Hitler's Brandenburgers

by Lawrence Paterson

  Hitler and many Wehrmacht chiefs also underestimated the value of accurate intelligence which reported substantial numbers of uncommitted Red Army troops at the time that ‘Case Blue’ got underway. Stalin’s generals had adopted a strategy of retreating before the German advance, trading physical territory for time and not allowing the Germans to succeed in their attempts to replicate the hugely destructive encirclement battles of ‘Barbarossa’. Where Soviet prisoners of war had numbered millions in 1941 and whole armies were destroyed, the prisoners taken in 1942 numbered instead in the hundreds of thousands. By the standards of the North African desert or Western Europe those numbers would be catastrophic; on the Eastern Front, they were not. The Wehrmacht had expected to encircle and destroy what they believed remained of the Red Army in the Don bend during the first months of ‘Case Blue’, but the Soviets retreated before they could be trapped. Though the retreat was frequently chaotic and lost huge quantities of equipment to the invader, it nonetheless preserved troop numbers that could be added to the vast reserves about to come into action. Hitler’s fixation on Stalingrad can perhaps be explained by his mistaken and ill-informed belief that the Red Army was at its last gasp despite the warnings of some intelligence officers. Events soon proved otherwise.

  CHAPTER 9

  Regeneration, 1943

  ‘He often said to me, “Schellenberg, always remember the goodness of animals. You see, my dachshund is discreet and will never betray me. I cannot say that of any human being …”’

  Walter Schellenberg on Wilhelm Canaris

  The New Year brought yet another organisational change to the Lehrregiment ‘Brandenburg’ z.b.V. 800, this time a lasting transition that enabled a complete ‘repurposing’ of the entire organisation. Since their inception, the Brandenburgers had been intended for commando operations in advance of Wehrmacht offensives. They had proved their guile and worth on all major fronts to which German land forces had been despatched. Through their combination of bravery and deception they had acted as effective ‘pathfinder’ troops that frequently allowed the Blitzkrieg to function at its optimum capability. Speed of movement was a hallmark of Germany’s wars of conquest until the end of 1941. The Brandenburgers had also provided a skilled pool of men from which the Abwehr could draw potential agents and saboteurs who would act independently behind enemy lines. In this, they were less successful, although there are strong cases for a popular opinion that the highest echelons of the Abwehr were potentially acting against Germany’s best interests; the determination of men like Canaris, Oster and Lahousen to see Hitler deposed and the Nazi regime destroyed before German was dragged into an abyss would, after all, require military failure. This, in turn, was best enabled by a comprehensive failure of military intelligence. Though this theory is disputed, there is certainly a degree of logic to it.

  Regardless of the motivation, while the political machinations of those in command were unfolding in Berlin, the Brandenburg Regiment suffered accordingly. With increasingly infrequent use of the Brandenburgers as infiltration troops – both in disguise and not – on the Eastern and North African fronts during 1942, the regiment was more frequently utilised as a traditional light infantry unit. Bereft of heavy weapons, the Brandenburg companies were organised differently from traditional Jäger units, generally smaller and therefore more vulnerable when committed to standard infantry battles. They relied entirely on ‘parent units’ for the necessary supporting elements such as artillery and vehicles in order to function effectively, though such support was frequently either not available or not provided. By the end of 1942 casualties had risen accordingly as the Brandenburgers were thrown into the attritional battles of the front line. The staff at Abwehr II appeared to take little further interest in the Brandenburgers’ deployment, either through distraction by more pressing intelligence concerns or a belated acknowledgement that the original covert dual-purpose edge Canaris envisioned the Brandenburgers providing for anti-Nazi rebellion was completely out of the question. If anything, the regiment had managed to attract an idealistic membership to replace those original members that had been either killed or rotated elsewhere. Canaris’ original brief to Lahousen regarding its potential as a revolutionary weapon was moot after three years of war.

  An interesting insight into the fragmenting of the Brandenburg Regiment’s purpose can be read in a passage from the historical section of Herbert Kriegsheim’s post-war book. It demonstrates a basic misunderstanding of the method of operation employed by the Brandenburgers – by their leader, of all people.

  It became increasingly apparent how the absence of a clear, uniform leadership led to a dispersal of our forces and endless creation of plans. On the one hand, Abwehr II, as well as the staff of the ‘Brandenburg’ Division, developed a truly worldwide plan on the globe, while, on the other hand, the parts of the ‘Brandenburg’ Division used at the front were thrown in ‘everywhere’ that gaps arose.

  The connection between the regiments, battalions and companies employed in action was completely inadequate. The Commander-in-Chief himself, for example, visited the regiment ‘Brandenburg’, which had been deployed in heavy partisan warfare in 1943, only three times in six months and then only for hours. Thus, at the Division Staff on the Lochowdamm in Berlin, a false picture about the type of deployment and the fighting power of the ‘Brandenburgers’ was increasingly developed. These visits also had a depressing effect on the troops deployed. One episode can illustrate this:

  The divisional commander landed at a battalion of the 4th Regiment, which had just finished a heavy battle in Tunis. The battalion commander presented the battalion and spontaneously, but in this front-line situation understandably, stretched his hand out to the divisional commander. The Commander-in-Chief shook his hand before the assembled battalion, but said to the battalion commander:

  ‘It is I who will determine who offers a handshake.’

  He then visited the company. When he saw a series of ‘Brandenburgers’, who were obviously unshaven and had already begun growing beards, he went to the company commander:

  ‘Why are those people unshaven? These men are to leave immediately and get rid of their beards.’

  The company commander tried to explain but received the 08/15 response:

  ‘Keep quiet, I did not ask you!’

  The battalion commander and the commander of the regiment are told the same harsh way. At the next meal, when the freshly shaved ‘Brandenburgers’ report to the divisional commander, he is also told that the next ‘Brandenburg style’ operation must fail because it was planned to put these men behind English lines disguised as bearded Arabs.1

  The Brandenburgers had been created as an unorthodox unit of the Wehrmacht and clearly this irregular nature had become increasingly at odds with traditional military discipline and structure. Undoubtedly the gradual decline of the Abwehr did nothing to eliminate this apparent confusion and the Abwehr’s failings – whether by design or not – had also served to irretrievably isolate the Wehrmacht’s intelligence service. The competitive nature of inter-department relationships within the Third Reich had provided an opening for the power-hungry men of the SD to exploit. Reinhard Heydrich had long eyed Canaris’ crown as Germany’s intelligence chief and developed offices in the SS accordingly, the rise of his service motivated by naked ambition as much as a distrust of the Abwehr’s loyalty to Germany and its Führer. Even Heydrich’s death at the hands of Czech SOE agents on 4 June 1942 and subsequent replacement by Austrian Obergruppenführer und General der Polizei Ernst Kaltenbrunner did not end the SD–Abwehr contest.

  One of Heydrich’s most industrious protégés was Walter Schellenberg who in March 1942 with the rank of SS Obersturmbannführer was given command of SD-Ausland (officially known as ‘Amt VI’); the civilian foreign intelligence agency of the Third Reich that had been established at the outbreak of war in 1939. The SD-Ausland was divided into sections similar to those of the Abwehr:

  •Department A (Organisation
and Administration);

  •Department B (Espionage in the West);

  •Department C (Espionage in the Soviet Union and Japan);

  •Department D (Espionage in the North and South American Sphere);

  •Department E (Espionage in Eastern Europe);

  •Department F (Technical Matters).

  Determined to engage in foreign missions, Schellenberg established Operation ‘Zeppelin’ as part of Amt VI C; an intelligence unit formed in 1942 to train and employ Caucasian and Asiatics from the Soviet republics of Central Asia, who had been recruited as prisoners of war, as agents against the Soviet regime. While sabotage was the key mission, the accumulating of essential information regarding the Soviet Union’s military-industrial capability and spreading of anti-Bolshevik propaganda were all allocated to ‘Zeppelin’. However, despite a considerable number of men being enlisted and trained at ‘Sonderlager T’ in Breslau-Oswitz, only a minority dropped into action and with little overall success. Through German operational inefficiency, security was poor and most men deployed were killed or captured soon after reaching their assigned areas.

  A second major military intelligence-style operation was launched by Schellenberg during 1942 because of the arrival of the US Army’s 34th Infantry Division in Northern Ireland, the first such unit to be shipped overseas after the declaration of war on the United States by Germany in December 1941. German plans for Eire had previously been limited to a brief idea of occupation that was soon abandoned in favour of keeping a wary eye on British attitudes towards the neutral Irish state while also providing limited support to the IRA. The neutrality of both Iceland and Greenland had already been compromised by US forces and an occupation of Eire was thought possible, which would open new ports and coastline to Allied forces to aid their Battle of the Atlantic. Schellenberg was involved in the planning of Operation ‘Osprey’ that entailed the use of volunteer commandos trained in sabotage and the use of British weaponry to land in Eire in the event of American occupation to train Irish volunteers of the IRA and any Irish Army units that had determined to resist the Americans.

  Approximately one hundred SS volunteers were gathered together at the Totenkopf barracks at Oranienburg, appropriately named Sonderlehrgang z.b.V. ‘Oranienburg’ (Special Unit for Special Assignments ‘Oranienburg’). Dutch SS-Hauptsturmführer Pieter van Vessem was placed in command and the men awaited training instructions for nearly a month before officially activated. Though ostensibly gathered for ‘Osprey’, the head of the SS-Führungshauptamt (SS Leadership Main Office) SS-Obergruppenführer Hans Jüttner, responsible for all organisational aspects of the Waffen SS, saw an opportunity to establish a counterpoint to the Brandenburg Regiment. With assistance from two Irish prisoners of war that had been recruited from Friesack Camp (Stalag XX-A (301)) – Fusilier James Brady and Private Frank Stringer – the SS volunteers were given English-language training, as well as instruction in the use of British weaponry, sabotage and explosives.

  Nonetheless it was still to the Abwehr that the SS turned for advice regarding their newly established commando unit and its preparedness. Two Brandenburgers were brought to Oranienburg, ostensibly to give English lessons, but in fact to evaluate the SS unit for its suitability for employment in Ireland. The pair, Bruno Reiger and Helmut Clissmann, had already participated in Hollmann’s abortive Operation ‘Seagull’ during 1940. Clissmann was well suited to the task. He had first travelled to Ireland as a young student during the 1930s where he studied at Trinity College Dublin on a doctoral thesis. Before the outbreak of war, he returned to Dublin as representative of the German Academic Exchange, contacting the IRA and marrying Budge Mulcahy, from a strongly Republican family in County Sligo. After war was declared he returned to Germany and worked for the Abwehr on all matters pertaining to Ireland, enlisted into the Brandenburgers as a non-commissioned officer. He was involved in many Irish plans, though without any notable success.

  His expert opinion was sought regarding the SS men and, though he did not doubt their fighting ability as they were all decorated and seasoned veterans, he found their general demeanour to be one of arrogance and contempt for all things foreign. Their English was generally poor and Clissmann doubted they would make any favourable impression on potential Irish recruits. He and Reiger returned an unfavourable report as well as encouraging the cancellation of ‘Osprey’ as the strategic situation appeared to already be changing in Ireland. There now appeared little chance of an Allied invasion and so the SS leadership acquiesced to their recommendation.

  However, the SD decided to retain Sonderlehrgang z.b.V. ‘Oranienburg’ for other purposes. Though they would remain on the SD roster, they were seconded to the Waffen SS for training. Now that they had established their own version of the Brandenburg Regiment, the SS were able to step into the arena of secret operations that had previously been the domain of the Abwehr. Six of the Oranienburg volunteers were dropped into Persia (Operation ‘Franz’) where they contacted hill tribes and attempted unsuccessfully to foment trouble against the British. Meanwhile the remainder continued sabotage training with an eye to potential deployment in the Balkans while Schellenberg awaited military developments in the region.

  There were some in the SD who opposed this move into irregular operations and to circumvent potential problems Schellenberg removed the Sonderlehrgang from the office of Department F where they had been administratively placed and instead created a new ‘Department S’ for sabotage. To take charge of his new section, Schellenberg also placed in command a man who would have a profound impact on the future of many from the Brandenburg Regiment: Obersturmführer Otto Skorzeny. During the early summer of 1943, SS Sonderlehrgang ‘Oranienburg’ moved to a purpose-built facility in nearby Friedenthal and was redesignated SS Sonderlehrgang z.b.V. ‘Friedenthal’. By this stage Hauptsturmführer van Vessem commanded one full company of volunteers and other smaller elements that included an independent transport element. Comprising a total of 300 Waffen SS men, the complement included fifty Dutchmen and Flemings and a few Hungarian Volksdeutsche. Skorzeny immediately set about expanding his unit which in October 1943 was renamed 502nd SS Jagderverbänd.

  The development of an independent specialist commando unit by the SD echoed profoundly in the corridors of OKW. The need for the Brandenburgers to retain their original purpose was deemed to have now been considerably diminished, not least of all by the general war situation. The Abwehr had lost motivation to deploy the regiment as before, though their use as infantry had merely caused unnecessary casualties. The decision was therefore taken during November 1942 to raise the Brandenburg Regiment to the size of a division while also beginning the process of transferring direct command from Abwehr II to OKH in Berlin. The Brandenburgers were to become the ‘house unit’ of the German Army Staff.

  The growth was to be managed in stages beginning on 1 January 1943 when the regiment would be renamed. From that date, it would be known as Sonderverbänd ‘Brandenburg’, each existing company providing a nucleus for a battalion (Abteilung), each battalion that of a regiment until the new unit had reached full strength. The nomenclature and structure for this new unit was as follows:

  Sonderverbänd 800 (former Regimental Staff).

  Verband 801 (former 1st Battalion, Freiburg), Major Wilhelm Walther.

  I, II and III Abteilung.

  Verband 802 (former 2nd Battalion, Baden Unterwaltersdorf), Oberstleutnant von Kobylinski.

  I, II and III Abteilung.

  Verband 803 (former 3rd Battalion, Düren), Oberstleutnant Franz Jacobi.

  I, II and III Abteilung.

  Verband 804 (formed from newly enlisted elements in Brandenburg and fragments), Hauptmann Hollmann.

  I, II and III Abteilung.

  Verband 805 (formed from V-Leute), Major Ernst von Eickeren.

  Regimental units remained outside of the formalised Sonderverbänd structure as this was intended purely as a temporary ‘hold-all’ title until divisional strength was atta
ined over the first four months of 1943. Major Friedrich Heinz was also soon returned from his exile at the Regenwurmlager to take charge of Verband 804, created from the remnants of Abteilung von Koenen after its return from North Africa as well as members of the V-Leute Abteilung and other fragments of existing units, including Leutnant König’s which had been active on the Danube.

  With elements of the new Sonderverbänd still in combat both in the Soviet Union and North Africa, the build-up was conducted in a manner that was, at best, disjointed. As new units were formed they were also thrown piecemeal into action, predominantly against partisans. The first of these was the newly established I Abteilung/Verband 801, despatched towards the communications lines of Army Group North on 30 January 1943, when Rittmeister Plitt received orders to get his men on trains travelling from Frankfurt to Tilsit, East Prussia. After two weeks in Tilsit infantry barracks, they were instructed to join antipartisan operations near Kretschy, Novgorod. There they went into action in heavily wooded marshland against fortified partisan groups, suffering a steady stream of casualties from direct enemy action and landmines.