Hitler's Brandenburgers

by Lawrence Paterson

  His previous identification with National Socialism rapidly deserted Canaris and he began to develop his own agenda, aided by Oster, in which he would undermine the nation’s leadership in order to prevent another conflict. His first attempt included the staging of deception operations that clearly showed Germany mobilising troops to invade neighbouring Austria. However, the demonstration went unremarked and on 13 March 1938, the unprepared Austria was successfully absorbed into the Greater German Reich.

  Following the Anschluss, the aristocratic Oberstleutnant Erwin Heinrich René von Lahousen was transferred to the Abwehr; his enlistment by OKW’s Generaloberst Beck made at the prompting of Canaris who vouched for the Austrian’s ‘political attitude’. Born in 1897 in Vienna, Lahousen served as an officer in the 14th Infantry Regiment on the Italian front during the First World War. Wounded in action, he survived the war and remained an active infantry officer in the Austrian Army’s 2nd Division in Vienna, later completing his Höheren Offizierskurse (Higher Officer’s Course) and promoted to Major.4

  Following the 1918 collapse of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, a Federal government was established with an associated Federal Army. Though this army had no military intelligence establishment, the former head of the wartime Kaiserliche und Königliche Evidenzbüro, Generalmajor Max Ronge, served as an ‘honorary’ adviser to the State Police on all internal security matters, primarily monitoring the various left-and right-wing paramilitary groups, as well as engaging in counter-espionage. Vienna at that time was a hotbed of international undercover activities and into this fevered atmosphere Lahousen was indoctrinated, graduating with top marks from his Officer’s Course. Lahousen was transferred to the newly established Austrian Defence Ministry in 1933 at the behest of Ronge himself, to be trained as Chief Intelligence Officer for the Austrian Army and its newly established Intelligence Section. Between 1933 and 1937 the emphasis for Austrian Intelligence was gathering information on Czechoslovakia (which was engaging in anti-Austrian intelligence work of its own, somewhat ironically using Austrian officers dismissed from the military due to pro-Nazi activities) and Yugoslavia as well as monitoring events along the Austro-German border for the illegal activities of Austrian Nazis, though there was no intelligence work officially carried out against those nations with which Austria exchanged information: Italy, Hungary and Germany. Lahousen was promoted to Oberstleutnant and transferred to the General Staff in 1936. During the following year, Lahousen was present at a meeting between Austrian military and intelligence leaders with the head of Abwehr Amt. Ausland, Wilhelm Canaris, to discuss information to be exchanged regarding Czechoslovakia. It was the first time that he had met directly with the head of the Abwehr, a meeting that would have fateful consequences.

  Following his transfer to the Abwehr after the Anschluss, Lahousen was made deputy head of Abwehr I (responsible for espionage) and soon taken into Canaris’ confidence, who appealed to his ‘anti-Nazi attitude, with which he was familiar’. Lahousen, though a loyal and dedicated soldier, was primarily an Austrian nationalist and he firmly believed that his country would only be returned to its former greatness with the elimination of the Nazis and separation from the German state. Canaris knew that following the relatively effortless annexation of Austria, Hitler’s next objective was the absorption of Czechoslovakia, to be achieved by agitating the Sudeten-German issues that had been left in the wake of the First World War. Canaris was certain that this would mean war, as he judged it inconceivable that both Great Britain and the USSR would remain silent after yet another bold strike by the German Chancellor. Canaris instructed Lahousen to help prevent the annexation of Czechoslovakia by deliberate overestimation of Czech military force and preparedness while also assisting in the enlistment of other anti-Nazi Austrian officers into the Abwehr. At the end of 1938 Prussian Oberstleutnant Helmuth Groscurth left Abwehr II for OKW and subsequent field commands, Oberstleutnant Erwin von Lahousen being transferred to replace him at the beginning of 1939.

  Meanwhile, the ‘atavistic adventurer’ Hippel had been hard at work outlining his ideas for a new Wehrmacht formation. Inspired by the known success of the German East African campaign that he had been a part of and his study of pioneering work with indigenous irregulars by T.E. Lawrence during the British Middle Eastern campaigns, Hippel desired to create the first German ‘special forces’. He maintained that small elite units of men could achieve exceptional results, particularly those skilled in demolition and small arms combat and able to speak relevant foreign languages fluently. Hippel’s proposals for the formation of such a unit for employment behind enemy lines in psychological warfare were rejected by his military superiors, who remained rooted in military orthodoxy. Even once the idea reached Canaris’ ears, they were rejected. Though Canaris was far from orthodox in his approach to warfare, he viewed Hippel with suspicion, believing him and his unique proposal to be pro-Bolshevik. Canaris informed Hippel that he believed that such activities as psychological and ideological warfare were the prerogative of the ruling political party, not the military.

  Unswervingly committed to his idea, Hippel turned to his former commander Groscurth who had long advocated the formation of ethnic German sabotage units in the Sudetenland and Poland. Groscurth brought pressure to bear at OKW and strongly backed Hippel’s suggestion. With this added impetus, authorisation was soon received to create his unit which was to be placed under Abwehr command. Once Canaris was reconciled to this decision, he changed his stance and instead saw the new unit as potentially enhancing secret instructions that he had recently given to Lahousen.

  Following his appointment as head of Abwehr II, Lahousen had held lengthy discussions with Canaris, who gave him explicit instructions on how he was to run his section, both in public and secret. Publicly, Lahousen was instructed to: limit his tasks to military matters only and not become involved in ‘political actions’; reject all methods that were employed by the SD and Gestapo; and absolutely refuse collaboration with either the SD or Gestapo. These instructions were unequivocal and repeated by both Canaris and Lahousen at all discussions and meetings involving Abwehr II, particularly for the benefit of officers that were judged sympathetic or fully indoctrinated by the Nazi ethos.

  These ‘covert’ instructions were to form a dedicated anti-Nazi cadre in Abwehr II, prepared to commit illegal acts by which the Nazi state could be sabotaged from within. It was to this end that Canaris believed Hippel’s new unit could be used. A gradual but systematic removal of National Socialist officers from Hippel’s command was begun by Lahousen and the unit was strictly forbidden to engage in ‘kidnapping, assassination and poisoning, or similar actions related to the methods of the SD’. Lahousen was also secretly instructed to passively resist by under-employing his resources while making a show of great activity, avoiding any operations entirely that could be justifiably abandoned. These latter instructions were greatly relaxed following Operation ‘Barbarossa’ and intended more in relation to the Western Allies than the USSR. Canaris’ rationale remained a final attempt to prevent the war that he knew was sure to come if Hitler continued his territorial ambitions in Eastern Europe.

  Beginning with his very detailed conversations with me relative to my taking over Abt. II of the Abwehr (beginning of 1939) up until my departure from the Amt./Ausland, Abwehr (middle of 1943), Canaris had spoken constantly – whether by paraphrases and hints or quite openly – of the necessity of doing away with Hitler, Himmler and Heydrich (the ‘3-Hs’) and of deposing the whole criminal gang. He also explained therewith my appointment as head of Abwehr II and the real reason for forming the Brandenburg Regiment … The role that he had destined for my Abteilung, specifically for me and the Brandenburger Regiment, was as follows; I was to prepare myself at a given time for the acquisition of material (explosives and time fuses) for the accomplishment of the ‘action’.

  On the other hand, the Brandenburg Regiment was, to a degree, to be set up as Special Troops at the disposal of that first, powerful
occupation by certain ‘key units’ of the National Socialist juggernaut (the RSHA, radio network, Intelligence branch of the OKW etc.)5

  Lahousen was assisted in his tasks by his adjutant Kapitän der Reserve Hans-Joachim Wolfgang Abshagen. This 41-year-old native of Stralsund had been a pre-war member of the NSDAP and SS, but had joined solely in order to remain in Germany’s cinema business, which had become increasingly dominated by Joseph Goebbels and his approved output. A foreign correspondent of some repute, he was called up for military service as a member of the Wehrmacht reserve at the outbreak of war. It was Abshagen who assisted Lahousen in his gradual removal of Nazi officers with ‘great cleverness and with characteristic intelligence’.6 Amongst those men that Abshagen and Lahousen chose to remove was eventually Hippel himself, though not due to any political motivation, but rather his dedication to the Wehrmacht. However, that lay some years in the future as Hippel, with the assistance of his adjutant, Luftwaffe Flak artillery Wachtmeister Wilhelm Johannes, began to create the first of his special units. Johannes was the perfect foil for Hippel’s sometimes vague theoretical notions. Where Hippel embraced the concept of forming small specialised units, it was frequently Johannes’ gift for organisation and his ability for managing people that allowed the wish to become reality. They were further supported at the outset by Leutnant der Reserve Verbeek, Bavarian Hauptmann Putz, leader of the Abwehr II in Vienna, and Austrian Hauptmann Fleck of the Breslau Abwehr.

  Recruited primarily from volunteers from the ‘Sudetendeutsches Freikorps’ that comprised mainly First World War veterans and local SA men drafted into the Wehrmacht, Hippel’s men were not spies. Even though the use of disguise using captured or manufactured enemy uniforms was a fundamental tool for Hippel’s service, he instructed that each man wear his Wehrmacht uniform underneath, able to discard the disguise before engaging in combat and therefore arguably not contravening the articles of the Hague Convention. Oberleutnant Lazarek became the small force’s second in command and training began under the supervision of Verbeek and his chief instructors Leutnant Dr Gottfried Kniesche and Leutnant Siegfried Grabert. The formation’s codename ‘Baulehr Kompanie (Deutsche Kompanie) z.b.V.’ (Training and Construction Company (German Company) Special Purpose) was first used on 15 August 1939 when it had moved to the Slovakian base at Sliac north-west of Bratislava in preparation for the invasion of Poland. These members of the Wehrmacht would soon become merged with another unorthodox formation; the Ebbinghaus Organisation.

  The origins of this paramilitary grouping can be traced back to the violence surrounding the plebiscite for the self-determination of Upper Silesia that had been guaranteed by the conditions of the Versailles Treaty. The Prussian province of Silesia had been divided into Upper and Lower at the end of the First World War. The region not only contained an enormous quantity of coalmines and heavy industry but was ethnically split between Polish-and German-speaking inhabitants. British, French and Italian troops occupied the region on behalf of the Supreme Allied Council as both the Polish and German governments began to campaign in the months leading up to the ballot. Two Polish uprisings took place a year apart during the campaign, in August 1919 and August 1920, both of which were quelled by League of Nations forces but both of which led to violent clashes between German and Polish paramilitary forces; the former comprised primarily of Freikorps troops. Following a German majority in the overall plebiscite vote, Britain suggested the region split in a way that would provide only a fraction of the industrial capacity to Poland, triggering a third Polish uprising that took place during April 1921. Once again, the insurrectionists clashed with German paramilitary volunteers in large-scale fighting that culminated in the Battle of the Annaberg.

  Unable to determine or control the partitioning process, the Supreme Allied Council passed the matter over to the League of Nations who partitioned Upper Silesia along lines that followed plebiscite voting, with most of the industrial and mining regions going to Poland. Though the fighting was finished, resentment over this decision would simmer until the outbreak of war in 1939. German paramilitary units continued to exist within the occupied area, including the Industrieschutzes Oberschlesien (Industrial Protection Upper Silesia) that had tasked itself with safeguarding transport and industrial installations now under Polish control. However, as tensions gradually eased, the small group slowly became dormant.

  During 1935 and the remilitarisation of the Reich, the Industrieschutzes Oberschlesien was reactivated and expanded, subsumed into Canaris’ Abwehrstelle VIII (Breslau) and renamed the ‘Ebbinghaus Organisation’, such units traditionally taking the name of their leader, in this case purported to be Ernst Ebbinghaus. The formation remained paramilitary by nature and it is difficult to ascertain exactly how many members it comprised, though the most reliable figures appear to be between 500 and 600 men.7 So too is there confusion over exactly what the organisation was titled as various secondary accounts name ‘Freikorps Ebbinghaus’, ‘Ebbinghaus Battalion’, ‘Sonderformation Ebbinghaus’ and ‘Kampfgruppe Ebbinghaus’. It appears likely that these are the same, officially listed as ‘Organisation Ebbinghaus’ (subsequently anglicised for the sake of this text as ‘Ebbinghaus Organisation’). They were far from the sole paramilitary unit to take part in the invasion of Poland, but remain the focus of this study due to their subsequent role as a building block for the Brandenburgers.

  The actual identity of Ebbinghaus himself remains something of a mystery, a common explanation given is that this was simply a cover name for Hippel. However, biographical details have been provided by Polish researcher Grzegorza Bębnik that cite Ebbinghaus as a genuine character, born in 1889 in Westphalia, schooled in Kassel and later attending the Mining Academy in Berlin before wartime service as an officer in the Engineers. Later, working for the Prussian Ministry of Economy and Labour, he is cited as covertly heading the paramilitary group that bore his name while employed during 1939 in the Prussian Main Mining Office in Wroclaw, scheduled to become Director of the Silesian Central Mine Rescue Station in Bytom.8

  The Ebbinghaus Organisation undertook training in Oels, Glatz and Lamsdorf, members wearing civilian clothes with the addition of a swastika armband when on active service. Armed with automatic pistols, rifles, machine guns, hand grenades and batons, the men infiltrated through the so-called ‘Green’ Polish border of occupied Upper Silesia – an area used for clandestine crossings of the Polish frontier – as the start date of the German invasion approached. While his men moved forward, Ebbinghaus, his deputy Oberleutnant Lazarek and their small headquarters occupied the Promenade Restaurant in Bytom as a makeshift headquarters. The Ebbinghaus Organisation featured several section commanders that had taken part in the Freikorps battles between 1919 and 1921 and who subsequently had become local lights in the Silesian NSDAP, including SA-Standartenführer Hans Ramdohr from Gliwice, SA-Hauptsturmführer Wilhelm Pisarski from Bytom, SA-Sturmführer Karl Rolle from Gliwice and SA-Sturmbannführer Josef Piontek also from Bytom.

  The Abwehr had also supplied extra men with military training for the Ebbinghaus Organisation, including Siegfried Grabert, an ex-Leutnant of the Reichswehr’s 5th Kraftfahr-Abteilung (Motorised Battalion), 5th Infantry Division, who had retired from the military following a sports injury. Enlisted into the Abwehr by Canaris while studying medicine in Tübingen, Grabert was responsible for the establishment of the Deutsche Kompanie (German Company) that was subsequently attached to Ebbinghaus, comprised of Polish-speaking Volksdeutsche from both the Industrieschutz Oberschlesien and the Sudetendeutsches Freikorps. Grabert’s men trained in standard Slovakian Army uniforms with an armband bearing the legend ‘Deutsches Kompanie’ and later donned various disguises for their part in the forthcoming invasion.

  The term Volksdeutsche may not have originated with Nazi Germany, but it was most certainly used as a common theme by Hitler in his approach to racial matters. In a 1938 Reich Chancellery memorandum, the term is defined as indicating ‘races whose language and culture had
German origins but who did not hold German citizenship’. Volksdeutsche were those who were considered of Germanic culture but who lived outside the borders of German-speaking nations such as Germany, Austria and Switzerland. It did not refer to ‘recent’ German migrants who lived elsewhere, rather it encompassed those who considered their identity and culture to be of German origin, generally due to past migration or inhabitants of territory lost through war. An equivalent English term would be ‘ethnic Germans’ though that does not fully cover the racial overtones of the Nazi application, espousing the idea that Germany was a ‘cultural nation’ whose inhabitants were part of a ‘race’ as opposed to a ‘nation state’. Those who were considered Jewish Germans were excluded from the category of Volksdeutsche no matter what their claimed ethnicity.

  CHAPTER I

  Baptism of Fire

  ‘If you win, you need not explain … If you lose, you should not be there to explain.’

  Adolf Hitler

  Hitler’s original planned date for the invasion of Poland was 26 August 1939. However, an Agreement of Mutual Assistance’ signed between Great Britain and Poland at noon the previous day which guaranteed military assistance to either party should another ‘European country’ attack them prompted a nervous Hitler to postpone until the morning of 1 September. Unfortunately, notice of this rescheduling came too late for one of the new covert Abwehr units led by Leutnant der Reserve Dr Hans-Albrecht Herzner.