CHAPTER XXVI. HOW A STATE IS RUINED BECAUSE OF WOMEN
[In Livy we read how the offense against Lucretia by the Tarquins brought about the event that ended their rule and how the offense committed against Virginia cost the decemvirs their authority. Furthermore, Aristotle lists the injuries done to women as one of the most important causes of a tyrant’s downfall. Since this topic has been discussed in the chapter on conspiracies, I shall only say here that rulers should pay attention to this problem in governing a state.]
CHAPTER XXVII. HOW UNITY MAY BE RESTORED TO A DIVIDED CITY, AND HOW THE OPINION THAT DIVIDED CITIES MUST BE KEPT DIVIDED IN ORDER TO HOLD THEM IS NOT TRUE
[The example of the Roman consuls shows that of the three methods of dealing with a divided city—killing the leaders of the factions, expelling them from the city, or forcing them to make peace with each other—the first is the most reliable and the last the most dangerous. Florence attempted to control Pistoia by the third method, but was finally forced to use exile to control the city; it would have been safer to have killed the leaders of the city’s factions, but the Florentine republic was too weak to follow such a policy. Although it was a commonly held belief that fostering divisions in subject cities enabled Florence to govern them more effectively, such factions, in fact, always offered an enemy a means of taking these cities, as it is impossible to defend a city with enemies both without and within. Thus, such a policy may be of some use in peacetime, but it could be disastrous in time of war.]
CHAPTER XXVIII. THE DEEDS OF THE CITIZENS SHOULD BE SCRUTINIZED CAREFULLY, FOR THE BEGINNING OF TYRANNY IS OFTEN CONCEALED BENEATH A PIOUS ACT
[While a republic cannot survive without outstanding citizens, it is also true that the reputation such citizens acquire in a republic may also be the cause of tyranny. Because of this, there must be some check upon their reputations so that these citizens will benefit and not harm the republic and its freedom. A citizen may acquire reputation by either public or private means. While the first means is never harmful, private means are always very dangerous, for they create factions and partisans and encourage those who are favored to become corrupt. Any well-organized republic, such as Rome, will encourage citizens to gain fame by public rather than private means.]
CHAPTER XXIX. THAT THE SINS OF THE PEOPLE COME FROM THEIR PRINCES
A prince should not complain of any sin committed by the people he governs, for such sins of necessity come either from the prince’s negligence or from the fact that he is stained with similar defects. Anyone examining the people, who, in our times, have been reputed to be totally engaged in robberies and like crimes, will see that this comes solely from those who govern them, who are of a similar nature. Romagna, before Pope Alexander VI did away with the lords who ruled it, was an example of the most wicked way of life, for there murder and looting would take place on a grand scale at the slightest pretext. This arose from the sorry nature of the princes, not from the sorry nature of the inhabitants, as those rulers claimed. Since those princes were poor yet wanted to live as if they were rich, they were forced to engage in frequent robberies, and they did so by various means. Among their most dishonest methods was the making of laws prohibiting certain actions; then they were the first to provide reasons for the nonobservance of these laws. Nor did they ever punish those who did not observe them except when they saw that many others had become involved in the same practice; then they turned to punishment—not out of their zeal to uphold the law they had made but rather out of their greed to collect the fines. Many problems arose from this situation, and one above all: the people became impoverished and were undisciplined; those who had become poor sought to enrich themselves at the cost of those who were less powerful. From this sprang all those evils described above, of which the prince is the cause.
And that this is true is shown by Livy when he recounts how the Roman legates, while carrying the Venetian gift of booty to Apollo, were captured by the pirates of Lipari in Sicily and taken to that city. When Timasitheus, their prince, learned what kind of gift it was, where it was going, and who had sent it, he comported himself like a Roman (although he was born in Lipari) and showed his people how impious it would be to steal such a gift. With the consent of the crowd, he allowed the legates to depart with all their possessions. The words of the historian are these: “Timasitheus instilled religious fear into the crowd, which is always like its ruler.”77 And Lorenzo de’ Medici, in confirmation of this maxim, said: “What the ruler does, many do afterward, / because all their eyes are fixed on their ruler.”78
CHAPTER XXX. ANY CITIZEN WHO WISHES TO EMPLOY HIS INFLUENCE IN DOING GOOD FOR HIS REPUBLIC MUST FIRST PUT DOWN ENVY; AND HOW, WHEN THE ENEMY ATTACKS, THE CITY’S DEFENSE MUST BE ORGANIZED
[Envy may be overcome either because an impending disaster forces everyone to turn to a man of obvious ability to save them from it or when a man’s natural rivals are removed either by violence or in the normal course of events. When an able man can rid himself of those who envy him by natural means, this is most fortunate, but when this is not the case he must find some other method of removing them. Moses was forced to kill a great number of men in order to establish his laws and institutions, for they opposed him out of envy. Both Girolamo Savonarola and Piero Soderini of Florence recognized the danger of envy surrounding their positions, but Savonarola was unable to obtain enough authority to remove his opponents while Soderini felt his goodwill would lessen the opposition of his opponents. Both men came to ruin because they could not overcome envy. In defending a city, one should avoid relying upon a mob and give authority and arms only to a select group of men.]
CHAPTER XXXI. STRONG REPUBLICS AND EXCELLENT MEN RETAIN THE SAME SPIRIT AND THE SAME DIGNITY IN EVERY SITUATION
[Great men like the Roman Camillus never alter their characters with a change in their fortunes and are so resolute in their undertakings that Fortune can have no hold over them. Weak men behave in the opposite manner, for they become elated with success and terrified by failure. Republics act like men in this regard, as can be seen by examining Rome and Venice. The Romans never despaired in adversity, nor did they become arrogant in victory. The Venetians, on the contrary, feel that their good luck is due to admirable qualities they do not actually possess, and when they are defeated they become despondent and lose their spirit. Although I have already noted that a state’s security depends upon military discipline, and that there can be no good laws or institutions without it, it is not superfluous to repeat this again. If a city is well trained and well armed, as Rome was, her character will be unchangeable and will not depend upon the whims of Fortune, as does the character of the Venetian republic.]
CHAPTER XXXII. WHAT MEANS SOME HAVE EMPLOYED TO UPSET A TREATY OF PEACE
[There is no surer means of disturbing a peaceful settlement than to commit an outrageous action against the party with which you do not wish to uphold the settlement.]
CHAPTER XXXIII. TO WIN A BATTLE IT IS NECESSARY TO INSPIRE AN ARMY’S CONFIDENCE IN ITSELF AND IN ITS COMMANDER
[An army’s confidence depends on whether it is well armed and well organized and whether the soldiers know each other. To achieve this, the troops must be natives of the same area and must have lived together. Their commander must also possess qualities which inspire confidence, such as bravery, alertness, and dignity. The Romans inspired confidence in their men by means of religion.]
CHAPTER XXXIV. WHAT KIND OF FAME, RUMOR, OR OPINION MAKES THE PEOPLE FAVOR ONE CITIZEN; AND WHETHER THE PEOPLE DISTRIBUTE OFFICES WITH GREATER PRUDENCE THAN A PRINCE
[In choosing leaders, the people usually rely upon gossip and upon the reputation of men when they have no actual knowledge of their deeds, as well as upon some preconception of their worth. Such men are thus judged by their family, by their behavior, and by the company they keep. A reputation based upon family standing is unreliable; that derived from one’s company is better, but still not as good as fame gained from honorable actions of a private nature. Men
in a republic ought to strive to rise above the mean through extraordinary deeds. Such feats should be the basis for appointing men to high office, but mistakes can also be made in estimating the greatness of a man’s deeds. Therefore, well-organized republics encourage other citizens to proclaim publicly a candidate’s faults in order to warn the people before they make their choice. When the people has enough information, it judges men running for offices better than princes do.]
CHAPTER XXXV. WHAT RISKS ARE RUN WHEN ONE TAKES THE LEAD IN COUNSELING AN UNDERTAKING, AND HOW MUCH GREATER THESE RISKS ARE WHEN THE ENTERPRISE IS AN EXTRAORDINARY ONE
[Since men judge actions by their results, a man who counsels a difficult undertaking will suffer the consequences if failure results, but if it is successful his rewards will not be proportionately as great. The advisers of a prince or republic find themselves in a difficult position, for if they hesitate to give their honest counsel they may fail to fulfill the duties of their offices, but if they are honest they risk losing their position and possibly even their lives. The only answer is to offer and defend your views without undue emotion, so that if they are accepted by a ruler or a republic they will appear to be the will of the majority and will not cause undue disgrace if they result in disaster. If, however, you have insisted upon your views against a majority and disaster results, your downfall will ensue. Advocating a minority opinion that might have prevented a catastrophe is one means of acquiring glory, and although it is not a happy means of obtaining a reputation, it is nevertheless worthy of mention.]
CHAPTER XXXVI. THE REASONS WHY THE FRENCH HAVE BEEN, AND STILL ARE, CONSIDERED BRAVER THAN MEN AT THE OUTSET OF A BATTLE AND LESS THAN WOMEN AFTERWARD
[Livy describes the French in this manner, but it does not necessarily follow that their nature could not be disciplined so as to prolong their bravery until a battle’s end. There are three kinds of armies. The first kind has both bravery and discipline, for from order arises both bravery and ability, as was the case in the Roman army. The army of the French, on the other hand, had bravery without discipline. Since it lacked a method in fighting, unless it succeeded during an initial attack it was usually defeated. The third kind of army is the kind we see in Italy today, which lacks both bravery and discipline.]
CHAPTER XXXVII. WHETHER SMALL SKIRMISHES BEFORE THE MAIN BATTLE ARE NECESSARY; AND HOW TO FIND OUT ABOUT A NEW ENEMY AND AVOID SUCH SKIRMISHES
[In human affairs there is one constant problem: in perfecting one thing we always produce another thing that is evil, and the two are so inseparable that one cannot exist without the other. This is true of anything men undertake, and it is for this reason that you can only attain the good you seek with Fortune’s assistance. A good commander, therefore, should do nothing, no matter how insignificant, which would adversely affect his army. Skirmishing can achieve good results as well as bad ones, for without testing a new enemy by means of such encounters you will never know how to fight him; if you fail to gain the upper hand in these skirmishes, however, your troops may be afraid to face the enemy. If a commander is forced to skirmish, he must do so only when he has such an advantage that he is not likely to be defeated.]
CHAPTER XXXVIII. WHAT A COMMANDER SHOULD BE LIKE TO GAIN THE CONFIDENCE OF HIS ARMY
[Before Valerius Corvinus went into battle against the Samnites, in addition to skirmishing with the enemy he addressed his army, asking his men to follow him, not because of his brilliant oratory, but rather because of his valiant deeds. Men who command others should follow his practice, for a man’s deeds bestow honor upon his titles, while titles alone do not make a man famous. It is more difficult to meet an enemy with an inexperienced army than with an army composed of veterans. To do this, great generals of the past have exercised their troops for several months before the battle to accustom them to obeying orders and accepting discipline. No ruler with a sufficient number of men should despair of lacking soldiers, for if he is unable to train them adequately it is a sign of his own shortcomings and not the cowardice of his subjects.]
CHAPTER XXXIX. THAT A COMMANDER SHOULD BE FAMILIAR WITH VARIOUS TERRAINS
[A military leader must be familiar with various kinds of terrains and countries, for without such knowledge he cannot perform his duties well. Such knowledge is acquired only through much practice, hunting being an excellent exercise to achieve this. Ancient writers note that great heroes of the past were raised in the forests and were avid hunters. Xenophon suggests that a hunting expedition is very much like a war and that great men should practice this sport. A knowledge of many kinds of terrains in one country can be applied to others as well, for there is a certain uniformity in all countries.]
CHAPTER XL. HOW EMPLOYING FRAUD IN WAGING A WAR IS A GLORIOUS AFFAIR
Although the employment of fraud in all of one’s actions is detestable, it is a praiseworthy and glorious affair in waging a war; and anyone who overcomes the enemy with fraud is to be praised as much as a man who overcomes the enemy by sheer strength. This is evident from the judgment passed by many who have written about the lives of great men: they praise Hannibal and the others who have been outstanding in the use of such methods. Since one can read about many examples of this, I shall not cite any. I shall say only this: I am not implying that the fraud which makes you break your promises and established agreements is a glorious thing, for this kind of fraud—even if it sometimes gains you a state or a kingdom, as has been discussed above—will never win you glory. But I am speaking of the kind of fraud that is used against an enemy who does not trust you, the kind involved in waging war, as was Hannibal’s fraud when he pretended to retreat at the Lake of Perugia in order to encircle the consul and the Roman army, or the time he lit up the horns of a cattle herd in order to escape from the hands of Fabius Maximus.
The fraud that Pontius, general of the Samnites, employed to encircle the Roman army at the Caudine Forks is the kind I mean. When he had stationed his own army behind the mountains, he sent some of his soldiers, dressed as shepherds, to the plain with a large flock. When they were taken by the Romans and asked where the Samnite army was, they all agreed to say, following Pontius’s orders, that it was at the siege of Nocera. This was believed by the consuls, who enclosed themselves inside the Caudine cliffs, where they were immediately attacked by the Samnites. This victory, achieved by means of fraud, would have been most glorious for Pontius if he had followed the advice of his father, who wanted the Romans either to be allowed to survive in liberty or to all be killed, and who advised that a middle course should not be taken, “for it neither wins friends nor eliminates enemies.”79 This course is always pernicious in matters of state, as I have discussed above.
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