The Crusades- Islamic Perspectives

by Carole Hillenbrand

  Plate 3.1 Great Mosque of Nur al-Din, mosaic decoration in mihrab, thirteenth century, Hims, Syria

  Figure 3.2 Silver dirham of Rukn al-Din Suìayman Shah; its reverse quotes Sura 9: 33 which has jihad associations. 592/1195–6, Kayseri, Turkey

  But the messenger and those who believe with him strive with their wealth and their lives. Such are they for whom are the good things. Such are they who are the successful. Allah hath made ready for them Gardens underneath which rivers flow, wherein they will reside. That is the supreme triumph.4

  Plate 3.2 Great Mosque of Nur al-Din, sanctuary showing minbar and mihrab, twelfth–thirteenth centuries, Hims, Syria

  (Creswell Photographic Archive, Ashmolean Museum, Oxford, neg. C. 5907)

  Plate 3.3 Great Mosque of Nur al-Din, courtyard, twelfth–thirteenth centuries, Hims, Syria

  (Creswell Photographic Archive, Ashmolean Museum, Oxford, neg. C. 5907)

  The second canonical source in Islam, the hadith, the corpus of sayings attributed to the Prophet Muhammad, also contains many references to jihad. One such hadith declares: ‘A morning or an evening expedition in God’s path is better than the world and what it contains, and for one of you to remain in the line of battle is better than his prayers for sixty years.’5

  The hadith also stress repeatedly that those who fight jihad are given God’s promise that they will enter Paradise: ‘The gates of Paradise are under the shadow of the swords.’6

  Jihad in the Early Islamic Period

  There is no doubt that there was a religious motivation to the early Muslim conquests of the seventh century, especially amongst the elite of the Muslim community (umma) who had been closest to the Prophet and who had experienced his charismatic personality and the power of the Islamic revelation. Indeed, the religious impetus played a crucial part in the phenomenon which allowed the Arabs to establish an empire which by the beginning of the eighth century stretched from Spain in the west to northern India and Central Asia in the east.

  In the eighth century the Arabs made several unsuccessful attempts by land and sea to take Constantinople. Their failure marked a watershed. Thereafter, the great surge of conquest receded in the lands which bordered Christian territory: the Byzantine empire on the one hand and the kingdoms of northern Spain on the other. The Muslim rulers opted for consolidation rather than expansion. On the Byzantine-Islamic borders, both Christians and Muslims continued to be active, and lines of defensive forts were built or rebuilt to strengthen the frontiers. It became the practice for both empires to engage in annual campaigns, described in the Islamic sources as jihad, but these gradually became a ritual, important for the image of the caliph and emperor, rather than being motivated by a vigorous desire to conquer new territories for their respective faiths. The boundaries between the Islamic and Christian worlds remained more or less stabilised and from the later eighth century onwards it was deemed more important to defend existing frontiers than to extend them.

  Plate 3.4 Great Mosque of Nur al-Din, courtyard, twelfth–thirteenth centuries, Hims, Syria

  (Creswell Photographic Archive, Ashmolean Museum, Oxford, neg. C. 5896)

  Plate 3.5 Masjid al-Hasanayn, exterior, rebuilt after 552/1157 by Nur al-Din, Hama, Syria

  Moreover, the tenth century saw the emergence of a major ideological rival to the ‘Abbasid caliphs of Baghdad – namely the Shi‘ite Isma‘ili Fatimid imams who moved from North Africa to Egypt and established a new dynamic Mediterranean state. Both Sunni and Shi‘ite became locked in an internal battle for supremacy within the Islamic world and much less effort was expended on prosecuting jihad against the outside world of the infidel.

  The Elaboration of the Classical Islamic Theory of Jihad

  It was during the ‘Abbasid period (from 750 onwards) that Islamic law was definitively formulated although its practice had been evolving since the earliest days of the Muslim empire. It is important to stress that the classical theory of jihad is an entirely Islamic phenomenon. It is a hermetically sealed tradition and does not appear to have been influenced by Christian notions of Holy War, although both religions use similar sets of images for fighting on God’s side and stress the aspect of spiritual renewal and personal struggle in God’s path. Muslim legists were motivated by a deep religious concern to provide and uphold an ideal framework within which the Islamic state might flourish, and it was in their books of Islamic law that the classical theory of jihad was elaborated.

  The classical works of Islamic law (Shari‘a), such as that of al-Shafi‘i (d. 204/820), usually contain a chapter on jihad. This follows a predictable layout. First, the evidence for jihad in the Qur’an and the hadith is presented and interpreted. As we have seen, the theory of jihad has a sound Qur’anic basis and many verses from the Qur’an are cited in the legal books in support of jihad. The conventional chapter on jihad in the law books also draws very fully on the hadith. From the evidence provided by the Qur’an and the hadith, the classical expositions of the topic of jihad then proceed to draw up the following rules. Jihad is obligatory on all able-bodied Muslims, in the same way as they are required to pray, make the pilgrimage and give alms. As al-Shafi‘i writes:

  Plate 3.6 Great Mosque of Nur al-Din, minbar portal, twelfth–thirteenth centuries, Hims, Syria

  Plate 3.7 Great Mosque of Nur al-Din, mihrab, twelfth–thirteenth centuries, Hims, Syria

  (Creswell Photographic Archive, Ashmolean Museum, Oxford, neg. C. 5903)

  The jihad, and rising up in arms in particular, is obligatory for all able-bodied (believers), exempting no one, just as prayer, pilgrimage and (payment of) alms are performed, and no person is permitted to perform the duty for another, since performance by one will not fulfil the duty for another.7

  Jihad is generally considered to be a collective, not individual, duty on all Muslims and it is perpetual. For those who live in territory which borders the non-Muslim world; however, jihad is a duty for the individual Muslim too. Muslim jurists also laid down the rules for the treatment of non-Muslims within Islamic countries. The Islamic community must protect non-Muslims within its territories, provided that they are not polytheists and that they follow one of the permitted religions (Christianity and Judaism are explicitly mentioned in this context). These non-Muslims in Islamic territory must in turn recognise their subordinate status and pay the poll-tax (jizya).

  The system of protection for non-Muslims within the Islamic community, the ‘House of Islam’ (Dar al-Islam), as outlined by the Muslim legists, is contrasted sharply with the situation outside in the rest of the world, which is designated the ‘House of War’ (Dar al-harb). According to the classical Islamic theory, no other polity may be recognised outside the ‘House of Islam’. In the fullness of time all men must accept Islam when invited to do so, or submit to Muslim government. Meanwhile it is the duty of Muslims to strive perpetually in the path of God, in other words, to wage jihad. According to Islamic law there is an obligatory state of hostilities between the ‘House of Islam’ and the ‘House of War’ until the conversion or subjugation of all mankind has been achieved. Legally a peace treaty between the Muslims and non-Muslims is impossible. Jihad may not be terminated; it can only be suspended by a truce which should not exceed ten years. The overall leadership of the jihad belongs to the caliph (or his representatives).

  Spiritual Jihad (the ‘Greater Jihad’)

  It should be emphasised that from the earliest period the notion of jihad (struggle) as a spiritual concept for individual Muslims was paramount. Two kinds of jihad were identified: the greater jihad (al-jihad al-akbar) and the lesser jihad (al-jihad al-asghar). The greater jihad is the struggle which man has to wage against his lower self and is, indeed, more meritorious than the military struggle conducted against infidels. The connection between the greater and lesser jihad will be discussed again later in this chapter.

  Figure 3.3 Horsemen fighting a lion and a dragon, stucco relief, c. 1220, Konya, Turkey

  Modification in the Classical Th
eory of Jihad

  In general, there is a remarkable uniformity in the works of Islamic law from different periods of Islamic history on the topic of jihad. Nevertheless, a few slight shifts in the theory may be observed with the passing of time. These shifts show some recognition of political realities on the part of the legists. After the tenth century, when the political fragmentation of the ‘Abbasid caliphate became all too apparent and a number of small regional dynasties established themselves, there are signs that peace rather than war became the norm. This situation is reflected in the definition of jihad found in the Islamic legal works of the time. Instead of the rigid dichotomy between the ‘House of War’ and the ‘House of Islam’, some scholars mention an intermediate area, the so-called ‘House of Peace’ (Dar al-sulh) or ‘House of Covenant’ (Dar al-‘ahd),8 in which non-Muslim states may retain autonomy and be exempt from attack, provided that they recognise Muslim overlordship and they pay tribute. Moreover, someone from the land of the infidel, the ‘House of War’, may visit the ‘House of Islam’ under guaranteed safe-conduct. This legal device permitted commercial relations, for example between the Islamic world and the Christian Byzantine empire, to flourish.

  Another modification in the classical theory of jihad was the inevitable consequence of the territorial breakup of the ‘Abbasid empire and the usurpation of power by military commanders in different areas. Caliphs and other rulers neglected their duty to prosecute jihad, but Muslim warriors took the initiative into their own hands and gathered together on the frontiers of Islam to live in ribats (a combination of fortress and cloister) and engage in individual jihad. The legitimacy of this kind of individual jihad, unauthorised by the caliph, became generally recognised. Legal theory, however hallowed it was by tradition, could be interpreted by individual religious scholars to meet the needs of a given historical situation. Their legal pronouncements (fatwas) related to the actual practice of the Shari‘a; such fatwas have been preserved from the Ayyubid and Mamluk periods, especially the numerous fatwas of the formidable Hanbalite scholar Ibn Taymiyya. Unfortunately, evidence of the fatwas for earlier periods of Islamic history is sparse.

  Most of the Turkish military commanders of the Crusading period followed the Hanafite or Shafi‘ite madhhabs (legal schools). This did not mean, however, that they were immune to the influence of the other two Sunni madhhabs, the Malikites and the Hanbalites. The Hanbalites, in particular, were strong in Damascus, especially since the prominent Palestinian family the Banu Qudama, who belonged to this madhhab, had settled there in the early part of the twelfth century and even established a new quarter, the Salihiyya. One member of this family, Ibn Qudama, was a close adviser of Saladin. In his legal writings Ibn Qudama perhaps reflects the exigencies of life in the Crusading period when he mentions the concept of maslaha (‘the public interest’). This, Ibn Qudama argues, should allow flexibility in dealing with the infidel. He writes: ‘The head of state has the right to conclude a truce with infidels when he considers that there is benefit in doing so.’9

  Figure 3.4 Boot, Dioscorides, De Materia Medica, 619/1222, Iraq

  A detailed exposition of jihad is given by the Ottoman Hanafite legist Ebu’s Su’ud (d. 1574).10 His views show the conservative nature of the Islamic legal tradition and how little the theory of jihad changed over the centuries. Indeed there is very little difference in content and structure between Islamic law books composed in the tenth century and those composed in the nineteenth. According to Ebu’s Su’ud, jihad is incumbent not on every individual but on the Muslim community as a whole. Fighting should be continual and should last until the end of time. It follows therefore that peace with the infidel is an impossibility, although a Muslim ruler or commander may make a temporary truce if it is to the benefit of the Muslim community to do so. Such a truce is not, however, legally binding.11 Within the Dar al-harb those who live there are enemies and are not entitled to the protection of the law. However, a free non-Muslim can obtain the right to live within the Dar al-Islam and to be afforded legal protection. He can accept Islam or pay the poll-tax (jizya) and have the status of a tributary subject (dhimmi) in the latter case. (He is then entitled to the protection of both his life and his property.) The ruler may also give the enemy a temporary safe-conduct, providing him with the status of a protected resident (musta’min).12

  Figure 3.5 Leg armour, stucco relief, c. 1195, Rayy, Iran

  The other prevalent madhhab amongst the Turkish and Kurdish military leaders in Syria and Palestine in the Crusading period were the Shafi‘ites. This group considered jihad as a communal duty but in their view, when the infidels threaten a Muslim land, jihad becomes an individual duty, incumbent on all inhabitants of that area who are capable of bearing arms.13

  The Realities of Jihad in the Pre-Crusading Period

  In the early Islamic period the belief was current that there is only one God in heaven and only one ruler and one law on earth (the caliph). It is probably true to say that until the goal of taking Constantinople had been abandoned in the early eighth century there was no reason to doubt that Muslims believed that the final triumph of Islam in the whole world was imminent. However, in the ninth century, with the stabilisation of the frontiers with the world outside and the cessation of the Islamic conquests, the gulf between legal theory and political reality began to widen rapidly. Bernard Lewis argues that a relationship of mutual tolerance was established between the Muslim world and the world outside its borders, and that more or less stable and peaceful frontiers existed in the ninth and tenth centuries.14 This is demonstrated by those legists who argued that truces could be renewed as often as was deemed necessary and, in some legal works, by the creation, as already mentioned, of an intermediate status, the ‘House of Peace’.

  Despite the generally peaceful situation between the Islamic world and its neighbours, it is important to stress, however, that there were very few stages, if any at all, during the medieval period when there were not some manifestations of jihad on one of the many borders of the ‘House of Islam’. To be sure, individual frontiers relaxed the spirit of jihad at certain points but elsewhere there was always another border area, dynamic and militant, keeping alive the concept of jihad. In the tenth and eleventh centuries, for example, the eastern Islamic frontier of Central Asia, which bordered the territory of the pagan nomadic Turks, saw the emergence of a classic example of one major kind of jihad movement; that which combined military activity and proselytising for Islam, the closest perhaps to the theory of the jurists. Thousands of miles away on the Islamic frontier with Byzantium, in northern Syria and what is now eastern Turkey, the small tenth-century Shi‘ite Hamdanid dynasty became famous for its vigorous pursuit of jihad in response to what was perceived as external aggression on the part of infidels. It is worth mentioning the military activities on these two frontiers in greater detail.

  Figure 3.6 The sun and moon, stone reliefs, hospital of Kayka’us I, 614/1217–18, Sivas, Turkey

  The Muslim Border with the Nomadic Turks of Central Asia

  In the tenth and eleventh centuries regular campaigns were conducted against the pagan nomadic Turks. It is especially in the context of the area bordering the Central Asian steppes that the historical sources mention the term ghazi, the frontier warrior inspired by religious fervour who fights jihad in the path of God. To this frontier flocked many volunteers. Indeed, the testimony of medieval geographers, even allowing for exaggerations and idealisations, demonstrates beyond doubt the popularity of the building usually called a ribat. A ribat was a frontier fort in which jihad fighters lived according to strict religio-military rules and in a constant state of military readiness. It was these jihad fighters who made regular forays into nomadic Turkish territory and converted many of the tribesmen to Islam.

  Figure 3.7 Craftsman’s signature on a brass ewer dated 627/1229, probably Mosul, Iraq

  The Muslim Frontier with Byzantium

  Another early blueprint for jihad activity, as noted above, was the t
enth-century Shi‘ite dynasty of the Hamdanids. Under its most famous ruler, Sayf al-Dawla (ruled 333–56/944–67) it became famous throughout the Islamic world for its annual campaigns of jihad against the Byzantine Christians. This was, it should be stressed, in response to renewed expansionism on the Byzantine side. The efforts of the Hamdanids became so well known that thousands of volunteer mujahidun or ghazis from far-away Central Asia travelled vast distances to join in these wars. Here proselytism was not in question. This jihad was waged in response to perceived external aggression on the part of the Christians.

  According to the tenth-century writer al-Tarsusi, a judge (qadi) in Ma’arrat al-Nu‘man and Kafartab who wrote a work (now lost) entitled Ways of Life along the Frontiers (Siyar al-thughur), in 290/903 the town of Tarsus on the Muslim-Byzantine border contained many houses for the lodging of Muslim warriors for the faith (ghazis) who had come from all parts of the Islamic world. The warriors were supported by the charitable donations of the pious and rulers.15

  The propaganda for jihad developed by the Hamdanids showed the beginnings of a much more sophisticated approach. Dating from the Hamdanid period are the famous, if little studied, jihad sermons of Ibn Nubata al-Fariqi (d. 374/984–5) of Mayyafariqin in present-day Turkey. These are written in very elaborate and resonant rhymed prose. They were intended to exhort the people of Mayyafariqin and Aleppo to fight jihad against the Byzantines. These sermons display a careful symmetry of balanced couplets and a clever exploitation of the long-established and cherished Arab tradition of oratory. They utilise alliteration, assonance, repetition and similar devices in a manner which recalls to Western ears the Old Testament or Ciceronian prose. To their Muslim hearers the language of these sermons was impregnated with Qur’anic echoes and allusions and would have moved them to tears – and to action (cf. colour plate 2). Indeed, the elevated style of Ibn Nubata’s sermons was itself part of a deliberate attempt to arouse the faithful; he is known to have preached both before military campaigns and afterwards to celebrate victory in battle. In one such sermon Ibn Nubata praises Sayf al-Dawla for taming heretics and encouraging jihad fighters.16 In another sermon delivered in 352/963 to jihad volunteers who had come from distant Khurasan to Mayyafariqin Ibn Nubata exhorts the people to rouse themselves from their comfortable beds and to fight like lions in the path of jihad.17 The sermon reaches its climax when Ibn Nubata explicitly mentions the victory of Islam over Christianity: ‘God has graciously bestowed on us and on you His near victory and He has made the people of monotheism victorious over the servants of the Cross.’18