[The outcome of such revolutions depends upon whether or not they take place by violent means, for when they are accompanied by violence many people are inevitably hurt. If, however, they occur with the common consent of the people, there is no reason to harm anyone other than the heads of these governments. Change without bloodshed occurred with the expulsion of the Tarquins, or the expulsion of the Medici from Florence in 1494. Revolutionary changes in governments brought about by men who seek vengeance, however, are bound to be bloody.]
CHAPTER VIII. ANYONE DESIRING TO CHANGE THE GOVERNMENT OF A REPUBLIC SHOULD CONSIDER ITS SUBJECTS
[An evil citizen can do little harm in a republic that is not yet corrupt, as can be seen from Roman history in the examples of Spurius Cassius and Manlius Capitolinus. Such men must, if they wish to come to power, employ means in a corrupt city which differ from those necessary in one that is not yet corrupt. Manlius would have succeeded if he had applied his methods during the more corrupt times of Marius or Sulla. Therefore, if a man wishes to seize power in a republic and impose upon it an evil form of government, he must do so after a period of gradual corruption has set in; such a period of gradual decay will inevitably occur if some man of exceptional ability does not restore the government to its original principles at some time. Thus, before attempting an alteration in the government of a republic, a man should consider the nature of its citizens.]
CHAPTER IX. HOW IT IS NECESSARY TO CHANGE WITH THE TIMES IN ORDER ALWAYS TO ENJOY GOOD FORTUNE
I have often observed that the reason for the bad as well as good fortune of men is to be found in the way in which their way of working fits the times: for it is clear that in their actions some men proceed with impetuosity, others with care and caution. And since men go beyond the proper limits in both these methods, they make errors in both, not being able to follow the true path. But that man whose method of procedure, as I have said, fits the times makes fewer mistakes and enjoys a prosperous fortune, for you always act as Nature inclines you. Everyone knows how Fabius Maximus proceeded carefully and cautiously with his army, refraining from every act of impetuosity or Roman boldness, and good fortune caused this method of his to fit well with the times. At the time Hannibal came into Italy as a young man with fresh fortune, having already twice defeated the Roman people, and while that republic was almost totally deprived of her good soldiers and was terrified, no better fortune could arise for her than to have a general who, with his hesitation and caution, might delay the enemy. Nor could Fabius have found times more suitable to his methods, which caused him to become famous. And that Fabius did this naturally and not by choice is evident, for when Scipio wished to cross over into Africa with his armies to end the war, Fabius spoke out against it, as a man who was unable to give up his methods and his practices. In fact, if it had been left to him, Hannibal would still be in Italy, for Fabius was a man who did not understand that the times had changed and that it was also necessary to change the methods of warfare. And if Fabius had been king of Rome, he could have easily lost that war, for he would not have known how to change his ways to suit the times; however, since he was born in a republic where there were different citizens and different opinions, just as Rome once had Fabius as the best leader in times requiring that the war be drawn out, so later she had Scipio in times suitable for winning it.
Therefore, the truth is that a republic is of longer duration and has a much better fortune than a principality, for a republic, by virtue of its diverse citizenry, can better accommodate itself to the changeability of conditions than can a prince. For, as I have said, a man who is used to acting in one way never changes; he must come to ruin when the times, in changing, no longer are in harmony with his ways.
Piero Soderini, cited on other occasions, proceeded in all his affairs with humanity and patience. He and his native city prospered when the times were in harmony with his way of acting; but later, when the time came for him to put aside his patience and humility, he did not know how to do so, and the result was that, together with his native city, he came to ruin. Pope Julius II proceeded with impetuosity and haste throughout the entire span of his pontificate; and because the times went along with him every one of his undertakings succeeded. But if other times requiring different methods had come, he would have necessarily come to ruin, for he could not have changed either his method or his way of governing. And there are two reasons why we cannot change ourselves: first, because we cannot oppose the ways in which Nature inclines us; second, because once a man has truly prospered by means of one method of procedure it is impossible to convince him that he can benefit by acting otherwise. As a result, it happens that Fortune varies for a single man, for she changes the times while he does not change his ways. The downfall of cities also arises from this fact, for republics do not modify their methods with the times (as we have discussed above at length); rather, they are slow since it is more difficult for them to change. For change results from times in which the entire republic is shaken; and for this to occur, it is not sufficient for one man alone to modify his method of procedure.
And since we have mentioned Fabius Maximus, who kept Hannibal at bay, it seems appropriate for me to discuss, in the following chapter, whether a general eager to give battle to the enemy at any cost can be prevented from doing so by the enemy.
CHAPTER X. A COMMANDER CANNOT AVOID A BATTLE WHEN HIS ADVERSARY WISHES TO FIGHT AT ANY COST
[If there has been a departure from ancient practices in modem times, this departure is most notable in military matters. This is because most princes and republics entrust these affairs to others; and when they do order a commander to the field, they tell him to avoid battle at all costs, thinking to imitate, in this fashion, the policies of Fabius Maximus, who saved Rome from the Carthaginians. But this is wrong, for if the enemy is determined to fight, a field commander cannot avoid it; and so, to avoid battle at all costs really means to fight on the enemy’s terms. In any case, it would be more accurate to say that Fabius Maximus, when he enjoyed an advantage, preferred to fight rather than to hesitate. Many examples from the campaigns of Hannibal, Scipio, and Gaius Sulpicius underline the truth of this position.]
CHAPTER XI. ONE WHO MUST FIGHT MANY ENEMIES, ALTHOUGH HE MAY BE INFERIOR TO THEM, MAY STILL WIN IF ONLY HE STANDS UP TO THE FIRST ONSLAUGHTS
[A single power, although weaker than the sum of its enemies, may still be able to emerge victorious if it is able to break up the coalition. Numerous examples from present times will bear out the truth of this proposition; for example, the Italian alliance against Venice in 1483 eventually resulted in an improvement of the Venetian position. The same thing occurred a few years ago when all of Europe formed an alliance against France; as a result of the defection of Spain, however, all of the allies were forced to come to terms with France. The crucial factor here is the ability to withstand the first onslaughts of such a confederated attack; if this is done, some means can eventually be found to weaken the coalition and to achieve eventual victory.]
CHAPTER XII. HOW A PRUDENT COMMANDER IMPOSES EVERY NECESSITY OF FIGHTING UPON HIS OWN SOLDIERS BUT DOES NOT DO SO TO THE ENEMY
[Necessity plays a great role in human affairs and may lead men to glorious achievements. Thus, a prudent com mander may leave an escape route open to his enemy while closing such an avenue to his own troops. When attacking a city, a commander should dispel all reason for an obstinate defense on the part of its citizens, promising them a pardon if they fear punishment and, if they fear the loss of their freedom, insisting that the attack is aimed only at a few of their number. Roman history is full of examples of enemy soldiers fighting more bravely and to greater effect once all means of escape were cut off; for necessity, as Livy notes, is the last and best of weapons.]
CHAPTER XIII. ON WHICH IS MORE TRUSTWORTHY: A GOOD COMMANDER WITH A WEAK ARMY, OR A GOOD ARMY WITH A WEAK COMMANDER
[Since there are many instances in which the ability of troops has saved the day while in others, the ability of the c
ommander has done so, it must be concluded that one has need of the other. According to Julius Caesar, neither a good army poorly commanded nor a poor commander with good soldiers is worth much. Whether it is easier for a good army to make a good commander, or vice versa, it is obvious that many men can select one good man more easily that a single man can select many good men. Commanders who have had not only to defeat the enemy but also to train their own soldiers display a twofold ability and deserve twice as much glory.]
CHAPTER XIV. WHAT EFFECTS ARE PRODUCED BY NEW INVENTIONS THAT APPEAR OR NEW SOUNDS THAT ARE HEARD IN THE MIDST OF BATTLE
[Such occurrences have a great effect upon a well-trained army and are even more effective in one without discipline. Good discipline is absolutely essential in warfare, so that small rumors, cries, or disturbances do not cause your troops to flee.]
CHAPTER XV. ONE MAN, AND NOT MANY, SHOULD BE MADE COMMANDER OF AN ARMY; AND HOW A NUMBER OF COMMANDERS CAN BE HARMFUL
[Numerous ancient and modem examples prove the harmful effects of dividing a military command among many men. The Romans learned the evil results of such a policy, but this mistake is still the cause of most of the military disasters that have befallen French and Italian armies in our times. Rather than improving the quality of command, sending more than just one above-average commander to the field only produces confusion and is less beneficial than sending a single commander of only average ability.]
CHAPTER XVI. TRUE ABILITY IS SOUGHT IN DIFFICULT TIMES; IN EASY TIMES MEN WITH WEALTH OR FAMILY CONNECTIONS, NOT ABLE MEN, ARE MOST POPULAR
It always was and always will be the case that great and exceptional men are neglected in a republic during times of peace; because of the envy the reputation arising from their ability creates, there are many citizens in such times who wish to be not just their equals but their superiors. There is a good passage about this in Thucydides, the Greek historian, who shows that when the Athenian republic had gained the upper hand in the Peloponnesian War and had checked the pride of the Spartans, subjugating almost all the rest of Greece, she gained so much renown that she planned to seize Sicily. This undertaking came under debate in Athens. Alcibiades and some other citizens argued in favor of the plan, for they gave less thought to the public welfare than to their own reputation (since they planned to be the leaders of such an undertaking). But Nicias, who was one of the most famous men of Athens, advised against it. In addressing the people, the best reason he brought forward to persuade them to trust him was this: that in advising them not to wage this war, he was advising them in a matter that was not in his own interest, for with Athens at peace he realized that there were countless citizens who wanted to get ahead of him, but if they waged war he knew that no citizen would be superior or even equal to him.
It is evident, then, that in republics the people have little esteem for their able men in times of tranquillity. This causes such men to feel indignant on two counts: first, they see themselves as not having reached their proper rank; second, they see themselves in the company of associates and superiors who are unworthy men and men of less ability than they. This disorder in republics has brought about many downfalls. The citizens, feeling that they have been undeservedly rebuffed and recognizing that the reason for this lies in the fact there is peace and not turmoil, set about to stir up the times by instigating new wars to the detriment of the republic. Considering the possible remedies for this, I find that there are two: first, keeping the citizens poor so that they cannot corrupt either themselves or others with riches; second, organizing oneself in such a way that one can always wage war and, as a consequence, there will always be need of reputable citizens—which was the Roman practice. Because that city always maintained armies in the field, there was always a need for able men; hence, she could not take away a rank from one who deserved it and give it to one who did not; if Rome sometimes did this by mistake or as a test, the immediate consequence was such disorder and such danger that she quickly returned to the true way. But other republics which are not organized as she was and only wage war when necessity requires it cannot defend themselves from such a problem; on the contrary, they will always encounter it and disorder will always arise from it, especially when the neglected and able citizen is vengeful and has some reputation and following in his city. Rome had protected herself against this at one time; but when she conquered Carthage and Antiochus (as was described elsewhere) and no longer feared wars, she, too, ceased to pay as much attention to ability as to the other qualities which gain favor with the people, believing that she could entrust her armies to whomever she wished. We see that Paulus Emilius was frequently defeated for the consulship, nor was he made consul before the Macedonian War broke out; but since this was judged a dangerous war, it was entrusted to his care by the entire city.
After 1494, in our city of Florence, when there had been many wars in which the Florentine citizens had made a bad showing, the city chanced upon a man who demonstrated how one ought to command armies. He was Antonio Giacomini. So long as dangerous wars had to be waged, the ambition of the other citizens abated; in the election of the commissioner and the leader of the armies he had no competitor whatsoever. But when a war was to be waged wherein the outcome was in no doubt and there was promise of very great honor and high rank, then he discovered so many competitors that when three commissioners had to be chosen to attack Pisa he was left out. Although it is not immediately evident that failing to send Antonio resulted in harm to the republic, nevertheless, it can easily be conjectured; since the Pisans no longer had anything to defend themselves with or to live on, if Antonio had been present they would have been so tightly squeezed that they would have surrendered themselves to the Florentines’ discretion. But since they were besieged by generals who knew neither how to blockade them nor how to attack them with force, they held out for so long that Florence finally had to buy them off where she could have taken them by force. It was likely that such disdain for Antonio might have affected him greatly; he must have been very patient and good not to want to take revenge for it—either through the downfall of the city, if he could bring it about, or through the injury of some individual citizens. A republic ought to guard itself against this, as will be discussed in the following chapter.
CHAPTER XVII. A MAN SHOULD NOT BE OFFENDED AND THEN ASSIGNED TO AN IMPORTANT GOVERNMENTAL POST
[Men who have been offended sometimes attempt to use another governmental post to make up for their previous experiences, as Claudius Nero did when he attacked Hasdrubal in Italy after being reviled for failing to defeat him in Spain, thereby risking his army in a dangerous engagement which he was lucky to win. If such a great man was aroused to such lengths by offenses during a time when Rome was still free from corruption, one can well imagine what others in corrupt cities would attempt. Since it is impossible to foresee all such dangers to a republic, it would be impossible to design one that would last forever.]
CHAPTER XVIII. NOTHING IS MORE WORTHY OF A COMMANDER THAN FORESEEING THE PLANS OF THE ENEMY
[Military matters are difficult to understand, for it is hard to understand or foresee the enemy’s plans, actions, or even if and when a battle is won or lost.]
CHAPTER XIX. WHETHER INDULGENCE OR PUNISHMENT IS MORE NECESSARY IN CONTROLLING A MULTITUDE
The Roman republic was disturbed by the enmities of the nobles and the plebeians; nevertheless, when war was upon them they sent forth their armies with Quintius and Appius Claudius in command. Since Appius was cruel and harsh, his troops obeyed him so badly that, on the brink of defeat, he fled from his province. Quintius, on the other hand, was kind and humane; he was obeyed by his soldiers and carried off the victory. Thus, it seems that it is better in controlling a multitude to be humane rather than arrogant, merciful rather than cruel. Nonetheless, Cornelius Tacitus, with whom many other writers agree, arrives at the opposite conclusion in one of his maxims when he says: “In governing a multitude, punishment is more valuable than indulgence.”71 And in considering how b
oth of these opinions can be maintained, let me say that you either have to rule men who are usually your companions or men who are always your inferiors. When they are your companions, punishment simply cannot be used, nor that severity described by Tacitus; and because the Roman plebeians had authority in Rome equal to that of the nobility, a man who became ruler for a limited period of time could not control them with cruelty and harshness. And it is clear that those Roman captains who made themselves loved by their armies and who managed them with indulgence frequently achieved better results than those who made themselves extraordinarily feared—un—less they were endowed with exceptional ability, as was Manlius Torquatus. But if you command subjects such as those Tacitus describes, you must lean toward punishment rather than indulgence if they are not to become insolent and tread on you because of your excessive kindness to them. But this, too, must be moderated in a way that does not arouse hatred; for making oneself hated benefits no prince. The way to avoid this is to leave the property of subjects alone. No prince is eager to spill blood except when he is driven to do so by necessity, unless he does so to hide his greed, and this necessity seldom arises. But when this eagerness is combined with greed, the necessity always appears, and a reason is never lacking to do away with these subjects, as was discussed at length in another treatise.72 Quintius, therefore, deserved more praise than Appius, and the maxim of Tacitus deserves to be approved within its limits and not in the instances experienced by Appius.
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