Implosion: India’s Tryst with Reality

by John Elliott

  Musharraf claims that Sharif was briefed three times about the plans, but Sharif has always insisted that he was not told in advance, and that he had not therefore been deceiving India’s prime minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, when he welcomed him on a dramatic peacemaking trip on 20 February, 15 days after one of Sharif’s alleged Briefings on 5 February. Vajpayee crossed the land border at Wagah, between the Indian city of Amritsar and Lahore in Pakistan, and was feted by Sharif and other leaders, though the visit was boycotted by the armed service chiefs including Musharraf.16 The two prime ministers initiated a diplomatically significant cross-border bus service and signed the Lahore Declaration that started with the words: ‘Sharing a vision of peace and stability between their countries ’.17

  If Sharif was briefed on 5 February, I missed the scoop of my career. I had joined him on a day-long helicopter tour so that I could catch a quick interview on the country’s politics and economy for Fortune magazine. We landed at Kel, a Pakistan army camp some 6,000ft up in the Himalayas, beside the Line of Control. I was introduced to Musharraf, who looked at me quizzically, and I chatted to more approachable army officers, asking about the mood in the country and the government’s stability, without a thought that I ought to be checking on an invasion. Musharraf took Sharif into a conference room with other aides and officers for what I was told was a routine border Briefing, and it lasted about an hour or so. They then went for prayers in the base’s mosque – it was a Friday – while I chatted to some of the more Westernized looking officers who declined to join them, and we flew off.

  Musharraf started secretly sending infiltrators (out of uniform) across the LoC a few weeks later, and maybe had already been doing so for two months according to some reports.18 In his autobiography, Line of Fire, he says that the aim was to ‘fill large gaps between our defensive positions’, and that this had been approved in January 1999.19 ‘Freedom fighters’ were moving across the border ‘from March onwards’ and by ‘the end of April’ over 100 new posts had been secured by Pakistani troops. India’s intelligence and military failures meant that the Indian army did not react to what was happening till early May. A border battle followed, involving 1,000 fighters from Pakistan (its own troops and Afghan and other Islamic militants or ‘freedom fighters’) that brought the two nuclear powers to the brink of war. The action ended when Sharif went to see President Bill Clinton in Washington in July and agreed, apparently contentedly, to withdraw Pakistani troops, having already been refused help on a visit to Beijing, which remained neutral.20

  Since then, Sharif has repeatedly said he was not informed in advance,21 but Musharraf claimed in Line of Fire22 that he had been briefed on three occasions, the second time at Kel.23 An Indian report in 2006, based on alleged Indian phone tap transcripts, however supports the Sharif line and says he was not told till May24. Mani Dixit, a former Indian foreign secretary, wrote in a book published in 2002 that Sharif was briefed ‘at the general headquarters of the Pakistan Army in Rawalpindi in January 1999’.25 The controversy continues – as recently as January 2013, a retired Pakistani army general claimed Kargil was planned by a ‘four-man show’ run by Musharraf, though Sharif had ‘not’ been kept totally in the dark.26

  A Novelist’s War Secret

  As a footnote to the story, having missed my scoop at Kel, I was forewarned of the Kargil offensive by Humphrey Hawksley, an old friend and a BBC journalist. He was in Pakistan at the end of February 1999 researching a novel called Dragonfire that was published a year later27. He came to Delhi on 1 March and told me confidentially that (as a novelist researching material) he had been informed in Pakistan that there would soon be a cross-border invasion. I laughed and said that could not be correct because, just eleven days earlier, Vajpayee had done his bus trip to Lahore, but Hawksley was sure.

  He later explained what happened in a (non-fiction) book,28 where he wrote that a former head of the ISI had told him that ‘Pakistan needed to conduct military operations inside India and that would happen very soon’. (This was an intriguing example of how journalists are trusted more when they switch roles and become novelists!). In Dragonfire, Hawksley utilized the former ISI chief’s Briefing, and Pakistan invaded India. He also included a nuclear attack on India, which derived from another conversation with a former top Pakistani diplomat, who told him that ‘although we say the use of the [nuclear] bomb would be our last resort, it would in fact be our first resort’.29 The Pakistani diplomat’s argument was that, because India’s conventional forces would be so overwhelming, the only way they could be stopped would be with nuclear weapons. ‘Therefore last resort becomes first resort,’ says Hawksley.30

  The extent of the Pakistan civilian government’s prior knowledge and approval of the Kargil affair is significant because it goes to the heart of how much India can now trust peace initiatives from Sharif, as well as other civilian leaders. Would Sharif have taken a foreign correspondent on the trip if he had known how sensitive it was? And even if he thought it safe with a business-oriented Fortune reporter, his spokesman had also invited Ken Cooper of The Washington Post.31 Cooper did not come because of an appointment elsewhere, but might have been more focused on border questions. So maybe Sharif did not know what he would be told, or at least not its full extent and implications – and maybe, as others have suggested, he was not fully briefed.

  Distant Peace

  There is no chance of the main dispute over Kashmir and the Line of Control being solved permanently in the foreseeable future, and military and other sensitivities on both sides make it difficult to settle the border at Siachen and Sir Creek. That situation could continue, without severe disruption to either country, so long as extremists in the ISI and terrorist groups based in Pakistan do not seize power or escalate attacks. Almost inevitably, however, a terrorist attack in India, or a major border incident, will raise tensions. The risk, says Ahmed Rashid, a leading Pakistani writer on terrorism and diplomacy, is that ‘the proxy wars’ that India and Pakistan wage could escalate. ‘Terrorist groups who have been sponsored by the Pakistani military in the past and are not under any control now could create a war syndrome on the border, just as the 2008 suicide attack in Mumbai by Lashkar-e-Taiba did when 166 Indians were killed. Likewise, India is needling Pakistan by allegedly backing separatists in Baluchistan’.32

  Policy planners should not expect the two countries to make peace for many years ahead. It is inconceivable that China would allow Pakistan to make a deal while it continues to have border and other differences with India. There will be constructive periods, as there have been, when successful attempts are made to build ties, though there will always be the risk that extremists in Pakistan will launch terror attacks to destabilize talks if they seem to be successful. What is needed in parallel is leadership from the prime ministers in both countries to develop the exchanges and possible agreements on trade, investment, visas and cross-border links. If these help Pakistan’s economy to develop, optimists believe that its army might realize that it should slow down militancy and border clashes in order not to disrupt trade co-operation. At the same time, India would have to tolerate Pakistan regularly (but ineffectually) raising the issue of Kashmir in international meetings such as the United Nations.

  India would need to develop a more coherent and tough policy than it has displayed in recent years, when Manmohan Singh’s determination to keep talks going has undermined the ability of his government and army to retaliate. This is a neighbourhood example of how India needs to toughen up its habitually soft approach to international diplomacy and set firm boundaries for co-operation that Pakistan can accept or reject. A consensus would have to be reached in India with other political parties and with the states. International pressure could help to persuade Pakistan’s civilian government and the military to co-operate. Unless that happens, it will be business as usual, with occasional trouble on the LoC, possible terrorist attacks, and some talks – and with Pakistan being unable to reap the benefits of trade and inve
stment co-operation with India.

  Notes

  1. http://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/ajai-shukla-the-lac-is-not-the-loc-112091800050_1.html

  2. ‘Protests in Indian Kashmir – Stony ground – A new round of anti-government unrest’, 8 July 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/16542619?story_id=16542619

  3. http://www.ridingtheelephant.wordpress.com/2010/07/07/security-forces%E2%80%99-bullets-for-stones-bring-death-and-disaster-to-kashmir/

  4. http://www.ridingtheelephant.wordpress.com/2010/05/28/manmohan-singh-displays-his-own-and-his-government%E2%80%99s-limitations/

  5. Shivshankar Menon, National Security Adviser, ‘Our ability to change India in a globalised world’, The Prem Bhatia Memorial Lecture, IIC, New Delhi 11 August 2011; full text http://www.prembhatiatrust.com/ click on Lecture 16

  6. ‘Summit ascended, but Kashmir not yet broached – The Indo-Pakistani summit came close to success, and may yet achieve it if the hardliners on both sides can be restrained’, The Economist, 19 July 2001, http://www.economist.com/node/702471

  7. Shekhar Gupta ‘National Interest’ column, ‘On the LoC, in fact’, Indian Express, 19 January 2013; the figures were sourced from the Ministry of Home Affairs and the J&K Government and appear in a table in the newspaper headed ‘The Ceasefire Dividend’, http://www.indianexpress.com/news/national-interest-on-the-loc-in-fact/1061720/0

  8. ‘Manmohan Singh, Musharraf came close to striking Kashmir deal: WikiLeaks’, The Times of India, 3 September 2011, http://www.articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-09-03/india/30109679_1_ pervez-musharraf-president-musharraf-pakistani-president and Musharraf speaking at Hindustan Times Leadership Summit, Delhi, November 2012 http://www.youtube.com/watchflv=dh30ffA4-6k

  9. http://www.ridingtheelephant.wordpress.com/2011/07/28/a-new-young-face-brings-hope-to-pakistan%E2%80%99s-tortured-india-relationship/

  10. http://www.ridingtheelephant.wordpress.com/2012/12/18/pakistan-minister-fuels-a-bad-relationship-with-india/

  11. Kanwal Sibal, ‘India’s Options in Dealing with Pakistan’, Indian Defence Review, 7 August 2013, http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/indias-options-in-dealing-with-pakistan/0/

  12. G. Parthasarathy, ‘India’s Pakistan policy comprising uninterrupted dialogue and getting US to pressure Pakistan on terrorism is falling apart’, The Hindu Business Line, 13 February 2013, http://www. thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/columns/g-parthasarathy/composite-dialogue-with-pak-a-failure/article4411449.ece

  13. http://www.ridingtheelephant.wordpress.com/2009/03/08/musharraf-walks-a-delhi-tightrope-%E2%80%93-in-a-time-warp/

  14. ‘Pak army kills 5 soldiers in raid, tests India’s patience yet again’, The Times of India, 7 August 2013, http://www.articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-08-07/india/41166744_1_poonch-sector-indian-soldiers-pakistan-troops

  15. ‘Just a small skirmish in Kashmir? John Elliott on why the India-Pakistan border is suddenly the world’s most dangerous place’, New Statesman, 7 June 1999, http://www.newstatesman.com/node/134912

  16. ‘Pak military chiefs boycott Wagah welcome’, Rediff.com, 20 February 1999, http://www.rediff.com/news/1999/feb/20bus2.htm and http://www.rediff.com/news/1999/feb/20bus1.htm

  17. The Lahore Declaration, a Memorandum of Understanding, and a Joint Statement issued at the end of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s visit to Lahore, 20-21 February 1999, Stimson Research Papers http://www.stimson.org/research-pages/lahore-summit/

  18. Mani Dixit, former India Foreign Secretary, India and Pakistan in War and Peace, p 43, Books Today (India Today Group), India, and Routledge, USA, 2002, http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415304726/ and online at http://www.books.google.co.in/booksflid=XnzRttnqExUC&pg=PA25&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=4#v=onepage&q&f=false

  19. Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, A Memoir, pp 87-93, Simon and Schuster, London, 2006, Simon and Schuster Pocketbook paperback, 2008, Free Press, India, 2008, extracts on line http://www.amazon.co.uk/In-Line-Fire-Pervez-Musharraf/dp/074329582X (also sold on Delhi and Mumbai streets in pirated edition for Rs 200)

  20. Swaran Singh, ‘The Kargil conflict: Why and How of China’s Neutrality’, Strategic Analysis Volume 23, Issue 7, 1999, IDSA, http://www. www.idsa-india.org/an-oct9-3.html

  21. Sohail Warraich, ‘Ghaddar Kaun?’, http://www.bookcentreorg.wordpress.com/2012/02/21/ghaddar-kaun-author-sohail-warraich-price-us-28-50-price-pak-rs/

  22. Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, A Memoir, p. 96

  23. Pervez Musharraf produced photographs of Nawaz Sharif’s visit on a Pakistan TV channel, http://www.businessplustv.pk/ in July 2006. ‘Look at these pictures,’ said Musharraf. ‘In one of these pictures, I am receiving him.’ ‘Musharraf says Sharif knew about Kargil’, DNA, 13 July 2006, http://www.dnaindia.com/world/report_ghaddar-kaun-musharraf-says-sharif-knew-about-kargil_1041540

  24. ‘‘99 phone tapes show General kept Sharif in dark on Kargil, in book he says opposite’, Indian Express, 26 October 2006, http://www.indianexpress.com/news/-99-phone-tapes-show-general-kept-sharif-in-dark-on-kargil-in-book-he-says-opposite/15422/0

  25. Mani Dixit, India and Pakistan in War and Peace

  25. ‘Kargil adventure was four-man show’, Dawn, 29 January 2013 http://www.dawn.com/2013/01/29/kargil-adventure-was-four-man-show-general/

  27. Humphrey Hawksley, Dragonfire, Macmillan, London, 2000. George Fernandes, India’s Minister of Defence at the time said: ‘The political and historical backdrop against which he [Hawksley] writes is real. The dramatis personae couldn’t have been more real. The flctional denouement stands out as a call for reason to assert before time runs out. I commend this book to every Indian.’

  28. Humphrey Hawksley, Democracy Kills, p. 168, Macmillan, London, 2009

  29. Ibid., pp. 167-168

  30. Humphrey Hawksley in conversation with JE, September 2013

  31. http://www.multimedia.journalism.berkeley.edu/people/kencooper/

  32. Ahmed Rashid, ‘Beware Pakistan’s small nuclear weapons’, Blogs FT.com, http://www.blogs.ft.com/the-a-list/2013/10/22/beware-pakistans-small-nuclear-weapons/#axzz2iQHAMoKG

  22

  India and the US

  Sometimes Partners, Not Allies

  India’s relations with the US were transformed in 2008 with a deal on the civilian use of nuclear energy that gave it a new level of acceptability in Washington and international respectability, plus access to nuclear energy and freedom to trade internationally in sensitive technologies. In terms of the history of independent India, this stood alongside the economic liberalization reforms that began in 1991, which were the biggest positive event since the British left in 1947.1 Its effect has not been as instantly dramatic as those of 1947, nor yet as progressive as 1991, but it helped to change India’s potential place in international affairs and laid the foundations for the world’s most powerful and largest democracies to become allies one day, though progress is slow.

  There have been ups and downs since 2008 as both sides have begun to learn about each other’s priorities and limitations, but there are strong bilateral links. Nearly three million people of Indian origin live in America, forming the second largest Asian community there and playing a significant role in politics and business, and there are almost 100,000 Indian students studying in the country.2 There is a $100bn target for annual two-way trade and there is substantial direct investment in businesses and projects – $50bn from the US into India and over $11bn from India into the US.3

  From the Indian side, the nuclear deal was achieved primarily because of three men who saw the historic potential of ending a half-century stand-off. The first two were Jaswant Singh, who was India’s external affairs minister from 1998 to 2002 in the then NDA government, and Brajesh Mishra, a retired diplomat who was a central figure in that government, pulling the strings of power for Prime Minister Vajpayee. With Vajpayee and Singh, Mishra led a transformation of foreign (and security) policy, not just with the US but also Israel and Pakistan.4The third per
son was Manmohan Singh. Though largely seen from 2009 as an ineffectual prime minister, he had had the vision to revive the nuclear deal when it appeared to be collapsing in 20085 and to drive it through a parliamentary confidence vote (amid allegations of bribery) on the floor of the Lok Sabha6. In terms of personal initiative, this far exceeded his role as finance minister in 1991. All three men had to overcome extreme scepticism in India because of a deep distrust of America, especially in the self-consciously leftward-leaning Congress party where it has never been politically correct to display pro-US tendencies.

  The US Turns

  The change in US attitudes began with India’s 1998 nuclear tests. Within a month, Bill Clinton, the US president who till then had tilted towards Pakistan rather than India, sent Strobe Talbott, a senior state department official, to Delhi to start a dialogue with Jaswant Singh7. In Washington, there was a surge of interest and access for Indian diplomats that had not been seen before.8 Clinton then supported India during its potentially dangerous conflict with Pakistan in 1999, when he told Nawaz Sharif to withdraw troops from the mountain peaks above Kargil. He had a triumphant visit to India in 2000, saying he welcomed ‘India’s leadership in the region and the world’, adding that he knew it must be difficult to be ‘bordered by nations whose governments reject democracy’.9 But Clinton did little more. In particular, he did nothing to lift a multitude of nuclear-linked sanctions on India. This was partly because his Democratic Party took a strong line on nuclear non-proliferation after the 1998 tests, and partly because the state department did not want to upset Pakistan which it saw as its more important ally.

  The next moves came after two major terrorist attacks in 2001 – 9/11 on the New York twin towers in September that year and on the Indian parliament in December. By this time, George W. Bush had become US president and he decided to launch an initiative to build a new relationship. officials from both sides, including Mishra and Robert Blackwill, the then US ambassador in Delhi, began to look for a policy idea that would be a game-changer in the bilateral relationship and enable India gradually to become a counterweight to China10. They chose the nuclear deal which was, as Geoffrey Pyatt, a senior US official, said later, ‘a single big issue which captured everybody’s attention and made clear that we were changing the rules of engagement’.11 Without China as a potential common adversary, these moves might never have happened.