He vented all his wrath in a dispatch to the Directory, dated 26th September, in which he roundly accused Bonaparte of having exhausted the resources of the country within a few months after their arrival, of leaving no cash in hand and a deficit of 12 million. The soldiers had not been paid, and they suffered from lack of clothing. Egypt, he said, was quiet in appearance, but unsubdued. Alexandria had been well enough fortified with heavy artillery, but after they had lost that artillery in the disastrous Syrian Campaign, and after Bonaparte had withdrawn all the naval guns to complete the armament of the two frigates in which he departed, it could offer but a feeble resistance. He ended his dispatch:
I know all the importance of the possession of Egypt; I said in Europe that it was the fulcrum upon which to move the commerce of the four corners of the world; but to use it we need a powerful lever, and that lever is the fleet. Ours existed once. Since then all has changed, and in my opinion peace with the Porte can alone offer an honourable way for us to get out of an enterprise that can never achieve the object that was proposed.
Bonaparte had already written, on 17th August, to the Vizier suggesting negotiations. Kléber considered the reply so insolent that no self-respecting Frenchman could demean himself to negotiate with the Turks. He also considered that the Vizier was a man of straw and that the English directed everything. Therefore he replied to Sir Sidney on 30th October that he was prepared to send delegates for discussions on board The Tigre, but that the evacuation of Egypt could only be considered as part of a general settlement in Europe.
It is time [he wrote] that two nations who may not be able to love each other, but who consider themselves to be the two most civilised nations in Europe, should stop fighting each other.
Kléber’s evident desire for peace, not only in Egypt but in Europe as well, encouraged Sir Sidney to believe that negotiations would be fruitful; but his statement that the evacuation of his troops could only come about as part of a general settlement showed him that peace was still a long way off. He determined, therefore, to encourage the negotiations and at the same time to keep up the pressure on the French by vigorously prosecuting the war. He continued to cruise off Alexandria to keep in touch with Kléber, and he sent John Bromley, now promoted colonel, as his liaison officer to the Vizier, who had reached Jaffa with his army.
His instructions were firstly to impress upon the Vizier that although their enemies were ready to negotiate they were by no means beaten, and that it would be of the greatest advantage to Turkey if they were allowed to evacuate Egypt without further bloodshed. Secondly, he was concert with him a combined operation to capture the frontier fort of El Arish, which Bonaparte had called one of the keys to Egypt; but before any attack was made, he was to summon the French commander to surrender to the British. Coloney Dougles, Major Frotté, and all the marines who could be spared from The Tigre and the Theseus, were landed to protect the prisoners or to conduct the siege as circumstances might require.
The first part of Bromley’s mission was quickly accomplished: the Vizier had so much confidence in Sir Sidney’s judgement that he not only agreed to the discussions being held in The Tigre but asked him to represent the Porte, instead of appointing delegates of his own.
Sir Sidney was well aware that these important moves to further the objects of the treaty were the exact opposite of what he had been ordered to do as captain of The Tigre, but his embarrassment at being at variance with his commanding officer was, to a great extent, relieved by Nelson’s complete change of attitude after reading the dispatches describing the defence of Acre. This was reflected in his next letter, written on 20th August from Palermo, which ran:
My dear Sir, I have received with the truest satisfaction all your very interesting letters to July 16th. The immense fatigue you have had in defending Acre against such a chosen army of French villains, headed by that arch-villain Bonaparte, has never been exceeded, and the bravery shown by you and your brave companions is such as to merit every encomium which all the civilised world can bestow. As an individual, and as an Admiral, will you accept of my feeble tribute of praise and admiration, and make them acceptable to all those under your command...
He did not comment on Sir Sidney’s warning that the Turkish landings in Egypt would be a disaster if he was deprived of control over its commanders, but continued:
I hope Alexandria is long before this in your possession, and the final blow given to Bonaparte; but I hope no terms will ever be granted for his individual return to Europe.
The letter ended:
Be assured, my dear Sir Sidney, of my perfect esteem and regard, and do not let anyone persuade you to the contrary. But my character is, that I will not suffer the smallest title of my command to be taken from me; but with pleasure I give way to my friends, among whom I beg you will allow me to consider you, and that I am, with the truest esteem and affection, your faithful humble servant, Nelson.
He made no mention of his ban on allowing the French to leave Egypt, except in the individual case of Bonaparte, of whose arrival in France he had not yet been informed, so it seemed that he had accepted Sir Sidney’s explanation of the local conditions and their treaty obligations and was granting his request ‘to be set at liberty to act as was concerted at Constantinople, with that discretionary power which circumstances on the spot can alone dictate and decide’.
The news of Bonaparte’s defeat before Acre had caused a sensation in London. Sir Sidney’s dispatches were published in the Gazette; he was thanked by both Houses of Parliament; Lord Hood, Lord Spencer and Lord Grenville made speeches in his honour, and the letters he received were full of praise.
As a plenipotentiary enjoying the confidence of his own government and as the accredited representative of the Porte, Sir Sidney was in a favourable position to guide the negotiations with Kléber to a successful conclusion. To crown his achievements by ending the war in Egypt became the goal of his ambition.
Chapter Eleven – The Treaty
For the negotiations in The Tigre Kléber appointed as his delegates General Desaix and Monsieur Poussielgue, his very able Controller General of Finances who had introduced many western reforms into Egypt.
General Desaix had been conducting an arduous campaign with a very small force in Upper Egypt against Murad Bey, the unconquered Mameluke. Sometimes Murad had established his sway over a district and collected the taxes; sometimes the French had done so. Sometimes both had collected the taxes from the same district. Kléber had recalled Desaix and appointed Murad Bey to govern Upper Egypt for France. The general was a true soldier, caring little for the comforts of life and much for its pleasures, but he was also an able administrator; he was known to the inhabitants as ‘The Just Sultan’. He had expressed his joy and the happiness of the men under him, to be serving under Kléber’s command, but he was unwilling to undertake negotiations for the surrender of Egypt without the approval of Bonaparte whom he still regarded as his chief. Kléber gave him an order to do so, and he obeyed.
Monsieur Poussielgue shared Kléber’s opinion that they ought to negotiate while they were still in a position of strength instead of waiting until they were at the mercy of their enemies.
The delegates had to wait for several weeks during which heavy surf prevented their vessel from crossing the bar at Damietta. It was not until 23rd December that they were able to board The Tigre.
They brought with them a letter from Kléber addressed to Sir Sidney, demanding the dissolution of the triple alliance of Britain, Turkey and Russia against France, the return of the Ionian Islands occupied by Russia, the guarantee of Malta to France and the provision of ships to evacuate the French from Egypt. ‘You love glory, General,’ he wrote, ‘and it seems to me that to attach one’s name to such an event would be the greatest glory one could win.’ There was also a letter addressed to the Vizier in which he said:
I offer peace, friendship, and the evacuation of Egypt with one hand, and I accept battle with the other. Your Excellency in h
is wisdom will make the choice.
Sir Sidney told the delegates that the proposals were absolutely inadmissible. They were, except for the question of the ships to be provided, outside their competence even to discuss; but he did not break off the negotiations on that account. He requested the delegates to ask Kléber for new instructions, and they did so. Meanwhile, on the 24th, both sides agreed to an armistice of one month.
The messenger sent to the Grand Vizier to give him notice of the armistice was too late to forestall the attack on the fort at El Arish. It had been invested and summoned to surrender by Colonel Bromley on the 22nd: the French commander, Cazals, had rejected the summons, but some of his men protested against his decision. Colonel Douglas, Colonel Bromley, Major Frotté and Captain Winter surveyed the defences and sited the artillery. When the bombardment had continued for four days, the French started fighting among themselves. On the 29th, part of the garrison mutinied, hauled down the tricolour on one of the towers and hoisted the Ottoman flag. Then they called to the Turks to come in, and threw down ropes to help them to scale the 40-foot wall — but when the Turks ran up to take possession of the tower they were fired upon by the other part of the garrison. The result was chaos and massacre, during which a French artilleryman shut himself in the powder magazine and blew it up, killing friend and foe alike. The European officers and the marines were able, with great difficulty, to save about a hundred of the garrison from the fury of the Turks. News of the armistice reached the Vizier two days later.
Kléber heard of the loss of his fort on 4th January. After an outburst of indignation he realised that the breach of the armistice had not been intentional. Confronted by this new evidence that some of his men were unwilling to fight, he instructed his delegates to insist only upon a honourable capitulation, and not to insist upon the return of the fort. He also asked for the repatriation of his wounded, following Tallien’s advice who was Civil Commissioner for the Wounded. Tallien told him that their return would make a great effect in France, ‘particularly if they were landed at Toulon where the hot-headed inhabitants were quick to react to impressions; the entry of this sad debris would cause the author of the expedition to be blamed, and the man who put an end to such calamities to be blessed.’
Sir Sidney agreed that the wounded, and also the savants, should be immediately repatriated. He didn’t yet know that Nelson had disregarded the passport he had provided for the captain of a ship containing seventy French wounded he had sent to France from Acre. The ship had been stopped and sent to Corsica.
Poussielgue was, like Kléber, an ardent republican. At the beginning of the negotiations he was inclined to be resentful because one of his letters to his wife had been intercepted and published in England. Sir Sidney assured him that the English respected him for the affectionate tone of the letter, and that many naval men had praised the description it contained of the Battle of the Nile which he had viewed from Rosetta.
It was not long before the two men were on terms of mutual respect and friendship. They went very deeply into the question of the future form of government under which France might eventually make and preserve peace, and they found there was a remarkable coincidence between Sir Sidney’s views and those of Kléber as Poussielgue explained them. All three believed that Bonaparte would attempt to make himself dictator, and that France would become a victim to his inordinate thirst for power.
It appeared to Sir Sidney that if Bonaparte should succeed, France would become a military and conquering nation, a menace to her neighbours, and that it was important, therefore, that he should not succeed, and they ought to get Kléber, his most determined and most dreaded opponent, back to Paris as quickly as possible to strengthen the republican opposition. His devoted army, execrating the name of Bonaparte, since they had learned through their bitter experience at Acre the slight regard he had for human life, might be a potent factor in the crisis that loomed ahead. He expressed his views in a letter to Admiral Lord Keith, now C. in C. Mediterranean, to justify his policy:
Believe me, my dear lord, there is no way of finishing this long contest, in which we are engaged, but by pitting our opponents one against the other; what force have we got to set limits to their influence otherwise? I speak from the experience I gained at Paris, when I say, France can only be set to rights by Frenchmen, and till she is set to rights, in the internal springs of her government, we never can have peace...
Desaix held aloof from their political discussions, an amused spectator. He wrote to Kléber:
The Commodore thinks only of negotiating. The glory that would come to him from his own country, from the Russians and from the Turks, has turned his head...He trembles at not hearing from you, he strikes his foot, he cries, ‘General Kléber must answer me; I have dealt honestly with him; I thought him more reasonable than General Bonaparte.’
Before they had reached agreement, letters came from Lord Elgin announcing that he had arrived in Constantinople as Ambassador Extraordinary. It was not clear how this would affect Sir Sidney’s position, but it was at once apparent that no change of plan would be necessary. Lord Elgin confirmed his authority, and stated he had informed the Turkish Government that Sir Sidney Smith was ‘fully authorised by his situation to concert with the Grand Vizier any arrangement which might be found eligible for rescuing the Turkish Provinces from the French troops’. He stated also that he had requested that the Grand Vizier be instructed to carry on the negotiations conjointly with him. In a further letter, dated 30th November, he urged Sir Sidney to complete the negotiations as soon as possible. He described the difficulties that had arisen between Russia and Austria, and the disastrous defeat of the British army in Holland, writing:
In this melancholy state of affairs I feel myself doubly called upon to recommend every possible means that can aid in forcing the French out of Egypt...Meanwhile accept my most sincere good wishes, and the assurances that my most active exertions shall be heartily employed while here, for the success of your operations.
All apprehensions regarding Lord Elgin were laid to rest. The letter was friendly and affable. It seemed that the Sultan’s foreboding, when they had read of his appointment a year ago, that Elgin would turn out to be El-Jin, the Devil, was quite unfounded.
While The Tigre was being driven by a gale up the coast of Syria, beyond Jaffa, beyond Caesarea, beyond Acre, the conditions for the evacuation were settled. When it abated, Sir Sidney and the French delegates landed, on 15th January, 1800, and proceeded to El Arish to complete the formalities with the Vizier.
In the Turkish camp, Desaix heard rumours that there had been a coup d’état in France. He immediately wrote to Kléber:
Beware of evacuating Egypt. It is being whispered that there has been a revolution in France and that Bonaparte is at the head of the state. As for what is called the Grand Vizier’s army, it is a miserable mass of bandits...
Kléber replied that it made no difference who was in power in France. He was acting according to the dictates of his conscience which told him that he was doing what was right. A victory would only gain him a respite of three months.
If I were defeated [he wrote] I should be answerable to the Republic for the lives of 20,000 men who would be put to the sword by the unrestrained and furious soldiery who have no reason to observe either human rights or the usages of war, because in these respects we have set them the most tragic example. Think of this, and act accordingly.
The Convention of El Arish was signed on 24th January, 1800, by the Vizier, Desaix and Poussielgue. The Vizier agreed to let the French leave Egypt with all their arms and property, and with all the honours of war. He agreed further to provide the necessary transports, and supplies and maintenance until they sailed. The signatories stated that they hoped the convention would lead to the general pacification of Europe.
Kléber ratified the convention on 28th January. He announced it in a dispatch to the Directory in these words:
I have just accomplished, Citizen Directo
rs, a work of which reason will approve in all ages...it will arouse great discussion, but if the truthfulness and loyalty of General Bonaparte equal his high fortune I shall no doubt find in him the most intrepid Defender. If I do not, I shall know how to defend myself with my own arms.
On 30th January, the day on which the ratifications were exchanged, Sir Sidney enclosed a copy of the Convention of El Arish in a dispatch to Lord Nelson, for onward routing to London, in which he carefully explained his reasons for acting as mediator between General Kléber and the Vizier:
The great objects of our operations in this quarter being the recovery of Egypt for our ally, and the security of the British possessions in India, advantages not to be compared to trifling sacrifices, I doubt not but that your lordship will agree with me, that the utmost has been obtained by negotiation that could have been acquired by victory, where it cannot be the intention to destroy, or even humiliate a brave enemy unnecessarily; besides it must be borne in mind that a disciplined veteran army, however dissatisfied with its situation, if driven to desperation, might long keep possession of an insulated country full of dykes and canals, which render it difficult of access, although it might in the end be overpowered by the resources of three empires when brought forward.
He pointed out that he had not signed the convention himself, but he had reserved the right of arbitration, which the confidence both of the Vizier and of General Kléber, most unequivocally expressed, might enable him to exercise; and he had now only to endeavour to prevent any untoward circumstances from again causing the sword to be drawn in that quarter after it had thus been happily sheathed by the moderation, humanity and sound policy of those two highly distinguished chiefs.
Beware of Heroes: Admiral Sir Sidney Smith's War against Napoleon Page 14
