And because I have discussed punishment and indulgence, it does not seem superfluous to demonstrate how an act of kindness toward the Faliscians could accomplish more than weapons.
CHAPTER XX. ONE EXAMPLE OF KINDNESS MADE A GREATER IMPRESSION ON THE FALISCIANS THAN DID ALL OF ROME’S FORCE
[When Camillus refused the offer of a group of the city’s most noble youths, an offer made to him by the school-master of the city he was about to capture, the inhabitants were so impressed by his kindness that they decided to surrender to him, proving that violence can sometimes accomplish less than humane actions. Xenophon shows how much esteem Cyrus gained by such actions, while Hannibal gained fame and victory through opposite methods, as the next chapter will show.]
CHAPTER XXI. HOW IT CAME ABOUT THAT HANNIBAL, WHOSE METHOD OF PROCEDURE WAS DIFFERENT FROM SCIPIO’S, ACHIEVED THE SAME RESULTS IN ITALY THAT SCIPIO ACHIEVED IN SPAIN
I believe that some people will be amazed to see how some generals, though they led different kinds of lives, have nevertheless achieved results similar to those who have lived in the manner described above. It is thus clear that the causes of their victories are not dependent upon the previously mentioned causes. On the contrary, it appears that these methods do not bring you more power or Fortune if contrary methods can enable you to acquire glory and fame. In order not to pass over the above-mentioned men and to clarify what I am trying to say, let me point out that when Scipio entered Spain, with that kindness and compassion of his he quickly made the province his friend, and he was adored and admired by its people. On the other hand, when Hannibal entered Italy by means of completely opposite methods—that is, with cruelty, violence, plundering, and every sort of perfidy—he achieved the same result Scipio had achieved in Spain, for all the cities of Italy revolted in his favor and all its people followed him.
And in considering what might have caused this, there could be a number of reasons. The first is that men desire novelty to such an extent that those who are doing well wish for change as much as those who are doing badly; for, as was mentioned earlier—and it is true—men become bored in good times and complain in bad ones. This desire, then, opens the gates to anyone who puts himself at the head of some innovation in a province: if he is a foreigner, everyone runs to follow him; if he is a native, they crowd around him, increase his strength, and grant him their favor to such an extent that in whatever manner he proceeds he succeeds in making great progress in those places. Besides this, men are driven by two major impulses: either by love or by fear. And so, people can be commanded by someone who makes himself loved just as easily as they can be led by someone who makes himself feared; but in most cases a man who makes himself feared is better followed and more readily obeyed than one who makes himself loved.
And so, it is of little importance which of these roads a general chooses to travel as long as he is an able man and his ability gives him a reputation among the people. When his ability is great, as it was with Hannibal and Scipio, it cancels all those errors he made while making himself either loved or feared too much. From both of these methods great difficulties can arise that can bring about the downfall of a prince, for anyone who wishes to be loved too much becomes hated every time he deviates from the true path, and anyone who wishes to be feared too much becomes hated every time he exceeds the norm. And to keep within a middle course is not possible precisely because our nature does not allow us to do so; one who oversteps the middle course must atone for his excess with a great amount of ability, as Hannibal and Scipio did. Nevertheless, it is evident that although both men were harmed by their way of acting, at the same time their reputations were also enhanced.
I have already mentioned the heights to which both these men were raised. The harm that came to Scipio in Spain was that his soldiers rebelled against him, together with part of his allies, a matter which arose from nothing other than the fact that he was not feared. For men are so restless that as soon as the smallest door is opened to their ambition, they immediately forget all the love they give their prince, who had shown them such kindness—as did these soldiers and allies I just mentioned, to such an extent that in order to remedy this problem Scipio was forced to employ some of the cruelty he had always avoided. As for Hannibal, there is no particular instance where his cruelty and his lack of faith caused him harm; but it can safely be said that Naples and many other cities that remained faithful to the Roman people did so out of fear of his particular qualities. It is certainly clear that his merciless manner made him more hated by the Roman people than any other enemy Rome ever had. And while Pyrrhus was in Italy with his army, the Romans pointed out to him the man who wanted to poison him, but they never forgave Hannibal, even when he was disarmed and exiled, and in the end they brought about his death. These difficulties came to Hannibal, then, because he was reputed to be merciless, perfidious, and cruel; but, on the other hand, this also resulted in a great advantage for him, for because of this he was admired by all historians: there never arose in his army, although it was made up of different kinds of men, any dissension among the men or against himself. This could not have come from anything other than the terror his character inspired, for it was so great that when it was combined with the reputation his ability had earned him, it kept his soldiers quiet and united.
I conclude, then, that it is of little importance which method a general practices, provided that he possess enough ability to provide a good seasoning to either one of the two ways of behaving. As I have said, there are defects and dangers in both ways when they are not corrected by an extraordinary ability. If Hannibal and Scipio achieved the same result—the one with praiseworthy deeds and the other with detestable ones—it seems to me that a discussion of two Roman citizens who attained the same glory by both different and praiseworthy means should not be omitted.
CHAPTER XXII. HOW THE HARSHNESS OF MANLIUS TORQUATUS AND THE KINDNESS OF VALERIUS CORVINUS EARNED THE SAME GLORY FOR EACH MAN
There were two excellent generals living in Rome at the same time: Manlius Torquatus and Valerius Corvinus, equal in ability, victories, and fame, and each had acquired his reputation with equal skill insofar as facing the enemy was concerned. But as for managing armies and soldiers, they differed drastically in their methods: Manlius commanded his men with all severity, never permitting them any pause in their labor or fatigue; Valerius, on the other hand, treated them pleasantly, with every form and manner of human kindness and intimate friendliness. We see that in order to obtain the obedience of his soldiers one killed his son while the other never harmed anyone ; nevertheless, in using such different methods each achieved the same result, both against their enemies and in favor of the republic and themselves. For no soldier ever refused to fight, rebelled, or acted in any way contrary to their wishes, although the commands of Manlius were so harsh that all commands that went beyond the normal measure were called “Manlian commands.”
Here we should consider: first, what obliged Manlius to act in such a rigid manner?; second, why was Valerius able to act so kindly?; third, how did these different methods produce the same result?; and finally, which of them is best and most useful to imitate? If one carefully examines the nature of Manlius from the time Livy first mentions him, he will find him a most powerful man, respectful toward his father and his country and most respectful to his superiors. These things are clear from the killing of the Gaul, the defense of his father against the tribune, and from what he said to the consul before he went to fight the Gaul: “Without your order, I shall never fight the enemy, even if I see a certain victory.”73 So, when a man such as this comes into command, he wants to find all men like himself; his strong spirit makes him give strong orders, and that same spirit wants his commands to be obeyed once they are given. And it is a very sound rule that whenever harsh orders are given it is necessary to be harsh in having them executed; otherwise you will find yourself deceived. That is to say, if you want to be obeyed you must know how to give orders; for those men who know how t
o command will compare their qualities with those who have to obey, and when they see a correspondence there they will then give orders, but when they see a lack of correspondence, they will refrain from commanding.
Therefore, a prudent man has said that in order to hold a republic with force there must be a correspondence between the man who exerts the force and those against whom this force is applied; whenever this proportion exists, it can be believed that this force will last, but when the man subject to the force is more powerful than the man who employs it, we can assume that this force will end at any day.
But, to return to our topic, let me say that to order strong measures it is necessary to be strong; and the man who possesses this strength and orders these measures cannot then have them obeyed with softness. But anyone who does not possess this strength of spirit ought to guard against unusual commands; he may employ his kindness in normal commands, for normal punishments are not blamed upon the commander but rather upon the laws and their institutions. We should believe, then, that Manlius was obliged to proceed so rigidly by the extraordinary character of his orders, to which his nature inclined him; such orders are useful in a republic, for they lead its institutions back to their beginnings and their ancient vigor. And if a republic were fortunate enough to have, as we said above, someone who could renew her laws by means of his example, who would not only keep her from running to her ruin but would pull her back from it, such a state would endure forever. Thus, Manlius was one of those who maintained military discipline in Rome with the severity of his orders; he was obliged to first by his nature and then by his desire that what his natural inclination made him do should be put into effect. Valerius, on the other hand, was able to act humanely, like a man to whom the observance of the things usually observed in Roman armies was enough. Because this was a good practice, it was sufficient to bring him honor, for it was not difficult to observe and did not oblige Valerius to punish the transgressor, both because there were none and because if there had been any, they would have blamed their punishment, as was mentioned, upon the institutions and not upon the cruelty of the commander. In this way Valerius was able to show every kind act as having come from himself, as a result of which he gained the gratitude of the soldiers and made them happy. Thus, since both commanders possessed the same authority, they were able to achieve the same result by acting in different ways. Those who might wish to imitate them could fall into the vices of contempt and hatred, both of which I described above in discussing Hannibal and Scipio—something that can only be avoided if you possess unusual ability.
It remains now to consider which of these two methods is the more praiseworthy. This is open to dispute, for writers praise both methods; nevertheless, those who write about how a prince should act favor Valerius more than Manlius. In giving many examples of the humanity of Cyrus. Xenophon (cited previously) agrees closely with what Livy says about Valerius. For when Valerius was made consul in the war against the Samnites and the day of battle came, he spoke to his soldiers with the same kindness he had always practiced. Concerning this speech Livy has this to say: “Never was a commander more friendly with his soldiers, since he did not hesitate to carry out his duties among the soldiers of the lowest ranks without complaining. Also, in military games, when equals competed as equals in contests of speed or in tests of strength, he won or lost with the same kind attitude, nor was anyone ever despised who presented himself as an equal; he was kind in his actions when the circumstances permitted; and in conversation he was no less mindful of the freedom of others than of his own dignity; and he exercised his command (and nothing was more popular) with the same skills with which he had acquired it.”74 Livy speaks honorably of Manlius in the same manner, demonstrating that his severity in the matter of the death of his son made the army so much more obedient to the consul that it resulted in a victory for the Roman people against the Latins. He goes so far in praising him that, after reporting such a victory, having described the complete order of the battle and pointed out all the risks the Roman people ran and the difficulties they encountered in winning it, he draws this conclusion: only the ability of Manlius gave the victory to the Romans. And in a comparison of the forces of both armies, he affirms that the side which had Manlius as consul would have conquered. Therefore, considering everything the historians have said about these men, it would be difficult to choose between them. Nevertheless, so as not to leave this question undecided, let me say that for a citizen who lives under the laws of a republic, I believe the procedure of Manlius to be more praiseworthy and less dangerous. This method works entirely for the well-being of the public and in no way involves private ambition, for a man cannot acquire partisans by such a method since he always shows himself to be stern toward everyone and to love only the common good. And by acting this way he acquires no special friends (what we call partisans, as was mentioned above). No other method of proceeding can be more useful or more desirable in a republic, for it is not lacking in public benefit and there can be in it no suspicion of private power. But in the method used by Valerius the contrary happens: though it is true that this method produced the same results insofar as the public is concerned, nevertheless, many doubts arise from it because of the particular goodwill that the man acquires among his soldiers, which might produce bad results contrary to freedom in a long period of rule.
And if these bad effects did not arise with Publicola, the reason for this was that Roman spirits were not yet corrupted and he had not ruled continuously for a long enough time. But if we have to consider a prince, as Xenophon did, we should follow faithfully the example of Valerius and abandon that of Manlius; for a prince ought to seek obedience and love in his soldiers and subjects. Observing the institutions and being considered skillful bring him obedience; affability, kindness, mercy, and the other qualities Valerius possessed—and that Xenophon said Cyrus also possessed—bring him love. For a prince to be individually well liked and to have the army as his partisan is in conformity with all the other demands of his position, but when a citizen has the army as his partisan, this does not at all conform to those demands which oblige him to live under the laws and to obey the magistrates.
Among the ancient records of the Venetian republic, it appears that when the Venetian galleys returned to Venice a certain dispute arose between the men of the galleys and the people. This led to rioting and fighting, and the matter could not be quieted by the force of government officials or through respect for the citizens or fear of the magistrates. Then, suddenly, before those sailors a gentleman appeared who had been their leader the year before, and out of love for him they departed and abandoned the fight. This obedience generated such suspicion in the senate that a short time later the Venetians secured themselves against this man either by imprisonment or by death. I conclude, therefore, that the procedure of Valerius is useful in a prince but pernicious in a citizen, not only to his country but to himself—to his country since these methods prepare the way for tyranny; to himself since in suspecting his method of procedure his city is forced to secure itself against him, thereby causing him harm. And, on the contrary, I affirm that the procedure of Manlius is harmful in a prince and useful in a citizen—and especially useful to his country—for it rarely causes harm, unless the hatred that your severity brings you has not already been increased by the suspicion which, as a result of your great reputation, your other virtues bring upon you, as will be shown below in the case of Camillus.
CHAPTER XXIII. WHY CAMILLUS WAS EXILED FROM ROME
[Imitating Valerius does harm to a man’s country and to himself, while imitating Manlius assists one’s country although it may result in personal harm. Camillus acted much like Manlius, and it was his practice of being more severe in his punishments than he was generous in his rewards which caused him to become hated. This example shows what a ruler must do in order to avoid being despised. His worst mistake would be to deprive his subjects of whatever they value most. A second error is to be arrogant and proud.]
CHAPTER XXIV. THE PROLONGATION OF MILITARY AUTHORITY ENSLAVED ROME
[Two causes brought about the destruction of the Roman republic: the disputes connected with the Agrarian Law and the prolongation of military authority. This latter practice became more common as the Romans waged war farther abroad. The results were twofold: first, only a small number of men acquired a military reputation; second, the men who held command for long periods were able to use it to gain political power, as did Sulla, Marius, and, eventually, Julius Caesar. If the Romans had not prolonged the terms of military command, they would not have won so great an empire in such a brief time, but neither would they have lost their liberty in such a short period.]
CHAPTER XXV. ON THE POVERTY OF CINCINNATUS AND MANY ROMAN CITIZENS
Elsewhere we have discussed how the most useful thing that can be instituted in a free state is to keep the citizens poor. And while it is not clear which institution produced this result in Rome, especially since the Agrarian Law encountered so much opposition, nevertheless, experience shows that four hundred years after Rome had been built there was still a great deal of poverty there; nor can it be believed that any other condition produced this effect than the knowledge that the avenue to whatever rank or office you wished to obtain was not closed to you on the basis of your wealth, and that Ability was sought after in whatever home she lived. This method of living made wealth less desirable. For example, when Minutius, the consul, and his army were besieged by the Aequi, Rome was so filled with the fear that the army might be lost that they decided to appoint a dictator—the last resource in any difficult situation. They selected Lucius Quintius Cincinnatus, who at that time was on a small farm that he worked with his own hands. The event is celebrated by Livy with these golden words: “This should be heeded by all who disparage every human thing in comparison to riches and who have no use for honor or skill unless wealth flows in abundance.”75 Cincinnatus was plowing his little farm, which was not longer than four jugers, when the legates of the senate arrived from Rome to advise him of his election to the dictatorship and to show him in what danger the Roman republic found itself. He put on his toga and went to Rome, where he gathered together an army and went off to free Minutius; after defeating and despoiling the enemy and freeing the consul, he forbade the besieged army to take part in the pillaging, saying these words to them: “I do not want you to take part in the pillaging of those by whom you were almost despoiled.” He took the consulate away from Minutius and made him a legate, saying to him: “You will remain in this rank until you learn to know how to be consul.”76 And he made Lucius Tarquinius his master of horse, who fought on foot because of his poverty. And so it is evident that poverty was honored in Rome, and that for a good and valiant man like Cincinnatus four jugers of land were enough to support him. Evidence of poverty also appears in the times of Marcus Regulus, for when he was in Africa with his army he asked leave of the senate to return to care for his farm, which was being ruined by his workers. There are two noteworthy points here: first, poverty, and how the Romans were content with it; and that winning honor from war was enough for these citizens, who left all the profit to the public. If Regulus had thought of making himself rich from the war, he would have paid little heed to the fact that his fields were being ruined. The other thing to note is the generosity of spirit of these citizens, whose greatness of mind rose above a prince when they were placed at the head of an army; they feared neither kings nor republics; nothing frightened or confused them, and once they returned to being private citizens, they became frugal, humble, careful of their small means, obedient to the magistrates, and respectful toward their superiors to such an extent that it seemed impossible that one and the same spirit might undergo such a transformation. This poverty endured until the times of Paulus Emilius, which were virtually the last happy times of the republic, when a citizen whose triumph enriched Rome nevertheless remained poor himself. And poverty was still regarded so highly that in honoring a man who had conducted himself well in war Paulus gave a son-in-law of his a silver cup, which was the first piece of silver in his house. I could enter a long discussion of how poverty has produced much better fruits than riches—how the former has honored cities, provinces, and religions while the latter has ruined them—if this subject had not already been celebrated by other men countless times.
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