Meanwhile in London, opinion had been gradually hardening against the policy instituted by the Smith brothers in Constantinople and repeatedly explained by Sir Sidney from the first letters he had written when he took over the blockade of Alexandria from Troubridge. The ministers had received those letters in May, and therefore they had known for the past seven months that Sir Sidney was working for the recovery of Egypt by persuading the French to leave it, because, in his opinion, the Turks were unable to recover it in any other way. Events had shown that he was right, but St. Vincent and Nelson had urged upon them the opposite course, and Nelson had put in a request that Sir Sidney should be ordered not to permit the French to evacuate Egypt. They had not complied with this request, but Lord Spencer had had serious misgivings about the policy to which their plenipotentiaries had committed them. He didn’t want to see any considerable body of Frenchmen return to fight against the allies in Europe. The government, however, had raised no formal objections to the terms of the Treaty of Friendship, or to the policy agreements arising out of it.
On learning from the dispatches from Constantinople that negotiations were in progress between Kléber and the Grand Vizier, under Sir Sidney’s auspices, they held a cabinet meeting, on 12th December, to consider the implications. Since the Smith brothers had been given their instructions, the political scene in Europe had changed: both the Russians and the Austrians now had armies in the field, and both these governments were protesting indignantly against Sir Sidney’s proposal to send back 18,000 veteran troops, now happily isolated in Egypt, to fight against them. All the ministers’ hopes for a favourable issue to the war were centred in Europe. They decided, therefore, to placate the Russians and the Austrians by sacrificing Sir Sidney and the Turks. They determined not to allow Kléber’s army to leave Egypt except as prisoners of war, to disregard any convention made between him and the Turks for their repatriation, and to use the power of the blockade to prevent it from being carried out.
If the French had already sailed, Admiral Lord Keith was to force them back again to Egypt.
The ministers were not quite easy in their minds about the way they were treating the Turks. They proceeded to discuss what they could do, as they were prolonging the war, to help them to act against the French with effect, such as sending a force from India up the Red Sea to Egypt, or sending to fortify St. Jean d’Acre, so that Lord Elgin when announcing that they were not accepting the convention would be able to accompany that unwelcome piece of news ‘with some encouraging assurances of their intentions’.
Chapter Twelve – The Ambassador Extraordinary
Lord Elgin might have been in an even more embarrassing position if ministers had been aware that it was on his authority and, indeed, on his insistence, that the negotiations for the Convention of El Arish had been completed; but he had quickly changed his ground. Nelson had written both to him and to Spencer Smith describing the very deplorable state of the French in Egypt, and stating that he never would consent to one of them returning to Europe during the war. Elgin disowned the negotiations he had sponsored, and accused Sir Sidney, both to Nelson and to the Turks, of acting without authority and contrary to the wishes of the British Government.
Meanwhile he had got himself involved in a very murky project. Although a year had elapsed between his appointment and his appearance in Constantinople, the delay being occasioned entirely by personal matters — his marriage, the necessity of taking the sea bathing at Brighton for his health, arrangements for getting his allowances paid in advance, and so on — things had moved quickly when he got there. The handsome young lord and his bride reached the Dardanelles in the frigate Phaeton on 2nd November, 1799, on their first visit to the East. They were saluted by the Turkish flagship, Selim, 132 guns, commanded by the Captain Pasha, who had earned the contempt of the navy at Acre by refusing to go ashore until all the fighting was over, and were welcomed on board of her with a parade and music. They were entertained in the magnificent state cabin where they sat upon sofas covered with yellow damask embroidered with gold, dined off fine Dresden china and drank out of diamond cups.
On 3rd November the Phaeton reached the city of domes and minarets: having a representative of His Majesty on board, she saluted the Seraglio, the Sultan’s palace, with twenty-one guns, and the salute was returned by the shore batteries. She anchored under the ancient walls. Mr. Spencer Smith, who had been made subservient to Lord Elgin but who still retained the plenipotentiary powers that he held jointly with his brother, brought him ashore and helped him to settle in to the palace that had lately been occupied by the French Ambassador who was now imprisoned in The Seven Towers.
Constantinople was a hotbed of intrigue, backbiting and deadly rivalries, but it presented on the surface the fantastic glamour and colour of The Arabian Nights Entertainment. The Captain Pasha continued his attentions to the Ambassador Extraordinary and his wife, showering them with rich presents, and sending them complimentary letters by messengers attended by long lines of servants bearing trays of fine china, preserves, painted handkerchiefs, flowers and fruit. He arranged for Lady Elgin to be entertained in the harem presided over by his sister who was the Sultan’s favourite wife. When Lord Elgin went in state to be presented to the Sultan, Lady Elgin attended the ceremony, which was for men only, in male attire as ‘Lord Bruce’ and received a fine pelisse valued at £500.
Sir Sidney’s prestige and favour with the Sultan were so great that he had frequently been able to prevent the beys from getting their own way. Few of them had thought it safe to oppose him. Now they crowded hopefully round the new sun that had risen in the person of the Ambassador Extraordinary. He passed on their complaints to Nelson and Lord Grenville about Sir Sidney’s interference in the internal affairs of Turkey, and particularly about his intervention in Cyprus which, he stated, was ‘a fact literally without parallel in diplomatic history’ — which was certainly true — and he added some criticisms of his own about Sir Sidney’s visit to Jerusalem and his correspondence with Kléber, saying that in his negotiations in The Tigre ‘he was felt to have sacrificed our allies, the Turks, in public opinion and in fact, from his own exalted notions of French heroism’. In the same letter in which he damned his conduct he declared:
There exists not a man for whom I entertain a greater partiality than Sir S. Smith, nor whose conduct I would, and have, taken more conscientious care to support.
The beys were planning to make a treacherous attack on the French army after it had capitulated, either in the transports or on the way to the embarkation ports. One of the first requests he received from the Reis Effendi, the Foreign Minister, was for the passports that would be necessary to lure the French to their doom. He felt the difficulty, he said, of this request, but he refused it on the grounds that it was for the Grand Vizier and Sir Sidney to issue passports, but he was in favour of the Turkish plan which, he said, ‘would ensure (what is so desirable) a continuation of the war on their side’.
He told Grenville that, although he could never have consented to use His Majesty’s authority in matters of that kind, he could not dissuade the Reis Effendi from his purpose without the greatest danger, that its execution must in its consequences be most beneficial, and that if ever such a reprisal could be justified, the French in their conduct towards Turkey had brought it on themselves. He also said that he considered the proposal of such importance that he sent his private secretary, Morier, to the Grand Vizier as his personal representative: he also sent General Koehler (who had been practically living at the Embassy), ‘so that Sir Sidney would no longer have it in his power to act as representing Great Britain’.
The beys were very conscious that Sir Sidney, with his powerful squadron, might oppose their plan. Elgin assured them and the Reis Effendi that he no longer had any special powers or authority, and that the British Government felt that it was for the Turks themselves to decide on the measures to be taken for the recovery of their own province. However, they were not satisfied,
and at their request he wrote to Sir Sidney, telling him about the ‘stratagem of war’ which the Turks had in view, and explaining that, although he could not enter into details in writing, the mode of recovering Egypt involved the highest considerations of general policy. He instructed him not to give umbrage to the Turkish Government, ‘or take from them an occasion of conducting this business in any way they think proper, consistent with their engagements to us’.
Sir Sidney’s reaction to the plan justified, on this occasion at least, Elgin’s complaints to London that his instructions were disregarded and that Sir Sidney ‘treated him as null’: he replied that he positively would neither abet nor suffer the stratagem of war if it were within the reach of his power to prevent such an infamous breach of faith; and he added some useful advice, which Elgin didn’t appreciate, about how to handle the Turks. He also wrote to the Captain Pasha, deprecating the treachery they had in view.
On 23rd January Elgin received from Nelson copies of Kléber’s dispatches that had been intercepted. They included the one he had written in the heat of his indignation at the state of the army after Bonaparte had abandoned it. It appeared to Nelson to justify the policy he had all along advocated.
I hope your recommendation for the Vizier’s pushing on in Egypt will be duly attended to [he commented] and I have no doubt that the campaign will end in the destruction of the French...I own my hope yet is, that the Sublime Porte will never permit a single Frenchman to quit Egypt; and I own myself wicked enough to wish them all to die in that country they chose to invade. We have scoundrels of French enough in Europe without them...
Elgin immediately supplied a copy of the dispatches to the Turkish Government, and he sent one of General Koehler’s officers, Captain Lacy, with another copy to the Grand Vizier to urge him to attack the French. He provided Lacy with a letter to his secretary, Morier, instructing him to demand an audience as soon as possible after his arrival, for
I most anxiously hope that these papers will reach his Highness in time as they contain every explanation that could possibly be wished of the situation of the French army and of the cunning perfidy with which the present negotiation is carrying on...Commend to his Highness his most serious attention to the details contained in this correspondance [sic], in particular you will point out to his notice that the plan of Bonaparte is to establish a French colony in Egypt. Kléber and others, though they differ from Bonaparte as to the present circumstances, agree with him that France ought to wrest this province from the Turkish government whenever it can do so with security.
He is to tell the Vizier that the French, dispirited, greatly in arrears of pay, without money, clothing, ammunition, artillery or arms, despair of being able to deceive the inhabitants any longer, and that Alexandria is not capable of defence.
The papers, in a word, certify that the French labour under every disadvantage which can render a defence almost impossible and that, if the Grand Vizier now attacks them, he may depend upon the aid of the whole of the inhabitants. I conclude by expressing my anxious hope that the Grand Vizier may by his own army punish the French as they deserve, and enable the inhabitants of Egypt by aiding the troops to prove their allegiance and attachment to their religion, and show the world that the Turks are what they have always been.
On 20th February, while Sir Sidney was again at Cyprus in The Tigre for provisions, he received with astonishment and dismay a letter from Admiral Lord Keith announcing the positive orders of His Majesty that if the negotiations had resulted in a capitulation being agreed upon it was not to be respected; that the passports Sir Sidney had given would not be considered valid, and all French ships would be stopped and the troops in them treated as prisoners of war. This decision came as a bolt from the blue because he had received no indication until that moment that the government were not in accord with the policy he had been pursuing and with the obligations he had assumed on their behalf and with their authority during the past year. Worst of all, and ‘like a death blow to him’ was the government order that if the French had already embarked, the power of the blockade was to be used to thrust them back again to Egypt. It took him a long time to realise that the ministers’ abysmal ignorance of the situation and lack of imagination had prevented them from realising that if the French were thrust back defenceless into Egypt they would inevitably be massacred. He said, in a letter to Lord Spencer:
Nothing but the personal knowledge I had of the integrity and humanity of every individual member of the administration assured me against it being really meant as it appeared upon the face of it.
Enclosed in Keith’s letter was one for Kléber, which he was instructed to deliver, informing him that the British Government would not consent to any capitulation with the French in Egypt unless they laid down their arms and surrendered themselves as prisoners of war. The letter was so brusque, and so uncompromising, that to deliver it would be to ensure that the war would immediately break out again and that, by all reasonable calculations, the Vizier’s army, ‘an unconnected, disorderly, mutinous and famished multitude’, he called it, would be defeated. And yet, if he merely did nothing for a week or so the unsuspecting French would have given up all their strongholds and could easily be attacked and destroyed while peacefully proceeding to Alexandria for embarkation. His one hope of staving off calamity either to one side or the other lay in the fact that both the government’s instructions and Lord Keith’s letter had been written before they were aware that the convention had actually been signed. If he could persuade both armies to agree to a standstill while he appealed to the Cabinet to reconsider their decision, the situation might yet be saved.
He wrote to Elgin, enclosing a copy and an extract of the letters, and expressing the hope that his lordship would unite with him to prevent the war breaking out again; asserting also that Egypt might yet be restored to the Ottoman Government in a flourishing state if the policy of good faith and generosity that had brought about the Convention was upheld and continued.
Then, with the fate of two armies in his hands, he sailed for Alexandria, taking with him the frigate Constance that had brought the dispatches from Lord Keith. He arrived on the eighth, and at once sent an urgent letter ashore for Kléber explaining what had happened. He said he hoped the difficulties would be removed when it was realised in London that the Convention had actually been signed and ratified, for the dispatches unhappily crossed, but he suggested that Kléber should re-occupy the fortresses he had evacuated until the situation became clear.
He did not send Keith’s letter to Kléber. He entrusted it to Lieutenant Wright, ordering him to take it to the Turkish camp, show it to the Vizier and to Morier, and then take it to the French headquarters in Cairo. Thus he staved off the crisis for some days during which, he hoped, he would be able to persuade both sides to refrain from making any hostile moves until he had received a reply from London. He gave Wright a letter to the Grand Vizier, urging him not to do anything to break the Convention, and not to advance farther into Egypt. In another letter he impressed upon Morier that the resumption of hostilities must result in the annihilation of the Turkish army, and that Britain would be open to the imputation of breach of faith on one side, or even on both, if the Convention were not carried into effect.
Learning that Monsieur Poussielgue was in Alexandria, he invited him on board The Tigre and suggested that he should go in the Constance with his dispatches to Lord Keith at Syracuse and, if necessary, to London, in order to convince the authorities that for Bonaparte it would be an embarrassment and not an asset if Kléber and his army landed in France. He agreed, and sailed in the Constance without even waiting for permission.
At this time Kléber was much preoccupied with the political situation in France because he now had definite confirmation that Bonaparte had seized the supreme power in the famous coup d’état of the 18th brumaire (10th November, 1799). ‘France could not have been subjugated by a more miserable charlatan,’ he wrote in his private notebook. He sai
d that he had fought until then for the glory of their arms and for liberty, but as their glory increased, liberty had drawn further off until it had ceased to exist, perhaps never had existed except as a hope that now had vanished. But the more he reflected on the Convention, the more he was convinced that he had acted rightly, and that posterity would award him a crown for having had the courage to give a reasonable issue to an extravagant enterprise abandoned with cowardliness by its author.
On 10th March, he received Sir Sidney’s warning. In strict compliance with the terms of the Convention, he had already evacuated the French strongholds at Qatyeh, de Saleya, Belbeys, l’Esbet, Suez, and all the forts in Upper Egypt and on the Damietta Branch of the Nile. The guns in the Citadel of Cairo had been removed because, according to the agreement, the Turks were to take possession of it on the 14th. His troops were moving towards Rosetta and Alexandria to be ready for embarkation. He ordered them to about turn and without wasting a minute re-occupy the forts and the Citadel, and he sent out detachments of the Dromedary Corps in all directions to order all his scattered forces to concentrate in the neighbourhood of Cairo. He sent Damas, His Chief of Staff, to the Vizier to inform him that in view of Sir Sidney’s letter he could not surrender the city until Lord Keith’s objections to the embarkation had been overcome, and to suggest that with patience and good will they might both get what they desired after a short delay. He also wrote cordially to Sir Sidney inviting him to come and confer with him at his headquarters in Cairo; but a warning from Lord Keith that a French fleet might be expected on the coast of Egypt made it inadvisable for him to leave The Tigre.
As a result of Kléber’s peaceful and reasonable attitude there was a parley at the Turkish camp between the Vizier, the Reis Effendi, and two of Kléber’s officers, Damas and Gloutier. Sir Sidney was also invited to attend, but he was still obliged to remain in The Tigre; it was a very unfortunate circumstance. With his personal influence removed, the Vizier for the first time rejected his advice. He turned down the French delegates’ proposal of a standstill for one month and insisted on marching forward to occupy Cairo.
Beware of Heroes: Admiral Sir Sidney Smith's War against Napoleon Page 15
