Hitler's Brandenburgers

by Lawrence Paterson

  In blistering 40°C heat, Weithoener’s battalion and Oesterwitz both attacked Neapoli on 24 July from the east, Steidl’s company advancing along the left embankment of the entrance road and Oesterwitz on the right. Parched and breathless from the heat, they prepared to assault well-entrenched ELAS guerrillas. Supported by close-range fire from Flak guns and 75mm anti-tank guns, the Brandenburgers remorselessly took one hill after another, both battalions making steady progress. Under heavy fire from barricaded houses and positions lining the outskirts of the town, Steidl led the charge into Neapoli itself. Fierce hand-to-hand combat followed as each dwelling was cleared, flames licking through the streets as hand grenades ignited tinder-dry thatch. An ammunition dump in the centre of the village was found and blown up by a hand grenade thrown by Steidl. Eventually, the fighting subsided, regimental commander Oberstleutnant Pfeiffer arriving with personal congratulations for his men on their success.

  Throughout August his men continued to battle Andartes though with little loss to themselves. On 18 August in an operation alongside Italian troops southwest of Florina, 3rd Battalion encountered a weak band of guerrillas and killed two, capturing five. Amongst those taken prisoner were three British officers who had parachuted into Greece to attempt coordination with the ELAS. Codebooks, maps and a working transmitter were also taken before they could be destroyed by the prisoners.7

  Also in Greece was the newly deployed Küstenjäger Abteilung. Kriegsheim and his headquarters had accompanied its 1st Company to Brindisi by train whereupon they transferred to Piraeus in Greece, sailing regular patrols as far afield as Corfu, Thaka and Patras and acting as transport for any missions undertaken by Hollmann’s 1st Battalion/1st Regiment against bandits near the Gulf of Corinth.

  Brandenburgers also became established in Yugoslavia by the middle of 1943. Hauptmann Gerhard Pinkert’s 2nd Battalion/1st Regiment had travelled by train during May to the area in which Heinz had established his 4th Regiment headquarters. Pinkert’s attachment to Heinz’s command – now known as Kampfgruppe Heinz – was indirectly a replacement for Hollmann’s battalion that had been diverted to southern Greece. Pinkert’s regimental superior, Major Walther, had remained on the Eastern Front with Rittmeister Plitt during the partisan battles in the rear areas of Army Group North and would not arrive with his staff until July.

  Mihailović’s Chetnik policy was the formation of strong guerrilla forces that could rise against occupation in support of an Allied landing in Yugoslavia. To achieve this goal the Chetniks opportunistically accepted weapons from both British and Italian sources.8 However, his was not the sole underground movement gaining traction in the region. Josip Broz Tito had been born to a Croat father and Slovene mother in Kumrovec, Croatia, in 1892. After being drafted into military service he became the youngest Sergeant Major in the Austro-Hungarian Army but was wounded and captured by Russian troops in 1915. While a POW he had converted to communism during the Russian Revolution and, years after his return to Yugoslavia, had been Secretary General of Yugoslavia’s Communist Party since 1937. He began gathering forces immediately after the Axis occupation of Yugoslavia, his guerrillas named ‘Partisans’. They became so effective over the years that followed that their name became synonymous with underground guerrilla forces everywhere. As the Partisans were staunch anti-royalists, they were soon at war with the Chetniks following a brief period of cooperation against the Axis occupying powers.

  After strong Partisan attacks against Italian troops in Montenegro during 1941, the Axis authorities reached a vague accord with Chetnik forces to keep Tito’s Partisans in check, virtually relinquishing control of rural areas to Mihailovic’s troops while the Italians maintained urban garrisons. As further communist agitation transformed into a full-scale revolt in Serbia, German forces became involved in heavy fighting to quell dissident factions, assisted by the Croat nationalist fascist forces of Ante Pavelic’s infamous Ustaše. By the time of the Brandenburgers’ arrival in Yugoslavia, several major German operations had already been undertaken against guerrilla forces with high casualty figures and all hallmarked by extraordinary cruelty given the fratricidal nature of the conflict. During June 1943, German forces in the area were reshuffled. The 718th Infantry Division was stationed in Bosnia to the east; 714th Infantry Division assigned to west Bosnia; 704th Infantry Division in eastern Serbia; and 717th Infantry Division shifted from south-western to north-western Serbia. The vacuum left by this latter division’s movement was filled by the newly formed 7th SS Gebirgsjäger Division ‘Prinz Eugen’, created from Yugoslavian and Romanian Volksdeutsche volunteers.

  In Yugoslavia, Heinz was ordered to dismantle the triangular relationship that Mikhailović had established between his Chetniks and British and Italian forces. Tasked with arresting the Chetnik leader, Heinz opted to independently pursue the possibility of a rapprochement with the guerrilla force, with tacit Abwehr support. Heinz’s approach was made between January and March 1943, in the aftermath of ‘Case White’, the fourth major drive against Partisan forces in Yugoslavia and a high point in German–Chetnik cooperation. With two Brandenburg interpreters, Heinz passed through Chetnik lines in Montenegro and met with the local commander Pavle Đurišić on 10 May. There he proposed the establishment of an alliance against Tito and possible formation of a Montenegrin Legion to fight under Wehrmacht control. Negotiations were brief but promising and Heinz returned to his regimental headquarters to report to Befehlshaber der Deutschen Truppen in Kroatien (Commander-in-Chief of German Forces in Croatia) General der Infanterie Rudolf Lüters. However, Lüters rejected the idea out of hand and instead began a series of new offensives as commander of XV Gebirgs Corps. On 14 May, he ordered Ðurišić arrested and his Chetniks disarmed or brought under German control, beginning a major month-long drive against Partisan groups in the narrow highland area of Montenegro, Sandzak and Herzegovina. If successful, Lüters believed, he could trap and destroy Tito and the supreme military and political leadership of the ‘Yugoslavian National Liberation Movement’. In a major operation against Tito’s forces, Lüters aimed to eliminate the Partisan menace to German supply lines that trailed through Yugoslavia to Greece, which was still believed to be threatened by imminent British invasion. Codenamed ‘Case Black’, the Axis forces totalled 127,000 troops: 67,000 Germans, 43,000 Italians, 2,000 Bulgarians, 11,000 Croatians and 4,000 Chetniks with major air support from the Luftwaffe, Italian and Croatian Air Forces.9 Facing them were 19,700 Partisans of 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 7th Divisions National Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia (NOVJ), 3rd Dalmatian Brigade, III Battalion/4th Proletarian Brigade, II and IV Battalion/5th Montenegrin Brigade and the Drina Operations Group.

  Heinz’s regiment was subordinated to the 1st Gebirgs Division for ‘Case Black’ and fought in the area between Mojkovac and Berane where they suffered their first casualties in the Yugoslavian war. Attacking in a southwesterly direction from the Ćehotina River, the Brandenburgers were later attached to the substantial ‘Kampfgruppe Anaker’ comprised of the bulk of 738th Regiment and 118th Jäger Division with supporting units. Attacking through Tjentište they attempted to clear the left bank of the Sutjeska River but dogged Partisan defence held the German advance long enough for an orderly withdrawal by Tito’s troops, who left 235 dead and missing behind them, including a company commander and political commissar. On 17 June, a strong Partisan attack around Vitez-Podvitez (on the Sarajevo–Višegrad railway line) made headway before being stopped by the arrival of an armoured train and the hastily formed ‘Kampfgruppe Vertmiler’ of 1st Battalion/4th Regiment ‘Brandenburg’, 369th Anti-Tank Battalion, 12th Panzer Battalion and elements of two Ustaše brigades.

  The tenor of ‘Case Black’, like most operations in the region, was that of ruthless destruction. The pitiless operation echoed sentiments contained in OKW orders that had originated from Hitler at the end of 1942. Lüters issued a directive on 12 January 1943, stating that: ‘Every measure that ensures the security of the troops and ap
pears to serve the purpose of pacification is justifiable … No one should be held to account for conducting themselves with excessive harshness.’10 This, then, set the tone by which the Yugoslavian battle was fought.

  As a response to what he saw during the operation, Heinz wrote a letter to Lüters in which he attempted to illustrate the vicious circle that harsh repression created: driving civilians into the ranks of the enemy through either resentment or a desire for retribution.

  The previous method of shooting all Partisans indiscriminately could never lead to success. Many Partisans have only become so by a combination of different circumstances: Ustaše, Muslim or Chetnik outrages, need and hunger, terror and being forced by other Partisans. They remain Partisans, because their way back is blocked by German orders. They have lost home and family, so they fight until death. 11

  It was a recurring theme of Yugoslavia’s intense internecine warfare and Heinz was not the sole German voice to encourage restraint as a way of winning ‘hearts and minds’ or, at the very least, lose no more of them. Apparently, such pragmatic heads prevailed in Berlin and within a matter of weeks OKW issued official instructions that captured Partisans were no longer to be treated as irregulars, but afforded the protection of prisoner of war status.

  Though ‘Case Black’ had officially ended, ‘Kampfgruppe Heinz’ fought through most of July alongside the 7th SS Gebirgs Division and Ustaše and Chetnik units against Partisans in eastern Bosnia, possession of towns and villages see-sawing between the antagonists into well into August. A reinforced battalion of the German 373rd Division was nearly overwhelmed by Partisan forces on 24 August until Heinz’s men intervened and beat back Tito’s troops, killing a Partisan commander of the 12th Krajina Brigade, Milan Egic, near Kotor Varoš.

  Despite his regiment’s success in action, Heinz remained deeply unpopular with Pfuhlstein and he finally was relieved of his command in time to undergo a gall-bladder operation after what had been a recurring illness. While Oberstleutnant Christoph von Hugo took command of 4th Regiment, Heinz was placed in the officer reserve of Wehrkreis III Berlin-Brandenburg on 1 September 1943. From there he continued his political subversion in the pursuit of regime change, but with ultimately disastrous results for Canaris and other more active conspirators.

  Meanwhile, Wehrmacht forces were faced with a fresh, though not unexpected, problem in the Balkans. Throughout the region the codeword ‘Achse’ was received by all units at 0045hrs on 8 September and alongside other units of the German military, Brandenburger troops began moving to disarm Italian forces that had surrendered to the Allies.

  Disarming the Italians

  Allied troops had landed on Sicily in early July 1943 and the island was finally conquered by 17 August though without a conclusive German defeat as the Wehrmacht had mounted a highly successful fighting withdrawal to the Italian mainland. The expected Allied attack across the Straits of Messina began on the morning of 3 September when British troops landed on the toe of Italy in Operation ‘Baytown’. Kesselring had decided to establish his defensive lines further north and the British faced no major defences in Calabria. Nonetheless, they advanced with painfully cautious sluggishness over manmade obstacles and inhospitable terrain. Five days after the ‘Baytown’ landing, Eisenhower announced the negotiated surrender of Italy. Mussolini had been arrested and imprisoned but was later liberated by German paratroopers on 12 September in an operation that included the SS Hauptsturmführer Otto Skorzeny (Operation ‘Eiche’). The dejected Italian dictator was but a shadow of his former self, though still immediately flown to Germany and browbeaten into forming a new fascist regime, the ‘Italian Social Republic’ proclaimed on 18 September 1943.

  Meanwhile, German units activated Operation ‘Achse’ just as further Allied forces landed at Taranto on 9 September; the Allied attack executed at short notice following an Italian offer to surrender the port and its military units intact. Kesselring correctly surmised that neither ‘Baytown’ nor the new attack, ‘Slapstick’, were the primary Allied invasion which landed that same day at Salerno under the codename Operation ‘Avalanche’. American Lieutenant General Mark Clark’s Fifth Army experienced some localised successes in the Salerno beachhead but were soon fighting a desperate battle against aggressive attacks by Kesselring’s land forces and unexpectedly numerous Luftwaffe aircraft. Clark was initially thrown off balance and briefly panicked, proposing the evacuation of his troops from Salerno before Allied Supreme Command overruled him.

  On Sardinia, the surrendering Italian garrison outnumbered Hauptmann Benesch’s 16th (Light) Company and the men of 90th Panzergrenadier Division that formed the ‘Einstmann Brigade’ and refused to disarm as requested by their erstwhile allies. Initially, due to the cordial relations between Italian and German commanders and a confusing array of orders received from Rome regarding their proposed disposition towards the German forces, Wehrmacht troops were guaranteed safe passage off the island by the Italians. In Berlin, the decision had already been taken days before, after intelligence reports indicated an imminent Italian armistice, that reinforcement of Sicily would immediately cease and preparations made to evacuate German troops from Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica. The Sicilian evacuation had already succeeded, while units on Sardinia began embarking on transports for Corsica as a staging-post for onward transfer to the Italian mainland. The Küstenjäger Abteilung’s Heavy 4th Company had recently arrived in the port of Santa Lucia in south-eastern Sardinia, from where they mounted frequent anti-invasion patrols to cover the withdrawal.

  However, unsure of Italian adherence to their declared non-interference in the German evacuation, Benesch’s Brandenburgers initiated pre-emptive assaults on Italian strongholds and artillery positions on Sardinia, large coastal guns that would pose a significant potential threat to the German maritime withdrawal. Key positions were taken without any bloodshed and the German withdrawal from Sardinia was successful, the Brandenburgers departing the island for Corsica as the final rearguard without any interference. However, the peace did not extend to Corsica. There, French resistance fighters rose up against the occupying troops and were soon engaged in heavy fighting with troops of Sturmbrigade ‘Reichsführer SS’ and 90th Panzergrenadier Division who were supported by Italian paratroopers loyal to the fascist cause while the remaining Italian garrison had defected to the Allied side. On 15 September, an SOE-trained French battalion also landed on the island to bolster the uprising.

  Despite this reinforcement, the Maquis rebellion on Corsica was largely held in check and the German decision to evacuate the island was confirmed on 17 September once the harbours of Bastia, Porto Vecchia and Bonifacio and their connecting roads were confirmed as firmly in German hands. By 5 October the German evacuation was complete and Benesch’s Brandenburgers were transported to the front line in Yugoslavia.

  Elsewhere, the ‘Achse’ alert resulted in many Brandenburger units facing much greater Italian resistance. As well as Bansen’s troops in southern France and the Sardinian company, the following units were immediately tasked with disarming Italian troops and occupying their positions:

  1st Regiment: 1st Battalion on rail security duty near Levadia; 2nd Battalion near Sarajevo (Yugoslavia); 3rd Battalion near Thiva (Greece).

  2nd Regiment: 1st, 2nd and 3rd Battalions spread between Florina (northern Greece) and Korçë (Albania).

  4th Regiment: 1st Battalion in Peloponnese (Greece); 2nd Battalion near Sarajevo (Yugoslavia).

  Küstenjäger Abteilung: 1st Company in Athens (Greece); 3rd Company in Dalmatian Islands near Šibenik (Yugoslavia); 4th (Heavy) Company near Sardinia.

  15th (Light) Fallschirmjäger Company standing by in Kraljevo (Yugoslavia). These men were used to surprise Italian forces in Albania, a Kampfgruppe entering Durazzo harbour at dawn on 10 September and seizing machine-gun posts, the Italian headquarters and all shipboard armaments. By 0640hrs the harbour was in German hands and 3,000 Italian soldiers and sailors taken prisoner along with two torpedo boats and
seven merchant ships.

  On the Greek mainland, there appeared little opposition to German demands for Italian garrisons to disarm. General Carlo Geloso commanded the Italian occupation forces and had frequently complained to his friend General Vittorio Amrosio (Italian Army Chief of Staff in Rome), that his troops ‘have armament antiquato, lack almost any anti-tank or anti-aircraft guns, or armoured transport’. The influx of German forces that had taken place during the first half of 1943 to face the expected invasion of Greece had already tipped the balance of power in what was officially the Italian zone of control firmly towards the Wehrmacht. Furthermore, of Geloso’s 93,000 troops, at least 12,000 were ill with malaria.

  As ‘Achse’ was triggered, defeatism was already rampant amongst the mainland Italian garrisons that submitted relatively meekly to the Wehrmacht. An officer of 3rd Battalion/1st Regiment ‘Brandenburg’ reported that though Italian troops were ‘only partially’ obeying their own officers, they were ‘behaving in a disciplined and orderly way towards German officers’.12 Within the Athens area, Hauptmann Kuhlmann’s 1st Company of the Küstenjäger Abteilung had been placed under the command of Korvettenkapitän Dr Brand’s 21st UJ-Flotilla. Upon receipt of the ‘Achse’ codeword they promptly seized an Italian torpedo boat and destroyer – San Martino and Calatafimi – in Piraeus harbour which were later recommissioned into the Kriegsmarine as TA17 and TA19. There had been no shots fired and no blood spilt.