And how men are possessed and confused cannot be better demonstrated than by Livy, where he describes Alexamenes the Aetolian when he wanted to kill Nabis the Spartan, of whom we have spoken above. When the time for the deed had arrived, and he had revealed to his followers what had to be done, Livy says: “Even he had to regain his courage, as he was disturbed by so serious an act.”69 It is, indeed, impossible for anyone—even one who is strong-minded and used to the killing of men, and familiar with the use of steel—not to be confused. Therefore, experienced men should be chosen for such operations, and no others should be trusted, even if they are reputed to be extremely brave. For where courage in great undertakings is concerned, no one can promise a certain outcome unless he has had experience in such matters. This confusion, then, can make you drop the weapons from your hands or make you say things that produce the same effect. Lucilla, the sister of Commodus, planned for Quintianus to kill the emperor. He waited for Commodus at the entrance to the amphitheater, and, drawing near him while holding a bare dagger, cried: “The senate sends you this.” These words caused him to be arrested before he had brought down his arm to strike. Messer Antonio da Volterra, chosen, as was mentioned above, to kill Lorenzo de’ Medici, while drawing near to him shouted: “Ah, traitor!” This exclamation was the salvation of Lorenzo and the downfall of that conspiracy.
A conspiracy can fail to reach completion when it is directed against one ruler, for the reasons already given, but it can fail to reach completion more easily when it is directed against two rulers. Indeed, this kind of conspiracy is so difficult that it is almost impossible for it to succeed, since to carry out two assassinations at the same time in different places is almost impossible; yet two such acts cannot be carried out at different times if the first is not to spoil the second. Thus, if conspiring against one prince is an uncertain thing, one that is dangerous and imprudent, to conspire against two princes is completely vain and foolhardy. And if it were not for the respect I hold for the historian, I should never believe what Herodian says of Plautianus to be possible; that is, when he says that Plautianus entrusted to the centurion Saturninus the charge that he alone should kill Severus and Antoninus, who lived in different places; for this matter is so far removed from what is reasonable that anyone other than this authority would not persuade me to believe it.
Certain young Athenians conspired against Diocles70 and Hippias, tyrants of Athens; they murdered Diocles, but Hippias, who survived, avenged him. Chion and Leonidas of Heraclea, disciples of Plato, conspired against Clearchus and Satirus, who were tyrants; they killed Clearchus, but Satirus, who remained alive, avenged him. The Pazzi, whom we have cited many times, only succeeded in killing Giuliano. Thus, everyone should avoid similar conspiracies against more than one leader, for they do not benefit oneself, one’s country, or anyone; on the contrary, the survivors who remain become more insufferable and harsher, as is well known to Florence, Athens, and Heraclea, which I mentioned previously. It is true that although the conspiracy Pelopidas organized to liberate Thebes, his native city, met with all these difficulties, it nevertheless had a most happy ending; for Pelopidas did not conspire against two tyrants but against ten, and not only was he not intimate with them, so that access to these tyrants was not easy for him, but he was also a rebel. Nevertheless, he was able to come into Thebes, murder the tyrants, and liberate his native city. However, he did all this with the aid of one Charon, adviser to the tyrants, from whom he obtained easy access for his undertaking. Despite this, no one should follow his example, for it was an impossible undertaking whose success was miraculous—it was so viewed by historians at that time, and still is, for they praise it as a rare thing almost without parallel. Such an action can be interrupted by a false suspicion or by an unforeseen accident occurring during the course of the execution. On the morning when Brutus and the other conspirators decided to kill Caesar, it happened that Caesar was seen speaking at length to Gaius Pompilius Lenas, one of the conspirators; the others, observing this long conversation, were afraid that the said Pompilius had revealed the conspiracy to Caesar, so they decided they would kill Caesar right there and not wait for him to go to the senate; and they would have done so if, after the conversation was over, they had not been reassured by the fact that Caesar made no unusual move. These false suspicions are to be considered and prudently respected, so much the more so as they are easily aroused, for anyone who has a guilty conscience can easily be led to believe that people are talking about him. A word with another meaning is overheard which shakes your courage and makes you think it was said with respect to your plans. The result is that you either reveal the conspiracy yourself by fleeing or you confuse the undertaking by acting at the wrong time. And this occurs more easily when there are many people aware of the conspiracy.
As for accidents, since they are unexpected I can only demonstrate them by examples, in the hope of making men accordingly cautious. Luzio Belanti, of Siena, of whom we have made mention earlier, because of the anger he felt against Pandolfo, who had taken away from him the daughter he had earlier given him as his wife, decided to kill him and chose his time as follows: Pandolfo went almost every day to visit one of his sick relatives. On the way he would pass Luzio’s home. Hence, when Luzio saw this, he planned to have his conspirators in the house, ready to kill Pandolfo on command when he passed. They were all armed and placed inside the entrance; Luzio put one conspirator at the window, so that when Pandolfo passed by he could make a sign to indicate that he was approaching. It happened that as Pandolfo approached and the man had given the sign, Pandolfo encountered a friend, who stopped him, and some of those who were with him continued to walk ahead. Hearing the noise made by the weapons, they uncovered the ambush. In this way Pandolfo was saved while Luzio and the conspirators were forced to flee from Siena. This accidental meeting prevented that action and made Luzio fail in his undertaking. Since they are rare, no remedy can be provided against such accidents. It is, nevertheless, still essential to study all the possibilities that may arise and to guard against them.
There now only remains for us to discuss the dangers incurred after the execution, and these amount only to one—that is, when someone remains to avenge the dead prince. Those remaining can be his brothers, his sons, or other supporters in a position to inherit the principality. Either because of your negligence or for the reasons given above, there may remain those who will undertake this vendetta. This happened to Giovanni Andrea da Lampognano, who, together with his co-conspirators, killed the Duke of Milan; but since they left the duke’s son and two of his brothers alive, in time the latter avenged the dead man. And truly, in such instances the conspirators are to be excused, for they have no other remedy; but when someone is left alive because of their lack of prudence or negligence, then they deserve no excuse. Some conspirators from Forli killed Count Girolamo, their lord, and took his wife and small children. Since they felt they could not live securely unless they had command of the fortress—and the castellan would not surrender it to them—Madonna Caterina, as the countess was called, promised the conspirators that if they allowed her to go into the fortress she would deliver it up to them and they could keep her children as hostages. With this promise, they allowed her to enter the place; when she was inside, she reproached them for the death of her husband and threatened them with every kind of revenge. And to show that she had no concern for her children, she showed them her genitals, declaring that she still had the means to produce more offspring. Thus, the conspirators, lacking a plan and realizing their error too late, paid the penalty for their lack of prudence in the form of perpetual exile. But of all the dangers that can arise after the execution of a conspiracy, there is none more certain nor more to be feared than when the people have loved the prince you have killed: against this danger conspirators have no remedy whatsoever and can never secure themselves. As an example there is Caesar, whose death was avenged by the Roman people, who loved him. The reason why the conspirators, subsequently dri
ven out of Rome, were all killed at various times and in various places stems from this fact.
Conspiracies against one’s own city are less dangerous for those who undertake them than are those against princes because in organizing the former there are fewer dangers and in carrying them out there are only the same dangers; and after the execution there is no danger at all. In organizing them there are not many dangers, for a citizen can prepare himself for the acquisition of power without revealing his intention and plan to anyone. If these plans of his are not interrupted, his undertaking can be carried out successfully; but if his plans should be interrupted by some law, he can wait and try another way. This, let it be understood, applies to a republic where some corruption already exists, for in one which is not corrupted, where no evil has taken root, these thoughts cannot occur to one of its citizens. Thus, the citizens can aspire to the principality through many ways and means without undergoing the danger of being suppressed, both because republics are slower and less careful than princes and because they have more respect for their important citizens; such men, therefore, are bolder and more courageous in acting against them. Everyone who has read about the conspiracy of Catiline, which Sallust described, will remember how, after the conspiracy was discovered, Catiline not only remained in Rome but went to the senate and spoke offensively both to it and to the consul—so great was the respect that this city had for her citizens. And after he had left Rome and was already with his armies, Lentulus and those others would not have been arrested if there had not been letters in their own handwriting that clearly implicated them. Hanno, a very important citizen of Carthage who aspired to the tyranny, planned to poison the entire senate during the wedding of one of his daughters and then to make himself prince. When this became known, the senate did nothing except pass a law that limited the expenses of banquets and weddings—so great was the respect it had for this man’s qualities. It is certainly true that in carrying out a conspiracy against one’s own city there are more and greater difficulties because rarely do your own forces suffice in conspiring against so many; and everyone is not the leader of an army, as was Caesar or Agathocles or Cleomenes, and men like them, who, with a single blow and with their own forces, occupied their native cities. For men such as these, the way is most easy and secure, but others who do not possess so many additional forces must do things either through deception and ingenuity or with foreign troops. As for deceit and ingenuity, when Pisistratus the Athenian had defeated the inhabitants of Megara and had, as a result, won the favor of the people, he went outside one morning, wounded, declaring that the nobility had injured him out of envy and he asked to have armed men with him as a bodyguard. With this authority, he easily rose to such greatness that he became tyrant of Athens. Pandolfo Petrucci returned with other exiles to Siena, and he was entrusted with the guardianship of the public square, something the others refused as a thing of little importance; nevertheless, in time his armed guards gave him such a reputation that in a short while he became prince of the city. Many others, using other plans and methods, have, in the course of time and with danger, achieved their goal. Those who have conspired to occupy their native city with their own forces or with foreign armies have experienced different results, depending on Fortune. The previously cited Catiline was ruined in this way. Hanno, of whom we made mention above, when the poison did not succeed, armed his partisans, who numbered many thousands, and both he and they were killed. Some of the first citizens of Thebes called to their aid a Spartan army in order to make themselves tyrants, and the Spartans seized the tyranny of that city. Thus, when all the conspiracies directed against one’s own city are examined, you will find few if any that were suppressed at the stage of being organized, but all either succeeded or failed while being carried out. After they are carried out, no dangers are involved other than those inherent in the nature of the principality itself, for when a man has become a tyrant he experiences the natural and routine dangers that tyranny brings upon him, against which he has no other remedies than those discussed above.
This is as much as I intend to write about conspiracies, and if I have discussed those which are carried out with steel and not with poison, this comes from the fact that they are all subject to the same laws. It is true that those which make use of poison are more dangerous because they are more uncertain, for everyone does not have the means, and it is necessary to entrust them to those who do, and this necessity of depending upon others makes it dangerous for you. Then again, a drink of poison may not be fatal for many reasons, as happened to those who killed Commodus; for after he had vomited the poison that they had administered to him, they were forced to strangle him to kill him. Princes, therefore, have no greater enemy than a conspiracy, for when a conspiracy against them is carried out, it either kills them or disgraces them: if it succeeds they die; if it is uncovered and they kill the conspirators, it is always believed that the plot was an invention of that prince to give vent to his avarice and his cruelty against the lives and property of those whom he had put to death. I do not wish, however, to fail to warn that prince or that republic against whom a conspiracy is organized to take this precaution: when a conspiracy is uncovered, before deciding to avenge it they should seek to understand very well its characteristics and measure carefully the conditions of the conspirators as well as their own; and when they find the plotters to be great and powerful, they should never reveal the conspiracy to the public until they are prepared to suppress it with sufficient force—doing otherwise would result in their downfall. Hence, with all their skill, they should pretend to know nothing, for when the conspirators see that they are discovered they will act without hesitation, driven by necessity. An example is provided by the Romans: after they left two legions of soldiers to guard the Capuans against the Samnites, as we have said elsewhere, the leaders of these legions conspired to subjugate the Capuans. When this became known in Rome, the Romans sent Rutilius, the new consul, to prevent this from happening. In order to lull the conspirators to sleep, he spread the news that the senate had confirmed the assignments of the Capuan legions. Believing this to be true, these soldiers thought they had time to carry out their plan and did not try to hasten the matter; and so, they remained unaware until they began to realize that the consul was separating one legion from the other, and this aroused their suspicion and caused them to reveal and to implement their plans. There cannot be a better example than this on either side, for it shows how slow men are in matters when they believe they have time and how swift they are when necessity drives them to it. Nor can a prince or a republic that wishes to put off the uncovering of a conspiracy to his or its advantage employ a better method than to offer guile-fully an opportunity in the near future to the conspirators so that in waiting for that moment they will think they have time, whereas they are actually giving that prince or republic time to punish them. Anyone who does otherwise hastens his downfall, as did the Duke of Athens and Guglielmo de’ Pazzi. After the duke had become tyrant of Florence and had learned that he was being conspired against, without studying the matter carefully, he had one of the conspirators seized. This immediately caused the others to take up arms and seize the state from him. When, in 1501, Guglielmo was commissioner in the Valdichiana, he had heard that there was a conspiracy in Arezzo favoring the Vitelli to take away that city from the Florentines. He immediately went to that city and, without considering either his own forces or those of the conspirators, and without preparing himself with any force, he had one of the conspirators seized on the advice of his son, the bishop. Following this arrest, the others immediately took up arms and wrested the city away from the Florentines, and Guglielmo the commissioner became a prisoner. But when conspiracies are weak, they can and should be suppressed without hesitation.
Two methods have been used but should never be imitated in any way: the one used by the aforementioned Duke of Athens, who, in order to show that he felt he enjoyed the goodwill of the Florentine citizens, put to death a man who revea
led a conspiracy to him; the other followed by Dion of Syracuse, who, in order to test the intentions of someone he suspected, allowed Callippus, whom he trusted, to pretend to organize a conspiracy against him. Both of these rulers ended badly: the first discouraged informants and encouraged those who wanted to conspire, while the other provided an easy road to his death, or, rather, was himself the actual head of his own conspiracy—the event proved that Callippus, able to conspire against Dion without opposition, did so with such success that he deprived his master of his state and his life.
CHAPTER VII. HOW REVOLUTIONS FROM FREEDOM TO SLAVERY AND FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM SOMETIMES OCCUR WITHOUT BLOODSHED WHILE AT OTHER TIMES THEY ABOUND IN IT
The Portable Machiavelli Page 38
