The Afghanistan Papers
Page 32
“If we are going to get the Paks to really fight”: Donald Rumsfeld memo to Doug Feith, June 25, 2002, the National Security Archive, George Washington University.
“there was a failure to perceive the double game”: Strmecki interview, SIGAR.
“Pakistan would continue to see the Taliban as a useful surrogate”: Dobbins interview, SIGAR.
Everybody had a theory: Olson interview, U.S. Army Center of Military History.
“The American and Afghan perception”: Farris interview, Combat Studies Institute.
“these well-educated Pakistani generals who were nicely dressed”: Ibid.
“I think that’s pretty speculative”: Lt. Gen. David Barno interview, January 4, 2005, National Public Radio.
“are the Pakistanis playing a giant double-cross”: Gen. Barry McCaffrey memo to Col. Mike Meese and Col. Cindy Jebb, June 3, 2006, the National Security Archive, George Washington University. On June 15, Rumsfeld forwarded a copy of McCaffrey’s memo to Gen. Peter Pace, the Joint Chiefs Chairman, calling it “an interesting report.”
“The web of paranoia and innuendo”: Ibid.
Others disagreed: Marin Strmecki, Afghanistan at a Crossroads: Challenges, Opportunities and a Way Forward, August 17, 2006, the National Security Archive, George Washington University. Strmecki’s report was originally classified SECRET/NOFORN. It was declassified by the Defense Department on December 1, 2008.
“Musharraf has not made the strategic choice to cooperate fully”: Ibid.
Pakistani interlocutors habitually complained: Crocker interview, December 1, 2016, SIGAR.
“we’re hedging our bets, you’re right”: Ibid.
CHAPTER EIGHT: LIES AND SPIN
in a Toyota Corolla: Griff Witte, “Bombing Near Cheney Displays Boldness of Resurgent Taliban,” The Washington Post, February 28, 2007.
“The Taliban’s claims”: Jason Straziuso, “Intelligence suggested threat of bombing in Bagram area before Cheney’s visit, NATO says,” Associated Press, February 28, 2007.
word had leaked out about Cheney’s presence: Maj. Shawn Dalrymple interview, February 21, 2007, Operational Leadership Experiences project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
The bomber wasn’t far off the mark: Shawn Dalrymple interview with author, September 26, 2020.
in a different convoy about thirty minutes later: Ibid.
“The insurgents knew this, it was all over the news”: Dalrymple interview, Combat Studies Institute.
they originally set up a ruse: Dalrymple interview with author.
“You’d never expect him to ride in the gun truck”: Ibid.
“You have all the clocks but we have all the time”: State Department cable, Kabul to Washington, “Afghan Supplemental,” February 6, 2006. The cable was originally classified SECRET. It was partially declassified by the State Department in 2010 and released in response to a Freedom of Information Act request by the National Security Archive.
stoked fear among U.S. officials: Bush administration official interview, September 23, 2014, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. Name redacted by SIGAR.
“we finally woke up to the fact that there was an insurgency”: Ibid.
camping and riding horses and yaks: Ambassador Ronald Neumann interview, June 19, 2012, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training.
“it was going to get much bloodier, much worse”: Ibid.
“Nobody ever said to me”: Ibid.
“We thought the Taliban’s capability was greatly reduced”: Brig. Gen. Bernard Champoux interview, January 9, 2007, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C.
“we’re going to allow these guys to keep us languishing here”: Capt. Paul Toolan interview, July 24, 2006, Operational Leadership Experiences project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
“It’s a direct result of the progress that’s being made”: Donald Rumsfeld interview, CNN, Larry King Live, December 19, 2005.
“violence will rise through the next several months”: State Department cable, Kabul to Washington, “Policy on Track, But Violence Will Rise,” February 21, 2006. The cable was originally classified SECRET. It was partially declassified by the State Department on June 9, 2010, and released in response to a Freedom of Information Act request by the National Security Archive.
Neumann expressed fear: Ibid.
“I thought it was important to try to prepare the American public”: Neumann interview, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training.
didn’t sugarcoat his verdict: McCaffrey memo, the National Security Archive.
“very aggressive and smart in their tactics”: Ibid.
“They are in a disastrous condition”: Ibid.
“We will encounter some very unpleasant surprises”: Ibid.
“It is not that the enemy is so strong but that the Afghan government is so weak”: Strmecki memo, National Security Archive.
“We are not winning in Afghanistan”: State Department cable, Kabul to Washington, “Afghanistan: Where We Stand and What We Need,” August 29, 2006. The cable was originally classified SECRET. It was partially declassified by the State Department on June 11, 2010, and released in response to a Freedom of Information Act request by the National Security Archive.
“We are winning”: Terry Moran, “Battlefield Wilderness,” ABC Nightline, September 11, 2006.
a new set of talking points: Office of the Secretary of Defense Writers Group, “Afghanistan: Five Years Later,” October 6, 2006.
“Five years on, there is a multitude of good news”: Ibid.
“an excellent piece”: Donald Rumsfeld memo to Dorrance Smith, October 16, 2006, the National Security Archive, George Washington University.
“about ten times worse”: Staff Sgt. John Bickford interview, February 23, 2007, Operational Leadership Experiences project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
“they were always in Pakistan and regrouping”: Ibid.
“These are very smart people”: Ibid.
“hardcore ideologues”: Toolan interview, Combat Studies Institute.
“We’d ask the Afghans why”: Maj. Darryl Schroeder interview, November 26, 2007, Operational Leadership Experiences project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
one of his grandfathers was a farmer and the other a bootlegger: Brig. Gen. James Terry interview, February 13, 2007, Operational Leadership Experiences project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
“So you’d think that I’d have an appreciation of clans”: Ibid.
“ ‘Tell me about the Taliban’ ”: Ibid.
“There are three kinds”: Ibid.
CHAPTER NINE: AN INCOHERENT STRATEGY
The veteran Cold War warrior woke up before 5 a.m.: Gates, Duty, p. 5.
white Dodge Durango: Gates interview, Miller Center.
Bush wanted to hide his visitor: Ibid.
They chatted for an hour: Ibid.
“our goals were too ambitious”: Ibid.
“crush the Taliban”: Ibid.
received a call from Joshua Bolten: Ibid.
“There was no coherent long-term strategy”: Richards interview, SIGAR.
“just completely knocked the stuffing out of them”: Ibid.
the Canadians “were knackered”: Ibid.
“they were collectively exhausted”: Ibid.
“And Rummy said, ‘General what do you mean?’ ”: Ibid.
it permitted them to enjoy copious amounts of alcohol: Craig Whitlock, “German Supply Lines Flow with Beer in Afghanistan,” The Washington Post, November 15, 2008.
“We felt that we were giving it our all”: Ambassador Nicholas Burns interview, January 14, 2016, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR.
“a Frankenstein organization”: Maj. Brian Patterson interview, October 2, 2008, Operational Leadership Experiences project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
“to give better political shape”: Desmond Browne letter to Donald Rumsfeld, December 5, 2006, the National Security Archive, George Washington University.
a “commendable” idea: Donald Rumsfeld letter to Desmond Browne, December 13, 2006, the National Security Archive, George Washington University.
“There was no center”: NATO official interview, February 18, 2015, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. Name redacted by SIGAR.
“at that point I was ‘out of Schlitz’ ”: Gates interview, Miller Center.
“a lot of verbiage and talk, but no plan”: McNeill interview, SIGAR.
“I tried to get someone to define for me what winning meant”: Ibid.
“Iraq was sucking up all the resources”: Lt. Col. Richard Phillips interview, September 6, 2011, Operational Leadership Experiences project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
“just spinning our wheels”: Maj. Stephen Boesen interview, July 7, 2008, Operational Leadership Experiences project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
“my children will probably be doing the same mission”: Ibid.
he spent 85 percent of his time: Lute interview, SIGAR.
“We were devoid of a fundamental understanding of Afghanistan”: Ibid.
“It’s really much worse than you think”: Ibid.
“Is it alive and well now?”: Gwen Ifill, “Interview with Gen. Dan McNeill,” PBS Newshour with Jim Lehrer, December 10, 2007.
“Well, that statement didn’t come from me”: Ibid.
spaghetti-like chains-of-command: Lute interview, Miller Center.
“The left hand was not talking to the right hand”: Ibid.
“raid a compound overnight”: Ibid.
CHAPTER TEN: THE WARLORDS
publicly urged Afghanistan to confront its tumultuous past: press release, “Afghanistan: Justice for War Criminals Essential to Peace,” Human Rights Watch, December 12, 2006.
paid a private visit to one of the most notorious figures on the list: State Department cable, Kabul to Washington, “Meeting with General Dostum,” December 23, 2006, WikiLeaks. The cable was classified CONFIDENTIAL.
they found the warlord in a melancholy mood: Ibid.
“I’ve been called so many names”: Ibid.
settled into an overstuffed chair and did his best to calm Dostum’s “quasi-paranoia”: Ibid.
“On the basis of the enemy of my enemy is my friend”: Sarah Chayes interview, May 26, 2015, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR.
the U.S. government took a “schizophrenic” approach: Andre Hollis interview, May 16, 2016, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR.
Their deaths remained a secret: Assessments and Documentation in Afghanistan, Physicians for Human Rights.
no one was ever held accountable: Cora Currier, “White House Closes Inquiry into Afghan Massacre—and will Release No Details,” ProPublica, July 31, 2013.
“Dear U.S. president, George W. Bush!”: Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum letter to President George W. Bush, the National Security Archive, George Washington University. Dostum’s letter is undated and it lists Bush’s address as “1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington, D.C.”—with no zip code.
“I wish your Excellency good health”: Ibid.
the Pentagon took special care to deliver it: Gen. Tommy Franks memo to Donald Rumsfeld, January 9, 2002, the National Security Archive, George Washington University.
“He turned out to be quite a warfighter”: Donald Rumsfeld memo to Larry Di Rita, January 10, 2002, the National Security Archive, George Washington University.
urged him to give Dostum more power: State Department cable, Kabul to Washington, “Congressman Rohrabacher’s April 16 Meeting With President Karzai,” April 16, 2003, WikiLeaks. The cable was classified CONFIDENTIAL.
Karzai was incredulous: Ibid.
“under the Taliban at least there was law and order”: Ibid.
“a babyface Stalinesque Tito”: Hutson interview, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training.
floated an assortment of half-baked ideas: Ibid.
told Dostum he needed to think realistically: Ibid.
“Dostum had never heard of Aristide, or Haiti for that matter”: Ibid.
U.S. military commanders ordered a B-1 bomber: Khalilzad, The Envoy, p. 202–203.
one of the warlord’s aides placed a panicky phone call: Joshua Partlow, “Dostum, a former warlord who was once America’s man in Afghanistan, may be back,” The Washington Post, April 23, 2014.
Lamm thought about saying no: Col. David Lamm interview, March 14, 2007, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C.
“ ‘We’ve got to treat a warlord at Walter Reed?’ ”: Ibid.
thanked them for saving his life: Ibid.
The warlords “had thirty years of civil war behind them”: Finn interview, SIGAR.
“a mortal threat to the legitimacy of the regime”: Strmecki interview, SIGAR.
“people who diminish what was achieved in this phase are a little unfair”: Ibid.
“a major threat to the country’s future”: State Department cable, Kabul to Washington, “Confronting Afghanistan’s Corruption Crisis,” September 15, 2005. The cable was originally classified CONFIDENTIAL. It was declassified in full by the State Department on December 9, 2014, and released in response to a Freedom of Information Act request by the National Security Archive.
Both men, however, were politically untouchable: Partlow, A Kingdom of Their Own, p. 142–143.
Boucher admired Sherzai: Boucher interview, SIGAR.
“I thought that was one of the funniest things I ever heard”: Ibid.
it was better to funnel contracts to Afghans: Ibid.
“I want it to disappear in Afghanistan, rather than in the Beltway”: Ibid.
“a benevolent asshole”: Nils Taxell interview, July 3, 2015, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. In a December 2019 email to Washington Post reporters, Taxell added: “I must admit that I don’t recognize the specific language attributed to me by SIGAR, so the qualifier ‘as recorded by SIGAR’ is rather pertinent. Furthermore, I want to be clear that in my line of reasoning I was not expressing my opinion on any particular individual.”
“There was always a question of corruption”: Lt. Col. Eugene Augustine interview, February 22, 2007, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C.
“a simple-minded tyrant”: McNeill interview, SIGAR.
“SMA was dirty”: Ibid.
The black-bearded warlord had a tense history with Karzai: Partlow, A Kingdom of Their Own, p. 54.
the defense minister once blew his stack: Russell Thaden interview, June 13, 2011, Operational Leadership Experiences project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
“Fahim Khan was really upset about it until he learned which drug lab”: Ibid.
“He giggled while he related this”: Crocker interview, January 12, 2016, SIGAR.
“I would have considered him capable of any iniquity”: Ibid.
“as far as I know, he is still dead”: Ibid.
CHAPTER ELEVEN: A WAR ON OPIUM
a fleet of Massey Ferguson farm tractors: Lt. Col. Michael Winstead interview, November 7, 2013, Operational Leadership Experiences project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
“there will be no opium in this province”: Emmanuel Duparcq, “Opium-free in two months, vows governor of Afghanistan’s top poppy province,” Agence France-Presse, March 3, 2006.
“that’s just plain B.S.”: Lt. Col. Michael Slusher interview, February 16, 2007, Operational Leadership Experiences project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
he rushed to the scene and helped remove the bodies: Winstead interview, Combat Studies Institute.
a bag with $250,000 in cash: Ibid.
“We were really struggling”: Ibid.
“deserted their posts”: State Department cable, Kabul to Washington, “Helmand Eradication Wrap Up,” Ma
y 3, 2006, WikiLeaks. The cable was unclassified.
the ranks of the eradicators had dwindled: State Department cable, Kabul to Washington, “Helmand Governor Daud Voices Concerns About Security,” May 15, 2006, Wikileaks. The cable was classified CONFIDENTIAL.
To cover up the debacle: Maj. Douglas Ross interview, June 23, 2008, Operational Leadership Experiences project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
only “a modest amount” of the poppy crop was destroyed: State Department cable, “Helmand Eradication Wrap Up,” Wikileaks.
Yet the State Department certified the false numbers: Winstead interview, Combat Studies Institute.
“I had a number of villagers ask me”: Ibid.
“very corrupt individuals”: State Department cable, “Helmand Eradication Wrap Up,” WikiLeaks.
“Believe me, my hair turned white”: Ross interview, Combat Studies Institute.
“Ninety percent of the people’s income”: Lt. Col. Dominic Cariello interview, February 16, 2007, Operational Leadership Experiences project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
“That drug dealer doesn’t care”: Bates interview, Combat Studies Institute.
“We were disgruntling the whole province”: Ibid.
“The eradication campaign also appears”: State Department cable, “Helmand Eradication Wrap Up,” WikiLeaks.
“very bad and continuing to deteriorate”: State Department cable, “Helmand Governor Daud Voices Concerns About Security,” WikiLeaks.
“As soon as we handed it off to the British”: Slusher interview, Combat Studies Institute.
“Mullah Omar could enforce it with his blind eye”: Tooryalai Wesa interview, January 7, 2017, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR.
“Everyone from Congress brought it up immediately”: Metrinko interview, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training.
“we don’t have a functioning toilet here”: Ibid.
They agreed to pay Afghan poppy farmers $700 an acre: “Counternarcotics: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan,” June 2018, SIGAR.