Gaming the Game

by Sean Patrick Griffin

  One thing many observers, no doubt because they were without access to Battista’s betting records (and, more generally, because they are not familiar with the sociology of big-time betting), have not considered Donaghy’s claim regarding how and when he placed bets on games he officiated. The former referee says that he obtained “inside information” from other referees and player personnel, often in the pregame meeting, and that he commonly called Tommy Martino from arenas just prior to game time. As former FBI Supervisory Special Agent Phil Scala says, Donaghy told the FBI that he didn’t have to influence games with his calls because, Donaghy claimed, “I could pick a winner eighty percent of the time just knowing what I knew an hour before the game ” (emphasis added).

  No serious analysis of sharp sports gambling will demonstrate millions of dollars consistently being wagered in a matter of an hour or two, much less on an ongoing basis. As illustrated earlier, it takes a lot of time and effort to get that kind of money down, and the market adjusts quickly to the smart/sharp money, making it impossible to get big bets down unless there is sufficient time to manage and/or manipulate the world’s markets (Asia, Europe, offshore, Vegas, etc.). Big-time bettors place wagers and manipulate betting lines on NBA games often over periods of ten or more hours in order to obtain the most favorable point spreads (“the best numbers”). As Jimmy Battista said before ever hearing Donaghy’s story, and thus when it was an otherwise innocuous statement, “Starting with the very first game we bet together, Elvis bet about a third of the games the night before. Most of the time he called in his bets the mornings of his games, and then I got to work.”

  Lou, the pro gambler, offers this analysis of what he found regarding how Battista was betting (which is remarkably similar to what Battista describes, himself). “You have places like CRIS that take $3000 or $5000 on a game and their lines are published to the world. Then you have these outlaw guys, like the little guys in Philly and everywhere taking $5000 and their lines aren’t published anywhere, and sportsbooks in Asia and their lines aren’t published anywhere. Well, let’s say in Asia they were taking $30,000 a game, which is what they were taking at the time. The first thing Sheep was doing was faking the game in the morning, so that he could get a better line in Asia. They were betting the wrong way on purpose in the morning. You could see that by looking at their bets, and it’s the same thing we do. We fake in the morning, too. Sheep wanted to do two things: bet as much money as possible but he wanted the line to move as little as possible. He also did such a good job [when Battista did want the line to move] of throwing $5000 at a book like CRIS, or $5000 here, and $3000 there, to all these books that publish their lines that everyone uses. Imagine you have 10,000 sportsbooks in the world and all of them look to these 15 sportsbooks for their lines. These little bookmakers aren’t making their own lines. They don’t know what the right line on a game is.” Thus, with strategic, relatively small bets with the right sportsbooks, Battista influenced lines around the world until such a point he obtained the numbers he liked, at which point he bet millions on Donaghy’s games, spread out in parcels with multiple outs.

  Importantly, because Lou’s solitary focus was to understand the scheme’s betting mechanics, he didn’t (and perhaps still doesn’t) grasp the significance of his findings regarding Battista’s early morning “head fakes” and Battista’s betting in Asia. If one’s motivation is to assess Tim Donaghy’s claims that he placed bets just prior to game times, Lou’s research findings further refute Donaghy’s version of events. Instead, they support Battista’s claims that Donaghy placed his bets the evening prior or early in the morning of game days, so that Battista could manipulate the market sufficiently to get the best numbers. The FBI never knew about Battista’s betting pattern, however, and thus couldn’t have known Donaghy’s version of events flew in the face of how millions of dollars were bet on Donaghy’s games.

  Betting line data also support the contention that Battista was obtaining Donaghy’s picks long before game times. Recall that Battista and other pro gamblers say they were betting big on Donaghy’s games (often long) before Battista ever formally hooked up with Donaghy, especially including the beginning of the 2006-07 season. If—as Battista, Lou, and others claim— Battista bet earlier and more often on Donaghy’s games once he consummated the deal on December 12, 2006, including manipulating the lines (which could only be accomplished over longer periods of time), betting lines on Donaghy’s games would be expected to move more for those between 12/12/06 and 3/26/07 than for other Donaghy games that season. As illustrated in Table A-3, this is precisely what happened.15

  The validity of Donaghy’s defense against influencing games hinged largely on his story of “inside information” he was supposedly gleaning shortly before games he was officiating (i.e., overhearing other referees and player personnel in the locker rooms before games). Since Battista was betting big money long before Donaghy ever visited an arena on game day, the “inside info” explanation for Donaghy’s successful wagers is further discredited.

  Summing Up

  As I have stated implicitly and explicitly above and elsewhere, I have yet to come across data which supports Tim Donaghy’s claim that “inside information” accounted for his betting success.16 To the contrary, I have reviewed various types of information from numerous, independent sources, and most if not all of the data suggests Donaghy influenced the outcomes of games in support of his bets. The two pro gamblers cited throughout this appendix offer the following, as I conclude this analysis. “A lot of times the lines for Donaghy’s games moved four, five, six points,” Battista says. “Over time, people assumed the fix was in because NBA lines just don’t move that much. There was also a point in February or March 2007 when I just couldn’t believe no one was looking into Donaghy’s games because so many of them were falling right near the number [game outcomes were very close to the point spread]. If anyone was paying attention, and by then some gamblers were, it was obvious something was going on with his games.” Pro gambler Lou voices similar sentiments, and says more pointedly, “The NBA surely has to know Donaghy was fixing games. I really wish they’d release the individual call logs, which they have for every game, that show which referee made which calls, but that would make the NBA look really bad.”17

  * * *

  SOME SUGGESTED RESEARCH

  FOR THE NBA

  These are two things the NBA could entertain if they wanted substantive evidence of whether former referee Tim Donaghy altered game outcomes to advance his betting propositions. My first suggestion, ironically, was inspired by the NBA’s own inquiry into the betting scandal. In the Pedowitz Report (pp. 113-14, under “VII. Recommendations;

  4. Gambling Enforcement, Detection and Deterrence; c) Gambling Monitors; and d) Statistical Screening for Gambling and Bias”), the following is respectively discussed ( emphasis added):

  The League has now arranged to obtain information on a regular basis from individuals and entities involved in the gambling business who can provide the League with information about unusual movements in the betting lines , rumors about things such as injury reports or referee schedules or where the “smart money” is being wagered . By flagging games or individuals for the League to investigate, these monitors may help the League detect gambling or misuse of confidential information. . . .

  Since the 2003-2004 season, the League has been collecting data on calls and non-calls for each referee. The collection system was designed by Sibson as part of the overall effort to redesign the officiating performance program. The system itself was built by the League. Although this system was developed for training and instructional purposes, we have worked with the League and Sibson to develop a prototype, proprietary system for screening games in an effort to help detect data patterns that may suggest misconduct by referees and others. Data—including this foul call information and the movements of betting lines—can be analyzed using various algorithms to flag patterns consistent with questionable behavior. While
this system is in development, the League has already started to actively monitor several high level data-points (such as line movements) for every game for signs of potential misconduct, and certain game and betting information is distributed to League management on a daily basis. For those games that are flagged, the League has undertaken further review. In addition, the League hired Steven Angel, a former consultant with Sibson, as Senior Vice President for League Operations and Officiating to, among other things, help coordinate wagering intelligence and game screening . . .

  This collection of gambling and referee behavior data seems prudent, as do the related assessments. Why, though, restrict such analysis to current and future activity? If the referee/call data has been collected since the 2003-04 season (which, interestingly, is roughly when Tim Donaghy claims he first bet on NBA games), why not perform these analyses on Donaghy’s games (and others) beginning with the ’03-04 season? Such study would offer insights into various areas of inquiry, end much speculation, and better demonstrate for the NBA what was missed (and possibly how) during the betting scandal. There is an interesting footnote tangentially related to this suggestion. According to Kenny White, CEO and lead oddsmaker for Las Vegas Sports Consultants, the world’s largest oddsmaking company, he researched betting trends involving Tim Donaghy and submitted a report to the NBA in the fall of 2007. Of this situation, White told the Las Vegas Review-Journal , “They never called back to discuss it or anything.”

  The second thing the league could do is either the most simple or the most difficult: identify and locate big-time, heavy-hitting professional gamblers, and then interview them about the NBA betting scandal. As explained and exhibited earlier, some of these individuals have done their own, remarkably sophisticated assessments, and there may be considerable wisdom to gain from speaking with them.

  Footnotes

  I am using the term “influence” as opposed to “fix” simply because one referee among three working a game may influence a game and yet still not be able to sufficiently alter (fi x) the outcome because he is not in total control of the officiating or of other relevant matters (coaching decisions, injuries, etc.). Of note, it is often said that Donaghy didn’t “bet” on his own games during the ’06-07 scandal; he merely provided picks for them. In the gambling world, Donaghy’s actions are considered “betting” because he was picking a side of a sporting event and earning winnings if his pick was correct. The fact that he didn’t have to pay for losses is what confuses non-bettors regarding the definition of “betting.” Gamblers call arrangements like Donaghy’s betting on a “free roll,” and the practice is fairly common among the world’s sharps and their runners (free rolls—bets which have no cost for losses—are routinely offered as currency).

  Others would likely say there is a second unresolved question (among others): Were other referees involved in the scheme (and, if so, how)? As noted earlier, Jimmy Battista claims he only bet on approximately seven games not officiated by Tim Donaghy, and that he was not privy to Donaghy’s dealings with other NBA referees. Importantly, no one, including Tommy Martino, Pete Ruggieri, and other pro gamblers, is claiming that “non-Donaghy” games were of any significance in the betting scheme. I have not taken the time to investigate this issue of other referees further, and thus have little to add to the existing record beyond what already appears. Donaghy claims the other referees involved in the scandal were merely used by him for “inside information.” That is, he says he routinely phoned unknowing officials to pump them for any insights regarding injuries, etc., and that he placed bets on NBA games he wasn’t officiating in consideration of this information. As stated previously, no other referees were criminally charged as a result of the FBI’s investigation. Of course, it is true that authorities largely followed Donaghy’s lead in this regard and that they didn’t have much of the information contained in Gaming the Game which rather seriously calls into question many Donaghy assertions. Thus, it is possible the FBI would have approached the entire investigation differently, including the particular area of other NBA referee involvement, had sources like Battista and other knowledgeable pro gamblers cooperated in earnest with authorities. I have not ruled out returning to this area of inquiry when time permits. Of note, Jimmy Battista is incredulous other officials have not been pressed further. For instance, NBA referee and former Donaghy confidante Scott Foster was the subject of considerable media attention when his phone number appeared so frequently on Tim Donaghy’s phone records during the scandal’s time frame. About this, Battista says, “Everybody assumed Donaghy was getting Foster’s picks on Foster’s games, and maybe that did happen. I would love to see Scott Foster’s phone records to see who he was calling after he talked to Timmy. Why isn’t anyone considering the possibility that Foster was betting on Timmy’s games? And, don’t forget, Timmy was getting my NFL and college football picks, before and after we hooked up in December [2006]. Well, Timmy was always on the phone with Foster back then, too, so somebody should look into that. Was Timmy giving my football picks to Foster for Foster to bet on those games?” According to media reports, the FBI questioned Scott Foster about the calls, but probably not in a manner of which Battista would approve. “They specifically asked me, ‘Can you recall Tim pumping you for information?’ I was thinking, ‘How did I miss this? Am I a moron?’” Foster said. ”I thought about everything he and I talked about and whether I knowingly gave him information or if he was using me in any way. Yes, he probably could’ve been doing that.” In this regard, the Pedowitz Report states that “the government contacted Foster only once during its investigation—when the FBI interviewed him in August 2007. During this interview, which the FBI conducted by phone rather than in person, the FBI asked Foster about his relationship with Donaghy. Foster explained his long-term friendship with Donaghy and told the FBI that they spoke almost every day during the season. It appears that the purpose of this interview was simply to confirm that Donaghy had accurately described his relationship with his friend Foster.” Foster was also cleared by the NBA. Comically, given Donaghy’s allegations that federal law enforcement authorities didn’t sufficiently pursue the prosecution of other NBA referees, there was an area of activity which could have brought criminal charges against other officials, namely if other referees were somehow part of Donaghy’s 2003-07 betting on NBA games. Of course, such revelations would also have no doubt increased Donaghy’s criminal liability. That is, he and his colleagues would likely be in jeopardy if other referees were: betting on their own games with or through Donaghy; getting Donaghy’s picks on Donaghy’s games to then place bets on these games with their own bookies or agents; and/or knowingly offering their insights and/or picks to Donaghy for him to bet in return for a fee or for winnings on bets. Donaghy, though, made no such claims against other referees, offering instead information about matters unrelated to the betting scandal.

  As the writing of this book was being completed in March 2010, Lou was still refining his master list of the games he and his researchers believe Donaghy officiated and bet. Of note, his research team’s list for the 2006-07 NBA season is markedly different than the one offered by Tim Donaghy—the sides bet (and thus the bet outcomes) are different, and Lou’s team claims to have found evidence of Battista’s wagers on more than 40 Donaghy games they believe were part of that season’s betting scandal.

  Regarding betting line activity, the “open” lines are their own story because some sportsbooks do not maintain records for the true opening lines. Instead, their records consider the time when the market is “full” (i.e., after the point spreads have settled, and when the sportsbooks begin taking large bets) as the “open” line. Thus, comparisons between sportsbooks regarding betting line activity are problematic, and were not undertaken. Whatever analyses were conducted and are presented here are from within a sportsbook’s data (e.g., if comparing Donaghy’s games versus other NBA games, each data set was from the same source and the peculiarities of that sportsbook’s “open�
� lines are therefore consistent).

  Costa Rica International Sports (CRIS) describes itself as “a recognized sports betting industry leader since 1985” that “provides safe, legal, and secure sports betting on sporting events, as well as horse racing, online casino games, poker, and bingo from any location in the world, 24 hours a day 7 days a week.” CRIS lines were obtained courtesy of Don Best. The Las Vegas and offshore sportsbooks would only provide data if their identities were not disclosed.

  For example, a 3-month sample (January – March 2010 inclusive) of NBA lines from CRIS (via Don Best) shows that 21.8% of lines had equal to or greater than 1.5-point moves from open to close, and only 8.9% of moves equal to or greater than 2 points.

  As partly explained in Chapter 18, plenty of critics have rightly questioned Donaghy’s “inside information,” most of which was nothing of the sort.

  Officiating in many sports is subjective, with basketball a prime example, and thus quotes are necessary when using words like “incorrect” and “wrong” to describe judgment calls. I should point out that I have collected and reviewed numerous referee statistics, but require more time and expertise to conduct analyses sufficiently. I am aware of a few serious researchers who have looked into the NBA betting scandal vis-à-vis referee behavior from a statistical perspective. Most notable is the work of Indiana University business professor Wayne L. Winston in his book Mathletics: How Gamblers, Managers, and Sports Enthusiasts Use Mathematics in Baseball, Basketball, and Football, and of former professional gambler Haralabob “Bob” Voulgaris, whose work was featured on ESPN.com among other related internet sites. Of Voulgaris, in 2008 ESPN said, “He’s one of the very few people . . . who have achieved a high level of success betting full-time on the NBA . . . He has his own massive database that would be the envy of any stat geek . . . [which] tracks the tendencies of individual referees, and factors all that and much more into forecasts. Voulgaris also watches close to 1,000 games a year.” Among numerous other analyses of Tim Donaghy’s officiating, Voulgaris examined the number of calls Donaghy made against each team in games he officiated. His findings regarding foul call disparities and other matters should be researched further. Voulgaris says, for instance, that Donaghy’s 2006-07 games exhibited wildly odd call disparities, meaning that whereas most games show referees call roughly the same number of fouls against each team, Donaghy’s clearly favor a side. He says, “If you take the thirty-five or so games I have charted and add to those the two hundred or so games from the past two years [2009-10] and ranked the top five games in terms of greatest number of calls favoring Team A – Team B, all five spots would be owned by Donaghy.” Donaghy’s ’06-07 season included games that had such splits between Team A and Team B as 26 – 6, and 17 – 0. At press time, Voulgaris was in the process of compiling a full data set, as well as a reference group. In advance, he says, “Donaghy has several games where the ratio is greater than fifteen. I’d lay a decent price that once we are done with [the 2009 and 2010 reference data set] there isn’t one instance of another ref who has a game where he has a fifteen-call difference between Team A and Team B.”