But I have made too great a digression, and perhaps I have strayed from my topic; yet I have done so in order to reply to you and to show you that one cannot build one’s foundation on forces other than one’s own, and one cannot organize one’s own forces in any fashion other than by means of a citizens’ militia, nor can one introduce other kinds of armies or military discipline by any other means. If you have read about the institutions established by- the first kings in Rome, especially by Servius Tullius, you will discover that the organization of the classes was nothing other than a regulation permitting the quick assembly of an army for the defense of the city. But let us return to conscription. I repeat, if I had to recruit for an existing army, I should pick men of seventeen; but if I had to create a new one, I should choose men between the ages of seventeen and forty in order to be able to make use of them immediately.
COSIMO: Would you distinguish among the professions of the men you select?
FABRIZIO: These writers I have cited do so, for they do not wish us to choose fowlers, fishermen, cooks, whoremongers, and anyone who makes a profession of pleasure; they suggest, rather, that we select farmers, blacksmiths, farriers, carpenters, butchers, hunters, and other similar trades. But I would make very little distinction between men and their quality based upon their professions, although I would do so regarding their usefulness. Peasants who are accustomed to working the fields are more useful than anyone, since of all trades this is the most frequently used in the army. After them come blacksmiths, carpenters, farriers, and stonemasons, of whom it is useful to have a great many, since their trades serve in many areas; it is always a good thing to have a soldier from whom you can require double service.
BOOK II
COSIMO: I should like to learn from you, if you have pondered the matter, how it is that so much cowardice, so much lack of order, and so much neglect of these military matters exist in our times?
FABRIZIO: I shall gladly tell you what I think about the matter. You know that although there have been many famous warriors in Europe, there have been few in Africa and even fewer in Asia. This comes about because these last two regions of the world have had only one or two principalities and few republics; Europe alone has had several kingdoms and countless republics. Men become excellent and demonstrate their ability to the extent that they are employed and are advanced by their prince, their republic, or their king; therefore, it follows that where there are many rulers, there are many valiant men; and where there are few rulers, these men are few in number. In Asia one finds Ninus, Cyrus, Artaxerxes, Mithridates—very few others are fit to be in their company. In Africa, leaving aside the ancient Egyptians, we can name Masinissa, Jugurtha, and the leaders produced by the Carthaginian republic; when compared with those of Europe, however, these are few, for in Europe there are countless excellent men, and there would be many more if, together with those already known, we could name the others who are lost to us because of the malevolence of time. For the world has been more distinguished in those areas where the existing states have favored ability, either because of necessity or because of some human characteristic. In Asia, then, there arose few such men since that region was completely under a single kingdom, which, because of its size, remained listless for much of the time; it could not produce men distinguished in what they do. In Africa the same thing occurred; yet more great men were produced there because of the Carthaginian republic. For more great men spring from republics than from kingdoms, since in republics ability is usually revered while in kingdoms it is feared, so it is that in republics great men are encouraged while in kingdoms they are destroyed.
Anyone who examines Europe will find it to be full of republics and principalities which, out of the fear they have for each other, are obliged to keep alive their military institutions and to honor those who have distinguished themselves in service. In Greece, besides the kingdom of the Macedonians, there were many republics, and in each of them very great men rose up. In Italy there were the Romans, the Samnites, the Tuscans, and the Cisalpine Gauls. France and Germany were full of republics and princes, as was Spain. And although in comparison to the Romans few other men of this caliber are named, this is the result of malicious historians who follow Fortune and usually limit themselves to praise of the victors. It is not reasonable to suppose that among the Samnites and the Tuscans, who fought 150 years with the Roman people before being subdued, there did not exist a great number of excellent men. And the same is true for France and Spain. But that ability which historians do not praise in individual men they praise in a general way in their race, when they exalt to the stars the obstinacy that such people displayed in defending their freedom.
Since it is therefore true that where there are more states there are more able men, it must follow that if these states are done away with, their ability is likewise done away with, for what has produced the able men has been removed. Therefore, when the Roman empire later grew and destroyed all of the republics and the principalities of Europe and Africa and, for the most part, those of Asia, it left no path for ingenuity other than Rome. Then, as time passed, able men became as few in number in Europe as in Asia; and this type of ability reached a final decline when all ability was concentrated in Rome. When Rome was corrupted, almost the entire world came to be corrupted. The Scythian peoples were able to plunder that empire which had destroyed the abilities of others without knowing how to maintain its own. Even though that empire, as a result of the flood of these barbarians, was subsequently divided into many parts, this ability was not reborn there. One explanation for this is that it is a difficult matter to restore institutions after they have been destroyed. Another is that the manner of living today, as a consequence of the Christian religion, does not force one to defend oneself as it did in ancient times. For then men defeated in war were either killed or sold into perpetual slavery, where they led miserable lives; captured territories were either devastated or their inhabitants were driven out; their possessions were seized and they were scattered all over the world, so that those who were overcome in warfare suffered every form of misery. Terrorized by this fear, men kept military training alive and honored those who excelled in it.
But today this fear has, for the most part, been lost; few defeated men are killed and none are kept prisoner for a long time, for they can easily free themselves. Cities, even when they rebel a thousand times, are not leveled. Men are permitted to keep their property, so that the worst evil one fears is a tax. Men therefore do not wish to submit themselves to military institutions and to exert themselves therein in order to avoid those dangers that they do not actually fear. Furthermore, these European territories are under the rule of very few rulers as compared with the past; for all of France obeys one king, all of Spain obeys another, and Italy has few territories. Weak cities consequently defend themselves by joining anyone who conquers, and powerful states do not fear a complete defeat for the reasons mentioned above.
COSIMO: And yet we have witnessed many cities sacked during the last twenty-five years and some kingdoms lost. These examples ought to teach others how to live and to revive a number of these ancient institutions.
FABRIZIO: You are correct; but if you will note which towns have been sacked, you will discover that they have not been the capitals of states but less important towns: it was Tortona that was sacked, not Milan; Capua and not Naples; Brescia and not Venice; Ravenna and not Rome. These examples are not enough to make anyone who rules change his policy; on the contrary, they make him more obstinate in the belief that he can buy off his liberty with a ransom; and because of this, such rulers do not wish to submit themselves to the hardships of military training, since they regard such matters as partly unnecessary and partly a matter about which they have no understanding. Those others who are enslaved peoples and to whom such examples ought to instill fear do not have the power to remedy their situation; and those princes who have lost their states have no time to do so; those who still retain them do not understand and have
no desire to do so, for they would rely upon Fortune without any inconvenience rather than upon their own ability. They see that Fortune governs everything, since little ability exists there, and they want her to rule them and not them her. And to show that what I say is the truth, just consider Germany, where there are many principalities and republics that contain much ability; all that is good in the military methods of the present day comes from those peoples who, being very jealous of their states and fearing slavery (which is not feared elsewhere), all maintain themselves as free and independent people. I wish this to suffice concerning my opinion on the causes of the present decadence. I do not know if you are in agreement with me or if this discussion has given rise to some doubts. COSIMO: Not at all! On the contrary! I remain completely convinced.
BOOK VII
FABRIZIO: Would you, perhaps, also like to learn what qualities a military captain must possess? I shall be able to satisfy you, and in few words, on that question, for I know of only one man who would know how to accomplish all the things that we have discussed together today; yet the knowledge of these alone would not be sufficient if he did not know how to learn on his own, for no one without inventiveness was ever a great man in his profession; and if invention in other kinds of work honors the man, in this one especially it brings praise. And it is seen that every invention, no matter how insignificant, is celebrated by historians; for it is obvious that they praise Alexander the Great because, in order to break camp more secretively, he did not give the signal by trumpet but with a hat hoisted on a spear. He is also praised for having taught his soldiers to kneel upon the left knee when encountering the enemy in order to withstand their assault more bravely; this new idea not only gave him the victory, it also bestowed upon him such fame that all of the statues erected in his honor were sculpted in that position.
But since it is time to conclude this discussion, I wish to return to my subject, and in so doing I shall escape that penalty usually incurred in this city by those who fail to do so. If you remember, Cosimo, you asked me the reason why I was, on the one hand, an admirer of antiquity and a critic of those who do not imitate it in important matters, and why, on the other hand, I myself did not imitate antiquity in affairs of war which I have made my profession—you could see no reason for this. To this I replied that men who wished to accomplish things should first prepare themselves to learn the art of war in order to be able to put it into operation when the occasion arises. Whether or not I know how to return the militia to its ancient practices I wish you (who have heard me discuss this question at length) to decide. From what I said, I feel certain that you understand how much time I have spent on these thoughts, and you can imagine, I think, how very much I should like to ,put these thoughts of mine into action. That I have been able to do so, or have even had the opportunity to do so a single time, you can easily determine. To convince you all the more, as well as for my own justification, I now wish to present the reasons. In so doing, I shall partly keep my promise to you by demonstrating how difficult it is, and how easy it could be at this time, to practice the imitation of the ancients. Therefore, let me say that no activity practiced by men today can more easily be brought back to ancient practices than warfare, but it can only be done by those princes who can raise an army, from among the subjects of their state, of between fifteen and twenty thousand young men. On the other hand, nothing is more difficult than this when the prince does not possess this ability.
And in order that you may better understand this part of my argument, you should know that there are two kinds of military leaders who have been praised. One kind includes those leaders who have accomplished great deeds with an army already organized according to its normal discipline; the majority of the Roman citizens and others who have commanded armies are examples of these leaders—men who have not had any other problem except to keep up the training of their men and see that they are well led. Another kind includes those leaders who have not only had to overcome an enemy but who, before reaching that point, were forced to produce a good and well-disciplined army of their own; these men, without a doubt, deserve more praise than those who operated with good and disciplined armies. Examples of this second group of leaders include Pelopidas, Epaminondas, Tullus Hostilius, Philip of Macedonia (the father of Alexander the Great), Cyrus (king of the Persians), and Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus. All these men first had to establish a good army and then wage war with it. They were all able to accomplish this, both because of their wisdom and because they had subjects fit to receive such training. It would never have been possible for one of them, however great his ability, to accomplish such a praiseworthy deed if he had been a mercenary in a foreign country, full of corrupt men unaccustomed to any sort of honorable obedience.
Therefore, in Italy it is not enough to know how to command a previously established army; it is first necessary to know how to create one, and then how to command it. And to do this there must be princes who, possessing much territory and many subjects, have the capacity to do so. I cannot be counted among these, for I have never commanded, nor can I command, unless it is in an army of foreigners and men obligated to others than myself; whether or not it is possible to introduce among such men some of the things we discussed today I leave to your judgment. How can I make one of these soldiers who bears arms today carry more arms than he usually does; and, in addition to his arms, rations for two or three days and a shovel? How can I make him dig or keep him every day, and for many hours, practicing drills so that I can use him in real battles? How will he keep himself from gambling, whoring, swearing, and from the general insubordination of today’s army? How can he be brought back to such a degree of discipline, obedience, and respect that a tree full of apples in the middle of the camp would remain untouched? We have read how many times this occurred in ancient armies. What can I promise them that will make them fear me or respect me if, after the war, they know they will have nothing further to do with me? How can I make them feel shame when they are born and raised without it? Why should they obey me when they do not know me? By what God or saints should I have them swear: by those they worship or by those they curse? The saints they worship I do not know, but I certainly know the ones they curse. How can I believe that they will keep the promises they made to those they continuously despise ? How can those who have contempt for God honor men? What good form, therefore, could possibly be stamped on this raw material?
And if you tell me that the Swiss and the Spanish are good soldiers, I will confess to you that they are a good deal better than the Italians; but if you pay attention to my argument and the practice of these two peoples, you will see how they both lack many things required to attain the perfection of the ancients. The Swiss became good soldiers as a result of one of their customs, which I described to you today, while the others were made good out of necessity. Waging war in a foreign land and believing themselves to be faced with a choice of either victory or death, the Spanish became good soldiers because they had no place to flee. But it is a goodness defective in many parts, for the only good thing in it is their common practice of meeting the enemy with the point of their pike or sword. Nor is there anyone capable of teaching them what they lack—even less, one who does not speak their language.
But let us return to the Italians, who, in not having wise princes, have not accepted any good institutions; and because they have not experienced the necessity that the Spanish felt, they have not adopted any for themselves. They therefore are scorned by the rest of the world. It is not the people who are to blame, but rather their princes, who have been punished and who, because of their ignorance, have received the fitting penalty of losing their states ignominiously and without having done a single admirable deed. Do you wish to test whether what I have said is true? Consider, then, how many wars have been fought in Italy since the invasion of King Charles VIII until the present day. Although wars usually make men warlike and renowned, the longer and more savage these wars were, the more they caused a loss of
reputation, both of the subjects and their rulers. This came about-because the traditional institutions were not, and are still not, good; and there is no one here who has known how to adopt any new institutions. Nor should you ever believe that a reputation can be won for Italian arms except through the means that I have enumerated and through the deeds of those who possess the greatest states in Italy; for this form can only be stamped upon simple, rough, and independent men, not upon evil, badly governed, and foreign ones. Nor has any good sculptor ever been found who believes that he can make as beautiful a statue from a piece of poorly blocked marble as he can from one that is rough.
Before they had felt the blows of the Transalpine wars, our Italian princes believed that a prince need only know how to dream up witty replies in his study; write a beautiful letter, display intelligence and readiness in his conversation and his speech; weave a fraud; adorn himself with gems and gold; sleep and eat in a more splendid style than others; surround himself with a large number of courtesans; conduct himself in a miserly and arrogant manner with his subjects; rot in laziness; give military positions as favors; despise anyone who had shown them any praiseworthy path; and expect that their pronouncements be taken as oracles. Nor did these wretched men realize that they were preparing themselves to become the prey of anyone who assaulted them. This resulted in the great terrors, the sudden flights, and the miraculous losses of 1494; thus, three very powerful states of Italy were sacked and despoiled many times. But what is worse is that those princes who still remain persist in the same errors and live in the same disorder; they do not consider that those who, in ancient times, wished to maintain their states did, and had done, all of the things that I have discussed—their goal was to prepare the body for hardships and the mind not to fear danger. Thus it came about that Caesar, Alexander, and all those excellent men and princes were foremost in their soldiers’ ranks and went about in armor on foot; they would rather lose their lives than their states; in such a manner they lived and died valiantly. One could, perhaps, condemn some of them for being overambitious for power, but one could never accuse any of them of being too soft or of any other characteristic that makes a man delicate and unwarlike. If these things were read and believed by Italian princes, it would be impossible for them not to bring about a change in their way of life and in the fortune of their nations.
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