Hitler's Brandenburgers

by Lawrence Paterson

  Despite some minor skirmishes, the Hungarian military appeared paralysed as Horthy was supreme commander and without him, no orders could be issued to prevent the German takeover. Upon his return, he was presented with a fait-accompli and informed that he could remain in office and cooperate with Germany or be removed, his country fully occupied and a Gauleiter put in his place. Horthy remained.

  Pfuhlstein had accompanied his troops into Hungary for the virtually bloodless occupation. During his later confinement by the Allies, he related a story in which he had shared a ‘tricky moment’ on 19 March 1944 with RSHA chief Ernst Kaltenbrunner. Faced with a large group of angry Hungarian troops that wanted to arrest the two officers, it was only Pfuhlstein’s aggressive determination as he faced down the threat which avoided them being shot out of hand. Though he could not be aware of it at the time, Kaltenbrunner’s apparent sense of indebtedness would later come to Pfuhlstein’s rescue. In the meantime, he returned in April to Serbia where his 4th Regiment took part in Operation ‘Maibaum’ against Tito’s troops alongside the 7th and 13th SS Gebirgs Divisions.

  Unfortunately, Pfuhlstein’s list of transgressions against National Socialist and military orthodoxy had reached critical mass. Already denounced by one of his subordinates for defeatism, guilty of striking a Luftwaffe judge and now firmly classified as ‘politically unreliable’ as evidence collected by SD investigations of Abwehr plotting against Hitler and his government grew, Pfuhlstein was finally relieved of his command on 1 April 1944. The decision had been taken in Berlin nearly a month previously, on 7 March 1944, and a flurry of orders issued from Wehrmacht Operations Staff that placed the division completely under their control and insisted on the removal of Pfuhlstein as divisional commander at the beginning of April at the earliest (dependent on the outcome of Hungarian operations). Pending further investigations, Pfuhlstein was placed at the disposal of OKH and sent on a divisional commander’s course at Hirschberg before being appointed commander of the 50th Infantry Division on 1 July 1944. His replacement in the Brandenburg Division was 51-year-old Generalleutnant Friedrich ‘Fritz’ Kühlwein, officially appointed on 14 April. A veteran of the First World War, Kühlwein had continued his army service throughout the interwar period and then taken command of 2nd Battalion, 55th Infantry Regiment immediately before the outbreak of war at the rank of Oberst. As the commander of 133rd Infantry Regiment (45th Infantry Division) he was awarded the German Cross in Gold on 19 January 1942 before being given command of the division itself and involved in bitter fighting throughout the year as part of Army Group Centre. On 13 April 1944, after nearly a year in the Führer Reserve, he arrived to take control of the Brandenburg Division, a new Chief of Staff, Romanian-born Knight’s Cross holder Major Dr Johannes Erasmus, also being appointed by OKH in June.11

  Plans to Kill or Capture Tito

  In Yugoslavia, Kühlwein’s division took part in the ambitious attempt to kill or capture Tito that at last came to fruition. The infiltrators of Verband Wildschütz had increased their activities: small radio-equipped reconnaissance parties operating deep within Partisan-held territory for up to a week at a time, occasionally resupplied by Luftwaffe air drops. They soon confirmed that Tito’s location was in the Bosnian valley town of Drvar. The settlement had already seen the worst aspects of the Yugoslavian war. The Wehrmacht occupied it in April 1941, replaced by Italian troops shortly thereafter. During these early years of occupation brutal massacres by both Chetnik and Ustaše troops were committed before the Axis forces were pushed out of the region by mid-1942. The Wehrmacht responded by retaking Drvar in 1943 and razing large parts of the town to the ground before once again being expelled by Tito’s troops.

  Various German intelligence groups were involved in the hunt for Tito’s location and it was partially this fact that would ironically thwart the Germans’ eventual attack. The shortcomings of the intelligence used to pinpoint the target stemmed from the familiar problem of poor inter-service cooperation as at least three competing intelligence organisations were involved. First, there were conventional Wehrmacht units attached to Army Group F and Second Panzer Army, primarily supplied by Abwehr’s company-sized FAK 201. Second, there were the Brandenburgers of the 1st and 4th Regiments and Verband Wildschütz. Lastly there was Skorzeny and his Jagdverbände. The ambitious Sturmbannführer had been ordered personally by Hitler to eliminate the Partisan leader and flew to Belgrade during mid-April where he found Abwehr intelligence reports both contradictory and inadequate. Through his SS Jagdverbänd Südost in Bosnia he learned that Tito was in Drvar. His initial plan was to kill or kidnap Tito with a small commando team, despatching Hauptsturmführer von Fölkersam to the XV Gebirgs Corps headquarters in Banja Luka in order to liaise with General der Infanterie Ernst von Leyser regarding his plan. However, Leyser was already well on the way to developing his own operation with the same objective and resented what he saw as SS interference, snubbing Fölkersam and refusing to cooperate with Skorzeny’s proposal. Convinced that preparations for a large-scale operation would alert the enemy and that it was therefore doomed to fail – as it had before – Skorzeny withdrew completely from the undertaking.

  However, though Kirchner’s Verband Wildschütz had obtained much valuable information regarding Tito’s presence at Drvar and the precise locations of British and American military missions (confirmed by radio intercepts), he did not know exactly where Tito was located. It appears that the Germans believed his headquarters to be somehow hidden around the town cemetery, which was designated Objective ‘Citadel’ in the attack that followed. This assumption was largely based on aerial reconnaissance photographs that showed an established line of trenches, several anti-aircraft guns and an American jeep. However, it was later found that the trenches, ironically, had been dug by Italian occupation troops months previously.

  The small town of Drvar had been chosen by Tito because it was difficult to approach, entry limited to three easily defended roads as surrounding hills and the Unac River provided natural defensive barriers. Tito and his staff arrived on 22 January, initially using a house in the town as headquarters before the threat of Luftwaffe attack prompted their move to a natural cave situated in a cleft in the escarpment north of the town across the Unac River. The cave was relatively spacious internally but had a narrow entrance, a wooden hut erected before the cave mouth that served as Tito’s quarters and office when no enemy activity threatened. However, an increase in Luftwaffe air raids prompted a move to a second cave at the village of Bastasi, less than 6km to the west. Tito remained here throughout each day, before travelling by jeep to the Drvar cave, where the rest of his command staff had remained and where Tito would spend each night. Skorzeny had already surmised that the Drvar cave was the likely objective, but his intelligence was not offered to Leyser or his staff and, even if it had been, it would probably have been ignored.

  Rendulic accepted the final prepared mission plan which was subsequently endorsed by Generalfeldmarschall Maximilian von Weichs, Oberbefehlshaber Südost and commander of Heeresgruppe F. The operation was codenamed ‘Rösselsprung’ (‘Knight’s Move’) and involved elements of V SS-Freiwilligen-Gebirgs Corps and XV Gebirgs Corps. A heavy bombardment of Partisan positions in and around Drvar by aircraft of Fliegerführer Kroatien would precede a parachute and glider assault by Hauptsturmführer Kurt Rybka’s 500th SS Fallschirmjäger. There were several specialist teams that would accompany the Fallschirmjäger, including a group from Abwehr Section II – Frontaufklärungstrupp 216 – composed of former Brandenburgers commanded by Leutnant Walter Zawadil, who were primarily concerned with the retrieval of code material and documents. Forty men of Einheit Benesch (Verband Wildschütz) also joined the airborne attack, transported by glider into action. Commanded by Leutnant Gerhard Dowe, they were charged with the interrogation of prisoners taken, be they Partisans or members of the Allied military missions. Several Chetniks with local knowledge of the Drvar area and Croats who could act as interpreters were included in
this team. While this vertical envelopment was taking place, elements of XV Corps would converge on Drvar from all directions, planning to link up with the SS Fallschirmjäger that day. It was ambitious: speed, surprise and shock would be required to carry the day.

  The Brandenburgers had several roles to play in ‘Rösselsprung’ alongside that of Kirchner’s men. The 1st Regiment, with the addition of other elements from Verband Wildschütz and supporting Croatian troops, was ordered to advance overland from Knin 70km towards Drvar. Once they had pierced Partisan lines they were to deploy small mobile groups of men in Partisan Volltarnung to disrupt enemy movements and their expected path of retreat from the SS airborne assault. Furthermore, they were to cooperate with the SS Gebirgsjäger of the ‘Prinz Eugen’ Division advancing from the east should Tito escape the expected attack. However, the orders that he had received already exceeded Walther’s abilities. His regiment had only recently arrived from Greece and had neither the interpreters nor local Volksdeutsche available for a successful Volltarnung infiltration.

  Nevertheless, on 25 May, ‘Rösselsprung’ began. At 0635hrs Stukas and medium bombers had begun their attack on Drvar and twenty-five minutes later the first Fallschirmjäger began dropping, some wounded by ‘friendly’ shrapnel from the last wave of bombs. By the time that the final Fallschirmjäger were on the ground, thirty-four gliders began landing after throwing off the tow ropes from Henschel Hs 126 reconnaissance aircraft that had acted as tugs. Despite losses, the landings were generally successful, though ‘Citadel’, the main objective that had been thought to be Tito’s headquarters, was quickly seized and found to be just the town’s cemetery after all.

  Benesch’s Brandenburgers had been part of a landing group designated ‘Draufgänger’ and had been perfectly placed on top of their objective at the western crossroads which were thought to be adjacent to an enemy communications centre. The Brandenburgers immediately attacked the main building nearby but were repulsed by a strong force of over a hundred Partisans. After they called for reinforcements, the building was finally taken after savage fighting. Unfortunately for Benesch and his men, nothing of intelligence value was found inside. By 0900hrs Drvar was under German control with 200 Partisans taken prisoner and another 200 civilians rounded up and held in the town’s cellulose factory under guard.

  Frustrated, Benesch began a series of brutal interrogations, but they failed to establish the whereabouts of either Tito or his headquarters. The Germans had captured one of his uniforms from a town tailor’s as well as his jeep which still carried American markings, but nothing more. Summary executions of many prisoners were also carried out, although by whom exactly is unclear from the after-action reports. While Hauptsturmführer Rybka established his headquarters in the cemetery, the large volume of fire continuing to the north of the town at Fallschirmjäger patrols led him to correctly surmise this to be the probable location of Tito’s headquarters. However, with little cover and a river to cross under withering fire, attempts at assaulting the location failed. Counter-attacks were also beginning to come from the flanks and rear of the Fallschirmjäger positions, including a brief appearance by light tanks that were quickly driven off with grenades. Rybka ordered all forces to take up defensive positions and await reinforcements. It was during this lull in the fighting at 1115hrs that Tito escaped the cave to the town of Potoci.

  The operation had failed. Tito, his headquarters and the members of the Allied military missions had all escaped. Four unfortunate Allied war correspondents were taken prisoner, but their value was purely symbolic to the Germans. A second wave of Fallschirmjäger were dropped shortly before noon, suffering heavy casualties from ground fire. Close combat against the Partisans continued into the afternoon, with severe losses on both sides. The fighting was particularly brutal, wounded left where they fell and some German dead later found mutilated, with ears and noses cut off, red stars carved into their foreheads or lengths of explosive cord tied around their limbs to blow them off. The Fallschirmjäger battalion, surrounded by five Partisan battalions, held their ground throughout a night punctuated by extremely violent attacks. Finally, at 1045hrs the following morning the advance units of SS Aufklärungs Abteilung 373 linked up with the embattled Fallschirmjäger and the Partisans withdrew. Though further fighting took place over the days that followed as Partisan forces attempted to reclaim Drvar, the operation was officially ended on 4 June. Both sides claimed victory in this battle. The Germans succeeded in disrupting Tito’s headquarters, scatter the Partisans in the Drvar area and capturing large amounts of weapons, equipment and supplies, but did not achieve their ultimate goal. The Partisans, on the other hand, saved Tito and decimated an SS battalion despite losing thousands of men.

  The 1st Regiment ‘Brandenburg’ was later criticised for its slow movement towards Drvar, but it had always seemed an unlikely schedule given that the regiment was unfamiliar with the terrain and facing an enemy to whom it was home ground. The regiment (minus 3rd Battalion which guarded Skradin, Benkovac and the Lozovac aluminium factory) spearheaded a mixed Kampfgruppe reinforced with rifle and engineer companies from 373rd Division and a large number of Chetniks. The advance began at 0505hrs and within two hours the motorised column was strafed by six Allied aircraft bringing it to an abrupt halt. North of Strmica, near a demolished bridge, the vanguard of the column ran into two Partisan detachments and from that point onward Walther’s men fought their way to Grahovo along a frequently sabotaged and mined road. The key position of Cigelj was captured by 1600hrs, but the leading vehicle had been damaged by a mine and the road itself cut in seventeen places. To compound their problems, two large bridges had been destroyed, requiring an estimated two days to repair. During the following morning, one truck ran off the road at Derala, killing two men and injuring another five. Finally, 2nd Battalion was sent on foot through undefended Jelina Polja to Grahovo where at 1600hrs they linked up with 105th SS Reconnaissance Battalion and together they fought their way through to the plateau of Livanjsko Polje. The motorised column did not arrive in Drvar until 1400hrs on 28 May after further harassing air attacks had destroyed one Flak 38 and a staff car and caused severe damage to six trucks and one motorcycle.

  After the days of prolonged fighting that followed, the regiment was redirected on 5 June to head towards the Dalmatian coast where an Allied landing on Brać was initially feared to presage a larger landing attempt. Walther planned a reconnaissance in force to launch a surprise attack on the Partisans’ VII Corps headquarters near Grahovo. Heavy fighting followed in which the commander of the 2nd Company, Oberleutnant Waldemar Späth, suffered a painful stomach wound and Leutnant Karl Karolus von Wrede, battalion adjutant, was killed. Further advance over mountain peaks was impossible as Partisan reinforcements flooded into the area, and Walther retreated, his regiment suffering one officer killed, three NCOs and fourteen soldiers wounded.

  Allied air power now had total control over the Yugoslavian skies and 1st Regiment frequently paid the price for the defeat of the Luftwaffe. A single air attack killed eight men and wounded twelve from the 3rd Company as they travelled towards the coast in column by daylight. Walther’s regiment retreated to the Dalmatian shores of the Adriatic coast until late September when they transferred to Belgrade in time to face the advancing Red Army.

  Establishing the Streifkorps

  By the end of the battle in Belgrade, the Brandenburg Division had already reached the penultimate critical crossroads in its history. Kühlwein inherited a formation scattered and bruised by recent battles and having been on the receiving end of operational use for which they were neither intended nor equipped to handle. Morale had plummeted amongst the ‘old guard’, as evidenced by the defection of officers to the Waffen SS, while new recruits were joining what appeared to be a relatively standard Jäger unit, but one of reduced organisational strength as it still carried the shadow of an organisation suited to small-unit operations. Rather than continue the apparent inertia that had overtaken the Branden
burg command, Kühlwein made a direct written proposal to OKW on 27 May to reorganise once more.

  The division was created as a special organisation for attack operations. Since the German Wehrmacht have been fighting on the defensive, the division has adapted itself to this situation and become the Verfügungstruppe [disposal troops, i.e. ‘fire brigade’] of the Wehrmacht for fighting bandits. The division’s experience during the retreat in the East, during the battles against bandits in the Balkans, France and Italy, as well as in preparations for small unit warfare on Sardinia and in the Peloponnese, show that the division’s tasks can only be carried out if they can rely on enough combatants and recruited locals/translators. To be able to cope with growing demands, it is therefore proposed to establish provincial units.

  Proposals:

  Split the division into

  a)Streifkorps [Raiding Groups]

  b)Jäger Regiments and Specialised Battalions.12

  Kühlwein concisely laid out his plans to create specialist groups (Streifkorps) equipped with enough local knowledge and small-battle skills to create havoc amongst the existing paramilitary bands that his division was constantly fighting. The remainder of the division would become either a standard Jäger, light infantry unit, with the additional Küstenjäger and Fallschirmjäger battalions remaining untouched. The two sides of the Brandenburg Division could act in concert: the Streifkorps used to pinpoint enemy positions and gather intelligence whereupon the fast-moving ‘orthodox’ units could move in and engage the enemy in battle. He finished his communique with the following words:

  The division must be given the opportunity, after submitting framework proposals, for the use of Streifkorps, before orders are issued. Finally, every troop leader must be made aware of Napoleon’s principle based on his experiences in Spain against the guerrillas and in Germany and Russia against the paramilitaries and partisans: Wherever there are Partisans, we must fight like Partisans. [Partout ou il y’a partisans, faut combattre en partisans]. Or in good German: You have to hunt the Devil with Beelzebub.13