The Eastern Front 1914-1917

by Norman Stone

  32O. D. Yanushkevitch to Zhilinski 18th August cf. Savant p. 186 and, overall, Reichsarchiv p. 268f.

  33VIII. Army now contained 232 battalions, 124 squadrons and 1,212 guns, of which 184, 94 and 1,074 were concentrated for this battle. The Russians had 398, 288 and 1,492, but failed to concentrate. I Army had, scattered, 228, 173 and 924. Sbornik no. 795 gives X Army’s strength, somewhat later, as 150,000. These were not really used. In I Army, corps had on average 25,000 men and 100 guns (50 per infantry division), with only 811 officers for 40,000 men (Mileant’s figure, Sbornik no. 764 p. 791). V. Pflug, ‘10. armiya v sentyabre 1914 goda’ in Voyenni Sbornik (Belgrade) V (1925) pp. 231–60 is revealing; cf. Savant p. 286f. and 349f.

  CHAPTER FOUR

  1N. Stone: ‘Army and Society in the Habsburg Monarchy’ in Past & Present 33 (1966) pp.95–111.

  2F. Franek: ‘Probleme der Organisation in ersten Kriegsjahr’ (Ergänzungsheft of the Austro-Hungarian official history, Vienna 1932) p. 18; H. Kerchnawe: ‘Die unzureichende Rüstung der Mittelmächte…’ (Vienna 1932) p. 8.

  3The following account of Austro-Hungarian planning and mobilisation is based on study of the relevant documents in the Kriegsarchiv, Vienna: study has been made of private papers (Conrad, Kundmann, Potiorek) as well as of the records of planning in the General Staff, of railway-timetables for individual units, and of the activity of particular armies and army corps in July and August 1914. Full reference to these is made in the author’s article: ‘Die Mobilmachung der österreichisch-ungarischen Armee 1914’ in Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen (Freiburg i.B.) 1974/II pp. 67–95, which also contains a detailed account of the author’s disagreement with versions, hitherto given prominence, of these events. An important but unpublished source is the manuscript, prepared for the Carnegie series on the history of the war, by Emil Ratzenhofer: Oesterreich-Ungarns Mobilisierung, Transport, Versammlung Sommer 1914, known as ‘Ratzenhofer Deposit’ in the archives of the Hoover Institution, Stanford, California. The draft of this exists in Ratzenhofer’s Nachlass in the Kriegsarchiv, Vienna (B/691 Kartons 30–40). Ratzenhofer, as head of the Russland-Gruppe of the General Staff’s railway-section, was in an excellent position to survey events, and had an important part in them. The original record of the railway experts’ transactions is the Straub-diary: AOK. Quartiermeister-Abteilung, Faszikel 4119 from which my quotations are taken.

  4There had also been delay in partial mobilisation, against Serbia. It was proclaimed in the evening of 25th July, but the first day of mobilisation was not until 28th July. Conrad said that the delay occurred because the railways needed it. The railwaymen denied this, at least in private. Probably the delay occurred, like many others on the Austro-Hungarian side in the July crisis, because of ‘nerves’.

  5Conrad had told everyone that ‘the fifth day of mobilisation’ would be the decisive point. If he knew by then that Russia would intervene, then ‘B-Staffel’ could go north east directly; but if Russia intervened only after then, ‘B-Staffel’ would have started its road south, and would have to complete the Serbian campaign before going north-east against Russia. He said this more or less word-for-word to Burián, Tisza’s representative, on 28th July (Gróf Tisza István összes munkai vol. 2, Budapest 1924, p. 35). In fact, 1st August was the fifth day of this mobilisation-programme; and yet the experts found on 31st July—the fourth day—that ‘B-Staffel’ was irrevocably committed to the Balkans. Maybe it was just blundering; or maybe the whole question of fifth day had not very much meaning, but was merely a technical-sounding justification for Conrad’s proceeding to knock Serbia, despite the threat of Russian intervention, and despite the protests which he knew to expect.

  6Ratzenhofer, manuscript p. 214.

  7B. Enderes (and others) Verkehrswesen im Krieg (Vienna 1930) p. 60–5 record civilians’ disenchantment with the railway-experts’ ways. Other details are taken from the war-diaries of army commands: v. Stone, Mobilmachung note 41.

  8e.g. 4th Armeekommando, Faszikel 3, op. nr. 33, 37, 114.

  9M. v. Pitreich: Lemberg 1914 (Vienna 1924) p. 21. On Jaroslawice, Max Hoen: Jaroslawice (Vienna 1921) which should be compared with the (surprisingly numerous) Russian accounts: E. Tikhotski: Ataka avstro-vengerskoy konnitsy (Belgrade 1938); A. Slivinski: Konny boy (Belgrade 1912; V. Grebenshchikov: Noviye danniye o konnom boye 10. K. D.’ in Voyenni sbornik (Belgrade 1925) 7 pp. 111–9.

  10The battle of Galicia in August 1914 is best judged in the following, of which I have made extensive use:

  a) F. Conrad von Hötzendorf: Aus Meiner Dienstzeit 1906–1918 (5 vols. Vienna 1921–25), vols. 4 and 5.

  b) Oesterreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg (v. 2 ed. Vienna 1930)

  c) M. v. Pitreich: Lemberg (1924) and 1914. Die militärischen Probleme unseres Kriegsbeginnes (Vienna 1934) which I have found to be most reliable;

  d) A. Beloy: Galitsiyskaya bitva (Moscow 1929), most reliable work on the Russian side;

  e) N. Golovin: Galitsiyskaya bitva v. 1 (Prague 1930) and 2 (Dni pereloma) (Paris 1940) which have the usual faults of over-estimation of enemy strength and vendetta against Sukhomlinov and his friends in the General Staff;

  f) Memoirs, the most useful of which are M. v. Auffenberg: Aus Oesterreichs Teilnahme am Weltkrieg (Vienna 1920) and R. Pfeffer: Zum 10. Jahrestag der Schlachten von Zloczów und Przemyślany (Vienna 1924).

  114th Armeekommando Faszikel 34 (Evidenzen 1–330) passim, and the orders issued in Fasz. 4 (501—999) on the basis of this information. The information was sent on to the German VIII Army, with a request that it should attack across the Narev precisely because the Russians were so strong against Austria-Hungary (v. AOK. Verbindungs-offiziere Oberost. Fasz. 6180 No. 48 of 14th August).

  12Conrad-Archiv B/6 No. 100 (from Berchtold 18th August) cf. 4th Armeekommando Fasz. 3 No, 115 of 13th August and No. 36/1 of 13th August.

  13Beloy p. 353.

  14O. D. Yanushkevitch to Alexeyev and Ivanov, 9th and 10th August 1914.

  15Beloy p. 350, O. D. Yanushkevitch to Zhilinski 31st August.

  16Beloy’s Vykhod iz okruzheniya (Moscow 1925) is a special study of this battle. It should be compared with Auffenberg’s account (Teilnahme).

  17On Ruzski’s behaviour, a controversy developed both in Soviet and émigré publications after the war: for instance, in Voyennoye Delo (Moscow 1918–20) especially nos. 23, 25, and 27 of year 1, and 1–2 of year 2, where Klembovski and Bonch–Bruyevitch kept the controversy going, and inVoyenni sbornik (Belgrade) nos. 7f. where Dragomirov added his voice.

  CHAPTER FIVE

  1W. S. Churchill: The Great War (1930 ed.) vol. 3 p. 500.

  2These figures have been taken from the German official history: Reichsarchiv: Der Weltkrieg vol. 8 (Anlage 2 p. 629); Oberkommando des Heeres: Der Weltkrieg vol. 12 (1939) p. 477 (cf. Beilage 28); Bundesarchiv: Der Weltkrieg vol. 13 (1956) p. 47f and from the French equivalent: Les Armées françaises dans la Grande Guerre vol. 5 ii pp. 34, 45 and 47.

  3My account of strategy in the latter part of 1914 is based on the following:

  a) Sbornik dokumentov mirovoy voyni na russkom fronte. Manevrenny period. Varshavsko-Ivangorodskaya operatsiya (Moscow 1938) and Lodzinskaya operatsiya (1939), each with a volume of maps. Like the collection on East Prussia, these are collections, for Red Army use, of the important documents on strategy, individual engagements, and supply:

  b) G. Korolkov: Varshavsko-Ivanorodskaya operatsiya (1928 edition, Moscow);

  c) G. Korolkov: Lodzinskaya operatsiya (1928 edition, Moscow);

  d) Strategicheski ocherk voyni 1914–1918 gg. na russkom fronte vols 2 and edited respectively, by Korolkov and A. Neznamov, Moscow 1922–3);

  e) Reichsarchiv Der Weltkrieg vols. 5 and 6

  f) Bundesministerium f. Landesverteidigung: Oesterreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg vols. 1 and 2 (1931–2).

  4P. Cherkasov: Shturm Peremyshla (Moscow 1927) discusses Shcherbachev’s siege. The Grand Duke forbade attempts against the fortress (O. D. 8th September to Ivanov). He was ‘m
isunderstood’.

  5Varshavsko-Ivangorodskaya operatsiya p. 129f; cf. A. von Schwarz: Ivangorod v 1914–1915 gg. (Paris 1969) p.44f.

  6Varshavsko-Ivangorodskaya operatsiya nos. 81–101 cover V Army, nos. 44–63 IV Army and nos. 64–80 IX Arm in this eriod of transfer.

  7Stavka’s attitudes in Lodzinskaya operatsiya p. 199ff. (nos. 225f.)

  8Captain Neilson. His despatches (in diary form) are quite useful: v. WO. 106 nos. 1119-21 (23rd November 1914).

  9N. Novikov: 6. sibirskaya strelk. diviziya v boyakh pod Lodzyu (Moscow 1926) H. Kraft: ‘Brzeziny’ in Wehrwiss. Rundschau 1966/11 usefully corrects German legends on the subject.

  10Lodzinskaya operatsiya p. 79f. and on II Army p. 149f. covers supply. O.D. 30th November 1914 gives minutes of the Brest meeting of that day.

  11All of this was cast as a great Austro-Hungarian victory, Limanowa. v. J. Roth: Limanowa (Innsbruck 1929). The Russian side is cursorily dealt with in Strategicheski ocherk voyni, the account of which is however difficult to expand. Some points can be gleaned from A. Rostunov: General Brusilov(Moscow 1964), F. P. Rerberg: Istoricheskiye tayni: 10. korpus (Alexandria 1925, manuscript in the Golovin Archive, at the Hoover Institution) and the Soldier’s Notebook of A. Brusilov (London 1929).

  12FO. 371/2448 Russia (War): minute on Buchanan’s despatch of 28th May 1915.

  13Oesterreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg vol. 2 pp. 30–260 adequately covers the strategic problems of early 1915—the original correspondence between Conrad and Falkenhayn is in Kriegsarchiv: AOK. Op. B. Fasz. 512, esp. nos. 5999, 6005, 6052 and 6058–9. In exchange for the offensive, the Austrians gave up some of their rights in conquered Polish territory, particularly minerals. Ludendorff, as the correspondence of Conrad’s liaison officer shows (Fasz. 6182) had doubts as to the Carpathian offensive, but suppressed them, no doubt in order to convince Falkenhayn that his own East Prussian scheme was a necessary complement to Conrad’s. Südarmee suffered in other ways than from the snows. It had the highest syphilis-rate in the German army, excepting the garrison in Romania (v. Reichskriegsministerium : Sanitätsberichte vol. 3 (Berlin 1934) Tafel47 p. 65.).

  14Lodzinskaya operatsiya no. 516 pp. 447–9 gives the text of this report. Russian operations thereafter are ably discussed in: M. D. Bonch-Bruyevitch: Poterya nami Galitsii (2 vols. Moscow 1920 and 1923), vol. 1 p. 2of. and 34f. for Danilov’s report, and Kholmsen: Mirovaya voyna. Nashi operatsii na vostochnoprusskom fronte zimoyu 1915 goda (Paris 1935). For the Austro-Hungarian sector, Russian sources are not rich, although the work of A. M. Zayonchkovskiki: Mirovaya voyna: manevrenny period (Moscow 1929) fills some of the gaps.

  15Kholmsen p. 51f.

  16e.g. a Croat regiment that had to spend the night in the snow lost 28 officers and 1,800 men from frostbite (Kriegsarchiv B/50, Nachlass Pflanzer-Baltin, Tagebuch, Mappe 1, entry of 2nd February 1915).

  17Kriegsarchiv: Conrad-Archiv B/13 Tagebuch d.Obstlt. Kundmann for the period 5–17th March shows the depressed mood of Conrad, who blamed Falkenhayn and Linsingen. II Army lost 40,000 men from frostbite alone in the first few days of March.

  18Neilson’s despatch of 23rd March: W. O. 106/1122. Przemyśl would probably have fallen before if the Russians had been able to manoeuvre their artillery. But it took ten days to move heavy artillery from the naval base of Kronstadt to the nearest railway-station alone, and once it reached the mud of Galicia, it was virtually immobile: Barsukov; Russkaya artilleriya p. 204.

  19v. his article in Voyenni sbornik (Belgrade) V (1924) pp. 231–60.

  20Kholmsen p. 36. The most authoritative account of the battle on the Russian side is N. Kamenski: Gibel 20. korpusa (Moscow 1921). The account in Reichsarchiv: Der Weltkrieg vol. 7 should be used with care. Budberg, Sievers’s chief of staff, wrote an interesting justification in Voyenni sbornik VI pp. 148ff.

  21Kemenski p. 155f; cf. Kholmsen, chapter 7.

  22A. Khmelkov: Borba za Osowiec (Moscow 1939) p. 55f; cf. Bunyakovski: ‘Kratky ocherk oborony kreposti Osowiec’ in Voyenni sbornik V pp. 289–307.

  23The best source for this period is Bonch-Bruyevitch; Poterya vol. 1, but its bias should be corrected with reference to the O.D. series of orders, and the exchanges over Balkan matters with Russia’s allies: v. ‘Stavka i ministersvo inostrannykh del’ in Krasny Arkhiv 27 (1928) pp. 3–57, and N. Valentinov: Snosheniya I pp. 32, 52–3.

  24Vysochayshe utverzhdenniye osobiye zhurnaly sovieta ministrov 1915 no. 508 (26th June).

  25Kriegsarchiv: Conrad-Archiv B/13 Kundmann diary for 30th March cf. AOK. Op. B. Faszikel 512 nos. 8483 and 8445/I.

  CHAPTER SIX

  1F. Franek: ‘Probleme der Organisation im ersten Kriegsjahr, Erganzungsheft I of the Austro-Hungarian official history (Vienna 1930) and Entwicklung der öst.–ung. Wehrmacht in den ersten zwei Kriegsjahren’, Ergänzungsheft 5 (1935). Two manuscripts, prepared for the Carnegie series, but not used, are of some help in this context: Oberst Klose: ‘Deckung des personellen Bedarfs’ and A. Krauss: ‘Kriegsphasen’. Both exist in the manuscript collection of the Vienna Kriegsarchiv. A very brave attempt to sort out the confusions of call-up has been made by R. Hecht: Fragen zur Heeresergänzung (dissertation, Vienna 1969, of which the Kriegsarchiv has a copy).

  2Oberst Pflug: Bewaffnung und Munition (manuscript, originally designed for the Carnegie series, in the Kriegsarchiv) is the most authoritative work on artillery and munitions. Parts of it were used in G. Gratz and R. Schüller; Der wirtschafiliche Zusammenbruch Oesterreich-Ungarns (Vienna 1930) and R. Riedl: Die Industrie Oesterreichs während des Weltkrieges. (Vienna 1932). Pflug’s table p. 109 is revealing.

  3R. Lorenz: ‘Aus dem Tagebuch Marterers’ in Oesterreich und Europe (Festschrift for H. Hantsch) ed. R. Plaschka (Vienna 1967) p. 471.

  4Tisza to Burián, copy to Conrad in AOK. Op. B. Fasz. 561 Op. Nr. 19380 30th December 1915. In similar vein, Tisza demanded that, since most of the medals were won by Hungarians, the factories to produce them should be put up in Hungary.

  5Klose ms. Beilage 1.

  6Kriegsarchiv: Neue Feldakten: 4 Op. AKdo. Fasz. 70 Tagebuch 1 p. 14 (9th August).

  7Kriegsarchiv: Abt. 3 Kriegsüberwachungsamt Fasz. 120 No. 8 of 9th October 1915 (‘um ein Liebesverhältnis anzuknüpfen’).

  8‘Sämtliche kompromittierte Schüler wurden dem Militärgericht geliefert’: Coudenhove’s report to Stürgkh 21st May 1915, copy to AOK. in Op.B. Fasz. 31, Op. Nr.113 52 cf. Fasz. 37 Nr. 13729 of 31st July for further details of the same type. A thorough investigation of the whole matter is C. Führ: Armeeoberkommando und Natioialitätenfrage (Vienna 1968).

  9The whole question of desertion is of course very complex, and not much clarified by rival claims at the time. Czech propagandists made out that all Czechs were waiting for a chance to get away; Austrian soldiers sometimes made the same claim. The documents of the time are not so clear. Pflanzer-Baltin (Tagebuch, Mappe 3–4 of 24th May 1915) quotes 10th infantry division as ‘striking proof’ that Czechs and Romanians could do very well in attack; IV Army command, in answer to enquiry from AOK, thought on 20th October 1914 ‘the morale and condition of the troops is generally very good’.—Tagebuch 3 (Fasz.70), while Archduke Eugen, on the Italian front, was lavish in praise of the performance of his Slav troops, and was adamant that good leadership could overcome nationality-problems while bad leadership exacerbated them (AOK. Op.B. Fasz. 37,1915 No. 13781 of 5th August). This, probably, touched the heart of the matter, for sloppy commanders quite often seem to have blamed disaffection for the consequences of their own blundering. A famous instance of desertion was that of the 28th Infantry Regiment, recruited in Prague. Thorough investigation has revealed that a combination of Austrian sloppiness and Hungarian arrogance had as much to do with this regiment’s well-documented disaffection as initial Czech disloyalty. When they went up to the front, they had had little training, and, as simple Czech townsmen, were singularly ill-suited to mountain-warfare. They were treated, from the beginning, as if they had the plague, being for instance sent to Sz
eged in Hungary for their training, instead of being left in the Bohemian capital, with its ‘malign influences’. When they went up to the front, after a series of incidents with the Hungarian population in Szeged, and particularly with a Hungarian officer—whose reports are more revealing than he supposed—a great muddle was made of their transport. The train pulled out of Miskolc station, with the officers’ waggon (and the offices) attached, while the men were still eating in the station itself. There was inevitably much hooting as the crestfallen officers came back. At the front, the soldiers seem simply not to have defended themselves at all, and the regiment was officially disbanded (though re-constituted, after its nucleus had behaved well on the Italian front). The affair was thoroughly investigated by R. Plaschka: ‘Zur Vorgeschichte des Uebergans von Einheiten des Inf.Regt. 28’ in Oesterreich und Europa (op. cit. note 3) pp. 455–67. A separate collection of documents concerning this regiment and the 36th infantry regiment exists in the Kriegsarchiv, with a substantial selection from Op. Nr. 4329 to Op. Nr. 13016 (1914–15) as the army authorities traced the history of the units.

  10Conrad’s Denkschrift of 3 1st March 1915 in AOK. Op. B. Fasz. 551 No. 8577 expounds the view that Italian intervention would mean the end of the Monarchy in six weeks.

  11AOK. Verbindungsoffiziere: Oberost. Fasz. 6182 (unnumbered) of 4.3.15; Kundmann-Tagebuch 10.3.15; cf. letter to Bolfras, Kundmann 5.3.15.

  12W. Groener: Lebenserinnerungen ed. F. Hiller von Gaertringen (Göttingen 1957) p. 226–7; Straub-Tagebuch 5th–11th April passim. In general, Reichsarchiv: Der Weltkrieg vols. 7 and 8 supply an adequate account of the origins of the campaign as well as its course, which can be checked from Austro-Hungarian sources in AOK. Op. B. Fasz. 551 and 560.

  13The best source on the Russian side is: Sbornik dokumentov mirovoy voyni na russkom fronte. Manevrenni period. Gorlitskaya operatsiya, published by RKKA, for General Staff use, in 1941 (Moscow). Together with Bonch-Bruyevitch’s Poterya nami Galitsii (2 vols. Moscow 1920–26) it fills in most gaps. The general works of A. Neznamov: Strategicheski ocherk voyni (vols.3 and 4, 1922) and A. M. Zayonchkovski: Mirovaya voyna (p. 271ff.) are no more than useful short accounts.