Implosion: India’s Tryst with Reality

by John Elliott

  Future Contours

  The contours of the likely long-term relationship between the two countries began to emerge as Wen Jiabao finished his 2010 visit to Delhi and fiew on to Pakistan.46 Economic and cultural ties would grow and trade would boom, but China would continue indefinitely to rattle India’s nerves in a variety of ways, not least by becoming closer to Pakistan and claiming territory on the Himalayan border. Beijing would not see this economic carrot and diplomatic stick approach primarily as a bilateral matter because India is merely a (rather large) pawn in its overall ambition to become a superpower, alongside, and one day replacing, the US. That ambition necessitates keeping India in check because China is determined that it should not become a rival.

  A key to these contours, as seen from Beijing, came from a Chinese official who told a former top Indian bureaucrat and ambassador in 2010 that India needed to understand three things.47 First, political differences would not impede economic growth and trade relationship between the two countries. Second, India should not meddle with its neighbours (meaning presumably that China would meddle in places like Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh, but that India should neither object nor try to counter its efforts). Third, India should accept China’s growing links with Pakistan, which would continue (presumably because arming and aiding a nuclear Pakistan is a key way to keep India in check). This meant that, while China was content to see India’s prosperity grow and to participate in its economic growth, India should not expect to become a regional power, even though the US might like it to do so. It also probably meant that, though China was surprised and rather taken aback by India’s rapid economic and industrial advances in the first decade of the twentieth century, and was rattled by growing close ties (and the 2008 nuclear deal) with the US, it knew that it was way ahead in terms of overall development and as a regional power.

  King Goujian’s Revenge

  The contours laid down for India by the Chinese official – which, of course, India would not accept – tie in with the long-term question for the whole world of whether China will be a ‘Friend or Foe’, to quote the title of a special report in The Economist.48 Did China’s (rather clumsy) regional belligerence, which was developing in 2010, indicate that the ‘foe’ angle was gaining supremacy in Beijing as the country became economically powerful and the PLA’s influence grew? The magazine’s foreign editor wondered whether a story about Goujian, a fifth century king of Yue in what is now Zhejiang, was an alarming parable about China’s ambitions, as it could indeed well be. Goujian was defeated and humiliated by another king, but bided his time as a meek prisoner and then wreaked revenge. The story of how he ‘slept on brushwood and tasted gall is as familiar to Chinese as King Alfred and his cakes are to Britons, or George Washington and the cherry tree are to Americans,’ said the article. ‘In the early 20th century he became a symbol of resistance against the treaty ports, foreign concessions and the years of colonial humiliation’.

  It looks as though Goujian-style revenge may have begun, but with an economic and strategic slant. China has been aggressively stepping up the confrontation with Japan over the oil-rich, uninhabited Senkaku islands in the East China Sea, as it has also done with Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei over the Spratly and Paracel islands in the South China Sea. It has also argued with Vietnam over oil rights, in which Indian companies have been involved, and unilaterally announced an air defence identification zone that laid claims to international airspace over the East China Sea covering territories that China did not control. This ‘Chinese art of creeping warfare’, as Chellaney calls it, 49 is supported by extensive academic research into supportive historical maps and documents.50 It shows a greater willingness to disrupt relations with neighbouring countries than in the past.

  Other points of potential conflict are developing over China’s ‘hydro-hegemony’ which could affect one-third of India’s yearly water supply that comes from Tibet. Chellaney says that ‘in contrast to the bilateral water treaties between many of its neighbours, China rejects the concept of a water-sharing arrangement or joint, rules-based management of common resources’.51 There is a large-scale dam building programme on international rivers originating on China’s Tibetan plateau and flowing to southern and southeastern Asia, including the mighty Brahmaputra river which India relies on for its water. China, however, has not been consulting India and has not given details of its plans as requested by India.

  There was a sudden worsening of relations in April 2013 when 30 PLA troops not only crossed the LAC and moved 19 km inside what India regarded as its territory on the 16,000ft-high Depsang Plain in the Ladakh sector of the disputed border. This was in the no-man’s land, or the red zone as it is called, which is the overlapping area between the two countries’ perception of their territory. It is quite common for troops from both sides to cross into this area and then withdraw, but on this occasion the Chinese pitched tents and stayed. A procedure agreed in 2005 for solving such a face-off was not operated by China so, after some characteristically nervous indecision and delay, India reacted to heavy domestic political and media pressure and moved its troops and tents into the disputed area in a face-off with the Chinese. India also strengthened its previously soft diplomatic stance. After three weeks, both sides removed their troops and withdrew from Depsang, but the terms of the truce were not revealed.52 This confrontation was totally unexpected in Delhi, especially coming soon after China’s new president, Xi Jinping, had put forward five proposals for improving ties and said that ‘peace and tranquillity’ should be maintained on the border in order to help solve the border issue, a task that ‘won’t be easy’.53

  India avoided condemning China for the incursion because it did not want to upset the visit to Delhi a month later by China’s new premier, Li Keqiang. Though the visit was a presentational success, no firm commitments were made by either side. He repeated China’s usual line about the border issue being ‘a question left over by history’ but added that the two sides had ‘agreed to push forward with negotiations’, which contrasted sharply with the line taken by Wen and most Chinese leaders in recent years.54

  That apparent change of mood was the most notable point to emerge from the visit, especially coming at the start of the ten-year term in office of the new leadership, but it prompted questions about China’s motives. Did it really want to solve disagreements over the border, which seemed unlikely, or did it have other aims? It was certainly teasing the US – Li quoted a Chinese proverb that ‘a distant relative may not be as useful as a near neighbour,’ appearing to be trying (fruitlessly of course) to wean India away from America. Or it could have decided that it had sent the wrong signals with the recent border row, and that it should not fall out with its biggest neighbour at the same time as it was aggressively confronting Japan and the Philippines.

  Problems over the border, and over China possibly blocking India’s river waters with new upstream dams, had been dodged during Li’s visit by talking about mechanisms rather than potentially more controversial substance. That fitted with India’s traditionally low-key approach to foreign diplomacy everywhere, and of course played into China’s hands. It also fitted with what C. Raja Mohan describes despairingly as India’s ‘ideological romanticism and political timidity’ and ‘relentless mystification of Chinese policies’.55 It remained to be seen whether India would push for real movement, not just presentational mechanisms, and whether China would be willing to respond. Manmohan Singh visited Beijing a few months later and signed a border defence co-operation agreement aimed at preventing upsets with regular exchanges of information, and China agreed to share hydrological data. These were small steps of debatable signig cance.56

  It looks as though this uncertain see-saw relationship will continue indefinitely, certainly so long as both countries are preoccupied with their internal economic development and growth, and consequently have neither the time nor inclination to interfere extensively in each other’s affairs. There are, howe
ver, two problems with this approach, and India does not seem to be prepared for either because – chalta hai – it has no apparent overall plan for its dealings with China on a range of issues from infrastructure investment and corporate loans to border and river water issues.

  First, what will China do when it has achieved what Deng Xiaoping described as its first priority of achieving an ‘orderly rise’ in economic and development terms? Deng is reported to have said – and India agrees – that modernization needed ‘two prerequisites – one is international peace, and the other is domestic political stability’.57 When the development goals have been achieved, will globalization have developed so far that China continues with that orderly rise, or will it then want to settle scores with its neighbours? The second problem is that likely differences over international oil and gas rights, access to sea-lanes and river waters, and maybe other issues could be seen by China as affecting its orderly economic development and modernization, and could therefore upset the equilibrium. Already there are the signs that it is moving on from another Deng dictum – ‘hiding strengths and biding time’ – and will be asserting itself internationally.

  There is nothing to suggest that the border issue, which lies at the heart of the current differences, will be resolved any time soon. China will want to keep India on edge on the mountain peaks and passes, and it will also continue to develop close economic and defence relations in the neighbourhood. The best solution for India would be to keep talking with Beijing without expecting any agreements, while also strengthening border defences, improving liaison with Japan and other Asian countries, and watching out for King Goujian mustering his armies.

  Notes

  1. ‘Chinese PM Wen Jiabao begins bumper Indian trade trip’ – useful background here: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11997221

  2. http://www.ridingtheelephant.wordpress.com/2010/12/17/china-and-india-quarrel-despite-16bn-economic-carrots/

  3. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, Wen Jiabao Addresses the Indian Council of World Affairs, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/wenjiabaofangwenyinduhebjst/t779524.htm

  4. ‘Wen: Patience needed to resolve boundary question’, Xinhua News Agency, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010wenindia/2010-12/16/content_11714501.htm

  5. Website of the Embassy of the Republic of India in Beijing, China, http://www.indianembassy.org.cn/DynamicContent.aspx?MenuId= 3&SubMenuId=0

  6. Jagat Mehta, speaking in Delhi at the launch of his book The Tryst Betrayed, Penguin Viking, 2010

  7. B.G. Verghese, ‘The War We Lost’, Tehelka, 13 October 2012, http://www. tehelka.com/the-war-we-lost/; Verghese writes that Nehru said this to India’s new ambassador to China, G. Parthasarathi (according to Parthasarathi’s son Ashok), on 18 March 1958 prior to his departure for Peking

  8. Ajai Shukla, ‘The LAC is not the LOC’, Business Standard, 19 September 2012, http://www.business-standard.com/article/opinionajai-shukla-the-lac-is-not-the-loc-112091800050_1.html, and Broadsword blog http://www.ajaishukla.blogspot.in/

  9. Adam Roberts of The Economist graphically described a visit to the area in October 2012 on the magazine’s ‘Banyan’ blog –http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2012/10/indias-remote-north-east

  10. Brahma Chellaney, ‘The Lessons of the China-India War’, 14 October 2012, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/why-china-india-tensions-are-growing-by-brahma-chellaney# 2lvQQFMAHUiTL1VW.99

  11. Ibid.

  12. As recounted by Brajesh Mishra to JE, August 2009

  13. 13. Ibid

  14. 14. Mani Shankar Aiyar, ‘India’s foreign policy – from Jawaharlal Nehru to Manmohan Singh’, Australia-India Institute, University of Melbourne, 22 September 2011

  15. 15. Nicholas Nugent, Rajiv Gandhi Son of a Dynasty, BBC Books 1990, UBS Delhi 1991

  16. Conversation with JE

  17. Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013, office of the Secretary of Defense, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_China_Report_ FINAL.pdf

  18. ‘Can Pakistan survive without US aidfi’, Dawn, 15 February 2012, http://www.dawn.com/2012/02/15/can-pakistan-survive-without-us-aid/; this article quotes a Guardian (UK) newspaper report http://www. www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/jul/11/us-aid-to-pakistan – on six decades of US aid to Pakistan compiled by Wren Elhai of the Center for Global Development in Washington, DC. Since 1948, US assistance to Pakistan had largely been for civilian purposes – out of $61.7bn total assistance 19482010 (in constant 2009 dollars), $40.4bn was economic and $21.3bn military.

  19. ‘Wiki: China helping Pak upgrade its missiles’, Indian Express, 12 September 2011, https://www.google.co.in/search?q=Wiki%3A+China+helping+Pak+upgrade+its+missiles&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:en-GB:official&client=firefox-a

  20. ‘Break India, says China think-tank’, TNN, 12 August 2009, http://www.articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2009-08-12/india/28195335_1_dai-bingguo-state-councillor-chinese-website – Chinese website www.iiss.cn now not accessible on internet

  21. http://www.ridingtheelephant.wordpress.com/2009/08/13/china-aims-to-block-india%E2%80%99s-place-in-the-sun/

  22. http://www.ridingtheelephant.wordpress.com/2010/03/21/china-out-guns-the-us-in-friendliness-at-a-delhi-conference/

  23. http://www.dnaindia.com/world/report_deluded-india-stands-no-chance-in-arms-race-china-s-reaction-to-agni-v_1677979

  24. Kanwal Sibal, ‘Bested by China’s strategy’, Mail Today, 11 December 2012

  25. ‘Fear of influence’ – Financial Times article with interactive map of ‘string of pearls’ published 2009 (so lacking later information) http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/84a13062-6f0c-11de-9109-00144feabdc0. html#axzz26ibsc8AR

  26. ‘NIA chargesheet: NSCN got arms from Chinese firms’, Indian Express, 1 April 2012, http://www.indianexpress.com/news/nia-chargesheet-nscn-got-arms-from-chinese-firms/770069

  27. ‘Untangling the GMR-Male row: Timeline of incidents that lead to the scrapping of the $500 million airport development deal’, Business Standard, 16 December 2012, http://www.business-standard. com/article/current-affairs/special-untangling-the-gmr-male-row-112121600022_1.html

  28. ‘An insensitive political class: Public anger at the decline of governance’, G. Parthasarathy, http://www.tribuneindia.com/2013/20130116/edit.htm#4

  29. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/27/us-srilanka-china-highway-idUSBRE99Q06G20131027 and http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Sri-Lanka%E2%80%99s-inaugurates-second-highway,-%27made-in-China-%27-29389.html

  30. http://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India_-_Sri_Lanka_ Relations.pdf

  31. JE, ‘The Modern Path to Enlightenment’, Financial Times, 2 May 1987

  32. Govinda Riza, ‘Bhutan-China Border Mismatch’, Bhutan News Service, 1 January 2013, www.bhutannewsservice.com/column-opinion/commentry/bhutan-china-border-mismatch/– analysis with maps

  33. Virendra Sahai Verma, ‘Dances with dragons’, 21 August 2012 http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/article3800096.ece – article with map

  34. http://www.ridingtheelephant.wordpress.com/2011/05/29/bhutan-climbs-a-learning-curve-for-happiness/

  35. JE, ‘The Modern Path to Enlightenment’, Financial Times, 2 May 1987, and on http://www.ridingtheelephant.wordpress.com/2008/11/05/bhutan%E2%80%99s-king-told-me-about-his-plans-for-gross-national-happiness/

  36. ‘The background of Gross National Happiness: A development path with values’, GNH Centre Bhutan, http://www.gnhbhutan.org/about/a_development_path_with_values.aspx#sthash.7iUeemoF. dpuf

  37. Omair Ahmad, ‘The Royal Pleasure Index’, Sunday Guardian, 2 March 2013, http://www.sunday-guardian.com/artbeat/the-royal-pleasure-index. Omair Ahmed is the author of The Kingdom at the Centre of the World – Journeys into Bhutan, Aleph Book Company, Delhi, 2013

  38. C. Raja Mohan, ‘The faraway neighbour’, Indian Express, 17 July 2013, http://www.indianexpress.com/news/the-faraway-neighbour/1142653/0
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br />   39. Briefing by India’s Ministry of External Affairs, 18 May 2013, http://www.mea.gov.in/media-Briefings.htm?dtl/21718/Transcript+of+media+Briefing+on+Chinese+Premiers+Forthcoming+Visit

  40. http://www.ridingtheelephant.wordpress.com/2012/10/15/huawei-poses-risks-for-india-50-years-after-chinas-himalayan-victory/

  41. Figures supplied by Huawei to JE

  42. ‘Huawei and ZTE pose security threat, warns US panel’, BBC, 8 October 2012 www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-19867399 – and the US report is here: http://www.intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house. gov/files/documents/Huawei-ZTE%20Investigative%20Report%20 %28FINAL%29.pdf

  43. ‘Huawei – A matter of procedure’, The Economist, 6 June 2013, http://www. www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2013/06/huawei

  44. http://www.articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-08-28/news/33450461_1_mega-power-projects-joint-economic-group-chinese-commerce-minister

  45. ‘China power major eyes transmission projects in India, sets alarm bells ringing’, Indian Express, 15 October 2012, http://www.indianexpress.com/news/china-power-major-eyes-transmission-projects-in-india-sets-alarm-bells-ringing/1016828/0

  46. http://www.ridingtheelephant.wordpress.com/2010/12/17/china-and-india-quarrel-despite-16bn-economic-carrots/

  47. Related to JE in December 2010 by Abid Hussain (died June 2012), former Commerce Secretary, Member Planning Commission, and Ambassador to the US (1990-92); http://www.ridingtheelephant.wordpress. com/2010/12/17/china-and-india-quarrel-despite-16bn-economic-carrots/

  48. Edward Carr, ‘Brushwood and gall’, The Economist, 2 December 2010, www.economist.com/node/17601499?story_id=17601499

  49. Brahma Chellaney, ‘The Chinese art of creeping warfare – By altering territorial ‘facts’ on the ground, China is successfully altering its borders without resorting to war’, Mint, 24 December 2013, http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/bG5qzeOSsJRZ7dERHuuV6I/The-Chinese-art-of-creeping-warfare.html