The Afghanistan Papers

by Craig Whitlock

  mansions known as “poppy palaces” rose from Kabul’s rubble: Karin Brulliard, “Garish ‘poppy palaces’ lure affluent Afghans,” Washington Post, June 6, 2010.

  “Malign actions of power brokers”: Commander’s Initial Assessment, International Security Assistance Force, August 30, 2009.

  “The basic assumption was that corruption is an Afghan problem”: Rubin interview, January 20, 2015, SIGAR.

  “Our biggest single project, sadly and inadvertently”: Crocker interview, January 11, 2016, SIGAR.

  the U.S. government gave “nice packages”: German official interview, July 31, 2015, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. Name redacted by SIGAR.

  “you’d be stupid not to get a package”: Ibid.

  “so-and-so has just been to the U.S. Embassy and got this money”: Ibid.

  “self-organized into a kleptocracy”: Christopher Kolenda interview, April 5, 2016, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR.

  “The kleptocracy got stronger over time”: Ibid.

  “Petty corruption is like skin cancer”: Ibid.

  “It was like they just discovered something new”: Former National Security Council official interview, April 22, 2015, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. Name redacted by SIGAR.

  between 6,000 and 8,000 truckloads: “Warlord, Inc.: Extortion and Corruption Along the U.S. Supply Chain in Afghanistan,” Report of the Majority Staff, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, June 2010.

  A convoy of 300 trucks typically required 500 armed guards: Ibid.

  about 18 percent of the money went to the Taliban: Gert Berthold interview, October 6, 2015, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR.

  “And it was often a higher percent”: Ibid.

  corrupt Afghan officials and criminal syndicates skimmed off another 15 percent: Ibid. In a December 2019 email to a Washington Post reporter, Berthold added: “Where we identified anomalies in the flow of procurement funds, we typically proved, through financial records, that 16–25% of funds (where anomalies were identified) went to bad actors. We were told that this percentage was low, some saying that it was more like 40%.”

  “The political world gets in the way”: Thomas Creal interview, March 23, 2016, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR.

  disinvite them from the annual Fourth of July party: U.S. official interview, September 11, 2015, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. Name redacted by SIGAR.

  “the system was too entrenched”: Senior U.S. diplomat interview, August 28, 2015, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR.

  “We literally went there and surrounded the bank”: Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn interview, November 10, 2015, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR.

  “New Ansari was just incredibly corrupt”: Ibid.

  “No, no one was held accountable”: Ibid.

  “The pivot point was the Salehi case”: Justice Department official interview, April 12, 2016, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. Name redacted by SIGAR.

  “The interest and enthusiasm seemed to be lost”: Berthold interview, SIGAR.

  some Obama administration officials regarded corruption as “annoying”: Kolenda interview, SIGAR.

  “What I’m doing is not proper”: Andrew Higgins, “Banker feeds Afghan crony capitalism; Firm’s founder has secured Dubai home loans for some in Karzai’s inner circle,” Washington Post, February 22, 2010.

  exposed Kabul Bank as a teetering house of cards: Andrew Higgins, “Kabul Bank crisis followed U.S. push for cleanup,” Washington Post, September 18, 2010.

  loaned themselves hundreds of millions of dollars: “Report of the Public Inquiry into the Kabul Bank Crisis,” Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee, Government of Afghanistan, November 15, 2012.

  enmeshed in a power struggle: U.S. official interview, March 1, 2016, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. Name redacted by SIGAR.

  Kabul Bank served as the payroll agent: Joshua Partlow and Andrew Higgins, “U.S. and Afghans at odds over Kabul Bank reform,” Washington Post, October 7, 2010.

  Kabul Bank’s third biggest shareholder was Mahmoud Karzai: Andrew Higgins, “Karzai’s brother made nearly $1 million on Dubai deal funded by troubled Kabul Bank,” Washington Post, September 8, 2010.

  “On a scale of one to ten”: Senior Treasury Department official interview, October 1, 2015, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. Name redacted by SIGAR.

  emergency arrangements to fly in $300 million: Fitrat, The Tragedy of Kabul Bank, p. 170.

  “There were a million things we were trying to do”: Former senior U.S. official interview, December 12, 2015, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. Name redacted by SIGAR.

  U.S. spy agencies knew about illicit activities: Senior U.S. official interview, March 1, 2016, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. Name redacted by SIGAR.

  none of the intelligence agencies alerted law enforcement: “Report of the Public Inquiry into the Kabul Bank Crisis,” Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee.

  “it wasn’t in their mandate”: Senior U.S. official interview, March 1, 2016, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. Name redacted by SIGAR.

  The article’s findings shocked: Fitrat, The Tragedy of Kabul Bank, p. 115.

  Karzai refused to meet with the central bank governor: “Report of the Public Inquiry into the Kabul Bank Crisis,” Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee

  Neither of them had any inkling: Treasury Department official interview, July 27, 2015, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. Name redacted by SIGAR.

  “the whole house of cards came down”: Ibid.

  his office had to stop serving hot tea: Fitrat, The Tragedy of Kabul Bank, p. 202.

  “a group of mafia-controlled politicians”: Ibid, p. 192.

  “a case study of how fragile and precarious U.S. policy”: Treasury Department official interview, July 27, 2015, SIGAR.

  “I saw the tide turn when the going got tough”: International Monetary Fund official interview, February 25, 2016, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. Name redacted by SIGAR.

  sympathetic to a counterargument: Crocker interview, January 11, 2016, SIGAR.

  “I was struck by something Karzai said”: Ibid.

  CHAPTER SIXTEEN: AT WAR WITH THE TRUTH

  Panetta fingered a string of rosary beads: Panetta, Worthy Fights, p. 320–321.

  Panetta smiled and thought of his old friend: Panetta, Worthy Fights, p. 301 and p. 328.

  a flair for blunt, unscripted comments: Craig Whitlock, “Panetta echoes Bush comments, linking Iraq invasion to war on al-Qaeda,” The Washington Post, July 11, 2011.

  “Osama was probably laughing in his watery grave”: Eggers interview, SIGAR.

  U.S. government auditors would conclude: Prepared Remarks of John F. Sopko, “SIGAR’s Lessons Learned Program and Lessons from the Long War,” January 31, 2020, Project on Government Oversight retreat, Washington, D.C.

  “Every data point was altered”: Bob Crowley interview, August 3, 2016, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR.

  “truth was rarely welcome”: Ibid.

  “They had a really expensive machine”: John Garofano interview, October 15, 2015, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR.

  “There was not a willingness to answer questions”: Ibid. In a December 2019 email to a Washington Post reporter, Garofano added: “With the hindsight of eight years, I see things a bit differently: These guys were executing. But where was the strategic oversight? There was no independent body in the Congress or Pentagon that asked, What is working and what is not? Should we continue building Highway One? Can we build an economy that will sustain the nation and society we are trying to construct? Washington, no less than the operators on the ground, fought the war one year at a time. It was easier to provide just enough resources to prevent catastrophe than to reassess strategy and tactics. And reassessment will not occur on the ground any more than assembly line workers will redesign an automobile.”

  “why does
it feel like we are losing?”: Flynn interview, SIGAR.

  “So they all went in for whatever their rotation was”: Ibid.

  “it showed that everything was getting worse”: Senior U.S. official interview, July 10, 2015, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. Name redacted by SIGAR.

  the Obama White House and Pentagon pressured the bureaucracy: National Security Council staff member interview, September 16, 2016, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. Name redacted by SIGAR.

  “It was impossible to create good metrics”: Ibid.

  the White House and Pentagon would spin them in their favor: Ibid.

  “It was their explanations”: Ibid.

  “with numbers you can spin them any way you want”: Maj. John Martin interview, December 8, 2008, Operational Leadership Experiences project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

  “does that mean the situation has gotten worse:” Ibid.

  “the mother of all databases”: Senior NATO official interview, February 18, 2015, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. Name redacted by SIGAR.

  “It should be a standard operating procedure”: Ibid.

  CHAPTER SEVENTEEN: THE ENEMY WITHIN

  looking down into the barren valley for signs of the enemy: Adam Ashton, “Ambush, shootings a deadly betrayal by allies” (Tacoma, Washington) News Tribune, May 12, 2013. See also Adam Ashton, “The Cavalry at Home: A soldier’s wounds and a will to live,” (Tacoma, Washington) News Tribune, December 14, 2013.

  gunfire erupted directly behind them: Ibid.

  shot several times in the back: Ibid.

  capped a brutal two-month period: Bill Roggio and Lisa Lundquist, “Green-on-blue attacks in Afghanistan, the data,” August 23, 2012, The Long War Journal.

  “I’m mad as hell”: Lara Logan, “Interview with Gen. John Allen,” 60 Minutes, September 30, 2012.

  placed a small bomb under the seat of an Australian colonel: Maj. Christopher Sebastian interview, November 1, 2012, Operational Leadership Experiences project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

  “a persistent feeling of dread”: Ibid.

  “they reflect a growing systemic threat”: Jeffrey Bordin, “A Crisis of Trust and Cultural Accountability,” U.S. Forces–Afghanistan, May 12, 2011.

  he wrote a series of articles: See Adam Ashton, “Ambush, shootings a deadly betrayal by allies,” (Tacoma, Washington) News Tribune, May 12, 2013; Adam Ashton, “Report sheds light on 2012 ‘green-on-blue’ attack,” (Tacoma, Washington) News-Tribune, August 6, 2013; Adam Ashton, “The Cavalry at Home: A soldier’s wounds and a will to live,” (Tacoma, Washington) News Tribune, December 14, 2013.

  six assailants: Ibid.

  “We knew what they were capable of”: Ashton, “The Cavalry at Home,” News-Tribune.

  might suddenly go rogue: Maj. Jamie Towery interview, December 17, 2012, Operational Leadership Experiences project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

  “We’d just never know when they might turn on you”: Ibid.

  only 2 to 5 percent of Afghan recruits could read: Jack Kem interview, April 23, 2014, Operational Leadership Experiences project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

  “The literacy was just insurmountable”: Ibid.

  army and police forces were shrinking: Ibid.

  more than 64,000 Afghans in uniform had been killed: Neta C. Crawford and Catherine Lutz, “Costs of War Project,” Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Brown University, November 13, 2019.

  “Thinking we could build the military that fast and that well was insane”: Former senior State Department official interview, August 15, 2016, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. Name redacted by SIGAR.

  “We can’t just shovel one-year money at this problem”: Lute interview, SIGAR.

  killed by his own men: Maj. Greg Escobar interview, July 24, 2012, Operational Leadership Experiences project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

  “Nothing we do is going to help”: Ibid.

  Can we win there?: Maj. Michael Capps interview, December 14, 2011, Operational Leadership Experiences project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

  “You could lose that place covering every inch of ground”: Ibid.

  he lined up rows of folding chairs: Maj. Mark Glaspell interview, November 2, 2012, Operational Leadership Experiences project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

  “it was going pretty good”: Ibid.

  “Well, then it was a brawl”: Ibid.

  U.S. officers reminded their Afghan soldiers that winter was coming: Maj. Charles Wagenblast interview, August 1, 2012, Operational Leadership Experiences project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

  “ ‘No, it’s not cold yet’ ”: Ibid.

  “But it will be cold, I’m pretty sure”: Ibid.

  got an earful from district tribal leaders: Shahmahmood Miakhel interview, February 7, 2017, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR.

  “I asked that why is it possible”: Ibid.

  “the most hated institution”: Thomas Johnson interview, SIGAR.

  “set up their own private checkpoints”: Norwegian official interview, July 2, 2015, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. Name redacted by SIGAR.

  “they are useless as a security force”: Crocker interview, January 11, 2016, SIGAR.

  “It was, ‘Here’s what handcuffing is’ ”: Maj. Robert Rodock interview, October 27, 2011, Operational Leadership Experiences project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

  “cop in a box”: Lt. Col. Scott Cunningham interview, August 15, 2013, Operational Leadership Experiences project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

  “We didn’t trust them with it one bit”: Ibid.

  “the bottom of the barrel”: U.S. soldier interview, September 7, 2016, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. Name redacted by SIGAR.

  “drug addicts or Taliban”: U.S. military officer interview, October 20, 2016, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. Name redacted by SIGAR.

  “You get unaccountable militias that prey on the population”: Lt. Col. Scott Mann interview, August 5, 2016, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR.

  he led his forces into combat with imaginary enemies: Capt. Andrew Boissonneau interview, September 17, 2014, Operational Leadership Experiences project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

  “he would get in firefights with the Helmand River”: Ibid.

  CHAPTER EIGHTEEN: THE GRAND ILLUSION

  Only 38 percent of the public said the war had been worth fighting: Washington Post–ABC News poll, December 11–14, 2014.

  the U.S. military launched missiles and bombs on 2,284 occasions: Combined Forces Air Component Commander, “2013–2019 Airpower Statistics,” February 29, 2020, U.S. Air Forces Central Command.

  Instead of flooding the country with 100,000 U.S. troops: Senior U.S. official interview, September 13, 2016, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. Name redacted by SIGAR.

  “will it hold when you leave?”: Ibid.

  “we could have brought them back on an airplane by now”: Boucher interview, SIGAR.

  slip a line in his inauguration speech: Lute interview, SIGAR.

  “There was a continuous tension”: Dobbins interview, SIGAR.

  with the call sign “Hammer”: Tim Craig, Missy Ryan and Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “By evening, a hospital. By morning, a war zone,” Washington Post, October 10, 2015.

  GPS coordinates of the site: “Initial MSF internal review: Attack on Kunduz Trauma Centre, Afghanistan,” Médecins Sans Frontières, November 2015.

  CHAPTER NINETEEN: TRUMP’S TURN

  Mattis and the Joint Chiefs wanted to give him a special briefing in “The Tank”: Rucker and Leonnig, A Very Stable Genius, p. 131–136.

  Trump called it a “loser war”: Ibid.

  “You’re a bunch of dopes and babies”: Ibid.

  McMaster thought the war had gone
off the rails: McMaster, Battlegrounds, p. 212–214.

  McMaster believed the expense was worth it: Ibid.

  Leading up to the session, McMaster refined his pitch: Ibid.

  Then the military intensified the airstrikes even more: “2013–2019 Airpower Statistics,” U.S. Air Forces Central Command.

  U.S., NATO and Afghan airstrikes killed an estimated 1,134 civilians a year: Neta C. Crawford, “Afghanistan’s Rising Civilian Death Toll Due to Airstrikes, 2017–2020,” Costs of War project, Brown University, December 7, 2020.

  By some estimates, thirty to forty Afghan soldiers and police were killed daily: Rod Nordland, “The Death Toll for Afghan Forces Is Secret: Here’s Why,” The New York Times, September 21, 2018.

  an Afghan soldier carrying a crate of pomegranates: Mujib Mashal and Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “How a Taliban Assassin Got Close Enough to Kill a General,” The New York Times, November 2, 2018.

  the shooter had… enlisted as a guard: Ibid.

  Smiley had narrowly escaped death: Dan Lamothe, “U.S. general wounded in attack in Afghanistan,” Washington Post, October 21, 2018.

  CHAPTER TWENTY: THE NARCO-STATE

  An independent analysis by a British researcher: David Mansfield, “Bombing the Heroin Labs in Afghanistan: The Latest Act in the Theatre of Counternarcotics,” January 2018, LSE International Drug Policy Unit.

  “we should have specified a flourishing drug trade”: Lute interview, SIGAR.

  “these guys have a history of smuggling”: Maj. Matthew Brown interview, July 30, 2012, Operational Leadership Experiences project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

  “ ‘the entire world’s worth of opium’ ”: Ibid.

  “The Western policies against the opium crop”: Phil Stewart and Daniel Flynn, “U.S. Reverses Afghan Drug Policy, eyes August Vote,” Reuters, June 27, 2009.

  “ineptitude and lack of capacity”: Former senior British official interview, June 17, 2015, Lessons Learned Project, SIGAR. Name redacted by SIGAR.

  “no one could stop the Marines”: Ibid.