Good Hunting: An American Spymaster's Story

by Jack Devine

  As to whether someone with bipolar disorder could work as a case officer, it is worth remembering that in 2008 bipolar disorder was officially declared to be a disability that would not bar employment in the U.S. government. There are “excepted service” positions in certain high-risk jobs (the Navy SEALs, for example) for which mentally or physically handicapped personnel may not qualify. However, this condition and the associated medicines would have to be declared at the time of employment—something Claire Danes’s character, Carrie, does not do in Homeland. Nonetheless, I would point out that when I first joined the CIA in the late 1960s, bipolar disorders were not classified as such, and as I think back on the colleagues I worked with through the years, I don’t doubt that there were officers at all levels in the Agency who had this disability, and functioned at the top of their game. So while Carrie the rogue operative is out of focus, the concept of bipolar personnel serving in key positions is certainly well within the range of the possible, as it should be. The U.S. intelligence service needs to be a reflection of its people, which includes gender, minority, and disability diversity.

  Much has changed in the world since I reported for duty at the CIA years ago. But much has stayed the same. The Agency can still speak truth to power. It can still steal enemies’ secrets. It can still run covert operations that Ian Fleming would envy. We have proved we are fallible, to be sure. But we’ve also proved we are an indispensable force. Riding down from the seventh floor in the DO’s elevator after my last meeting with the DCI, its trim still colored with tiny red squares, I felt a surge of pride, confident that the CIA would, to paraphrase William Faulkner, not just endure, but prevail.

  FOURTEEN

  Good Hunting

  New York, 2014–

  The role of the CIA and its covert programs in the post-Iraq and -Afghanistan world will be critically important to our national security, and there is no shortage of other seriously troubled countries around the world that will require our attention for years to come. Given the supposition that the United States will not put large numbers of troops on the ground again anytime soon, and that the defense budget will be cut significantly, it is axiomatic that we will need to find a smart way to protect our interests abroad if we wish to stay involved globally and exercise our power for America’s benefit and defense. Thus, one of the key strategies by necessity in the future will be an enhanced use of covert power. As we proceed down this path, we must be mindful that these activities are carried out in a responsible and effective manner. I view successful covert action as having six common characteristics. These are principles that decision makers need to keep in mind as they consider whether to commit the United States to a particular covert action.

  1. Identify a legitimate enemy. To be successful, covert action must be in the U.S. national interest. This means that it is directed against a legitimate enemy of the United States or an “intrinsically evil” force that should be driven from power or influence. In this regard, it is useful to distinguish the target of the covert operation from the venue in which it takes place. There is no reason the CIA shouldn’t conduct covert action in nonenemy territory if it is in the service of action against a legitimate enemy. This will continue to occur across the world, in peacetime and in war. Policy makers tend to forget that almost all covert action eventually comes to light. Thus, there will be hell to pay if a program does not align with our values and interests. This is also a reason to be cognizant of the trade-offs between short-term gain and long-term consequences. If something is expedient in the short term but looks like it may turn out to run counter to our interests over time, policy makers should be very wary of making that trade-off, and not only because they may be held accountable later for damage to national security or our global reputation.

  2. Determine on-the-ground conditions. We should never undertake any covert action that does not have a reasonable likelihood of success. Thus, our goals must be consistent with reality on the ground. We cannot expect to achieve our objectives in any country where the environment is not suitable for intervention. We must be diligent in avoiding the myth that “all it takes is a spark” to overcome a nasty foreign policy problem. This myth, which essentially states that covert action can instigate change by simply setting the wheels in motion and allowing the United States to step back as history unfolds, has been the source of many blunders in U.S. foreign policy, and still looms large in our government’s decision making today. I have provided many examples of such strategies falling flat, beginning with the Nixon administration’s premature attempts overthrow President Allende of Chile in 1970. Without the support of the Chilean military and population, no amount of U.S. covert activity or influence would have convinced Chileans that Allende was not the man for them then. We had to wait for the circumstances to bring the Chileans around, helping out where we could to preserve the opposition. This is exactly what our role should be where the time is not right: we can provide support to a movement, but we can’t spark one that isn’t there.

  3. Ensure adequate funding and staff. Successful covert action requires robust funding and personnel levels that match policy goals. Otherwise, we are not only putting our people at risk and wasting valuable resources but also dabbling in potentially counterproductive activities that could have serious unintended consequences. This shortcoming has been a key reason for many failed covert programs in the past, including the initial attempts to overthrow Saddam Hussein in the 1990s with a vastly inadequate budget. Not only did this program consume significant time and effort and result in lives lost, but it also ultimately empowered a group of exiles who were neither trustworthy nor representative of the on-the-ground reality in Iraq, and who in later years reportedly helped bolster the misinformation campaign that supported the U.S. invasion in 2003.

  4. Find legitimate local partners. It is tempting to ignore the need for having viable partners in place. Prominent exiles may have the ear of important political figures and policy makers who believe that exile communities can help them achieve their political goals. However, exiles, by virtue of their distance, are rarely in a position to marshal significant forces within their homeland or provide accurate intelligence of the situation in real time. A base of operations contiguous to the target is critical—London, Paris, or Washington won’t do. Moreover, prominent exiles have their own agendas that may not correspond to our own once action gets under way. An effective covert action must have partners within a host nation who share our goals and objectives and are willing to fight and die for their cause. Relying on exiles is a recipe for miscommunication, blunders, and often disaster.

  5. Determine proportionality. If the objective of a covert campaign is to eliminate or displace an enemy (for example, to drive the Soviets from Afghanistan), there is a maximum cost in lives and resources that is proportional in the moral and patriotic sense. When covert action is not in concert with American interests and values, whether in purpose or cost, we start to veer into dangerous territory. As mentioned earlier, at some point almost all covert action activities become public, and disproportionate activity that seemed reasonable on the drawing board will be hard to defend in the light of day. History has shown this again and again, so policy makers should never mount an operation that they can’t justify to the public.

  6. Acquire bipartisan political support. When considering whether to move forward with an initiative, this is among the most important considerations, since all foreign policy, even if it is not public, should support the values of the American people. If elected officials in Congress do not or would not think something is a good idea—Iran-Contra is an obvious example—then it should be abandoned. Moreover, if the above conditions are met, bipartisan congressional support will be much more likely to follow. Although only very few members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence have access to programmatic information about covert action, it is critical that these elected officials specifically charged with
authorizing and funding these activities believe our programs are in the national interest and consistent with their constituents’ objectives and values.

  Returning to the theme of what national security will look like in the years ahead, it is a pretty good bet that there will be a steady pull toward military neo-isolationism in our body politic. The tension between those advocating robust international engagement and others advocating isolationism is as old as the republic itself, appearing as early as George Washington’s Farewell Address in 1796. America today is war-weary and wants its troops home and the funding for recent wars redirected to domestic growth. Specifically, when I speak of neo-isolationism, I’m referring to a much-reduced and streamlined military presence abroad and a domestic policy focused on improving our economy, particularly reducing unemployment. If handled properly, this shift could actually enhance our national security. After all, no nation can expect to be taken seriously for long from a weak economic base. Having said this, the United States must remain engaged in this globalized world through the use of its “soft power”—political, economic, and intelligence activities.

  Now, as we approach 2015, we need to take a second look at our overarching strategy. The Cold War is long behind us, and our new enemies are less likely to be nation-states, with the possible exception of Iran and North Korea. The new world pits us against threats from asymmetrical special interests, terrorists, and localized interest groups, not to mention economic and political challenges such as the impending bubble burst in China and the fallout from the Arab Awakening. As a consequence, we will need to adjust our foreign policy strategies, our use of the armed forces, and our intelligence community to meet these changing strategic threats and challenges in the years ahead.

  * * *

  Without question, terrorism will remain the key national security threat to the homeland and will have to be dealt with tactically and fiercely. But, compared to the decade following 9/11, terrorism will begin to decline as a driver of U.S. foreign policy and world events. More than ten years after the fall of the Twin Towers, al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups are neither the strategic threat we once feared nor comparable to the threat of the Soviet Union during the Cold War that jeopardized our existence, government, way of life, or economic prosperity. That said, weapons of mass destruction in the hands of even relatively small enemies could have a devastating impact on America’s sense of security. Similarly, these groups would represent a renewed challenge to our national security if they were able to mount a campaign of ongoing low-grade terrorist events such as bombings, shootings, and cyberattacks, which so far they have proved incapable of doing or unwilling to do.

  A strong case could be made that al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden reached their high-water mark on 9/11, since they have not been able to pull off a major terrorist event in over a decade and have not carried out even a minor attack against the U.S. homeland. Since 9/11, large-scale international terrorism has actually been a remarkably unsuccessful tool for terrorist groups and their political affiliates. It has brought military and covert action upon their safe havens, restricted their access to assets and finances, led governments to hunt and kill their leaders and adherents, and generally decimated their ranks. So, while al-Qaeda and its spawn will continue to disturb our security for the foreseeable future, they need not be the overwhelming focus of our national security policy as we go forward.

  Rather, a long view suggests that terrorism, as an instrument of power, will continue its decline and become a much less serious strategic threat to the West as we reduce our presence abroad. Much of the credit for this can be given to U.S. and allied militaries, intelligence agencies, and law enforcement, which have greatly improved our defenses and abilities to detect terrorist planning. Al-Qaeda itself is also responsible, due to its propensity to slaughter Muslim civilians, for undermining its own ability to garner deep support in the Muslim world.

  * * *

  The Middle East and South Asia, the regions with which terrorism has been most closely associated, will continue to be critical for the United States. Afghanistan and Pakistan in particular will continue to be important battlegrounds for a struggle that will continue for many years. But the context will not be the one that Harvard professor Samuel P. Huntington anticipated almost twenty years ago in his Foreign Affairs article “The Clash of Civilizations.” Huntington believed that the diversity of peoples, culture, and values would be the leading cause of conflict in this century, and suggested that the West would almost certainly confront the Muslim world as our most serious adversary. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Huntington seemed to many to be right on target. But as some steam has gradually gone out of the Islamic terrorist groups, this inevitable “clash” seems far from certain. Rather, just as the United States will increasingly isolate itself from broad international conflicts, the nations of the Middle East and elsewhere will increasingly focus on their own internal problems. U.S. engagement with them will become a much more subtle prospect—and one that is better suited to covert action than overt military activities.

  With that in mind, there is little doubt that a major withdrawal of Western powers from Afghanistan will lead to instability and possibly even civil war. As Whitney Kassel and I wrote in the World Policy Journal in September 2013, the NATO drawdown is “likely to be followed by a civil war between a predominantly non-Pashtun security apparatus and Pakistan-backed Taliban forces.”1 It is clear that the Taliban and other Islamist groups, such as the Quetta Shura and the Haqqani network, will gain ground and sow unrest as U.S. and NATO forces subside. The government of Afghanistan is on the whole far too weak to stand up to these groups or their Pakistani sponsors, although international pressure will likely ensure that, in the near term, Karzai and his successor maintain some level of control over at least Kabul, if not the major urban centers of the country.

  It is unclear to what extent the future government will allow elements like al-Qaeda to reestablish safe havens in Afghanistan. Most of the leadership of al-Qaeda and other major international terrorist networks already resides in Pakistan, so until Pakistan becomes less hospitable, they are likely to remain in place. But an Afghanistan in which the United States has little influence or visibility will remain a haven for extremist groups that can threaten the United States and our allies, much as in the 1990s after the Soviet withdrawal. This is why it is critical that we maintain a residual presence, albeit covert, for as long as it is feasible—including some military advisers, a limited counterterrorism capability, and, most important, a robust covert action and intelligence infrastructure—to ensure we do not lose track of what is happening in this important and dangerous country.

  As noted earlier, I argued in The Wall Street Journal in July 2010 that “we should figure out now which tribal leaders—and, under specially negotiated arrangements, which Taliban factions—we could establish productive relationships with” and that “we should cultivate leaders inside and outside the current regime who are most likely to fill the power vacuum.”2 I can only assume and hope that we are doing this in some form, and that we have put ourselves in a position to ramp up covert activities with tribal leaders should it appear the Taliban is overwhelming other factions or liaising with al-Qaeda after our withdrawal.

  Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan will soon be the least of Americans’ concerns in the broader context of our relations with Pakistan, which poses perhaps the most imminent threat to U.S. national security. Frayed relations between the United States and Pakistan have very dangerous implications, including decreased U.S. counterterrorism options and the increased potential for conflict between India and Pakistan, including a nuclear exchange. This makes Pakistan one of our most immediate challenges and one that has more significant long-term strategic importance than the outcome in Afghanistan. While international terrorism will likely continue to decline gradually, armed groups in Pakistan remain one of the most likely sources of an international attack against Western interests. Our declining abili
ty to conduct robust counterterrorism operations inside Pakistan as a result of deteriorating bilateral relations could prove devastating if even one major attack is successful.

  Perhaps as worrisome as a potential attack on the homeland is the likelihood of a major terrorist attack in India that is traced back to Pakistan and results in an escalation of Indo-Pak tensions, possibly crossing the nuclear threshold. U.S. efforts should thus be closely focused on preventing both an attack in the United States and an attack against India. We should also continue to engage with the Indian and Pakistani governments to establish communication channels and other methods of preventing miscalculation in the event of an attack.

  Pakistan is on a downward spiral that could result in a failed state with nuclear weapons and a radicalized, young, male-dominated population. These internal, local dangers could prove much greater threats both to regional stability and to U.S. security than the remnants of al-Qaeda leadership residing in Pakistan today. Thus, we need to remain focused on maintaining good relations with the government of Pakistan and attempting to keep that country from falling into greater disrepair than it has already found itself, even after our withdrawal from Afghanistan. Like it or not, we need the Pakistanis if we are to protect our interests across the region, including counterterrorism and nuclear security.