COSIMO : This argument of yours truly appears to be well founded; nevertheless, since it is almost the contrary of what I thought until now, my mind is still not purged of every doubt; for I see how many lords and gentlemen live during peacetime by means of the military profession, like yourself, who are hired by princes and by cities. I also see that almost all these professional soldiers regularly receive their wages; I see many foot soldiers still guarding cities and fortresses—and it would appear to me that there is ample employment for everyone in time of peace.
FABRIZIO: I do not think that you believe that every man has his own position during peacetime; for, assuming that no other reason can be put forward, the small number of those troops who remain in those places you mentioned would respond to you. What proportion of the foot soldiers needed in wartime are necessary in peacetime? For fortresses and cities which are guarded in peacetime are guarded even more in time of war; and to them are added the soldiers who are kept in the field, whose numbers are numerous and who are disbanded in peacetime. And concerning garrisons of states (which are small in number), Pope Julius and you Florentines have demonstrated to everyone how much those who only know how to practice the profession of war are to be feared; you have thrown such men out of your guards and have replaced them with Swiss men, since the latter were born and raised in obedience to the law and were selected by their communities by means of an honest election. So, from now on you should not maintain that there is employment for every man in peacetime. As for horsemen, it appears that a solution may be more difficult to find, since they continue to be paid during peacetime. Nevertheless, anyone who carefully considers the whole problem will find the answer easy, for this means of keeping men-at-arms is a corrupt method and is not good. The explanation is that they are men who make a profession of warfare, they would cause a thousand problems every day in the states in which they reside if they were supported by a body of men of sufficient size; but since there are few of them and they are unable to constitute an army by themselves, they are not often able to cause serious damage. Nevertheless, they have done so many times, as I remarked about Francesco Sforza, his father, and of Braccio da Montone. Therefore, I do not approve of this custom of keeping men-at-arms—it is corrupt and can cause serious problems.
COSIMO: You would do without them? Or, if you kept them, how would you do so?
FABRIZIO: By means of a citizens’ militia: not like that of the French king, since it is as dangerous and as arrogant as our own, but like those of the ancients, who created the cavalry from among their own subjects and who, in peacetime, sent them home to live by their own professions, as I shall explain in more detail before this argument is ended. If this sector of the army can live from such activity during peacetime, this is the result of a corrupt institution. As for the appropriations reserved for myself and other military leaders, I say that this, in like manner, is a very corrupt institution; for a wise republic must not grant this to anyone; on the contrary, it must use its own citizens as its military leaders in wartime and must want them to return to their professions in peacetime. Likewise, a wise king ought not to pay such salaries or, if he does pay them, he should do so either as a reward for some distinguished deed or in order to assure himself of the services of a man both in peacetime and in wartime.
And since you cite my own case, I want to use myself as an illustration: I maintain that I have never followed war as a profession, since my profession is to govern my subjects and to defend them, and, in order to defend them, to love peace and to know how to wage war. My king rewards and esteems me not so much for my knowledge about warfare as for my advice during peacetime. No king, therefore, if he is wise and wishes to rule prudently, should want to have around him anyone who is not of the same feelings; for if he has around him either too many lovers of peace or too many lovers of war, they will make him err. According to my proposals here in my first discourse, I cannot speak further on this matter; and if what I have said does not suffice, you should seek someone else to satisfy you further. You can well begin to understand what difficulties there are in bringing ancient methods back into present wars and what preparations a wise man must make, and what opportunities one must hope for, in order to bring such plans to fulfillment; but you will gradually come to understand these matters better, if my argument does not tire you, when you compare any part of ancient institutions to modem methods.
COSIMO: If we wished, at the outset, to hear you discuss such matters, what you have said about them up to this, moment has truly doubled our wishes; therefore, we thank you for what we have received and we beg you for the rest.
FABRIZIO: Since this pleases you, I wish to treat this subject from the beginning so that you may understand it better, for it is possible in this way to explain more completely. The goal of anyone wishing to wage war is to be able to do battle with any enemy in the field and to be able to win the day. To wish to do so necessitates the institution of an army. To institute the army, it is necessary to find men, arm them, organize them, drill them in both small and large groups, quarter them, and confront the enemy with them, either marching or taking up a fixed position. In these matters resides all the labor of a field campaign, the most necessary and most honorable kind. For anyone who understands how to draw up. his troops for battle, any other errors he may commit in conducting the war will be tolerable; but anyone who lacks this discipline, even if he excels in other particulars, will never conduct a war with honor, for winning one battle cancels out all of your other mistaken actions; thus, in the same manner, all of the good works you previously accomplished are useless when a battle is lost.
Since men must first be found, however, it is necessary to come to the matter of conscription of soldiers, which the ancients called the delectus. We refer to it as the draft, but in order to call it by a more honorable title, I should like to retain the name of conscription. Those who set up rules for warfare wanted the men to be selected from temperate climates, so that they would possess both spirit and prudence; for a warm climate produces prudent but less courageous men, while a cold climate produces brave but foolhardy men. This rule is very useful for a prince who governs many lands, for he is permitted to choose his men from the places that will best serve him; but, in order to provide a rule on this topic that will be of use to anyone, it is necessary to state that every republic and every kingdom must select troops from its own territories, either hot, cold, or temperate. For we witness from ancient examples how in every country with an army one can produce good soldiers; for where natural talent is lacking, perseverance (a quality that, in this instance, is more valuable than natural talent) can provide a remedy. Choosing them from other places cannot be called conscription, since this means taking the best from a province and having the authority to select those who are unwilling to serve as well as those who are willing to serve. One cannot, however, make such a choice except in regions under one’s own rule, since you cannot force those who are not in your own domain to serve you.
COSIMO: And it is still possible, from among those who wish to volunteer, to choose some and to reject others; and because of this it can still be called conscription. FABRIZIO: You are correct to a certain extent, but consider the defects inherent in conscription, since many times it is not even conscription at all. The first problem: those who are not your subjects and who serve as volunteers are not the best; on the contrary, they are the worst soldiers of a province. For if there are any men who are scandalous, lazy, uncontrollable, atheists, fugitives from paternal authority, swearers, gamblers, or poorly bred, they are those who wish to serve in the army. Their customs cannot be more contrary to a true and good militia. When so many of these men offer themselves to you that you can choose more than you need, you may select them; but with such poor material, it is not likely that this type of conscription will be of any use. But in many instances there are insufficient numbers of men to meet your needs, so that you are forced to take them all; for this reason you cannot call this a con
scription but rather a hiring of soldiers. Today, by means of this poor system, all of the armies of Italy and elsewhere are being formed, except for Germany, for no one there is taken on by the prince’s orders, but only according to the wish of whoever volunteers to serve as a soldier. Consider for yourselves, then, which methods of those ancient armies can be introduced into an army of men assembled in such a fashion.
COSIMO: What method would you employ, then, to raise an army?
FABRIZIO: The one I mentioned: select them from the prince’s subjects and with his authority.
COSIMO: Among those selected in this fashion, could you introduce any ancient procedures?
FABRIZIO: Of course, if he who commanded them were their prince or their established lord in a principality; or if he were a citizen and temporarily a captain in a republic ; otherwise it is difficult to accomplish anything of value.
COSIMO: Why?
FABRIZIO: I shall explain this in time; now let it suffice for me to say that it is not possible to operate in any other way.
COSIMO: Since, therefore, this conscription must be made in one’s own territories, where do you deem it best to choose your men, from the cities or from the countryside? FABRIZIO: Those who have written about this problem are all in agreement that it is best to choose them from the countryside, since they are men used to hardships, brought up in toil, accustomed to being in the sun and to avoiding the shade; they are men who can use tools, dig ditches, carry burdens, and who are without guile and without malice. But in this regard, my opinion would be that since soldiers are of two kinds, infantrymen and cavalry, one should select infantrymen from the countryside and cavalry from the towns.
COSIMO: At what age would you take them?
FABRIZIO: If I had to create a new militia, I would choose my men from seventeen to forty years of age; if the militia were already established and I had to renew it, I would always take them at seventeen.
COSIMO: I do not fully understand this distinction.
FABRIZIO: I shall explain it to you. If I had to institute a militia where there was none, it would be necessary to select all those men who were most qualified, provided that they be of military age, in order to train them in the manner I shall shortly explain; but if I had to make a selection in places where this militia was already instituted, I would take men of seventeen as supplementary soldiers, for the older men would already be chosen and in service. COSIMO : Therefore, you would want to establish a citizen’s militia similar to that which we have here.
FABRIZIO : That is correct. But I would arm them, set up their leaders, train and organize them in a manner which I am not sure you follow here.
COSIMO: You are then praising the citizens’ militia?
FABRIZIO: Why would you wish me to condemn it?
COSIMO: Because many wise men have always criticized it.
FABRIZIO: You contradict yourself when you say that a wise man criticizes the militia; while such a man may be reputed wise, he can easily be otherwise.
COSIMO: The poor showing it has always made will force us to retain such an opinion.
FABRIZIO: Be careful that the shortcoming is not yours rather than the militia’s, as you will come to realize before this discussion is finished.
COSIMO: If you can convince us of this, you will be doing a very good thing; yet I wish to tell you why others criticize it in order that you may justify yourself better. They say this: that it will either be useless—in which case to trust in the militia will cause us to lose the state—or it will be effective—in which case whoever commands the militia will easily be able to take the state from us. The Romans are cited as examples of people who, using these kinds of soldiers, lost their liberty. The Venetians and the King of France are cited: the former used the arms of others in order to prevent any of their own citizens from seizing power, while the king disarmed his own people in order to be able to govern them more easily. But they fear its inef ficacy more than this. They cite two principal reasons for this inefficacy: first, that the soldiers are inexperienced; second, that the men are forced to serve as soldiers. They claim that men seldom learn anything and that force never does any good.
FABRIZIO: All these reasons you mention are put forward by shortsighted men, as I shall clearly demonstrate to you. First, as for the inefficacy of the militia, I say to you that no militia can be more efficacious than your own, nor can anyone’s own militia be organized except in this manner. And because this allows no room for argument, I do not wish to lose time dwelling on it—let all of the examples from ancient history be sufficient. And since they cite inexperience and force, I say that it is true that inexperience produces fear and that force produces discontent; but courage and experience can be instilled in them by arming, drilling, and organizing them, as you will see in the course of this argument. But, as for force, you have to understand that the men who are brought into the militia by order of the prince have to enter neither under force nor completely voluntarily. For if they were all volunteers, the inconveniences I mentioned above would arise; that is, there would not be a conscription and there would be few who would go. In like manner, compulsion would bring about bad results. Therefore, one must choose a middle path where neither compulsion nor free will is the sole operative, but where the men are attracted by a respect they have for the prince and where they fear his anger more than their immediate inconvenience. And it always turns out to be a force formed by means of free will in such a way that no discontent, which might lead to bad effects, will come of it. I do not, however, because of this, say that it cannot be defeated, for the Roman armies were defeated many times and the army of Hannibal was beaten; it is clear that no one can organize an invincible army. However, these wise men of yours must not measure the inefficacy of this sort of army by a single defeat; they should believe that just as it can be defeated, it can similarly conquer and remedy the cause of its defeat. And when they search for this remedy, they will discover that it will not have resulted from a defect in method but rather from the imperfection of its organization. And, as I said, they ought to make provisions for this, not by accusing the citizens’ militia but by correcting it. You will learn how this must be done as we go along.
As for your fears that such an institution may deprive you of your state by means of the individual who becomes its captain, I reply that arms carried by one’s citizens or subjects, when they are bestowed by law and are well organized, never do harm; on the contrary, they are always useful, and cities are maintained without corruption by means of them better than they are without them. Rome remained free for four hundred years and was armed; Sparta, for eight hundred; many other cities were unarmed and remained free for less than forty years. Cities need military forces, and when they do not have their own they hire foreigners. These foreign soldiers are more likely to harm the public good than are one’s own men, since such men are more easily corrupted and more likely to be used by some citizen seeking power; such a man has easier material to manage, since he wishes to oppress men who are unarmed. Besides this, a city will fear two enemies more than one. A city that uses foreign troops simultaneously fears the foreigner it hires as well as the citizen. To prove that this fear does exist, let me remind you of what I said earlier concerning Francesco Sforza. A city that uses its own troops fears only its own citizens. In spite of the many reasons I can bring to bear, I would have this one suffice: no one ever established a republic or a kingdom who did not believe that the same people who lived there would also defend it with their arms.
And if the Venetians had been as wise in this matter as in their other institutions, they could have set up a new monarchy in the world. They deserve even more blame since they had been armed by their first lawgivers. Not possessing any territory on land, they were armed at sea, where they carried out their wars with great skill and, through their own arms, increased their homeland. But when the time came for them to wage war on the mainland in order to defend Vicenza, instead of sending one of their citizens t
o fight on land they hired the Marquis of Mantua as their leader. This was the unfortunate policy that cut off their legs and kept them from climbing to Heaven’s greatness. And if they did this out of the belief that they knew how to fight at sea but were unsure as to how to do so on land, this was an unwise move; for a sea captain, experienced in fighting the winds, the waters, and men, can become a leader on land more easily than a captain on land can become a sea captain. My Roman friends, knowing how to fight on land but not on the sea, did not hire Greeks or Spaniards familiar with the sea when they fought the Carthaginians, who were powerful on the ocean; rather, they imposed that duty on the citizens they usually used to fight on land—and they triumphed. If the Venetians hired foreign soldiers lest one of their citizens could become a tyrant, this was a senseless fear, for, besides the arguments on this matter that I advanced a while ago, if a citizen with naval forces had never made himself a tyrant in a city situated on the sea, he would have had even less chance with ground forces. If they had considered this, they would have seen that it is not arms in the hands of one’s citizens that produce tyrants but rather the evil institutions of the government that tyrannize a city; and if a city has a good government, it need not fear its armies. Therefore, they chose an imprudent policy which caused them to lose much glory and much peace of mind. As for the error the King of France committed in not keeping his own people disciplined in warfare (a case those citizens of yours cite as an example), no one who sets aside his own private feelings will judge that this is not a defect in that kingdom and not the sole cause of its weakness.
The Portable Machiavelli Page 50
