what extent the accomplishments of individual men made Rome great and brought about many good effects in that city, I shall now narrate and discuss these actions: this third book and last section of the commentary on these first ten books of Livy will conclude within the framework of this topic. Although the actions of kings were great and noteworthy, since history treats of them in great detail I shall nevertheless leave them aside, discussing them only when kings did something pertaining to their own personal interests; we shall begin, then, with Brutus, the father of Roman freedom.
CHAPTER II. HOW IT IS A MOST WISE POLICY TO PRETEND TO BE MAD AT THE RIGHT TIME
[From the example of Junius Brutus, who feigned madness to protect himself until he could arouse the citizens of Rome against their tyrannical kings, we see that all those who are dissatisfied with their rulers but are too weak to oppose them openly should either pretend to be their supporters or feign madness.]
CHAPTER III. HOW NECESSARY IT WAS TO KILL THE SONS OF BRUTUS IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN A NEWLY ACQUIRED FREEDOM
[Brutus’s severity in judging his own sons and in condemning them to death was most unusual but most beneficial to the maintenance of the freedom Rome had acquired through his deeds. Everyone should realize from the study of ancient history that when a government changes it is necessary to make examples of those who oppose the new regime. In our own day, Piero Soderini thought he could appease the opponents of his new regime in Florence by doing good deeds. He was mistaken about this, and he should have taken more drastic measures against his enemies, for the good results of such actions would have revealed them to be motivated not by personal ambition but by a concern for the common good. Because he was unable to imitate Brutus, he lost both his prestige and his position as gonfaloniere of Florence.]
CHAPTER IV. A PRINCE CANNOT LIVE SECURELY IN A PRINCIPALITY WHILE THOSE FROM WHOM HE HAS TAKEN IT ARE STILL ALIVE
[Old offenses are never canceled by new benefits, particularly when the gains are less important than the offenses previously suffered. Tarquinius Priscus and Servius Tullius lost their kingdoms because they did not know how to protect the kingdoms they had usurped from others.]
CHAPTER V. WHAT CAUSES A HEREDITARY RULER TO LOSE HIS KINGDOM
[When Tarquinius Superbus murdered Servius Tullius, he should have experienced no difficulty in maintaining his rule, for the dead man had no heirs. But he failed to respect ancient customs, ruled as a tyrant, and disregarded the senate’s authorit
y. The fact that his son, Sextus, raped Lucretia was not, as some claim, the cause of his downfall, for any other event would have eventually aroused the spirit of rebellion against him. Princes should learn from this that they begin to lose their kingdom when they show little regard for the customs and ancient traditions of their subjects. Conspiracies will be discussed at length in the next chapter, for they are of great importance both to rulers and to private citizens.]
CHAPTER VI. CONSPIRACIES
I think it would not be proper for me to omit a discussion of conspiracies, since they are a matter of grave danger both to princes and to private citizens; for it is evident that many more princes have lost their lives and their states through conspiracies than through open warfare. While the ability to wage open warfare against a prince is granted to just a few people, being able to conspire against a prince is granted to everyone. On the other hand, private persons will not find a more dangerous or more reckless undertaking than this one, for it is difficult and most dangerous at every stage. The fact is that many conspiracies are attempted but very few reach their desired goal; therefore, in order that princes may learn to guard themselves from these dangers and private persons may enter into them with more caution—or, rather, that private persons may learn to live content under the rule assigned to them by fate—I shall discuss conspiracies in great detail, without omitting any noteworthy case useful to the instruction of either kind of person. And truly golden is this maxim of Cornelius Tacitus, which states: men must honor past things and obey present ones; they should wish for good princes, but they should endure whatever sort they have. And truly, anyone who does otherwise generally brings ruin upon himself and his native city.
In treating this subject, we must first consider against whom conspiracies are formed. We find that they are made either against one’s native city or against a prince. I should like to discuss these two kinds at present, for the kinds that are formed to hand a city over to the enemies besieging it, or those that have some similarity to this for whatever reason, have been sufficiently discussed above. In this first part we shall treat of conspiracies against a prince, examining first the causes of such conspiracies, which are many. One, however, is much more important than all the rest, namely, being hated by all his subjects; for when a prince has aroused a universal hatred, it follows that there are some private individuals who have been severely harmed by him and who desire revenge. This desire is increased in them by that universal hostile feeling they see aroused against him. A prince, therefore, should avoid such private hatreds; how he should act in order to avoid them I do not wish to discuss here, since I have treated this problem elsewhere; but if he guards himself against this, the simple individual offenses will create less opposition for him. The first reason is that rarely will he encounter men who value one injury so much that they place themselves in great danger to avenge it; the second is that even when they possess the courage and strength to do it, they are held back by that universal goodwill they see the prince enjoy.
Injuries must affect either property, life, or honor. Insofar as threats to one’s life are concerned, they are more dangerous than their execution—that is, threats are most dangerous, but when they are carried out there is no danger whatsoever, for one who is dead cannot think about a vendetta, and those who remain alive, in most cases, leave the thinking to you. But anyone who is threatened and is forced by necessity either to act or to suffer becomes a very dangerous man to the prince, as will be discussed in detail in its proper place. Apart from this necessity, property and honor are the two things concerning which men take offense more than anything else, and the prince ought to be cautious in such matters, for he can never take away from a man so much that there is not left to him a dagger for avenging himself, and he can never dishonor a man so much that he does not retain a spirit determined on revenge. And of the honors that may be taken from a man, women are the most important; after that, personal disgrace. This kind of dishonor armed Pausanias against Philip of Macedonia and has armed many others against many other princes; in our times Luzio Belanti conspired against Pandolfo, tyrant of Siena, for no other reason than that Pandolfo had given his daughter to Luzio as his wife and then had taken her away, as we shall discuss in its proper place. The main reason that moved the Pazzi to conspire against the Medici was the estate of Giovanni Bonromei, which was taken away from them by the Medici. There is another cause, a most important one, which makes men conspire against a prince—the desire to free their native city after it has been seized by him. This reason moved Brutus and Cassius against Caesar; it moved many others against Phalaris, Dionysius, and other usurpers of their native city. Nor can any tyrant guard himself from this passion except by abandoning his tyranny. And since there is no one who will do this, there are few tyrants who do not come to a bad end; hence this verse from Juvenal: “Few kings descend to the realm of the son-in-law of Ceres without wounds or slaughter, and few tyrants die a bloodless death.”65
The dangers that are incurred in conspiracies, as I said above, are great and continue throughout all their phases: for in such matters there is danger in planning them, in executing them, and even after they are carried out. There may be one conspirator or many, although a single person cannot be said to constitute a conspiracy; rather, he represents the firm determination of one man to kill the prince. Of the three kinds of danger risked in conspiracies, this single man avoids the first, for before the execution of the conspiracy he runs no danger whatsoever, since others do not share his secret, nor does he run the risk that his plan will come to the prince’s ear. Such a determination on the part of one man can arise in any man of whatever rank—great, small, noble, common, close to or at a distance from the prince—for everyone is permitted to speak to him at some time, and anyone who is allowed to speak to him may give vent to his feelings. Pausanias, about whom I have spoken above, killed Philip of Macedonia on his way to the temple, surrounded by a thousand armed men and standing between his son and his son-in-law. But he was a nobleman and known to the prince. A poor and abject Spaniard gave King Ferdinand of Spain a blow in the neck with a dagger; the wound was not a mortal one, but it is evident from this that he had the courage and the opportunity to carry this out. A dervish (Turkish priest) with a scimitar struck at Bajazet, father of the present Turk; he did not wound him, although he nevertheless had the courage and the opportunity to do so. I believe many men with like dispositions can be found who have a similar wish, for in the wish there is neither penalty nor any danger whatsoever; but there are few who do so, and of those who do very few or none escape being killed on the spot; for this reason you do not find people who wish to go to a sure death. But let us leave aside these single cases and turn to conspiracies among many people.
Let me say that, according to the history books, all conspiracies have been formed by those great men closest to the prince; for others, if they are not actually mad, cannot conspire, since weak men and men not close to the prince lack all those hopes and opportunities which are required for the execution of a conspiracy. First, weak men cannot find supporters who will keep faith with them, for a man cannot consent to their intention without some of those hopes that cause men to incur great dangers; if, therefore, they increase their number to two or three persons, they find themselves an accuser and come to ruin. Even when they are so lucky as to avoid the accuser, they are surrounded by such difficulty in the execution—for they do not have easy access to the prince—that it is impossible for them not to come to ruin; if noblemen and those who enjoy easy access to the prince are hindered by the difficulties explained below, the difficulties of the weak must increase without end. Therefore, since men are not completely insane in matters concerning life and property, when conspirators see they are weak they are cautious; and when they are tired of a prince they turn to cursing him and wait for others who have greater power than they possess to avenge them; indeed, if there is anyone who has ever attempted such a thing, we can only praise his intentions but
not his prudence.
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