Hitler's Brandenburgers

by Lawrence Paterson

  Twenty minutes after the successful demolition, the armoured train appeared, coming to a stop 500m from the ruined bridge and immediately being shelled by Dutch artillery that crippled the locomotive by fracturing her brake line, killing seven of the seventy-five Wehrmacht troops aboard. The German armoured train returned fire as the troop train arrived and disgorged its infantry passengers, the combined artillery and machine-gun fire killing several of the new arrivals. Nonetheless, by 0930hrs the Wehrmacht had forced a crossing of the river and taken the west bank. However, the loss of both bridges would remain a major logistical problem for the German advance until engineers could provide makeshift pontoons.

  Fifty kilometres to the north the 4th Company had mixed results from their operations. Oberleutnant Walther’s company had been given five main bridges to deal with: the railway bridge at Gennep; the railway bridge across the Maas near Mook; the road bridge at Malden; the lifting lock on the Maas at Heumen; and the road bridge at Hattert. Walther himself led the attack on the Gennep bridge, using three Dutch Kampfdolmetscher disguised as Gendarmes of the Marechaussee whose duties included that of military police for the Dutch Army. These men would infiltrate the defences by masquerading as the escort of six German ‘deserters’, each carrying concealed weapons.

  At 2200hrs on 9 May the company moved from their camp in the Reichswald towards the border to prepare for their crossing during the early hours of the morning. The six Germans wore their standard Wehrmacht uniform while the Dutchmen received their disguises and weapons at the forward staging area. Walther’s ‘deserters’ had perfected their weapon concealment and each wore an unbuttoned greatcoat without a belt, a machine pistol carried under the armpit, a pistol and wire cutters each stuffed in the back of their trouser waistband and pockets full of egg and stick grenades.

  At 0230hrs the small column of men crossed the border and began their journey towards the Gennep bridge. One of the Dutchmen experienced a change of heart once over the border and Walther quickly detailed one of his men to escort him back to the staging area in Germany, where he was to be kept under lock and key to prevent any potential security breach. The remainder pressed on and in time they reached the bridge, stopping 800m short for a final briefing. The group then emerged into full view and walked slowly towards their target. Walther’s immediate subordinate, Bavarian Feldwebel Hermann Stöhr, later recalled the attack:

  The bridge itself, an imposing iron construction, was about 150 metres long and had a Dutch defence system with bunkers and a permanent guard of platoon strength if not more. I think everybody in our ‘commando’ got a little queasy when they saw it. But impudence wins; something we proved later.

  An open road to the bridge and the Dutch have already seen us. At the entrance to the bridge, four Dutchmen intercepted us. Now it was time for acting! Did they still think that we were prisoners and if so, was there any danger from this handful of German soldiers, were there still any more German troops yet to see? Who knows! Oberleutnant Walther and I suddenly put our pistols against the guards’ chests, the action invisible from the other end of the bridge. Walther kept the sentries at bay, while I took the two steps to the guardhouse, with a deep breath, pulled out my knife and cut all the wires that could be reached. I did not see what was going on around me, since I only had eyes and ears for this wire. Meanwhile it appears that a Dutchman had become suspicious and fired a shot and we had our first badly wounded man. It’s still a mystery to me today how this went unnoticed.8

  Indeed, somewhat miraculously, the men holding the other end of the bridge displayed no reaction to the gunshot. Walther and Stöhr, along with another Brandenburger and a single Dutch interpreter, Martin van Haalen, continued along the length of the bridge, maintaining their disguise while the remainder of Walther’s group took cover on the west bank. The four men passed a guard stationed midway without hindrance and reached the far end whereupon they were confronted by raised weapons from the remaining guards. Walther improvised as the sound of German aircraft could be heard overhead, shouting, ‘Fliegerdeckung!’ (‘Aircraft, get down!’) at the top of his voice. As all men present dived for cover the Brandenburgers pulled free their hidden weapons and rapidly disarmed the startled guards. Three bunkers were taken by a combination of ‘weapons and cunning’ and approximately forty Dutch troops captured, though some defenders remained at large and began shooting at the small Brandenburg group. With the eastern end of the bridge secured, Walther fired a signal flare that summoned the armoured train (Eisenbahn Panzerzug No. 1) that was waiting on the German border, arriving shortly thereafter and silencing a single bunkered Dutch artillery piece that had begun firing. Minutes later a second train carrying a battalion of troops from the 256th Infantry Division passed by as elements of the 7th Panzer Division also flowed west over the major crossing point.9

  Walther and his troops returned to Germany, the young officer subsequently being recommended for the Knight’s Cross, which was awarded on 24 June 1940. Commander of XXVI Army Corps, General der Artillerie Albert Wodrig, wrote Walther a personal letter eight days after the operation:

  After the directive to occupy Holland, I would like to recall once more the fighting which you have carried out for the task of the Corps. It is only now that we can fully appreciate the importance for the whole operation of your bravery and your circumspection on the campaign’s first day of combat.10

  Wodrig’s Army Corps made up the left flank of the Wehrmacht’s Eighteenth Army and relied heavily on the capture of the northern bridges. However, despite Walther’s success, attacks on the three remaining targets were mostly failures. At Hatert, Stabsfeldwebel Babuke’s group approached the bridge in civilian clothes, but were quickly unmasked by observant Dutch guards who opened fire, driving the attackers to ground and allowing the Dutch to withdraw to the west bank and blow the demolition charges. However, due to improper positioning of the explosives, the structure did not completely collapse and despite one man in a ‘black suit’ being killed by defending gunfire, Babuke’s men continued the battle until reinforced by armoured cars of the SS Verfügungstruppe reconnaissance battalion. With most of the bridge decking still intact, SS armoured cars began crossing the bridge, the Dutch quickly surrendering despite not suffering a single casualty. Opposing them, every single member of the SS assault group had either been killed or wounded, Untersturmführer Vogt capturing the bridge with only four active men of his unit left. However, the bridgehead obtained on the far bank was, somewhat bizarrely, not exploited to its full potential. The SS unit was denied permission to continue west as the Wehrmacht officer in command of the spearhead formation – Major Einstmann – put no trust in the bridge’s structural integrity.11 The SS raged at being held back, their ultimate target the bridge at Grave, less than 7km away.

  A group of Brandenburgers in civilian clothing attacked the bridge at Malden. Four men approached the bridge’s guards from the 26th Infantry Regiment and demanded authorisation to cross at approximately 0400hrs but were denied by the suspicious sentries. The Brandenburgers retreated into the early morning gloom along the approach road, only to return in a larger group of nine men who immediately spread out and opened fire. Bluff appeared to have failed so now they applied force. Storming forward, they reached the eastern bank and immediately attempted to consolidate their hold after taking most of the surprised guards prisoner. However, the corporal commanding the bridge defences had summoned help, which arrived in the shape of ten men armed with a light machine gun and small arms. Led by a Captain Peeters, they silently took up position before opening fire on the Germans. Four of the attackers were killed instantly – Gefreiters Kurt Kleebauer, Hans Krön and Erhardt Neuhöfer – as well as their Dutch interpreter. The remaining five men surrendered and, being still in civilian clothes, were briefly interrogated before Peeters ordered them shot as spies. Fortunately for them, this order was soon cancelled and the five taken to the rear while the bridge was successfully destroyed. Moments later SS armoured cars commanded
by Obersturmführer Pötschke arrived at the far bank and, after a brief exchange of fire that saw two SS men killed, moved off to find an alternative crossing.

  Leutnant Dietrich Witzel led probably the largest group of the entire attack against the sluice gates at Heuman. Using four disguised Dutchmen as Gendarmes, they escorted nearly thirty Brandenburgers dressed in civilian clothes. The bridge was raised during the hours of darkness and guards from the 26th Infantry Regiment challenged the disguised ‘Gendarmes’. German intelligence had provided the correct recognition codes and the entire party was soon authorised to cross once the bridge was lowered into place. The midway point passed over a small island upon which were heavy bunkers and the bridge controls; it was here that the Germans sprang into action with machine guns and grenades, taking three of the five bunkers before the remaining defenders opened fire.

  On the western bank, the guard commander, Captain Dr Postma, raced to the scene and rallied the defence despite being hit by a stray bullet. The Dutch managed to raise the bridge once more, temporarily isolating the attackers who eventually managed to force a captured civilian operator to lower it from their end, operating it by hand as gunfire had destroyed the electric controls. Dutch mortar fire began landing amongst the German raiders though the first elements of the SS reconnaissance battalion soon arrived in the shape of four Sdkfz 231 armoured cars, after having intercepted a Dutch force attempting to attack the Brandenburgers from the rear from the direction of Groesbeek.

  Both sides continued to reinforce the battle, with German artillery fire also being directed against the defending casemates. An initial SS assault across the bridge was repulsed, with their commander Untersturmführer Gerhard Letz killed, and repeated attempts defeated by accurate Dutch fire. However, efforts by the defenders to retake lost ground also stalled amidst heavy German artillery fire directed by reconnaissance aircraft that had arrived with the dawn light. Finally, the tide of battle turned irrevocably in the attackers’ favour and at 1700hrs the final defending machine gun was silenced and the bridge taken. In total the Dutch had lost sixteen men killed and fifty wounded while the Germans suffered twelve dead. Amongst those were Brandenburgers Pionier Josef Jelinek, Gefreiter Franz Koudele and Dutch interpreter Anton Lukessen from Didam. While ultimately the bridge was taken intact, Witzel’s surprise attack had failed to achieve its objective, the protracted battle that dragged into the late afternoon already putting the German offensive behind schedule.

  During the final moments of early morning darkness, Unteroffizier Ziesold’s small group failed to take the 400m railway bridge at Mook which was destroyed by its guard unit at the first sign of the approaching Germans. The task fell to the 474th Infantry Regiment to storm the river using conventional methods during the day with the help of heavy artillery support.

  The Brandenburgers had lost more bridges than they had taken, but their combination of daring, subterfuge, bravery and ruthlessness had captured enough crossings to warrant their commitment to action. While these were the most significant units committed along the northern river line leading into Belgium and The Netherlands, it appears that smaller units or even individuals were committed elsewhere, as evidenced by at least two deaths of men attributed to the strength of Baulehr-Bataillon z.b.V. 800. In Nijmegen, 23-year old Pionier Theodor van den Hurk – a German from Kleve – was caught in civilian clothes at Neerbosch, apparently scouting the bridge approaches. Interrogated by Captain F.J.A. Boers, he was then shot and his body hastily buried by the roadside. Stabsfeldwebel Josef Hempelmann, formerly of the 1st Battalion Grenzwacht-Regiment 36 (border guards) but attached to the Brandenburgers, was wounded in Arnhem and later died in a German field hospital. Further west, Pionier Leopold Habicher was killed at Grave, the objective of the German spearhead forces once over the initial river and canal line.

  A separate Abwehr unit had also been committed to action. At Maastricht three main bridges crossed the Maas River and Bataillon z.b.V. 100 had been raised specifically to deal with these. A special assault group of Luftwaffe Fallschirmjäger undertook a daring attack on the formidable Belgian Fort Eben Emael to neutralise this cornerstone of Belgium’s border defence. Maastricht provided the key to ground support reaching the heavily outnumbered Fallschirmjäger and a special subsection of the battalion, designated Sonderverbänd Hocke after its commander Leutnant Hans-Joachim Hocke, was tasked with seizing the bridges in the same manner as the Brandenburgers had employed. Hocke’s assault group included motorised regular infantry units, Flak troops and a small number of armoured vehicles as well as bicycle and motorcycle infantry, signalmen and engineers, superseded by disguised infiltrators using the same methods as the Brandenburgers.

  The battalion was subdivided into three sections for the operation at Maastricht:

  •A small commando unit consisting of seven men – one German and six Dutch collaborators – dressed in civilian clothes were met in the Maastricht suburb of Wijk on the day preceding the attack. They were to attack the guards of the Wilhelmina Bridge at dawn the following day to secure the crossing.

  •A second commando of thirty men in civilian disguise crossed the border at Herzogenrath and took possession of bicycles stored at Bleierheide and Kerkrade before heading to Maastricht to tackle the Servaas and railway bridges.

  •A third unit that comprised much of the bicycle infantry – approximately forty men – were also to cross the border south-east of Sittard wearing Dutch Gendarme uniforms. The motorcycle detachment would follow them, similarly clothed. This heavier force would assist the vanguard units and help secure the bridges against counter-attack while the remainder of the battalion crossed the border at 0430hrs on 10 May.

  However, efforts to secure every assigned target failed and losses were heavy, including Hocke himself killed as he attempted to cross Maastricht’s railway bridge and defuse explosives at the exact moment they were detonated. The first group of seven men were ironically not defeated in combat, but by heavy drinking the night before which rendered all but the German and a single Dutchman unable to conduct their mission in the morning darkness. The two that attempted their task were so dishevelled and awkward that they immediately aroused guards’ suspicions and were arrested, the Dutchman attempting to flee and shot dead. The group of thirty men on bicycles was stopped shortly before reaching Maastricht and arrested en-masse, while those disguised as Gendarmes were found to be wearing incorrect uniform and forced to fight their way towards their targets. At 0645hrs the Servaas Bridge was destroyed, at 0652hrs the Wilhelmina Bridge and at 0700hrs the railway bridge was also demolished. At 0720hrs, the remains of Bataillon z.b.V. 100 informed the vanguard of the 4th Panzer Division that all Maastricht bridges had been lost, though they had managed to secure a small lodgement on the western bank after storming across in rubber boats. They then finally reached the Albert Canal bridge at Vroenhoven which had been taken by the Fallschirmjäger group ‘Concrete’.

  Nonetheless, the attack on Eben Emael itself was a stunning success; a total Fallschirmjäger force of force of eleven officers and 427 NCOs and men divided into four separate assault groups (codenamed ‘Iron’, ‘Steel’, ‘Concrete’ and ‘Granite’) had captured the imposing fort and three bridges over the Albert Canal. Indeed, the ‘Granite’ group of eighty-five Fallschirmjäger neutralised the entire fort, capturing its 750-man garrison. Though the loss of the Maastricht bridges delayed the relieving ground forces, they eventually reached the Fallschirmjäger during early morning on 11 May.

  Meanwhile, further to the south, Rudloff’s 3rd Company went into action across the Belgian and Luxembourg borders. Rudloff’s men had been assigned twenty-four objectives that included bridges to be taken intact, communication centres either destroyed or captured, anti-tank obstacles removed and Gendarme stations neutralised. They would be operating in the Ardennes forest through which the Wehrmacht was attempting to make its crucial armoured attack, their role being to facilitate the initial passage of heavy troops through an area considered na
turally unsuitable for such troops.

  Rudloff’s men divided into small groups of six to nine men and infiltrated the borderlands with the Halbtarnung of civilian outer garments over their army uniforms. Once on enemy soil the company regrouped somewhat into three combat groups deployed in different areas: Leutnant Hütten (an instructor from Quenzgut) took approximately thirty men to the zone around Sourbrodt; Leutnant Kutschera led another forty-five to the region of Bütgenbac; Rudloff the remaining seventy-five men towards St Vith.

  Hütten and his group moved by truck from Münstereifel towards the border during the afternoon of 9 May, reaching Kalterherberg by 2300hrs. His primary task was to prevent the reporting of the imminent German invasion by Belgian reconnaissance troops that were stationed at points along the border. Five separate units were formed, their objectives being the railway bridge at Küchelscheid and protection of the tracks by occupation of the small monastery at Am Grünen Kloster; the Sourbrodt railway station; the crossroads and telephone exchange at Elsenborn; and the transport hub of Baugnez near Malmedy. Hütten was assisted by Unteroffizier Peter Hardy (who hailed from the Belgian area they were to operate in) and Zeipel and Austrian Feldwebel Johann Tanzer, who had already served in the Sudetenland and Poland after having enlisted in the Abwehr in 1938.

  Passing over the frontier near border-marker number 640, Hütten’s men immediately cut telephone lines and isolated the military exchange at Elsenborn Camp, largely empty after Belgian troops and civilians that had been stationed there had moved to their mobilisation regions. Three telephone operators from the camp were captured near Küchelscheid, the Brandenburgers engaging in a brief firefight with a trio of Belgian soldiers in Leykau at 0400hrs, wounding two. The remaining man raced from the scene by bicycle – his front tyre hit by a bullet – and reached a second Belgian outpost (Post 25), immediately ordering the Küchelscheid railway bridge destroyed using the pre-prepared charges before Hütten’s troops could secure it. A Belgian engineer hurried onto the exposed bridge and successfully lit the fuses under fire from the approaching Brandenburgers. With the bridge blown, the Gendarmes and soldiers retreated to Elsenborn Camp where they were later captured; a Belgian corporal being hit in the back during their hurried escape and later dying in hospital in Butgenbach.