Hitler's Brandenburgers

by Lawrence Paterson

  Over the days that followed, German forces thrust west and north-west from Prijepole. Pfeiffer’s regiment was used to block Partisan troops attempting to attack from the rear of the advance, the 1st Battalion being transported to Brodarevo to repulse this new threat. In heavily wooded undulating terrain and winter weather of snow and fog, the Brandenburgers fought their way against Partisan units attempting to break the German cordon. With periodic support from Croatian and German units, the battalion stubbornly battled until available ammunition ran low and they were forced to withdraw. Finally replaced in the line, they were put into reserve at Prijepole where they received fresh equipment and a number of replacement men. Amongst them was Hauptmann Weithoener, returned to take command of the battalion while Steidl was promoted to Hauptmann for his achievements; he was subsequently awarded the Knight’s Cross on 26 January 1944 for courage in the face of the enemy.

  Ultimately, although Operation ‘Kugelblitz’ killed a confirmed 2,280 Partisans with an estimated 2,000 more as well as taking 2,330 Partisans and 1,900 renegade Italian soldiers prisoner, it failed to achieve its aims. Tito had correctly surmised the German intention to encircle his troops and spread them wide to each flank as well as slipping through the advancing Germans to attack from the rear. By avoiding any frontal attacks, the bulk of the Partisan forces eluded their enemy and by 18 December 1943 the operation was called off. A second assault, codenamed ‘Schneesturm’ (‘Snowstorm’) against Partisan forces in the Krivaja Valley began almost immediately but was similarly unsuccessful. Other operations continued throughout December by XV Gebirgs Corps in northern and western Bosnia which also inflicted casualties, but failed to trap and destroy Tito’s army. The Partisan war would continue into 1944 with undiminished intensity.

  On Christmas Eve, Pfuhlstein issued a customary message to his division in which he summarised the achievements of the previous year, singling out those men who had particularly distinguished themselves. The final section of his message also painted the immediate future of the division:

  What will 1944 bring us? Our ranks have been thinned by the battles at the end of this year. This will change at the start of the New Year. Beginning in January hand-picked volunteers from every branch of the armed forces will join us, who will be assigned to the front-line regiments. We will also be receiving the first young soldiers who were carefully trained in the new training regiment under the command of Major Martin. I have seen these recruit companies; they are trained in all styles of fighting and have exercised in the field. The regiments will be keen to get these excellent young soldiers. Our weaponry will be improved to the maximum degree possible. NCO courses, combat school courses and other opportunities for the best possible training will be exploited to the utmost. In the preceding summary I have mentioned several officers by name. But our success would not have been possible if these officers had not had hundreds of brave NCOs and men standing at their side as part of a true fighting team. To all of them goes an equal measure of my thanks and recognition. The Brandenburg Division enters the New Year self-confident, with head held high. No one in the entire German Wehrmacht and certainly no one on the enemy side, can impress or show us Brandenburgers anything! Our motto for the year 1944 is the same as in the old year. It is: Brandenburgers Forward Everywhere!19

  CHAPTER 11

  Metamorphosis, 1944–1945

  ‘Was not a traitor. Did my duty as a German.’

  Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, 8 April 1945

  1944 was a tumultuous year for both the Brandenburg Division and its current commander Alexander von Pfuhlstein. Pfuhlstein had spent months visiting his individual units in the south-east region as they became embroiled in the savagery of guerrilla warfare. In May 1943, he had spent a few days with the 4th Regiment in Montenegro, time with the 1st Regiment in Greece north of Athens during autumn and would go on to visit the 2nd Regiment at Banja Luka in Bosnia during the spring of 1944. The town had become the centre for anti-Partisan operations and so-called Bandenjägerlehrgänge (Anti-Partisan Training Units) were formed for training German and Croat troops, mostly for Volltarnung missions behind enemy lines. In charge was Hauptmann Konopacki, who had gained partisan-hunting experience with various police regiments, while the specialist instructors were all drawn from the ranks of experienced Brandenburgers. Pfuhlstein later recounted the motives for his string of visits in post-war interrogations regarding possible Brandenburg involvement in the regular shooting of hostages by German troops in the Balkans. Since the expansion of the Brandenburgers to divisional strength, Canaris and Oster had reminded him of the likelihood of action against Hitler during the year to come and the potential role that the Brandenburgers could play:

  The reasons for these visits were to clarify the personnel and material requirements of the regiments and, above all, to seek out officers from the regiments who seemed suited to me per their political position, for the revolution which I had to prepare to act on in Berlin … I received extensive and detailed reports, especially from the 2nd Regiment. I am not aware of the shooting of hostages by the commanders’ orders.

  I did have in one case an officer, of whom I suspected something like this and relieved him of his position with immediate effect while requesting an investigation. This officer then reported me for defeatism, which ultimately led to my release from the Regiment. It was Oberleutnant Böckl. In Böckl’s case, I suspected that he harboured an innate cruelty, so I had him removed with immediate effect.1

  A letter denouncing Pfuhlstein’s behaviour during his visit to ‘Abteilung Böckl’ on 29 February, was received by Oberbefehlshaber Südost and, though crawling through official channels for several months, came at a particularly unfavourable moment for Pfuhlstein. The Abwehr as a whole had come under increasing suspicion from other security agencies and more political branches of the Third Reich for potentially treasonous activities. The presiding Judge of the Luftwaffe’s Court Martial court, Oberstkriegsgerichtstrat (Judge Advocate) Dr Manfred Roeder, a hard and ultra-conservative legal mind, had been tasked with investigating rumours of Abwehr plans to topple the government. While Canaris may have become increasingly vague and distant from the front-line plotters against Hitler, the tenacious and highly intelligent Roeder had soon detected traces of conspiracy that swirled around Canaris and, by extension, the Abwehr.

  Roeder arrested Abwehr Sonderführer Hans von Dohnányi on charges of breaching foreign currency regulations. The Hungarian-born Dohnányi, was a deeply committed member of the anti-Hitler conspiracy and Oster’s direct subordinate and had illegally transferred funds from Germany to a Swiss bank on behalf of Jews that he had personally helped escape Germany. Papers incriminating Oster and other high-ranking Abwehr men were found and Oster was dismissed from his post on 15 April 1943, placed initially into the personnel reserve while investigations continued. Roeder’s hunt for conspirators virtually paralysed all activity by Canaris and his officers and it was an ironic twist that it took the Allied invasion of Sicily to diminish the darkening shadow of suspicion over the Abwehr. Officers sympathetic to Canaris convinced Keitel at OKW that the Abwehr’s full faculties were required in Italy and Roeder was quietly called off his hunt. A replacement for Oster as head of Abwehr II, Oberst Baron Wessel von Freytag-Loringhoven, was appointed and the immediate peril posed by investigations into alleged treason appeared to have passed.

  Attempts were made to repair damaged prestige and restore some measure of effectiveness with the new blood that was subsequently brought into the Abwehr. Abwehr III’s new chief, Oberst Theodor Heinrich, instigated measures to transform previously static counter-espionage and counterintelligence units into mobile reconnaissance units – Frontaufklärungskommando (FAKs) – whose operations closely resembled aspects of the Brandenburger Division’s previous covert work, but who remained departmentally separate from the division.

  Meanwhile, there were many of the veteran Brandenburgers who felt disgruntled by the change in the division’s role and there had even bee
n some major defections from the division. While on leave in Germany, Adrian Baron von Fölkersam, representing a delegation of eleven Brandenburg officers, arrived at SS Sturmbannführer Otto Skorzeny’s office of the 502nd SS Jagderverbänd in October 1943.

  He told me that there was great dissatisfaction in the ranks of the old ‘Brandenburgers’. The division was no longer employed on special service, but used as a stop-gap at various points along the front – a role which any other division could have played equally well. Its losses had always been very high and it was almost impossible to make them good, having regard to the special training they had received … He and ten other officers from his battalion would like to join my command, the formation of which they had only just heard … It was in this connection that I came into contact, for the first and last time, with the well-known Admiral Canaris, Director of German Military Intelligence.2

  Skorzeny accompanied Walter Schellenberg and Ernst Kaltenbrunner to a meeting with Canaris superficially aimed at establishing greater cooperation between the deadly rivals of the Abwehr and the RSHA. The SS commando appears to have been impressed by Canaris, both as an enigmatic man and a skilled negotiator. Skorzeny negotiated for the transfer of Fölkersam and his comrades over the course of several hours until Canaris eventually agreed, though it took a further month before the Brandenburg volunteers were released. Fölkersam, promoted and commissioned into the Waffen SS as a Hauptsturmführer, became Skorzeny’s chief of staff and second-in-command and went on to distinguish himself yet further as a member of the Jagdverbände.

  Meanwhile Canaris had travelled to Venice accompanied by Lahousen and Freytag-Loringhoven and met with his Italian intelligence counterpart at the end of June 1943.3 There he was confidentially informed of Italian efforts to achieve an armistice with the Allies, returning to Germany and engaging in wilful misdirection by advising his superiors that the likelihood of Italian surrender was highly improbable. This mistaken bid to reduce German reinforcement of Italy was to have profound consequences as Walter Schellenberg at the SD obtained solid information of exactly what Canaris had, in truth, been told. He now had the ammunition with which to assassinate his rival. However, he had not reckoned with Canaris’ wiles and the elderly Admiral skilfully extracted his head from the noose by submitting more accurate papers on the Italian matter once he had learned of Schellenberg’s imminent exposure of his ruse. The clandestine fencing for advantage resumed between the Abwehr and SD.

  By January 1944, Roeder had once again taken up the unfinished Dohnányi case, causing fresh concerns for Canaris who then proceeded to use Pfuhlstein as a means of shutting the investigation down or, at the very least, deflecting attention. During an examination of a witness in court at Dohnányi’s trial, Roeder was quoted on record as proferring the opinion that ‘the Sonderverbänd Brandenburg is a shirkers’ club’. Aware of his subordinate’s tempestuous nature and undoubted bravery, Canaris informed Pfuhlstein of Roeder’s statement in the course of a hastily convened meeting. Though Pfuhlstein initially appeared to calmly appraise his response options, Canaris applied further pressure, appearing agitated and virtually goading Pfuhlstein into action. The commander of the Brandenburg Division unfortunately rose to the bait and immediately travelled with his adjutant Leutnant Arnold von Gustedt to the headquarters of Luftflotte IV in Lviv, marched straight into Roeder’s office and, receiving no mollifying response to his challenge of the Luftwaffe judge’s original comments, punched him in the face.

  This could not go unpunished and Keitel sentenced Pfuhlstein to seven days’ confinement to quarters and, though he claimed full responsibility and even officially thanked his superiors for allowing him to defend his division’s honour in person, Pfuhlstein never forgave Canaris for compelling him to act in ‘violation of his official standing’.4 Though it transpired that Roeder had actually been referring to the ‘Kurfürst Battalion’ that was no longer a part of the division, it was a petty and trivial victory for Canaris against his Luftwaffe inquisitor, but ultimately achieved little. Roeder’s pride may have been injured, but his desire to trace conspiracy and treason remained undiminished. Ultimately, the Abwehr did not even need such activities to destroy itself and it finally fell victim to its own inertia, after failing to identify the threat of additional Allied landings in Italy due to incontrovertible failures in the gathering and analysis of intelligence.

  Friedrich Hummel, leader of the frogmen of Meeresjäger Abteilung ‘Brandenburg’, unwittingly aided the downfall of the Abwehr by his activities in neutral Spain. He and his small group had been mounting covert sabotage missions against British freighters that lay at anchor in Spanish harbours. Following Italy’s surrender, they widened their target list to include Italian merchant ships. He was always careful to use British explosives and leave no trace of Brandenburg/Abwehr involvement, and although the Spanish authorities had been investigating him for some time and were convinced of his role in the series of mysterious explosions, they had no evidence. Finally, in early January 1944, a three-man sabotage team that had been based on the German ship Lipari in Cartegena harbour blundered and one of its number, Carl Kampen, was killed in an explosion as he planted his charges, and the Brandenburg operation was subsequently exposed. Hummel, disguised as a diplomat of the German Embassy, was immediately arrested and he and his men expelled from Spain. It was one more embarrassment for the Abwehr, but was swiftly followed by yet another. On 12 January, a group of intellectuals opposed to Hitler and his regime who frequently met to discuss the situation and potential solutions, was penetrated by the Gestapo and arrested en-masse. Amongst them was Otto Kiep, a Foreign Office official with close ties to many Abwehr members, including two agents stationed in Istanbul, Erich Vermehren and his wife, the former Countess Elizabeth Plettenberg. Both were summoned to Berlin by the Gestapo for interrogation regarding the Kiep case and, in fear for their lives, they contacted British intelligence and defected on 27 January.

  This proved to be the final straw for the Abwehr which had been constantly under siege by the SD and Ribbentrop’s Foreign Office. Hitler, incensed at the shambles that Canaris’ organisation had become, signed a directive on 12 February 1944 that created a ‘unified German secret intelligence service’ to which he appointed the Reichsführer SS as commander.5 Canaris was relieved of his command and Oberst Georg Hansen, head of Abwehr I, placed nominally in charge.6 Hitler’s order necessitated the Abwehr being absorbed into the SS, specifically Amt VI/RSHA, effective from 1 June. However, in practice Abwehr I (intelligence) and Abwehr II (sabotage), although nominally under Amt Mil/RSHA, remained under OKW control until 1 December 1944. Nonetheless, an independent Abwehr was no more and the Brandenburg Division was completely removed from Abwehr influence and placed solely under the authority of OKW.

  In the field the machinations of power in the office corridors of Berlin had little relevance. On New Year’s Eve Banja Luka, the main German and Ustaše base in western Bosnia and home to XV Corps headquarters, had been attacked by ten Partisan brigades that attempted to relieve German and Ustaše pressure on Partisan forces in eastern Bosnia. The V Bosnian Corps battled its way into the city streets as the Axis defenders were squeezed into a small area centred on the Zalužani airfield: a grass runway shared by the Luftwaffe and ZNDH (Air Force of the Independent State of Croatia). The base personnel of 310 Germans had been significantly reinforced as the Partisan attack developed and elements of the 4th Regiment ‘Brandenburg’ were present as the street fighting raged.

  The Partisan offensive was slowly beaten back but not before Brandenburger reinforcements had been called from Kotor Varoš, 20km to the south-east. There, Brandenburgers of the small unit ‘Einheit Kirchner’ had trained local militia groups which were also thrown into the fray. Brandenburger troops established a bridgehead over the Vrbas River but it was the arrival of the 92nd Motorised Brigade that eventually repulsed the Partisans. The Brandenburgers suffered one man killed and thirteen wounded before being placed in the Army Corps re
serve.

  Leutnant Wolfram Kirchner had been tasked by Pfuhlstein with finding Tito’s headquarters and had begun his hunt for the communist leader with clandestine reconnaissance in the Banja Luka area during October 1943.7 Towards the end of the previous summer, Kirchner had been tasked with establishing a small special unit in Vienna known as ‘Einheit Kirchner’. Its purpose had originally been envisioned as a parachute unit bound for Kurdistan, but the events on the Eastern Front nullified this plan. Instead it was to be used solely for the gathering of intelligence regarding Tito in preparation for operations to be mounted directly against the Partisan headquarters. During October, the platoon-sized ‘Einheit Kirchner’ was relocated to the heavily fortified Trappist Mariastern Abbey just outside Banja Luka in northern Bosnia and commenced operations. By the successful use of local Chetniks, he narrowed the likely location of NOVJ headquarters to the town of Jajce and obtained information that Tito was present at that time, attending the second meeting of the AVNOJ (Anti-Fascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia). Kirchner immediately suggested a precise operation to target Tito and his immediate staff, presenting two options to Rendulic.